Administrative - 1992

The case shown here are derived from the lawindexpro case law database. lawindexpro is a low cost case law database, with over 130,000 case listings, and over 95,000 links to full text judgments. The free service below shows the core information on the case, but is restricted in several ways. A small proportion of cases do allow access to the full lawindexpro information. These cases are selected at random, and may be different on your next visit. The active links through to lawindexpro are extremely powerful allowing full access to all linked cases.  

This page lists 16 cases, and was prepared on 04 October 2008.

Regina -v- Henderson Unreported, November 1992
1992 CACD	Crime, Administrative
	The British authorities had, over a period of time, failed to enforce restrictions on the export of military equipment to Iraq and had known that such material was being exported to Iraq via Jordan. The prosecution of the defendant for breach of the regulations collapsed rather than have papers disclosed to the court. Ministers had signed public interest immunity certificates which, if accepted by the trial court, would have prevented disclosure of the equivocal role which the authorities had played.

West -v- Secretary of State for Scotland 1992 SC 385
1992 Lord President (Hope)	Scotland, Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court asked what was to be considered to be truly an application to the supervisory jurisdiction of the court. Held: Lord President (Hope): "The public or private nature of the inferior body or tribunal is not decisive, nor is it necessary to enquire whether the decision of the inferior body or tribunal is administrative in character. The essential point is that a decision-making function has been entrusted to that body or tribunal which it can be compelled by the court to perform. As counsel for the respondent pointed out, the tripartite relationship in these arrangements is significant. The essential feature of all these cases is the conferring, whether by statute or private contract, of a decision-making power or duty on a third party to whom the taking of the decision is entrusted but whose manner of decision-making may be controlled by the court." The competency of an application to the supervisory jurisdiction "does not depend upon any distinction between public law and private law, nor is it confined to those cases which English law has accepted as amenable to judicial review...".

Lonrho plc -v- Tebbit [1992] 4 All ER 280
1992 CA	Administrative, Negligence	1 Cites
	The company became involved in a takeover bid. It was referred to the Monopolies Commision, and the buyer undertook not to increase his shareholding pending the report. In the meantime another buyer acquired a majority shareholding. The buyer had not been released from his undertaking even though it had been found that his proposed take-over would not be contrary to the public interst. The buyer had therefore been prevented from acquiring a majority interest and claimed damages in negligence from the defendant Secretary of State. The defendant appealed a refusal to strike out the claim. Held: The buyer had a clear private interest in being released from his undertaking immediately it became unnecessary, and the defendant owed a duty in private law to him to exercise reasonable care. The claim in private law was properly commenced by writ.

Regina -v- Secretary of State for Health, ex parte United States Tobacco International Inc [1992] 1 QB 353
1992 CA Taylor LJ	Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	The applicant company produced oral snuff. It had opened a factory in the United Kingdom after the Government, on advice, had negotiated an agreement with it to restrict the marketing of the product. The committee, basing itself not on new evidence but on a changed evaluation of the existing evidence, subsequently advised the Secretary of State to ban the product; and the Secretary of State, without disclosing the advice to the company, laid regulations banning the product before Parliament. Held: The Secretary of State had a duty to consult the company and had acted unfairly in failing to disclose the committee's advice. The advice was "crucial": "One cannot help feeling that the denial of the applicants' request was due to an inbuilt reluctance to give reasons or disclose advice lest it give opponents fuel for argument. One can understand and respect the need for ministers to preserve confidentiality as to the in-house advice they receive on administrative and political issues from their civil service staff. But here, the advice was from a body of independent experts set up to advise the Secretary of State on scientific matters I can see no ground in logic or reason for declining to show the applicants the text of the advice. In view of the total change of policy the Regulations would bring about and its unique impact on the applicants, fairness demanded that they should be treated with candour. To conceal from them the scientific advice which directly led to the ban was, in my judgment, unfair and unlawful."

Regina -v- Darling (Wreck Commissioner) Ex Parte Swan Hunter Shipbuilders Ltd; Similar
8 Jan 1992 QBD	Costs, Administrative, Transport
	No costs order should normally be made in favour of the relatives of the deceased seamen, following an enquiry by the Wreck Commissioner, save only in cases of hardship. The responsibility for ship safety is a matter of proper concern to ship-builders as well as regulators. The Commissioner having considered all those points which he was obliged to do, his decision was not to be faulted.

