Administrative - 1970- 1979

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This page lists 27 cases, and was prepared on 24 January 2013. These case are being transferr

Agricultural, Horticultural and Forestry Industry Training Board -v- Kent [1970] 2 QB 19
1970 CA	Administrative	1 Citers
	A notice of assessment to a levy which was served by the appellant Board failed to provide an address for service of a notice of appeal as required. Held: The decision notice was invalidated by the omission.
	Industrial Training Levy (Agricultural, Horticultural and Forestry) Order 1967 4(3) - Industrial Training Act 1964 4

Ministry of Housing and Local Government -v- Sharp [1970] 2 QB 223; [1970] 1 All ER 1009
1970 CA Lord Denning MR, Salmon LJ, Cross LJ	Professional Negligence, Administrative	1 Cites
	Mr Sharp was the local land registrar with statutory duty to maintain the local registry, issuing certificates in response to search requests. A clerk who had been seconded by another Council to assist him negligently issued an inaccurate certificate to a prospective purchaser of land, omitting any reference to a claim to reimbursement of compensation which the Ministry had against the seller. The result was to extinguish the right which the Ministry would otherwise have had to pursue its claim against the purchaser. It was conceded that, if the clerk was liable in negligence to the Ministry, then the council was vicariously liable for its clerk. Held: The clerk was liable. The Court rejected the argument that a voluntary assumption of responsibility was the sole criterion for imposing a duty of care for the negligent preparation of a search certificate in the local land charges register. Lord Denning MR disagreed with the proposition that a duty of care could not fall on someone accepting an assumption of responsibility non-voluntarily: "It has been argued . . that since the council did not voluntarily make the search or prepare the certificate for their clerk's signature they did not voluntarily assume responsibility for the accuracy of the certificate and accordingly owed no duty to the Minister. I do not accept that, in all cases, it necessarily depends upon a voluntary assumption of responsibility." and "The object of the register is to provide security for two classes of people, incumbrancers and purchasers." Cross LJ saw "no sufficient reason why in an appropriate case the liability should not extend to cases in which the defendant is obliged to make the statement which proves to be false." he said: ""In 1888 the registrar [i.e. the Chief Land Registrar] was expressly exempted from liability to be sued for acts done in exercise of his powers under the Land Transfer Act, 1875; so Parliament at that date cannot have thought that there was anything inherently objectionable in the fact that members of the public who suffered through innocent mistakes in the registry should have no civil remedies. As he was exempt from liability under the Land Transfer Act, to subject him to liability under the Land Charges Act would, prima facie, be anomalous. The anomaly would, however, be explicable if and so far as the various officers of the Supreme Court who were directed to maintain registers by the Acts scheduled to the Conveyancing Act, 1881, and similar Acts, were themselves liable to be sued, for the provisions for official searches and certificates made applicable to the registrar in 1888 were taken from the provisions in section 2 of the Conveyancing Act, 1882. Further, in 1900, two registers formerly kept by the registrar of judgments were transferred to the land registrar. But if and so far as the court officials were not themselves liable to be sued I find it very difficult to suppose that Parliament intended to subject the land registrar to liability by the Act of 1888. The natural assumption would be that Parliament either considered that no express exemption corresponding to the Land Transfer Act provision was necessary or, more probably, simply forgot to put one in. So the point which to my mind is crucial is to what extent, if at all, the various "proper officers" were liable to be sued. Douglass v. Yallop, (1759) 2 Burr. 722, to which the Master of the Rolls refers, shows that the senior master of the Court of Common Pleas, who received five shillings for each entry, would have been liable to be sued for any damages suffered by the plaintiff for his failure to register a judgment presented for registration under the Judgments Act, 1838. Of course, by 1888, the registrar of judgments (the senior master of the Queen's Bench Division) received a fixed salary and it might perhaps be argued that his personal liability to be sued for the failure of one of his clerks to register a judgment did not survive the legislation which reorganised the courts. But even if that is not so, what we are concerned with is the obligation to issue certificates of search which was first created by the Conveyancing Act, 1882. That Act was a code applicable to all registers kept, or apparently to be kept, in the Central Office under the Acts scheduled to the Conveyancing Act, 1881, and any other Acts; so that it might apply to functionaries of varying status. I find it difficult to suppose that Parliament in the year 1882 intended by such an Act to make these unidentified officers of the court paid by salary personally liable to ensure the accuracy of the certificates of search issued in respect of registers under their charge." Salmon LJ held that the local registrar was not liable for breach of an absolute statutory duty, which was what had been alleged. It had been accepted that the local registrar had not been negligent in any way and that he was not vicariously responsible for the negligence of the council's servant who had carried out the search and issued the certificate. He noted indications in favour of civil liability, on the basis of an absolute obligation, saying: "It is clear that section 17(1), (2) and (3) of the Land Charges Act 1925 were enacted particularly for the benefit of chargees, incumbrancers (of whom the Minister is one) and purchasers rather than for the benefit of the general public. Purchasers, chargees and incumbrancers may suffer the most grave financial loss if the search which section 17(2) requires is not properly carried out or the certificate which it requires is inaccurate." The statutory duty was one of due diligence, not an absolute duty and because the claim had been put on the basis of an absolute duty, he held that it failed. As to section 131, he said: "It was, in my view, designed to protect those working in the registry from being plagued by vexatious actions. It accordingly provided that any claim, save a claim in fraud, could be struck out in limine. The indemnity in section 85 was a beneficent provision, possibly in part to compensate for the loss of a cause of action in negligence, and which, in any event, justice demanded. It might well have been introduced into the Land Charges Act, 1925, but only in so far as concerned Her Majesty's Land Registry, for in 1925 Parliament could hardly have been expected to set up a central fund in effect to indemnify local authorities against the mistakes of their own servants. Accordingly, the fact that no provisions corresponding to sections 83, 85 or 131 of the Land Registration Act appear in the Land Charges Act seems to me to be irrelevant to the question we have to decide."
	Land Charges Act 1925 17(1) 17(2) 17(3) - Land registration Act 1925 131

