Administrative - 1995

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This page lists 17 cases, and was prepared on 15 November 2008.

Regina -v- Warwickshire County Council, Ex parte Collymore [1995] ELR 217
1995 Judge J	Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court questioned the over rigid application of a policy in a decision by the respondent.

Regina -v- Northern and Yorkshire RHA, ex parte Trivedi [1995] 1 WLR 961
1995 Auld LJ	Health Professions, Administrative	1 Citers
	The court discussed the scope of the disciplinary process undertaken by the respondent: "The fact that the process is investigative and inquisitorial rather than a form of litigation between the parties …. does not mean that the medical service committee or the authority is entitled to investigate and make findings on matters not the subject of complaint."

Ex parte Hamble (Offshore) Fisheries Ltd [1995] 2 AER 714
1995 Sedley	Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	Judicial review was requested of a decision of the Minister to declare a moratorium on the permitted transfer of certain fishing licences. Held: The request failed. Sedley J put forward a test for what makes a claim for a legitimate expextation: "These considerations, I think, bring one closer to some conceptual understanding of what makes an expectation legitimate. Legitimacy in this sense is not an absolute. It is a function of expectations induced by government and of policy considerations which militate against their fulfilment. The balance must in the first instance be for the policy-maker to strike; but if the outcome is challenged by way of judicial review, I do not consider that the court's criterion is the bare rationality of the policy-maker's conclusion. While policy is for the policy-maker alone, the fairness of his or her decision not to accommodate reasonable expectations which the policy will thwart remains the court's concern (as of course does the lawfulness of the policy). To postulate this is not to place the judge in the seat of the minister. As the foregoing citations explain, it is the court's task to recognise the constitutional importance of ministerial freedom to formulate and to reformulate policy; but it is equally the court's duty to protect the interests of those individuals whose expectation of different treatment has a legitimacy which in fairness outtops the policy choice which threatens to frustrate it." He asked rhetorically whether the Minister's decision was fair:- "This, as I have held, while initially a question for the minister is ultimately a question for the court. But, in answering the question, the minister's policy objectives and reasoning form as important an element of the forensic exercise as do the potency and reasonableness of the applicant's expectations."

Regina -v- Broadcasting Complaints Commission Ex Parte British Broadcasting Corporation
24 Feb 1995 QBD	Media, Administrative
	A pressure group has no locus to make complaint to the Broadcasting Complaints Commission.
	Statute References omitted

Wood -v- Law Society
1 Mar 1995 CA	Negligence, Administrative, Legal Professions	Casemap
	The solicitor had acted for the client in a series of loans, and had not disclosed his own directorship in one or more of the companies. His firm later acted for the lender in recovering possession form their former client. The claimant made several complaints to the Law Society. Held: A damages claim against Law Society for failure to deal properly with a complaint failed. The plaintiff's damages did not arise from the Society's fault, but that of the solicitor.

Regina -v- Coventry Airport Ex Parte Phoenix Aviation; Regina -v- Dover Harbour Board Ex Parte Gilder [1995] EWHC Admin 1; [1995] 3 All ER 37
12 Apr 1995 QBD Simon Brown LJ, Popplewell J	Local Government, Administrative	Casemap
	A local authority operator of an airport suspended flights on aircraft transporting livestock; a harbour authority refused to allow cross-Channel services for the export of live animals; and a local authority challenged the decision of a statutory body operating a dock not to ban the export of live animals. In each case what was relied on to justify imposing a ban was the activity and size of the disruptive protests. Held: None of the bans was lawful under the body's statutory power but each was, or would have been, unlawful. The authority had given in to unlawful threats. "None of them, it appears, gave the least thought to the awesome implications for the rule of law of doing what they propose." This was contrary to "the thread [which] runs consistently throughout all the case law; the recognition that public authorities must beware of surrendering to the dictates of unlawful pressure groups." A lawful trade in live animals was not to be interrupted for fear of public disorder.
	Link[s] omitted