Regina -v- Durham County Council, ex parte Robinson Times, 31 January 1992
31 Jan 1992 Pill J	Administrative, Judicial Review	Casemap 1 Citers
	The applicant sought to challenge the decision of the local authority to terminate his stallholder's licence. The parties had agreed that a sufficient element of public law was involved to give the court jurisdiction to review the decision. Held: It was not open to the parties to create jursidiction for the court. No sufficient element of public law was involved and a review was refused.

Pfeifer And Plankl -v- Austria (1992) 14 EHRR 692; 10802/84; [1992] ECHR 2;; [1992] ECHR 2
25 Feb 1992 ECHR	Human Rights, Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	Two of the judges who had acted in Mr Pfeifer’s case also presided at his trial, despite a clear provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure disqualifying them. The Commission dealt with whether the court was ‘established by law’ separately from whether it was ‘impartial’ and held that it was not. The Court held that the two complaints coincided: the court was not established by law because of the disqualification which national law had imposed so as to remove all reasonable doubt as to the impartiality of trial courts. Hence there was a breach of Article 6(1) (and there had not been an effective waiver of the applicant’s rights). In order to be effective, a waiver must be made without undue compulsion.
	Link[s] omitted

Roy -v- Kensington & Chelsea and Westminster Family Practitioner Committee [1992] 1 AC 624; [1992] 7 CL 474; [1992] 2 WLR 239
6 May 1992 HL	Judicial Review, Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	The respondent had withheld part of the plaintiff's GP payments saying that he had failed to devote himself full time to his practice. The plaintiff sued, and the defendant sought to strike out his application, saying that his application had to be by way of public law action through a judicial review. Held: The fact that the defendant's decision was a public law act did not prevent the plaintiff pursuing his rights in private law and that could be by way of ordinary action. The plaintiff had a relationship with the committee which established private law rights. The rule of procedural exclusivity does not apply where a defendant in a civil case simply seeks to defend himself by questioning the validity of a public law decision.

Airedale NHS Trust -v- Bland [1993] 2 WLR 316
19 Nov 1992 FD Sir Stephen Brown P	Crime, Health, Health Professions, Administrative	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The patient had suffered catastrophic injuries in 1989, leaving him in a persistent vegetative state (PVS). The doctors sought leave to discontinue life maintaining treatment and medical support. The inevitable result would be his death. The application was for an order discharging them from any civil or criminal liability. Held: The provision of food by naso-gastric tube was medical treatment. The decision to withdraw it would be a medical decision. The true cause of the death was the accident. The judge made no declaration as to potential criminal liability, since the action would be within standard and proper medical practice. Future similar decisions should continue to be made after applications to court.
	Link[s] omitted

Regina -v- Harrow London Borough Council Ex Parte Carter (1992) 26 HLR 32
25 Nov 1992 QBD Mr Roger Henderson QC	Housing, Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	The applicant had sold her home and moved to Harrow with her four children, living with her sister. She became unintentionally homess and had priority need, applying to Harrow for accomodation. Harrow said that under their policy she retained her local connection with Camden, and refused assistance beyond referring her to Camden. Held: The applicant had a possible case for special assistance under section 61 so as to establish a local connection with Harrow. The discretion given to local authorities under section 67(1) could not be disclaimed under a strict policy. They had to consider each individual case, and the policy had to allow exceptions. Mr Roger Henderson QC said "I have seen no evidence of a decision focusing upon the respondents' discretion under section 67 of the Act whether or not in all the circumstances of Mrs Carter's case to refer her to Brent. Instead, although for reasons to which I will come I am sure that the respondents' senior officers in the housing department and its members were well aware that such a reference was discretionary and not mandatory, there is persuasive evidence that the reference to Brent was made as an automatic and unreviewed consequence of the decision that Mrs. Carter had no local connection and had not established special circumstances. I refer to this because although the reference to Brent led to nothing and it not the subject of judicial review, yet it is a significant feature in the history of this case which points to a similar unlawful approach in the decision-making when the reference to the London Borough of Camden occurred a month later."
	Statute References omitted