Corbett -v- Corbett (otherwise Ashley) [1971] P 83
1 Feb 1970 FD Ormrod J	Administrative, Family	Casemap 1 Cites
	There had been a purported marriage in 1963 between a man and a male to female trans-sexual. Held. Because marriage is essentially a union between a man and a woman, the relationship depended on sex, and not on gender. The law should adopt the chromosomal, gonadal and genital tests. If all three are congruent, that should determine a person's sex for the purpose of marriage. Any operative intervention should be ignored. The biological sexual constitution of an individual is fixed at birth, at the latest, and cannot be changed either by the natural development of organs of the opposite sex or by medical or surgical means. The marriage was void ab initio. As to the difference between a declaration under RSC Ord.15, and a decree of nullity, Ormrod J observed: "The importance of this distinction is, of course, that on a decree of nullity, the court has the power to entertain an application for ancillary relief whereas if a declaration order is made, there is not such power." Since ecclesiastical courts did in fact grant declaratory sentences in cases of meretricious marriages, there was no discretion to withhold any decree of nullity. "[o]n the facts as I have found them to be, a matrimonial relationship between the petitioner and the respondent was a legal impossibility at all times and in all circumstances, whereas a marriage which is void on the grounds of bigamy, non-age or failure of third party consents, might, in other circumstances, have been a valid marriage." Sex is an essential determinant of marriage, because: "it is and always has been recognised as the union of man and woman." Ormrod J: "It is common ground between all the medical witnesses that the biological sexual constitution of an individual is fixed at birth (at the latest), and cannot be changed, either by the natural development of organs of the opposite sex, or by medical or surgical means. The respondent's operation, therefore, cannot affect her true sex. The only cases where the term "change of sex" is appropriate are those in which a mistake as to sex is made at birth and subsequently revealed by further medical investigation."

