1:--

(1) Section 2(1) of the Limitation Act 1939 (which, in the case of certain actions, imposes a time-limit of three years for bringing the action) shall not afford any defence to an action to which this section applies, in so far as the action relates to any cause of action in respect of which -

(a) the court has, whether before or after the commencement of the action, granted leave for the purposes of this section, and

(b) the requirements of subsection (3) of this section are fulfilled.

(2) This section applies to any action for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or of provision made by or under a statute or independently of any contract or any such provision) where the damages claimed by the plaintiff for the negligence, nuisance or breach of duty consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries to the plaintiff or any other person.

(3) The requirements of this subsection are fulfilled in relation to a cause of action if it is proved that the material facts relating to that cause of action were or included facts of a decisive character which were at all times outside the knowledge (actual or constructive) of the plaintiff until a date which -

(a) either was after the end of the three-year period relating to that cause of action or was not earlier than twelve months before the end of that period, and

(b) in either case, was a date not earlier than twelve months before the date on which the action was brought.

4:-

(1) Where under section 6(1)(c) of the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935 a tortfeasor (in this section referred to as "the first tortfeasor") becomes entitled after the passing of this Act to a right to recover contribution in respect of any damage from another tortfeasor, no action to recover contribution by virtue of that right shall (subject to subsection (3) of this section) be brought after the period of two years from the date on which that right accrued to the first tortfeasor.

(2) For the purposes of this section the date on which the right to recover contribution in respect of any damage accrues to a tortfeasor (in this subsection referred to as "the relevant date") shall be ascertained as follows, that is to say :

(a) if the tortfeasor is held liable in respect of that damage by a judgment given in any civil proceedings, or an award made on any arbitration, the relevant date shall be the date on which the judgment is given, or the date of the award, as the case may be;

(b) if, in any case not falling within the preceding paragraph, the tortfeasor admits liability in favour of one or more persons in respect of that damage, the relevant date shall be the earliest date on which the amount to be paid by him in respect of that liability is agreed by or on behalf of the tortfeasor and that person, or each of those persons, as the case may be;

and for the purpose of this subsection no account shall be taken of any judgment or award given or made on appeal in so far as it varies the amount of damages awarded against the tortfeasor."

6:--

(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, the provisions of this Part of this Act (other than section 4 thereof) shall have effect in relation to causes of action which accrued before, as well as causes of action which accrue after, the passing of this Act, and shall have effect in relation to any cause of action which accrued before the passing of this Act notwithstanding that an action in respect thereof has been commenced and is pending at the passing of this Act.

(3) For the purposes of this section an action shall not be taken to be pending at any time after a final order or judgment has been made or given therein, notwithstanding that an appeal is pending or that the time for appealing has not expired; and accordingly section 1 of this Act shall not have effect in relation to a cause of action in respect of which a final order or judgment has been made or given before the passing of this Act.

7:--

(2) In this Part of this Act any reference to the three-year period relating to a cause of action is a reference to the period of three years from the date on which that cause of action accrued:

Provided that -

(a) in relation to any cause of action in respect of which, by virtue of section 22 of the Limitation Act 1939 (which relates to persons under a disability), an action could have been brought after the end of the period of three years from the date on which that cause of action accrued, any reference in this Part of this Act to the three-year period relating to that cause of action shall be construed as a reference to the period up to the end of which an action could, by virtue of that section, have been brought in respect thereof.

(3) any reference to the material facts relating to a cause of action is a reference to any one or more of the following, that is to say -

(a) the fact that personal injuries resulted from the negligence, nuisance or breach of duty constituting that cause of action;

(b) the nature or extent of the personal injuries resulting from that negligence, nuisance or breach of duty;

(c) the fact that the personal injuries so resulting were attributable to that negligence, nuisance or breach of duty, or the extent to which any of those personal injuries were so attributable.

(5) [a fact was outside the plaintiff's constructive knowledge: ]

(b) in so far as that fact was capable of being ascertained by him, he had taken all such action (if any) as it was reasonable for him to have taken . . . for the purposes of ascertaining it; and

(c) in so far as there existed, and were known to him, circumstances from which, with appropriate advice, that fact might have been ascertained or inferred, he had taken all such action (if any) as it was reasonable for him to have taken before that time for the purpose of obtaining appropriate advice with respect to those circumstances.

15:-- Except in so far as the context otherwise requires, any reference in this Act to an enactment shall be construed as a reference to that enactment as amended or extended by or under any other enactment.