Mohamed -v- Manek and Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea [1995] 27 HLR 439
28 Apr 1995 CA Nourse LJ, Henry and Auld LJJ	Housing, Administrative	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The claimant applied to the Council for accommodation, claiming to be homeless and in priority need. The council housed in a hotel owned by Mr Manek. He had a room, a separate bathroom and lavatory, and shared use of a kitchen. After three days the council completed their investigations. Though homeless, he was not in priority need, and his accommodation arrangement would be terminated. He was given time to challenge this in court. He obtained an interim injunction against being evicted without a court order. The council appealed, but Mr Manek did not. Held: Anti-harassment provisions in the 1977 Act do not apply to temporary housing by Local Authority. The court adopted a purposive approach to interpretation of the Act, but restricted the finding to the particular arrangements in this hostel. Auld LJ reviewed the case law on evictions: "In my view, none of those cases, on their facts or holdings, are of assistance in this case. The question here is not simply whether the hotel room was "occupied" by Mr Mohamed as his residence or dwelling, but whether the council licensed him to occupy it as a dwelling. And, even if, contrary to my view, the agreement between the council and Mr Mohamed was a licence, it was clearly tailored to the fulfilment by the council of their statutory duty to arrange temporary accommodation under section 63 or 65 of the 1985 Act, no more. The provisions in Part III of the 1985 Act for housing the homeless were formerly in the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977. In my view, the provisions of the other Act of 1977, the Protection from Eviction Act, cannot have been intended to apply to the temporary housing by or on behalf of councils of the homeless. Under Part III of the 1985 Act councils have a public duty to secure accommodation under section 63 or 65 for many people. It is in the interests of good public administration that they should not have to commit their limited resources to securing accommodation for persons to whom, after making due inquiries, they properly decide they have no duty, at the expense of others to whom they may have a duty. The threshold for the duty is a low one, "reason to believe that an applicant may be homeless and have a priority need". The inquiries may take only a few days and result in a decision that a temporarily housed applicant is not in fact homeless or in priority need. A council's ability efficiently to perform their public duty as a local housing authority could be seriously affected if the protection of the 1977 Act were automatically to attach to every temporarily housed unsuccessful applicant for housing just because he had been able to satisfy the low threshold under section 63 for investigation of his application. In my view, as a matter of construction of section 3(2B) of the 1977 Act, the expression "occupied as a dwelling under a licence" cannot apply to bed-and-breakfast accommodation of this sort, when, as here, it is provided pursuant to an agreement clearly intended as a purely temporary arrangement pending the making of inquiries under section 62. The council's duty under section 63 is only to secure accommodation pending those inquiries and their decision as a result of them. It cannot have been the intention of Parliament that there should be grafted on to that public and temporary obligation an extension of it by at least four weeks drawn from another statute dealing with the private rights and duties of landlords (licensors) and tenants (licensees) as between themselves. Nor does it accord with the ordinary use of language to describe temporary accommodation in a hotel or hostel for this purpose as premises "occupied as a dwelling under a licence". In my view, that is so whether the council provide the accommodation themselves or arrange it through some third party, subject in each case, however, to any contrary agreement. The agreement here was plainly not to the contrary. It bore all the marks of an arrangement for the purpose of section 63 only, and not, in Lord Greene's words, "as a matter of fair and reasonable construction of simple words" as premises occupied as a dwelling under a licence." Auld LJ: "If, despite the facts as I have summarised them, the council's decision not to continue the arrangement at the Thames Hotel was a decision to discontinue securing temporary accommodation under section 63 of the 1985 Act, as distinct from an attempt to evict him without notice contrary to section 3 of the 1977 Act, it was a public law decision. It is not the decision that Mr Mohamed has sought to challenge in these proceedings. He could not do so, because, as a general rule, it is contrary to public policy and an abuse of process to allow proceedings by way of an ordinary action to challenge a decision affecting rights entitled to protection under public law. . . Nor is this a case where a private right has come into existence as a result of the council's public law decision, so that ordinary civil proceedings may be taken to require them to discharge their executive, as distinct from their decision-making, function . . . Here the public law decision, if there was one, not to continue to secure temporary accommodation to Mr Mohamed did not confer on him any private right. It is the public law decision itself that Mr Mohamed seeks to challenge. The only way he can do that is to seek leave to apply for judicial review. Such a procedure, in its provision for interim relief, is capable of providing much longer tenure pending determination of a substantive application than the four weeks' notice provided by the 1977 Act." Nourse LJ: "I rest my decision primarily on the simple proposition, derived from a purposive construction of both statutes, that accommodation made available for an applicant pursuant to section 63(1) of the Housing Act 1985 pending a decision as a result of the local housing authority's inquiries under section 62 cannot, as a general rule, be premises let as a dwelling under a tenancy [or][1] premises occupied as a dwelling under a licence within section 3(1) and (2B) respectively of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977. The context and purpose of section 63(1) have been fully considered by Auld LJ and I agree with the views he has expressed. Moreover, it cannot be a purpose of the 1977 Act to give protection to persons whose entirely transient needs bring them within section 63(1). True, the general rule may be displaced by an agreement between an authority and an applicant such as had been entered into in Eastleigh Borough Council v. Walsh [1985] 1 W.L.R. 525, or perhaps if the applicant's occupation is allowed to continue on a more than transient basis. But there was no such agreement or occupation here, nor anything else to take the case out of the general rule. Judge Phelan, having referred to the judgment of Lord Denning M.R. in Luganda v. Service Hotels Ltd [1969] 2 Ch. 209 at 218-219, said that that case was from a long time ago and that here he was dealing with the rather different situation of the homeless in 1994. He added: "Certainly persons spending a few nights in a hotel normally have a dwelling elsewhere. This is not the situation of the homeless who have no dwelling. Where else would the Plaintiff be dwelling, even if for a very short time?" Those observations suggest that the judge proceeded on an assumption that everyone must have a dwelling somewhere. In my view the 1977 Act makes no such assumption. Without some element of more than transient occupation, premises cannot properly be called a dwelling. Lord Denning's observations are as valid now as they were in 1969. The two authorities relied on by the judge, Thurrock Urban District Council v. Shina (1972) 23 P. & C.R. 205 and Thrasyvoulou v. London Borough of Hackney (1986) 18 H.L.R. 370, are readily distinguishable."
	Statute References omitted