British Oxygen Co Ltd -v- Board of Trade [1971] AC 610; [1970] UKHL 4; [1970] 3 All ER 165; [1970] 3 WLR 488
15 Jul 1970 HL Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Reid	Evidence, Administrative	Casemap
	It was reasonable and right for a public authority to make known to those interested the policy it was going to follow: 'by doing so fruitless applications involving expense and expenditure of time might be avoided'. If a policy is not to be applied in accordance with its meaning, as would have been the case on the original wording of section 6.1 of the licensing policy, there can be no such guidance." and "Since there is a rule that a public authority is not entitled to fetter its discretion, it is obliged to keep open the possibility of not applying that policy in any particular case if the specific circumstances of that case warrant the disapplication of the policy in relation to it."
	Industrial Development Act 1966
	[ Bailii ]

Adams -v- Adams [1971] P 188
1971 Sir Jocelyn Simon P	Administrative
	Despite the lack of modern English authority applying the doctrine, it was still part of the English common law, that the acts of a de facto officer were validated. The de facto officer must have some basis for his assumption of office, variously expressed as ‘colourable title’ or ‘colourable authority’. The President declined to recognise a divorce decree granted in Rhodesia by a Judge who had been appointed under the Constitution adopted in 1965 after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. The case did not fall within the de facto doctrine ‘even so widely stated’ as in State v Carroll because the circumstances of his appointment which made it invalid in the eyes of English law were very well known, indeed notorious. The President could find no trace of its ever being applied during a rebellion to accord recognition to the judicial or official acts or under a usurping power.

Coleen Properties Ltd -v- Minister of Housing and Local Government [1971] 1 All ER 1049; (1971) 1 WLR 433
1971 CA d Denning MR, Sachs LJ, Buckley LJ	Land, Administrative	Casemap
	The minister confirmed a compulsory purchase order depite it having been made without any supporting evidence. Held: The order was set aside.

Szechter (orse Karsov) -v- Szechter [1971] P 286; [1971] 1 WLR 171
1971 Sir Jocelyn Simon P, Karminski J	Family, Administrative	1 Cites
	The parties, who had been given leave to stay in the United Kingdom for only a limited period, had acquired a domicile of choice in England by residing here with the intention of making this country their permanent home. It was immaterial that their intentions were liable to be frustrated by the decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department as to permission for their continued residence here. As to the necessary element of consent to a marriage. Sir Jocelyn Simon P said: "It is, in my view, insufficient to invalidate an otherwise good marraige that a party has entered into it in order to escape from a disagreeable situation, such as penury or social degradation. In order for the impediment of duress to vitiate an otherwise valid marriage, it must, in my judgment, be proved that the will of one of the parties thereto has been overborne by genuine and reasonably held fear caused by threat of immediate danger (for which the party is not himself responsible), to life, limb or liberty, so that the constraint destroys the reality of consent to ordinary wedlock. I think that in the instant ease that test is satisfied." Karminski J said: "In order for the impediment of duress to vitiate an otherwise valid marriage, it must, in my judgment, be proved that the will of one of the parties thereto has been overborne by genuine and reasonably held fear caused by threat of immediate danger (for which the party is not himself responsible), to life, limb or liberty, so that the constraint destroys the reality of consent to ordinary wedlock."

Wiseman -v- Borneman [1971] AC 297
1971 HL Lord Reid, Lord Guest	Administrative
	The requirement of fairness should not degenerate into hard-and-fast rules and any additional steps to the statutory procedure must not frustrate the apparent purpose of the legislation. Lord Guest: The principles "should be reasonably clear and definite" and cases should not be "decided ex post facto on some uncertain basis."

Attorney General -v- Chaudry [1971] 1 WLR 1614
1971 CA Lord Denning MR	Litigation Practice, Administrative	Casemap
	The court has jurisdiction to grant a civil law remedy by way of injunction in order to enforce the public law, except in cases where statute had expressly or by necessary implication removed the jurisdiction. Whenever Parliament has enacted a law and given a particular remedy for the breach of it, such remedy being in an inferior court, nevertheless the High Court always has reserve power to enforce the law so enacted by way of an injunction or declaration or other suitable remedy. The High Court has jurisdiction to ensure obedience to the law whenever it is just and convenient so to do.

Agricultural, Horticultural and Forestry Industry Training Board -v- Aylesbury Mushrooms [1972] 1 All ER 280
1972 Donaldson J	Administrative
	The Secretary of State proposed to introduce new regulations for the training of agricultural workers. It sent a notice inviting representation from a body representing the mushroom growing industry, but the letter was not received. The regulation was made, and the respondent now argued that it was not bound by the regulations because the industry had not been consulted as required. Held: Consultation requires more than the mere giving of notice, or as in this case the sending of a letter: "the essence of consultation is the communication of a genuine invitation, extended with a receptive mind, to give advice". Having decided that the industry representative should be consulted, the Secretary could not go ahead without doing so. The regulations were not binding on the defendant.

