Administrative - 1960- 1969

The case shown here are derived from the lawindexpro case law database. lawindexpro is a low cost case law database, with over 130,000 case listings, and over 95,000 links to full text judgments. The free service below shows the core information on the case, but is restricted in several ways. A small proportion of cases do allow access to the full lawindexpro information. These cases are selected at random, and may be different on your next visit. The active links through to lawindexpro are extremely powerful allowing full access to all linked cases.  

This page lists 20 cases, and was prepared on 26 February 2010.

Thames Launches -v- Trinity House [1961] Ch 197
1961	Administrative	1 Citers

Edwick -v- Sunbury Urban District Council [1962] 1 QB 229
1962	Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers

Hanks and Others -v- Minister of Housing and Local Government [1963] 1 QB 999
1963 Megaw LJ	Administrative	1 Citers
	A factor in a decision might be so insignificant that the failure to take it into account could not have materially affected the decision. There might be cases where the factor wrongly omitted was ‘insignificant’ and thus would not justify concluding that the exercise of power was ‘bad’.

Regina -v- Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Soblen [1963] 2 QB 243
1963 CA Lord Denning MR	Administrative, Immigration	Casemap 1 Citers
	Lord Denning MR discussed a decision to deport the applicant: "If it was done for an authorised purpose, it was lawful. If it was done professedly for an authorised purpose, but in fact for a different purpose with an ulterior object, it was unlawful."

Finbow -v- Air Ministry [1963] 1 WLR 697
1963 McNair J	Landlord and Tenant, Administrative	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The minister had mistakenly exercised a formal power to approve a licence to occupy land under a repealed section instead of its re-enacted successor. The claimant said that this was not an effective approval. The court also considered the authorities on how to distringuish between a lease and a licence. Held: The misdescription of his powers rendered the document a nullity would defeat the plain intention of the Minister. McNair J said "It is, in my judgment, a plain case for the application of the maxim falsa demonstratio non nocet and of the principle embodied in the maxim magis valeat quam valeat. There is a total inconsistency and repugnancy between the minister's manifest intention and the literal effect of the document, and, in my judgment, the former should prevail." As to the nature of the agreement: "1) that the agreement must be construed as a whole and that the relationship is determined by law and not by the lable which the parties put on it, though the label is a factor to be taken into account in determining the true relationship; . . . 2) that the grant of exclusive possession, if not conclusive against the view that there is a mere licence as distinct from a tenancy, is at any rate a consideration of the first importance;' and in all the cases where a licence was found, that was because of the presence of factors such as those set out in Facchini. As to the effect of reliance upon the mistake, McNair J said: "The document was in the circumstances in which it was executed plainly intended by the Minister to be an approval in the exercise of his statutory powers. These powers at the date of the instrument were to be found only in section 2 of the Act of 1948. To hold that the mis- description of his powers rendered the document a nullity, would, in my judgment, defeat the plain intention of the Minister to be deduced from the circumstances and the date of its execution. It is, in my judgment, a plain case for the application of the maxim falsa demonstratio non nocet and of the principle embodied in the maxim magis valeat quam pereat. There is a total inconsistency and repugnancy between the Minister's manifest intention and the literal effect of the document, and, in my judgment, the former should prevail. In this connection, reference may be made to In re Lockwood, Atherton v Brooke, where Harman J was confronted with a rather similar problem arising out of mistake in a statute and approved a citation from Maxwell on Statutes (now 11th ed. (1962) p 243) to the following effect: 'The authorities do .... establish that the judicial interpreter may deal with careless and inaccurate words and phrases in the same spirit as a critic deals with an obscure or corrupt test, when satisfied, on solid grounds, from the context or history of the enactment or from the injustice, inconvenience, or absurdity of the consequences to which it would lead, that the language thus treated does not really express the intention and that this amendment probably does.'"