Regina -v- Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan [1993] 1 WLR 909
4 Dec 1992 CA Sir Thomas Bingham MR, Farquharson LJ, Hoffmann LJ	Company, Natural Justice, Civil Procedure Rules, Administrative	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	Despite the wide range of its powers, the disciplinary committee of the Jockey Club remains a domestic tribunal. Judicial review is not available to a member. Tne relationship is in contract between the club and its member. Sir Thomas Bingham MR: "No serious racecourse management, owner, trainer or jockey can survive without the recognition or licence of the Jockey Club. There is in effect no alternative market in which those not accepted by the Jockey Club can find a place or to which racegoers may resort. Thus by means of the rules and its market domination the Jockey Club can effectively control not only those who agree to abide by its rules but also those -- such as disqualified or excluded persons seeking to participate in racing activities in any capacity -- who do not. For practical purposes the Jockey Club's writ runs in the British racing world, to the acknowledged benefit of British racing." As to the rules of racing: "The Rules of Racing are a skilfully drafted, comprehensive and far-reaching code of rules through which the Jockey Club exercises its control over racing in this country." Farquharson LJ: "… there has never been any doubt that public law remedies do not lie against domestic bodies, as they derive solely from the consent of the parties. … The question remains whether the Jockey Club, or this particular decision of it, can properly be described as a domestic body acting by consent. .... The courts have always been reluctant to interfere with the control of sporting bodies over their own sports and I do not detect in the material available to us any grounds for supposing that, if the Jockey Club were dissolved, any governmental body would assume control of racing. Neither in its framework nor its rules nor its function does the Jockey Club fulfil a governmental role. I understand the criticism made by Mr. Kentridge of the reality of the consent to the authority of the Jockey Club. The invitation to consent is very much on a take it or leave it basis. But I do not consider that this undermines the reality of the consent. Nearly all sports are subject to a body of rules to which an entrant must subscribe. These are necessary, as already observed, for the control and integrity of the sport concerned. In such a large industry as racing has become, I would suspect that all those actively and honestly engaged in it welcome the control of licensing and discipline exerted by the Jockey Club. For these reasons I would hold that the decision of the Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club to disqualify Aliysa from the 1989 Oaks is not susceptible to judicial review. As to Mr. Milmo's assertion that the question of the Jockey Club's susceptibility to judicial review must be answered on an all or nothing basis, I can only say as at present advised that I do not agree. … While I do not say that particular circumstances would give a right to judicial review I do not discount the possibility that in some special circumstances the remedy might lie. If for example the Jockey Club failed to fulfil its obligations under the charter by making discriminatory rules, it may be that those affected would have a remedy in public law. In the present appeal there is no hardship to the applicant in his being denied judicial review. If his complaint that the disciplinary committee acted unfairly is well-founded there is no reason why he should not proceed by writ seeking a declaration and an injunction. Having regard to the issues involved it may be a more convenient process. I would dismiss the appeal." Hoffmann LJ: "It is true that in some countries there are statutory bodies which exercise at least some control over racing. It appears from Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission (1977) 137 C.L.R. 487 that this is the position in Tasmania and we were told that it was also true of certain of the United States. But different countries draw the line between public and private regulation in different places. The fact that certain functions of the Jockey Club could be exercised by a statutory body and that they are so exercised in some other countries does not make them governmental functions in England. The attitude of the English legislator to racing is much more akin to his attitude to religion (see Reg. v. Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of Great Britain and the Commonwealth, Ex parte Wachmann [1992] 1 W.L.R. 1036): It is something to be encouraged but not the business of government. All this leaves is the fact that the Jockey Club has power. But the mere fact of power, even over a substantial area of economic activity, is not enough. In a mixed economy, power may be private as well as public. Private power may affect the public interest and the livelihoods of many individuals. But that does not subject it to the rules of public law. If control is needed, it must be found in the law of contract, the doctrine of restraint of trade, the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976, articles 85 and 86 of the E.E.C. Treaty and all the other instruments available in law for curbing the excesses of private power. It may be that in some cases the remedies available in private law are inadequate. For example, in cases in which power is exercised unfairly against persons who have no contractual relationship with the private decision-making body, the court may not find it easy to fashion a cause of