Administrative - 1930- 1959

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This page lists 19 cases, and was prepared on 25 August 2008.

Eshugbayi Eleko -v- Government of Nigeria [1931] AC 662
1931 HL Lord Atkin	Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	In a habeas corpus case, "no member of the executive can interfere with the liberty or property of a British subject except on condition that he can support the legality of his action before a court of justice."

In re Vauxhall Estates Ltd [1932] 1 KB 733
1932 CA Avory J	Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court looked at the question of the implied repeal of legislation. Avory J: "… I should certainly hold… that no Act of Parliament can effectively provide that no future Act shall interfere with its provisions… [I]f they [the two statutes] are inconsistent to that extent [viz. so that they cannot stand together], then the earlier Act is impliedly repealed by the later in accordance with the maxim 'Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant'."
	Statute References omitted

Ellen Street Estates -v- Minister for Health [1934] 1 KB 590; [1934] All ER Rep 385
1934 CA Scrutton LJ, Maugham LJ	Administrative	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The court considered whether the section in the later Act impliedly repealed that in the earlier. Avory J (referring to dicta in Vauhall Estates): "That is absolutely contrary to the constitutional position that Parliament can alter an Act previously passed, and it can do so by repealing in terms the previous Act… and it can do it also in another way – namely, by enacting a provision which is clearly inconsistent with the previous Act." Maugham LJ: "The Legislature cannot, according to our constitution, bind itself as to the form of subsequent legislation, and it is impossible for Parliament to enact that in a subsequent statute dealing with the same subject-matter there can be no implied repeal. If in a subsequent Act Parliament chooses to make it plain that the earlier statute is being to some extent repealed, effect must be given to that intention just because it is the will of the Legislature."
	Statute References omitted

Reilly -v- The King [1934] AC 176
1934 HL Lord Atkin	Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	The government has power to abolish a public service post, and it is an "elementary proposition that if further performance of a contract becomes impossible by legislation having that effect the contract is discharged".

Barnard -v- Gorman [1941] AC 378
1941 HL Viscount Simon LC	Administrative, Costs	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The court considered awarding costs in a judicial review case: "There will be no order as to costs in this House, as the Crown has very properly agreed (since this is a case of general importance, and the respondent is a poor man) to pay the costs of all parties in any event."

Carltona Ltd -v- Commissioners of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560
1943 CA Lord Greene MR	Litigation Practice, Administrative	1 Citers
	The court was presented with an attempt to transpose a doctrine of the law of agency – the rule that one who is delegated cannot himself delegate - into the field of public administration, treating the minister as the Crown's delegate. Held: The court recognised the inappropriateness of the argument and answered it by holding that in law, as the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms had firmly established in practice, that civil servants acted not on behalf of but in the name of their ministers. A minister could speak through the alter ego of a civil servant in an affidavit. Civil servants are servants of the Crown, not of the ministers who are answerable to Parliament for the departments in which they serve.

Watt (or Thomas) -v- Thomas [1947] AC 484; 1947 SC (HL) 45
1947 HL Lord Thankerton, Lord Macmillan	Administrative, Litigation Practice, Scotland, Family	Casemap 1 Citers
	Where a question of fact has been tried by a judge without a jury, and there is no question of his having misdirected himself, an appellate court disposed to come to a different conclusion should not do so unless it is satisfied that the decision of the judge cannot be explained by any advantage which he enjoyed by seeing witnesses. The printed record was only part of the evidence, and may not reveal elements seen by the judge. Where a decision either way may seem equally open the trial judge's decision is of paramount importance. Has it been shown that his judgment on the facts was affected by material inconsistencies or inaccuracies or that he failed to appreciate the weight of the evidence or otherwise went 'plainly wrong'? The trial judge's decision ought not to be disturbed unless it can be demonstrated that it is "affected by material inconsistencies and inaccuracies or he may be shown to have failed to appreciate the weight or bearing of circumstances admitted or proved or otherwise to have gone plainly wrong" and "III The appellate court, either because the reasons given by the trial judge are not satisfactory or because it unmistakably so appears from the evidence may be satisfied that he has not taken proper advantage of having seen and heard the witnesses, and the matter will then become at large for the appellate court." Lord Thankerton: "It is obvious that the value and importance of having seen and heard the witnesses will vary according to the class of case, and, it may be, the individual case in question. It will hardly be disputed that consistorial cases form a class in which it is generally most important to see and hear the witnesses, and particularly the spouses themselves;"

