Administrative - 1900- 1929

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This page lists 10 cases, and was prepared on 04 October 2008.

Rayner -v- Stepney Corporation [1911] 2 Ch 312
1911	Administrative	1 Citers

Solomon -v- Solomon (1912) 29 WN(NSW) 68
1912 Gordon J	Commonwealth, Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	(Australia - New South Wales) The fact that a party's residence in New South Wales was unlawful, prevented the acquisition of a domicile of choice there. "It is a curious proposition that a Court of Justice in New South Wales should hold that a man has acquired a domicile in New South Wales when the laws of the land forbid that man to be here." The man's Australian wife was unable to obtain a divorce from her husband, then in prison for rape, because he was a South Sea Islander who had come to and remained in Australia in defiance of laws which prohibited South Sea Islanders from doing so, and indeed had been on his way to be deported when he committed the offence for which he was then in prison.

Scott -v- Scott [1912] P 241; [1913] AC 417
1912 HL Lord Shaw of Dunfermline, Viscount Haldane LC, Lord Loreburn, Lord Atkinson	Media, Administrative, Children, Contempt of Court	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	There had been an unauthorised dissemination by the petitioner to third parties of the official shorthand writer's notes of a nullity suit which had been heard in camera. An application was made for a committal for contempt. Held: The House equated the contempt to a breach of an injunction and held that the Court had jurisdiction to make a punitive order. It emphasised the need for the openness in court proceedings, leading to a presumption in favour of publication. There was however an exception for cases involving children. Because matrimonial proceedings "affect status", the public has a general interest which the parties cannot exclude. Lord Shaw of Dunfermline explained the reasons for privacy in wardship proceedings: "Upon this head it is true that to the application of the general rule of publicity there are three well recognized exceptions which arise out of the nature of the proceedings themselves. The three exceptions which are acknowledged to the application of the rule prescribing the publicity of courts of justice are first in suits affecting wards; secondly in lunacy proceedings; and thirdly where secrecy . . is of the essence of the cause. The first two of these cases, my Lords, depend upon the familiar principle that the jurisdiction over wards and lunatics is exercised by the judges representing His Majesty as parens patriae. The affairs are truly private affairs; the transactions are transactions truly intra familiam; and it has long been recognised that an appeal for the protection of the court in the case of such persons does not involve the consequence of placing in the light of publicity their truly domestic affairs . . But I desire to add this further observation with regard to all these cases, my Lords, that, when respect has thus been paid to the object of the suit, the rule of publicity may be resumed. I know of no principle which would entitle a court to compel a ward to remain silent for life in regard to judicial proceedings which occurred during his tutelage" and "There is no greater danger of usurpation than that which proceeds little by little, under cover of rules of procedure and at the instance of judges themselves." and "The policy of widening the area of secrecy is always a serious one; but this is for Parliament, and those to whom the subject has been consigned by Parliament, to consider." Lord Atkinson: "The hearing of a case in public may be, and often is, no doubt, painful, humiliating, or deterrent both to parties and witnesses, and in many cases, especially those of a criminal nature, the details may be so indecent as to tend to injure public morals, but all this is tolerated and endured, because it is felt that in public trial is to found, on the whole, the best security for the pure, impartial, and efficient administration of justice, the best means for winning for it public confidence and respect." Earl Loreburn: "In all cases where the public has been excluded with admitted propriety the underlying principle, as it seems to me, is that the administration of justice would be rendered impracticable by their presence, whether because the case could not be effectively tried, or the parties entitled to justice would be reasonably deterred from seeking it at the hands of the Court." and "the Divorce Court is bound by the general rule of publicity applicable to the High Court and subject to the same exception." Viscount Haldane LC said: "As to the proposition that the Divorce Court has inherited the power to hear in camera of the Ecclesiastical Courts, I am of opinion that, since the Divorce Act of 1857, it has been untrue of every class of case, and not merely of suits for divorce strictly so called. I am in accord with the reasoning of Bramwell B, in the case I have already referred to [H (Falsely Called C) v C (1859) 29 LJ (P&M) 29], which led him to the conclusion that the Court which the statute constituted is a new Court governed by the same principles, so far as publicity is concerned, as govern other Courts" and "The exceptions are themselves the outcome of a yet more fundamental principle that the chief object of courts of justice must be to secure that justice is done. As the paramount object must always be to do justice, the general rule as to publicity, after all only the means to an end, must accordingly yield. But the burden lies on those seeking to displace its application in a particular case to make out that the ordinary rule must as of necessity be superseded by this paramount consideration. I think that to justify an order for hearing in camera it must be shown that the paramount object of securing that justice is done would really be rendered doubtful of attainment if the order were not made. " and "in all cases where the public has been excluded with admitted propriety the underlying principle, as it seems to me, is that the administration of justice would be rendered impracticable by their presence, whether because the case could not be effectively tried, or the parties entitled to justice would be reasonably deterred from seeking it at the hands of the Court."
	Statute References omitted