Ridge -v- Baldwin (No 1) [1964] AC 40; [1963] UKHL 2
1964 HL Lord Reid, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest	Employment, Natural Justice, Administrative, Police, Judicial Review	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The appellant Ridge, had been wrongfully dismissed because he was not given the opportunity of presenting his defence. He preferred to abandon the point and accept the view that he had been properly dismissed. The was an unlawful dismissal of a chief constable would be in breach of the obligation of natural justice. The dismissal was ultra vires and unlawful. Held: There should be no order to reinstate the Chief Constable as if he had never been dismissed. The House found value in the distinction between administrative and judicial decisions as a factor in the susceptibility of a decision to judicial review. The House considered its ability to look to decisions of non-statutory tribunals and was asked as whether an order for specific performance of a contract of employment was possible at common law: "There cannot be specific performance of a contract of service, and the master can terminate the contract with his servant at any time and for any reason or none." As to the nature of natural Justice: "In modern times opinions have sometimes been expressed to the effect that natural justice is so vague as to be practically meaningless. But I would regard these as tainted by the perennial fallacy that because something cannot be cut and dried or nicely weighed or measured therefore it does not exist". Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest said: "It is well established that the essential requirements of natural justice at least include that before someone is condemned he is to have an opportunity of defending himself, and in order that he may do so that he is to be made aware of the charges or allegations or suggestions which he has to meet: Kanda v Government of Malaya. My Lords, here is something which is basic to our system: the importance of upholding it far transcends the significance of any particular case."
	Link[s] omitted

Pfizer Corporation -v- Ministry of Health [1964] Ch 614
1964 CA Lord Justice Diplock	Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers

Merricks and Another -v- Nott-Bower [1964] 1 All ER 717; [1965] 1 QB 57; [1965] 2 WLR 702
1964 CA Lord Denning MR	Litigation Practice, Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	The plaintiff police officers had been disciplined by transfer in 1957 as a result of a report by an officer who was subsequently discredited. After their accuser was discredited they sought a declaration that the disciplinary action taken against them had been taken contrary to natural justice. Held: Lord Denning MR said that: "It is asked: what use can such declarations be at this stage, when the transfer took place six and a half years ago? What good does it do now? There can be no question of reopening the transfers . . on this point we have been referred to a number of cases which show how greatly the power to grant a declaration has been widened in recent years. If a real question is involved, which is not merely theoretical, and on which the court's gives practical guidance, then the court in its discretion can grant a declaration." and "Such being the case made, I am not prepared to say that it is unarguable. It is a well-known principle of our law that any powers conferred by statute or regulation on an executive or administrative authority must be exercised in good faith for the purpose for which they are granted. They must not be misused or abused by being applied to an ulterior purpose. Whether that principle applies here or not, I do not say; all I do say is that, if the plaintiffs allege, as they did that this was a misuse of the power of transfer that it was used, not for the purpose of good administration and efficiency but for the motive of punishment they have an arguable case which they are entitled to have tried by the courts."

Ibrelebbe -v- The Queen [1964] AC 900
1964 PC	Commonwealth, Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	The power to make ordinances for the government of dependencies is extremely wide.

In Re K (Infants) [1965] AC 201
1965 HL Lord Devlin	Children, Administrative	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The House considered the propriety of a tribunal chairman seeingmaterial not plaved before the parties. Held: Lord Devlin spoke of "the fundamental principle of justice that the judge should not look at material that the parties before him have not seen", and, referring to "the ordinary principles of a judicial inquiry", he continued: "They include the rules that all justice shall be done openly and that it shall be done only after a fair hearing; and also the rule that is in point here, namely, that judgment shall be given only upon evidence that is made known to all parties. Some of these principles are so fundamental that they must be observed by everyone who is acting judicially, whether he is sitting in a court of law or not; and these are called the principles of natural justice. The rule in point here is undoubtedly one of those."

Ashbridge Investments Ltd -v- Minister of Housing and Local Government [1965] 1 WLR 1320
1965 Lord Denning MR	Planning, Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	The Minister had decided to confirm a CPO of premises which were now alleged not to be a house as was required by the legislation under which the order was made. Held: The court considered how to look at further evidence in deciding whether the minister had acted outside his powers. Lord Denning said: "The court can only interfere on the ground that the Minister has gone outside the powers of the Act or that any requirement of the Act has not been complied with. Under this section it seems to me that the court can interfere with the Minister's decision if he has acted on no evidence; or if he has come to a conclusion to which on the evidence he could not reasonably come: or if he has given a wrong interpretation to the words of the statute; or if he has taken into consideration matters which he ought not to have taken into account, or vice versa; or has otherwise gone wrong in law" and "Fresh evidence should not be admitted save in exceptional circumstances. It is not correct for the courts to approach the case absolutely de novo as though the court was sitting to decide the matter in the first instance. The court can receive evidence to show what material was before the Minister; but it cannot receive evidence of the kind which was indicated in the present case so as to decide the whole matter afresh."