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd -v- Wednesbury Corporation [1947] 2 All ER 680; [1948] 1 KB 223; 1947 WL 10584; (1948) 92 SJ 26; [1948] LJR 190; 45 LGR 635; (1948) 112 JP 55; 63 TLR 623; [1947] EWCA Civ 1
10 Nov 1947 CA Greene MR, Somervell LJ and Singleton J	Administrative, Judicial Review, Licensing	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The applicant challenged the conditions which had been attached to its licence to open the cinema on Sundays. It had not been allowed to admit children under 15 years of age. The statute provided no appeal procedure, and the applicant sought a declaration that the conditions were ineffective. Held: Parliament had given to the local authority a discretion as to the conditions for the licence. That discretion might be exercised in different ways according to honestly and reasonably held opinion. It was not the court's job to substitute its own opinion for that of the local authority. Greene MR: "the discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology commonly used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often use the word "unreasonable" in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting "unreasonably." Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority." and "The court is entitled to investigate the action of the local authority with a view to seeing whether they have taken into account matters which they ought not to take into account, or, conversely, have refused to take into account or neglected to take into account matters which they ought to take into account. Once that question is answered in favour of the local authority, it may be still possible to say that, although the local authority have kept within the four corners of the matters which they ought to consider, they have nevertheless come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it. In such a case, again, I think the court can interfere. The power of the court to interfere in each case is not as an appellate authority to override a decision of the local authority, but as a judicial authority which is concerned, and concerned only, to see whether the local authority have contravened the law by acting in excess of the powers which Parliament has confided in them."
	Statute References omitted
	Link[s] omitted

Tamlin -v- Hannaford [1950] 1 KB 18
1950 CA Denning LJ	Administrative, Company	Casemap 1 Citers
	Discussing the Brtitish Transport Commission: "It is not the Crown and has none of the immunities or privileges of the Crown. Its servants are not civil servants, and its property is not Crown property. It is as much bound by Acts of Parliament as any other subject of the King. It is, of course, a public authority and its purposes, no doubt, are public purposes, but it is not a government department nor do its powers fall within the province of government." The court contrasted "commercial matters" with those which were "essentially the province of government", although it recognised that historically the carriage of mail had enjoyed a special position.

Foster -v- Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1951) 82 CLR 606
1951	Commonwealth, Administrative	1 Citers
	(Australia) The idea of "disclosure" to a person who already knew or was deemed to know the fact at issue iss conceptually impossible.

Regina -v- Fulham, Hammersmith and Kensington Rent Tribunal, ex parte Zerek [1951] 2 KB 1
1951 Devlin J	Administrative	Casemap
	As to the tribunal: "While they will not allow every empty threat to their jurisdiction to deter them from their proper business of fixing reasonable rents, they will likewise appreciate that they are not by their nature equipped for the trial of matters which in the ordinary civil court would be determined after pleading and discovery had been given and evidence on oath tested by cross-examination, and possibly, also after trial by jury. The tribunal cannot be required to determine summarily such an issue if it involves a point of substance and if one or other of the parties is willing to have it determined in the ordinary civil courts."

Clarence Henry Willcock -v- Muckle [1951] 2 The Times LR 373
26 Jun 1951 KBD Lord Goddard CJ, Sir Raymond Evershed MR, Somervell and Jenkins LJJ, Kilberry, Lynskey and Devlin JJ	Administrative, Police
	Mr Willcock was stopped for speeding. PC Muckle asked him to show his national registration identity card. Mr Willcock refused. PC Muckle served a notice requiring its production which Mr Willcock ignored. He was prosecuted. He argued that the emergency which had led to the Act had passed. He was convicted by the magistrates, but the magistrates imposed only an absolute discharge. He appealed. Held: There had been a declaration that the war had come to an end but no Order in Council revoking the Act. Only one emergency was meant - the imminent outbreak of war. The policeman had really wanted the defendant's vehicle registration number, but was still acting under standing orders requiring them to ask every person stopped to produce the identity card. Lord Goddard "That sort of thing tends to make motorists not law-abiding; it tends to cause resentment." The Act was being used for a purpose for which it was not passed. A court of seven judges had been convened to decide whether the Act remained in force. It did. It required a specific Order in Council to revoke it. '. . . The court wishes to express its emphatic approval of the way in which they [the magistrates] dealt with this case by granting the defendant an absolute discharge. Because the police may have powers, it does not follow that they ought to exercise them on all occasions or as a matter of routine . . . To demand production of the national registration identity card from all and sundry . . . is wholly unreasonable. This Act was passed for security purposes; it was never passed for the purposes for which it is now apparently being used. To use Acts of Parliament passed for particular purposes in war-time when the war 'is a thing of the past . . . tends to turn law-abiding citizens into law-breakers, which is a most undesirable state of affairs. Further, in this country we have always prided ourselves on the good feeling that exists between the police and the public, and such action tends to make people resentful of the acts of the police, and inclines them to obstruct the police instead of assisting them.' Devlin J: 'I think that it would be very unfortunate if the public were to receive the impression that the continuance of the state of emergency had become a sort of statutory fiction which was used as a means of prolonging legislation initiated in different circumstances and for different purposes.'
	Statute References omitted