The King -v- Mitchell [1913] 1 KB 561
1913	Administrative, Magistrates	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court considered the meaning of section 9 of the 1875 Act which read: "Where a person is accused before a Court of summary jurisdiction of any offence made punishable by this Act, and for which a penalty amounting to twenty pounds, or imprisonment, is imposed, the accused may, on appearing before the Court of summary jurisdiction, declare that he objects to being tried for such offence by a Court of summary jurisdiction, and thereupon the Court of summary jurisdiction may deal with the case in all respects as if the accused were charged with an indictable offence and not an offence punishable on summary conviction, and the offence may be prosecuted on indictment accordingly." Held: A declaration of objection to being tried by a Court of summary jurisdiction was duly made by a person accused of an offence made punishable by the Act who was entitled to object. Accordingly he had a right to trial by jury and that the justices were bound to give effect to his claim and had no jurisdiction to try the case.
	Statute References omitted

Ex parte Stott [1916] 1 KB 7
1916	Administrative, Litigation Practice
	An order of certiorari should be made only at the request of somebody with a sufficient interest in the mater.

England -v- Inglis [1920] 2 KB 636
1920	Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers

Rex -v- Nat Bell Liquors Ltd [1922] 2 AC 128
1922 HL Lord Sumner	Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	"Long before Jervis's Acts statutes had been passed which created an inferior court, and declared its decisions to be 'final' and 'without appeal', and again and again the Court of the King's Bench had held that the language of this kind did not restrict or take away the right of the court to bring the proceedings before itself by certiorari. There is no need to regard this as a conflict between the court and Parliament; on the contrary, the latter, by continuing to use the same language in subsequent enactments, accepted this interpretation which is now clearly established and is applicable to Canadian legislation, both Dominion and Provincial, when regulating the rights of certiorari and of appeal in similar terms. The Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848, was intended to produce and did produce its result by a simple change in procedure without unduly ousting the supervisory jurisdiction of the superior court." An error on the face of a judgment could not be said to make the decision a nullity. The error "however grave, is a wrong exercise of the jurisdiction which he has, and not a usurpation of a jurisdiction which he has not"

Rex -v- Electricity Commissioners, ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co (1920) Ltd [1924] 1 KB 171
1924 Younger LJ	Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	An objection was made that an inquiry was ultra vires. Held: Since the cost of the inquiry would have been wholly wasted if, thereafter, the Minister and Parliament had approved the scheme only to be told at that late stage that the scheme was ultra vires, the courts could examine the issue. Where some administrative order or regulation is required by statute to be approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament, the court can in an appropriate case intervene by way of judicial review before the Houses have given their approval. Younger LJ said: "the interference of the Court in such a case as this, and at this stage, so far from being even in the most diluted sense of the words a challenge to its supremacy, will be an assistance to Parliament."

Auckland Harbour Board -v- The King [1924] AC 318
1924 PC Viscount Haldane	Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	The making of ex gratia payments is lawful if, but not unless, there is Parliamentary authority for the disbursements: "It has been a principle of the British constitution now for more than two centuries … that no money can be taken out of the consolidated fund into which the revenues of the State have been paid, excepting under a distinct authorisation from Parliament itself.'"

Birkdale District Electric Supply Co. Ltd -v- The Corporation of Southport [1926] AC 355
1926 Lord Birkenhead	Administrative, Utilities	Casemap 1 Citers
	The appellants, having bound themselves not to exercise their discretion in the raising of electricity prices, were held not to have incompetently fettered their discretion, bearing in mind the commercial purposes for which the discretion was conferred and the commercial reasons for which the price fixing agreement had been entered to. Lord Birkenhead said that there is: "a well-established principle of law, that if a person or public body is entrusted by the legislature with certain powers and duties expressly or impliedly for public purposes, those persons or bodies cannot divest themselves of these powers and duties. They cannot enter into any contract or take any action incompatible with the due exercise of their powers or the discharge of their duties."