James -v- Secretary of State for Wales [1965] 63 LGR 269
1965 QBD	Administrative, Planning	Casemap 1 Citers
	The defendant challenged the validity of a planning enforcement notice served after he had increased the number of caravans on his site. The Secretary of State said it amounted to a change of use.

Patras -v- Commonwealth (1966) 9 FLR 152
1966 Lush J	Commonwealth, Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	(Supreme Court of Victoria) The court distinguished decisions which are judicial from those which are purely administrative: "The underlying principle of this form of estoppel is that parties who have had a dispute heard by a competent tribunal shall not be allowed to litigate the same issues in other tribunals. When the decision-making body is an administrative body not affording the opportunity of presenting evidence and argument … there is no room for the operation of this principle … It appears to me that both upon the general language of the authorities ... and upon … principle … no estoppel can arise from a decision of an administrative authority which cannot be classed either as 'judicial' or as a 'tribunal' and that an authority cannot be given to either of those classifications if it is one which is under no obligation to receive evidence or hear argument."

James -v- Secretary of State for Wales [1966] 1 WLR 135
1966 CA Lord Denning and Davies LJ	Administrative, Planning	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The planning authority served an enforcement notice after the land owner increased the number of caravans on his land. The court considered the validity of the enforcement notice. Lord Denning said: "It was said on behalf of the appellant that the change of use alleged in the enforcement notice (from one to four caravans) was not a material change of use. Intensification of an existing use, it was said, is not a material change of use. I do not agree. I think that a considerable increase in the number of caravans would be a material change of use. In any case it must be remember that this whole site was used as a pleasure ground with a café and one caravan. If the site is used as well for several caravans, that would be a material change of use. It would be a change from a pleasure ground to a caravan site, at least in part. This question -- of a material change of use -- has been repeatedly held to be a question of fact and degree. The Divisional Court was quite right to refer it to the Minister for decision."

Jean Moreau -v- Commission EAEC (Rec 1966,P 663) (Nl66-664 D 66-686 I 66-624 En66-459 Dk66-319 Gr66-467 P 66-519) (Judgment) C-15/64; [1966] EUECJ C-15/64
15 Dec 1966 ECJ	European, Administrative
	Europa 1. Officials - integration under the state regulations - aims of the relevant provisions (staff regulations of officials of the EAEC, article 102) 2. Officials - contractual servants - application of the staff regulations to such persons - revaluation of post - automatic transfer of the step in the new grade - not permissible - application by analogy of the provisions of the staff regulations relating to the promotion of officials (staff regulations of officials of the EAEC, article 102) 1. The object of article 102 of the staff regulations is to ensure that contractual servants, who are integrated in accordance with the said regulations, keep the position which they previously occupied, by the almost automatic transference to the table set out in article 66 of the staff regulations of the grade and step ' expressly or impliedly ' accorded them before the staff regulations were applied to them. 2. If the post of a contractual servant engaged during the period before the staff regulations entered into force has been revalued by the regulations, the step in the previous grade of that servant, when he is integrated, cannot automatically be transferred to his new grade. In order to determine the step in the new grade the administration must be guided by the provisions of the staff regulations relating to the promotion of officials.
	Link[s] omitted

Regina -v- Criminal Injuries Compensation Board Ex parte Lain [1967] 2 QB 864
1967 QBD	Administrative, Judicial Review	Casemap 1 Citers
	The Crown Prerogative origin of the power to make ex gratia payments does not exclude the scheme under which the payments are made from judicial review. Decisions of the Board may therefore be subject to judicial review.