Waddle -v- Wallsend Shipping Co Ltd [1952] 2 Lloyd's Rep 105
1952 Devlin J	Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court considered the relationship between the findings of an inquiry and later judicial proceedings: "… I think that the competent authorities might consider whether the useful purposes that wreck inquiries serve would not be increased if the report was made available to any court which had to determine the cause of the loss. It is not necessary that the findings of fact in the report should be treated as binding. The opinion of the commissioner based on the facts he finds has at least as high a value as that of an expert based on the facts which he assumes to be proved; and it has the advantage of being quite independent of either side."

Regina -v- National Insurance Commissioners, ex parte Timmis [1954] 2 All ER 292
1954 QBD	Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers

Smith -v- East Elloe Rural District Council [1956] AC 736; [1956] 1 All ER 855
1956 Lord Radcliffe, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone LC, Viscount Simons	Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	A compulsory purchase order was said to have been made and confirmed "wrongfully and in bad faith" and that it fell outside the ouster of jurisdiction provison. The regulations provided that any application be made to the High Court within six weeks of notice of the confirmation or making of the Compulsory Purchase Order and that otherwise the Compulsory Purchase Order should not be questioned in any legal proceedings. Held: (Majority) A challenge of this kind had to be made in accordance with the statutory procedure for challenge and, if not made in accordance with that procedure, could not otherwise be made. Lord Radcliffe: "An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity on its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders." Viscount Simons: "……I find it quite impossible to qualify the words of the paragraph in the manner suggested. It may be that the legislature had not in mind the possibility of an Order being made by a local authority in bad faith or even the possibility of an Order being made in good faith being mistakenly, capriciously or wantonly challenged. This is a matter for speculation. What is abundantly clear is that words are used which are wide enough to cover any kind of challenge which any aggrieved person may think fit to make. I cannot think of any wider words. Any addition would be mere tautology".
	Statute References omitted

Taylor -v- National Assistance Board [1957] 1 All ER 183
1957 CA Lord Denning	Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	As to the power of a court to issue a declaration The remedy is not excluded by the fact that the determination of the board is by statute made 'final'. Parliament gives the impression of finality to the decisions of the board only on the condition that they are reached in accordance with the law . . ."

Regina -v- Medical Appeal Tribunal ex parte Gilmore; Re Gilmore's Application [1957] 1 QB 574; [1957] 1 All ER 796
25 Feb 1957 CA Denning LJ, Romer LJ, Parker LJ	Administrative	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The claimant had received two injuries resulting in his total blindness. He sought an order of certiorari against the respondent who had found only a 20% disability. The tribunal responded that its decision, under the Act was final. Held: In its decision the tribunal had made reference to the expert medical report and thereby had incorporated it in the judgment. This resulted in an error being apparent on the face of the record, thus allowing the appeal court to intervene and make an order of certiorari. The words of the statute, that any decision of a medical appeal tribunal of a question arising under the Act 'shall be final', were insufficiently clear to prevent such an order. Such jurisdiction was well established: " . . On looking . . . into the old books I find it very well settled that the remedy of certiorari is never to be taken away by any statute except by the most clear and explicit words. The word 'final' is not enough. That only means 'without appeal'. It does not mean 'without recourse to certiorari'. It makes the decision final on the facts, but not final on the law. . . . All the authorities to which we have been referred indicate that this remains true today".
	Statute References omitted

Regina -v- Medical Appeal Tribunal (North Midland Region), Ex parte Hubble [1958] 2 QB 228
1958 Diplock J	Benefits, Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	The claimant sought to receive money out of insurance funds fed by contributions from all employers, insured persons and the Exchequer. The procedure for determining whether the claimant is entitled to a disability benefit was said to be more like an inquest than an action: "A claim by an insured person to benefit under the Act is not truly analogous to a lis inter partes. A claim to benefit is a claim to receive money out of the insurance funds . . . Any such claim requires investigation to determine whether any, and if so, what amount of benefit is payable out of the fund. In such an investigation, the minister or the insurance officer is not a party adverse to the claimant. If analogy be sought in the other branches of the law, it is to be found in an inquest rather than in an action."

Rands -v- Oldroyd [1959] 1 QB 209
1959	Litigation Practice, Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	The ejusdem generis rule is, at best, a very secondary guide to the meaning of a statute. The all-important matter is to consider the purpose of the statute. A statute preventing a civil servant contracting for his employers with a company in which he had an interest, should be interpreted strictly.