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Kingston London Borough Council -v- Environment Secretary [1973] 1 WLR 1549
1973 Lord Widgery C.J	Administrative, Planning	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	Planning was granted for the rebuilding of a railway station on condition that the land allocated for parking should be made available for such purposes at all times and used for no other purpose. The station was duly rebuilt but the car park was not provided. The local planning authority served an enforcement notice requiring compliance with the condition. Held: The words of the statute clearly on their face entitle the local planning authority to impose conditions which affect land not the subject of the application itself and which go to the restriction of the past user or removal of existing work. Although they are wide it has been recognised for a long time that they are subject to certain restrictions. The two principal restrictions which the court had placed on those words are first that a condition is invalid as being contrary to law unless it is reasonably related to the development in the planning permission which has been granted: it must not be used for an ulterior purpose, and second a condition which is so clearly unreasonable that no reasonable planning authority could have imposed it may be regarded as ultra vires and contrary to law and treated as such in proceedings in this court

Tarr -v- Tarr [1973] AC 254
1973 HL Lord Pearson	Administrative	Casemap
	A power to regulate does not imply a power to prohibit.

F Hoffmann La Roche & Co A G -v- Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295
1975 HL Lord Diplock, Lord Reid, Lord Wilberforce	Administrative, Litigation Practice	Casemap
	The Secretary of State sought an interlocutory injunction under the Act to restrain the appellant from charging prices in excess of those fixed by a statutory instrument he had made. The appellant argued that the statutory instrument was ultra vires, because it had been based upon a report by the Monopolies Commission, which the appellant maintained, had been produced without due regard to principles of natural justice. The Secretary of State objected to giving a cross undertaking in damages. Held: The Secretary of State was not required to give such an undertaking. Lord Reid said that normally a claimant "cannot be compelled to give an undertaking but if he will not give it he will not get the injunction." The fact that an individual has suffered loss because of an invalid administrative act does not in itself entitle him to be indemnified. Lord Diplock: "The court has no power to compel an applicant for an interim injunction to furnish an undertaking as to damages." and "The undertaking is not given to the defendant but to the court itself. Non-performance of it is contempt of court, not breach of contract, and attracts the remedies available for contempts, but the court exacts the undertaking for the defendant's benefit. It retains a discretion not to enforce the undertaking if it considers that the conduct of the defendant in relation to the obtaining or continuing of the injunction or the enforcement of the undertaking makes it inequitable to do so, but if the undertaking is enforced the measure of the damages payable under it is not discretionary. It is assessed on an inquiry into damages at which principles to be applied are fixed and clear. The assessment is made upon the same basis as that upon which damages for breach of contract would be assessed if the undertaking had been a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant that the plaintiff would not prevent the defendant from doing that which he was restrained from doing by the terms of the injunction."
	Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry Control) Act 1948 11(2)

Conteh -v- Onslow Fane and another Times, 26 June 1975; Bar Library Transcript No. 291 of 1975
26 Jun 1975 CA	Contract, Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	Mr Conteh, a boxer, was accused of misconduct in breaking his contracts with his former manager and former promoter, and the High Court proceedings had been brought by him for declarations that these contracts were not binding on him. It was conceded by the Board that any finding that the contracts were binding on Mr Conteh would be provisional, and that a subsequent High Court judgment to a different effect would prevail.