Durayappah -v- Fernando [1967] 2 AC 337
1967 PC Lord Upjohn	Administrative	Casemap 1 Cites
	An order had been made by a minister that the council of a local authority be dissolved. The council did not seek to challenge the order, but the appellant, the mayor, brought proceedings in his individual capacity to challenge the minister's decision. Held: He did not have the necessary standing. Lord Upjohn: "Apart altogether from authority their Lordships would be of the opinion that this was a case where the Minister's order was voidable and not a nullity. Though the council should have been given the opportunity of being heard in its defence, if it deliberately chooses not to complain and takes no step to protest against its dissolution, there seems no reason why any other person should have the right to interfere. [Referrring to Rige v Baldwin] . . . their Lordships can see no reason why any other person, such, for example, as a ratepayer of Brighton should have any right to contend that Mr. Ridge was still the Chief Constable of Brighton. As a matter of ordinary common sense, with all respect to other opinions that have been expressed, if a person in the position of Mr. Ridge had not felt sufficiently aggrieved to take any action by reason of the failure to afford him his strict right to put forward a defence, the order of the watch committee should stand and no one else should have any right to complain." and "Their Lordships therefore are clearly of opinion that the order of the Minister on May 29, 1966, was voidable and not a nullity. Being voidable it was voidable only at the instance of the person against whom the order was made, that is the council. But the council have not complained. The appellant was no doubt mayor at the time of its dissolution but that does not give him any right to complain independently of the council. He must show that he is representing the councilor suing on its behalf or that by reason of certain circumstances, such, for example, as that the council could not use its seal because it is in the possession of the Municipal Commissioner, or for .other reasons it has been impracticable for the members of the council to meet to pass the necessary resolutions, the council cannot be the plaintiff. Had that been shown then there are well-known procedures whereby the plaintiff can sue on behalf of himself and the other corporators making the council a defendant and on pleading and proving the necessary facts may be able to establish in the action that he is entitled to assert the rights of the council. That, however, is not suggested in this case. The appellant sets up the case that as mayor he is entitled to complain but as such he plainly is not. If the council is dissolved, the office of mayor is dissolved with it and he has no independent right of complaint; because he holds no office that is independent of the council. If the mayor were to be heard individually he could only deal with complaints against the council with which ex hypothesi the council itself did not wish to deal. So, accordingly, it seems to their Lordships that on this short ground the appellant cannot maintain this action."

James -v- Secretary of State for Wales [1968] AC 409; [1967] 1 WLR 171
1968 HL	Administrative, Planning	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The land-owner increased the number of caravans on his land. The planning authority alleged there had been a change of use, and issued an enforcement notice. The land-owner challenged its validity. Held: A decision granting or refusing permission after the expiry of the period is valid and effective.

Padfield -v- Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997; [1968] UKHL 1
14 Feb 1968 HL Lord Upjohn, Lord Reid, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lord Hodson, Lord Pearce	Judicial Review, Administrative	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The Minister had power to direct an investigation in respect of any complaint as to the operation of any marketing scheme for agricultural produce. Milk producers complained about the price paid by the milk marketing board for their milk when compared with prices paid to producers in other regions. The Minister refused to appoint a committee. Held: The Minister had a discretion so that the real question was how far it was subject to judicial control. Having summarised the four conventional heads under which the exercise of such a discretion may be attacked Lord Upjohn said "In practice they merge into one another and ultimately it becomes a question whether for one reason or another the Minister has acted unlawfully in the sense of misdirecting himself in law, that is, not merely in respect of some point of law but by failing to observe the other headings I have mentioned. In the circumstances of this case, which I have sufficiently detailed for this purpose, it seems to me quite clear that prima facie there seems a case for investigation by the committee of investigation. As I have said already, it seems just the type of situation for which the machinery of section 19 was set up, but that is a matter for the Minister. He may have good reasons for refusing an investigation, he may have, indeed, good policy reasons for refusing it....So I must examine the reasons given by the Minister, including any policy on which they may be based, to see whether he has acted unlawfully and thereby overstepped the true limits of his discretion, or as it is frequently said in the prerogative writ cases, exceeded his jurisdiction. Unless he has done so, the court has no jurisdiction to interfere." Lord Upjohn then proceeded to consider the Minister's various reasons individually and in detail.
	Agricultural Marketing Act 1958
	Link[s] omitted

Regina -v- Russell [1969] 1 QB 342
1969 Lord Parker	Administrative