Regina -v- Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte Lay and Gage
15 May 1995 Admn Mr Justice Latham	Agriculture, Administrative, European	Casemap 1 Cites
	The claimants sought damages for the wrong interpretation of the law by the Ministry, which had restricted their rights to milk quota. Held: Making an administrative decision which was in breach of European law was not enough in itself to justify a claim in damages, there had to be some misinterpretation of European law. The respondent acted bona fide, and made an excusable mistake as to the interpretation of a legislative provision which was not clear or precise. No claim for damages lay against them.

Bolton Metropolitan District Council and Others -v- Secretary of State for the Environment and Others (1995) 71 P & CR 309; (1995) 1 WLR 1176
25 May 1995 HL Lord Goff of Chievley, Lord Mustill, Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Lord Steyn	Planning, Costs, Administrative	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	There had been an application in 1986 for planning permission for a shopping centre in Trafford. There were two public enquiries, followed, as public policy changed by further representations. The plaintiff complained that the eventual decision letter was defective in failing to deal with issues of urban regeneration, and with reservation of areas for industrial use. Held: The Secretary of State had to state his reasons 'in sufficient detail to enable the reader to know what conclusion he had reached on the principal important controversial issues. To require him to refer to every material consideration, however insignificant, and to deal with every argument, however peripheral would be to impose and unjustifiable burden.' In this case, though the decision letter was open to criticism, it had achieved the necessary standard and stood. Lord Lloyd said: "In all questions to do with costs, the fundamental rule is that there are no rules. Costs are always in the discretion of the court, and a practice, however widespread and longstanding, must never be allowed to harden into a rule."