action to provide a remedy. In Nagle v. Feilden [1966] 2 Q.B. 633, for example, this court had to consider the Jockey Club's refusal on grounds of sex to grant a trainer's licence to a woman. She had no contract with the Jockey Club or (at that time) any other recognised cause of action, but this court said that it was arguable that she could still obtain a declaration and injunction. There is an improvisatory air about this solution and the possibility of obtaining an injunction has probably not survived Siskina (Owners of cargo lately laden on board) v. Distos Compania Naviera S.A [1979] A.C. 210. It was recognition that there might be gaps in the private law that led Simon Brown J. in Reg. v. Jockey Club, Ex parte R.A.M. Racecourses Ltd. [1993] 2 A11 E.R. 225 to suggest that case like Nagle v Feilden [1966] 2 Q.B. 633, as well as certain others involving domestic bodies like the Football Association in Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club Ltd. [1964] Ch. 413 and a trade union in Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union [1971] 2 Q.B. 175, "had they arisen today and not some years ago, would have found a natural home in judicial review proceedings." For my part, I must respectfully doubt whether this would be true. Trade unions have now had obligations of fairness imposed upon them by legislation, but I doubt whether, if this had not happened, the courts would have tried to fill the gap by subjecting them to public law. The decision of Rose J. in Reg. v. Football Association Ltd., Ex parte Football League Ltd., The Times, 22 August 1991, which I found highly persuasive, shows that the same is probably true of the Football Association. I do not think that one should try to patch up the remedies available against domestic bodies by pretending that they are organs of government. In the present case, however, the remedies in private law available to the Aga Khan seem to me entirely adequate. He has a contract with the Jockey Club, both as a registered owner and by virtue of having entered his horse in the Oaks. The club has an implied obligation under the contract to conduct its disciplinary proceedings fairly. If it has not done so, the Aga Khan can obtain a declaration that the decision was ineffective (I avoid the slippery word void) and, if necessary, an injunction to restrain the club from doing anything to implement it. No injustice is therefore likely to be caused in the present case by the denial of a public law remedy." Sir Thomas Bingham MR said that the test was whether the powers exercised were governmental: "I have little hesitation in accepting the applicant's contention that the Jockey Club effectively regulates a significant national activity, exercising powers which affect the public and are exercised in the interest of the public. I am willing to accept that if the Jockey Club did not regulate this activity the government would probably be driven to create a public body to do so. But the Jockey Club is not in its origin, its history, its constitution or (least of all) its membership a public body. While the grant of a Royal Charter was no doubt a mark of official approval, this did not in any way alter its essential nature, functions or standing. Statute provides for its representation on the Horserace Betting Levy Board, no doubt as a body with an obvious interest in racing, but it has otherwise escaped mention in the statute book. It has not been woven into any system of governmental control of horseracing, perhaps because it has itself controlled horseracing so successfully that there has been no need for any such governmental system and such does not therefore exist. This has the result that while the Jockey Club's powers may be described as, in many ways, public they are in no sense governmental. The discretion conferred by section 31(6) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 to refuse the grant of leave or relief where the applicant has been guilty of delay which would be prejudicial to good administration can scarcely have been envisaged as applicable in a case such as this. I would accept that those who agree to be bound by the Rules of Racing have no effective alternative to doing so if they want to take part in racing in this country. It also seems likely to me that if, instead of Rules of Racing administered by the Jockey Club, there were a statutory code administered by a public body, the rights and obligations conferred and imposed by the code would probably approximate to those conferred and imposed by the Rules of Racing. But this does not, as it seems to me, alter the fact, however anomalous it may be, that the powers which the Jockey Club exercises over those who (like the applicant) agree to be bound by the Rules of Racing derive from the agreement of the parties and give rise to private rights on which effective action for a declaration, an injunction and damages can be based without resort to judicial review. It would in my opinion be contrary to sound and long-standing principle to extend the remedy of judicial review to such a case. "It is unnecessary for purposes of this appeal to decide whether decisions of the Jockey Club may ever in any circumstances be challenged by judicial review and I do not do so. Cases where the applicant or plaintiff has no contract on which to rely may raise different considerations and the existence or non-existence of alternative remedies may then be material. I think it better that this court should defer detailed consideration of such a case until it arises. I am, however, satisfied that on the facts of this case the appeal should be dismissed."
	Statute References omitted
	Link[s] omitted