Congreve -v- Secretary of State for the Home Office [1976] 1 QB 629; [1976] 1 All ER 697; [1977] 2 WLR 291
1976 CA Geoffrey Lane LJ, Lord Denning MR	Administrative	Casemap
	The appellant had bought his television licence when the charge was £12 although the minister had already announced that it would later be increased to £18. The Home Office wrote to those who had purchased their licence before the new charge came into effect demanding the payment of the extra £6 failing which their licence would be revoked. Held: It was an abuse of the Minister's undoubted discretionary power to revoke TV licences for him to seek to revoke a validly issued licence as a means of levying money which Parliament had given the executive no power to demand. The courts will rule invalid the exercise of a discretion which contains no express limitations in such a way as to run counter to the policy of the legislation by which it was conferred. Geoffrey Lane LJ: "the proposed revocation … is illegal for two reasons. First, it is coupled with an illegal demand which taints the revocation and makes that illegal too. Secondly, or possibly putting the same matter in a different way, it is an improper exercise of a discretionary power to use a threat to exercise that power as a means of extracting money which Parliament has given the executive no mandate to demand: see Attorney-General v Wilts United Dairies Ltd (1921) 37 TLR 884." Lord Denning MR: "There is another reason for holding that the demands for £6 to be unlawful. They were made contrary to the Bill of Rights. They were an attempt to levy money for use of the Crown without the authority of Parliament: and that is quite enough to damn them." and "If the licence is to be revoked - and his money forfeited - the Minister would have to give good reasons to justify it. Of course, if the licensee had done anything wrong - if he had given a cheque for £12 which was dishonoured, or if he had broken the conditions of the licence - the Minister could revoke it. But when the licensee has done nothing wrong at all, I do not think the Minister can lawfully revoke the licence, at any rate, not without offering him his money back, and not even then except for good cause. If he should revoke it without giving reasons, or for no good reason, the courts can set aside his revocation and restore the licence. It would be a misuse of the power conferred on him by Parliament: and these courts have the authority - and, I would add, the duty - to correct a misuse of power by a Minister or his department, no matter how much he may resent it or warn us of the consequences if we do."
	Bill of Rights 1688 4

HTV Ltd -v- Price Commission [1976] ICR 170
1976 CA Scarman LJ	Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	Policies created by public bodies are a means of promoting consistency while not fettering the discretion of a public body. They allow others to know how the authority will respond to those who must deal with the authority. In maiing such policies . . "It is a common place of modern law that such bodies [the Price Commission] must act fairly … it is not really surprising that a code must be implemented fairly, and that the courts have power to redress unfairness".

Attorney-General -v- Jonathan Cape Ltd [1976] QB 752; [1976] 3 All E R 484
1976 Lord Widgery CJ	Media, Administrative
	Lord Widgery CJ: 'the court must have power to deal with publication which threatens national security.' As regards confidence in publicly owned material: "There must, however, be a limit in time after which the confidential character of the information, and the duty of the court to restrain publication will lapse" and "It may, of course, be intensely difficult in a particular case, to say at what point the material loses its confidential character, on the ground that publication will no longer undermine the doctrine of cabinet responsibility."

Regina -v- Chief Immigration Officer, Heathrow Airport, Ex parte Salamat Bibi [1976] 1 WLR 979,
1976	Administrative

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Regina -v- Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Ostler [1977] 1 QB 122
1977 CA	Administrative, Planning
	The six week period during which a challenge must be made to a compulsory purchase is not capable of extension under the rules of court. The legislative intention is that questions as to the invalidity may be raised on the specified grounds in the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, but that otherwise the jurisdiction of the court is excluded in the interests of certainty.

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Regina -v- Local Commissioner for Administration for the North and East Area of England ex parte Bradford Metropolitan City Council [1979] 2 All ER 881; [1979] QB 287
1979 CA Lord Denning MR	Administrative, Local Government	Casemap
	The court considered the meaning of 'maladministration' in the section. Held: Lord Denning MR said: "It will cover ‘bias, neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, ineptitude, perversity, turpitude, arbitrariness and so on.’ It ‘would be a long and interesting list’ clearly open-ended, covering the manner in which a decision is reached or discretion is exercised; but excluding the merits of the decision itself or of the discretion itself. It follows that ‘discretionary decision, properly exercised which the complainant dislikes but cannot fault the manner in which it was taken, is excluded,’ . . In other words if there is no ‘maladministration’, the ombudsman may not question any decision taken by the authorities. He must not go into the merits of it or intimate any view as to whether it was right or wrong." Parliament was "at pains" to ensure that the Ombudsman should not conduct an investigation "which might trespass in any way on the jurisdiction of the courts of law or of any tribunals."
	Local Government Act 1974 26

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