Regina -v- Ministry of Defence Ex Parte Smith and Others
7 Jun 1995 QBD Simon Brown LJ and Curtis J	Employment, Administrative, Human Rights, Discrimination, Armed Forces	Casemap 1 Citers
	An MOD ban on employing homosexuals was not Wednesbury unreasonable, even though it might be out of date. Pannick (counsel for the applicant, approved): ´The court may not interfere with the exercise of an administrative discretion on substantive grounds save where the court is satisfied that the decision is unreasonable in the sense that it is beyond the range of responses open to a reasonable decision-maker. But in judging whether the decision-maker has exceeded this margin of appreciation the human rights context is important. The more substantial the interference with human rights, the more the court will require by way of justification before it is satisfied that the decision is reasonable in the sense outlined above.' After referring to changes of attitude in society towards same-sex relationships: "I regard the progressive development and refinement of public and professional opinion at home and abroad, here very briefly described, as an important feature of this case. A belief which represented unquestioned orthodoxy in year X may have become questionable by year Y and unsustainable by year Z. Public and professional opinion are a continuum." Sir Thomas Bingham MR: "It is, inevitably, common ground that the United Kingdom's obligation, [under article 8] binding in international law, to respect and secure compliance with this article is not one that is enforceable by domestic courts. The relevance of the Convention in the present context is as background to the complaint of irrationality. The fact that a decision-maker failed to take account of convention obligations when exercising an administrative discretion is not of itself a ground for impugning that exercise of discretion."
	Statute References omitted

Regina -v- Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food ex parte Lower Burytown Farms Limited and National Farmers Union and others [1995] EWHC Admin 2; [1995] EWHC Admin 2
1 Aug 1995 Admn Mr Justice Laws	Agriculture, Administrative	Casemap 1 Cites
	The applicants were farmers who had claimed payments under the set-aside scheme. Payment was refused on the basis that they had claimed too much, but payment was ordered to be made after a ruling in Europe. They now sought judicial review of a refusal to pay interest on the payments withheld. The claims were wrong, but not fraudulent. Interest was payable if the sum claimed was owed as a debt. Held: The sums would not have been claimable by writ, and orders for review were granted.
	Statute References omitted
	Link[s] omitted

Regina -v- Ministry of Defence ex parte Smith; ex parte Grady [1995] EWCA Civ 22; [1996] 2 WLR 305; [1996] QB 517; [1996] IRLR 100; [1996] ICR 740; [1996] 1 All ER 257
3 Nov 1995 CA Sir Thomas Bingham MR, Henry LJ, Thorpe LJ	Employment, Armed Forces, Administrative, Human Rights	1 Cites 1 Citers
	Four appellants challenged the policy of the ministry to discharge homosexuals from the armed servces.
	Link[s] omitted

Highland Regional Council -v- British Railways Board
6 Nov 1995 IHCS	Administrative
	Full statutory procedure must be followed before board is allowed to close line.

Regina -v- Westminster City Council Ex Parte Ermakov [1996] 2 All ER 302
20 Nov 1995 CA Hutchinson LJ	Housing, Administrative	Casemap 1 Citers
	The applicant, having moved here from Greece, applied for emergency housing. The Council received no reply to its requests for corroboration sent to Greece. Housing was refused, but the officer later suggested that the real reason was that the applicant had accommodation available in Greece. Held: A Local Authority cannot later change the reasons given for a finding of intentional homelessness. The courts are not receptive to ex post facto justification of decisions. Hutchinson LJ considered the circumstances in which it was appropriate to admit and rely upon evidence adduced for the purpose of explaining or adding to the reasons for a decision made by a decision-maker, and said: "The Court can and, in appropriate cases, should admit evidence to elucidate or, exceptionally, correct or add to the reasons; but should, consistently with Steyn LJ's observations in ex p Graham, be very cautious about doing so. I have in mind cases where, for example, an error has been made in transcription or expression, or a word or words inadvertently omitted, or where the language used may be in some way lack in clarity. These examples are not intended to the exhaustive, but rather to reflect my view that the function of such evidence should generally be elucidation not fundamental alteration, confirmation not contradiction."
	Statute References omitted

Regina -v- Avon County Council Ex Parte Crabtree
29 Nov 1995 CA	Administrative
	Rules of natural justice need not always be followed if context requires.

Regina -v- Director of Passenger Rail Franchising, Ex Parte Save Our Railways and Others Etc
18 Dec 1995 CA	Administrative
	A requirement that proposed timetables should be 'based upon' existing timetables meant there should be no significant departures from such timetables.

Regina -v- Director of Passenger Rail Franchising, Ex Parte Save Our Railways and Others Etc
18 Dec 1995 CA	Administrative, Transport	Casemap
	A requirement that new services should be 'based upon' the present timetables did not mean that the services had to be at same level. It was possible that they may be a lesser service.