Airedale NHS Trust -v- Bland [1993] 2 WLR 316
9 Dec 1992 CA Sir Thomas Bingham MR, Butler-Sloss and Hoffmann LJJ	Crime, Health, Health Professions, Administrative	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The official Solicitor appealed a decision that doctors could withdraw medical treatment including artificial nutrition, from a patient in persistent vegetative state. Held: The doctors sought permission to act in accordance with recommended medical practice. Agreement was universal that there was no prospect of the patient's improvement, nor any purpose in continued treatment. The purpose of medical treatment was to act for the benefit of the patient, and no benefit was being derived. The inviolability of life is not an absolute, and hear no direct interference was proposed, but rather the withdrawal of support. The appeal failed.
	[ lip ]

Calvin E Williams -v- Court of Auditors of the European Communities (Rec 1992,p II-2499) T-33/91; [1992] EUECJ T-33/91
10 Dec 1992 ECFI	European, Administrative
	Europa 1. The action before the Court, even if formally directed against the rejection of the official' s complaint, has the effect of bringing before the Court the decision adversely affecting the applicant against which the complaint was submitted. 2. The fact that in the staff reports, under the heading "Knowledge required for post occupied", two officials occupying comparable posts receive identical assessments even though only one of them has specific training corresponding to the duties performed does not, in the absence of other factors, constitute proof of an infringement of the principle of equal treatment. The evaluation of the knowledge required for the post occupied calls for a specific assessment, taking account of all the actual knowledge of the official concerned, in particular his specific knowledge corresponding to the post which he occupies, not an abstract assessment of the level of his training, purely in terms of his qualifications and diplomas. 3. It is not for the Court to determine whether the assessment made by the administration in the context of a staff report of the occupational ability of an official is well founded when it involves complex value judgments which, by their very nature, are not capable of objective proof. However, the Court is required to carry out a review concerning any irregularities of form or procedure, manifest errors of fact vitiating the assessments made by the administration and any misuse of power. 4. The freedom of trade union activity recognized under Article 24a of the Staff Regulations means not only that officials have the right without hindrance to form associations of their choosing, but also that those associations are free to do anything lawful to protect the interests of their members as employees, in particular by means of bringing court proceedings. Furthermore, the Community institutions, and the bodies treated as such for the application of the Staff Regulations of Officials by virtue of Article 1 thereof, must refrain from doing anything which might impede the freedom of trade union activity recognized by Article 24a of the said regulations. 5. Where an internal directive of an institution concerning the reports procedure, such as a guide to staff reports, provides that the official assessed must be put in a position to state his point of view regarding all the information on the basis of which the appeal assessor adopts his final decision, a reports procedure in which that rule has been disregarded is irregular and the staff report subsequently adopted must be annulled.
	Link[s] omitted

Heinz-Jörg Moritz -v- Commission of the European Communities (Rec 1992,p I-6849) (Judgment) Case C-68/91; C-68/91; [1992] EUECJ C-68/91P
17 Dec 1992 ECJ	European, Administrative
	Europa 1. The periodic report constitutes an indispensable criterion of assessment each time the official' s career is taken into consideration by the administration and a promotion procedure is tainted with irregularity in so far as the appointing authority has not been able to consider the comparative merits of the candidates because there has been a substantial delay on the part of the administration in drawing up the periodic reports of one or more of them. It does not follow that all the candidates must be at exactly the same stage regarding the state of their periodic reports when the appointment decision is taken or that the appointing authority must postpone its decision if the most recent report on one or other of the candidates is not yet final because it has been referred to the appeal assessor or to the Joint Committee. In exceptional circumstances the absence of a periodic report may be compensated for by the existence of other information on an official' s merits. 2. If, in dismissing a plea by an official contesting the legality of a promotion procedure on the ground that the appointing authority assessed his merits in the absence of his periodic report and on the basis of a hearing of his Director-General at which he was not heard, the Court of First Instance merely holds that that hearing did not make that procedure unlawful but does not mention the reasons justifying recourse to information other than the periodic report or the reasons why hearing the Director-General was sufficient to compensate for the absence of that periodic report, it has failed to state sufficient reasons for its judgment. 3. It is for the Court of First Instance to respond to the pleas and claims as they were raised before it by the parties. It does not fulfil that obligation where it rejects a claim for compensation on the ground that a claim based on the same allegedly wrongful conduct of the administration was dismissed by a judgment given in another case between the same parties when the two claims are not identical, in so far as they are based on separate causes of damage, namely the fault consisting in the appointment of a candidate following an irregular promotion procedure, on the ground that the appointing authority assessed the respective merits of the candidates in the absence of the appellant' s periodic report, and the fault consisting in the fact that the periodic report in question was drawn up late by the appointing authority.
	Link[s] omitted

Tiziano Di Rocco v Economic and Social Committee (Rec 1992,p II-2653) T-8/92; [1992] EUECJ T-8/92
18 Dec 1992 ECFI	European, Administrative
	1. The decision by which the appointing authority decides to close without further action disciplinary proceedings does not constitute an act adversely affecting the official against whom the proceedings were initiated within the meaning of Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations, since the operative part of such a decision is not capable of altering the legal situation of that official. 2. The powers of the appointing authority in disciplinary matters permit it only to order one of the measures provided for in Article 86(2) of the Staff Regulations or to close the disciplinary proceedings without ordering a disciplinary measure, regardless of the opinion of the Disciplinary Board, which in any event is not binding on the appointing authority. 3. When, under Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations, the question of the admissibility of an action for damages is being examined, a distinction must be drawn between two types of cases. Where the claims for damages are closely linked to an action for annulment, the inadmissibility of the latter entails the inadmissibility of the action for damages. If there is no close link between the two actions, the admissibility of the claims for damages must be assessed separately from that of the action for annulment and is subject, in particular, to the pre-litigation procedure provided for under Articles 90 and 91 having been properly carried out. In that connection, where an action for damages is seeking redress for harm suffered as a result of an act which adversely affected the official, it is for the person concerned to lodge, within the prescribed period, a prior administrative complaint against that act, and then to bring an action within a period of three months from the date on which the complaint is rejected. Conversely, if the alleged harm has resulted from conduct which, since it had no legal effects, cannot be characterized as acts adversely affecting the official, the pre-litigation procedure must begin with a request for compensation. Only an express or implied rejection of that request constitutes a decision adversely affecting the official against which a complaint may be directed, and it is only after a decision rejecting, expressly or impliedly, that complaint that an action for damages may be brought before the Court of First Instance.
	Link[s] omitted

Lilian R Khouri v Commission of the European Communities (Rec 1992,p II-2637) T-85/91; [1992] EUECJ T-85/91
18 Dec 1992 ECFI	European, Administrative
	1. Where the application of a rule of the Staff Regulations depends on the application of a legal rule applying in the legal system of one of the Member States, it is in the interest of the sound administration of justice and proper application of the Staff Regulations that the review by the Court of First Instance should also extend to an examination of the way in which the appointing authority of a Community institution has interpreted the national law of one of the Member States. 2. Under Article 2(4) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations, the treatment, as a dependent child, of a person whom an official has a legal responsibility to maintain and whose maintenance involves heavy expenditure constitutes an exceptional step. The condition that the official must have a legal responsibility to maintain a person other than a dependent child must for that reason be interpreted strictly. The concept of "a legal responsibility to maintain" used in the Staff Regulations is derived from the legal systems of the Member States, which, under their laws, impose a mutual obligation to provide maintenance on relatives by blood and/or marriage of a greater or lesser degree of proximity. That concept must therefore be understood as referring exclusively to an obligation of maintenance imposed on an official by a source of law independent of the will of the parties and as excluding maintenance obligations of a contractual, moral or compensatory nature. Since neither Community law nor the Staff Regulations provide the Community court with any guide as to how it should define, by way of independent interpretation, the meaning and scope of the concept of a legal responsibility to maintain entitling an official to receive a dependent child allowance under Article 2(4) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations, it is necessary to determine whether the national legal system to which the official in question is subject imposes such a responsibility on the official. 3. The terms of a provision of Community law which makes no express reference to the laws of the Member States for the purpose of de?ermining its meaning and scope must normally be given an independent interpretation which must take into account the context of the provision and the purpose of the relevant rules. In the absence of an express reference to the laws of the Member States, the application of Community law may sometimes necessitate reference to the laws of the Member States where the Community court cannot identify in Community law or in the general principles of Community law criteria enabling it to define the meaning and scope of such a provision by way of independent interpretation.
	Link[s] omitted