Administrative - 1996
Law relating to Administration, and government. See also Judicial Review, and constitutional law.
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This page lists 31 cases, and was prepared on 26 February 2010.
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| Regina -v- London Borough of Islington ex parte East [1996] ELR 74 |
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1996 AdmnKeene J |
Education, Administrative |

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| The court considered the obligation on an authority to consult: ".. the precise demands of consultation .. there according to the circumstances .. The extent and method of consultation must depend on the circumstances. Underlying what is required must be the concept of fairness" |
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| Regina -v- Executive Counsel of the JDS, ex parte Hipps (1996) (New Law Transcript 296069202) |
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1996 ChDDyson J |
Administrative |
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| The court considered the law as to whether disciplinary procedings should be stayed pending the outcome of civil proceedings. Held: The court was not reviewing the decision not to adjourn the proceedings, but exercising an original jurisdiction whether to grant a stay. That jurisdiction must be used sparingly. The court must balance any prejudice to the defendant against any public interest in the need to complete the disciplinary proceedings, and in assessing this the court will listen to the disciplinary body. Each case turns on its facts. |
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| Regina -v- Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Unilever plc [1996] STC 681 |
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1996 CASimon Brown LJ, Sir Thomas Bingham MR |
Taxes Management, Administrative |
Casemap
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1 Citers
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The revenue had refused to exercise a discretion in favour of the tapayer, who complained that this was unfair. Held: The commissioners are under a common law duty to treat taxpayers fairly, and not to discriminate without justification between taxpayers. It is not always a condition for a legitimate expectation to arise that there should be a clear, unambiguous and unqualified representation by the public authority, the test is whether the public authority has acted so unfairly that its conduct amounts to an abuse of power. Sir Thomas Bingham MR: "the categories of unfairness are not closed, and precedent should act as a guide not a cage" and "These points cumulatively persuade me that on the unique facts of this case the Revenue's argument should be rejected. On the history here, I consider that to reject Unilever's claims in reliance on the time limit, without clear and general advance notice, is so unfair as to amount to an abuse of power".
Simon Brown LJ: "'Unfairness amounting to an abuse of power' as envisaged in Preston and the other Revenue cases is unlawful not because it involves conduct such as would offend some equivalent private law principle, not principally indeed because it breaches a legitimate expectation that some different substantive decision will be taken, but rather because either it is illogical or immoral or both for a public authority to act with conspicuous unfairness and in that sense abuse its power. As Lord Donaldson MR said in R v ITC, ex p TSW: 'The test in public law is fairness, not an adaptation of the law of contract or estoppel'." |
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| Regina -v- Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council, ex parte Avdic [1996] 30 HLR 1 |
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2 Jan 1996 CALord Justice Simon Brown, Lord Justice Staughton |
Housing, Administrative |
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1 Citers
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A refugee from Bosnia moved from Kirklees to London, where she applied for accomodation as being homeless. Hammersmith accepted that she was owed a duty, but referred her back to Kirklees in September. Her solicitors then sent in more material which the LHA considered before, in January, refusing her again. The reconsideration of the case was voluntary.
Lord Justice Simon Brown (obiter): "In my judgment, this council went as far as it possibly could in construing section 61 in a way favourable to this appellant. By no stretch of the imagination could [the cousin's] presence in the neighbouring borough be regarded as a family association such as to give the appellant a local connection with the respondent under section 61(1)(c). Indeed [counsel] does not so submit. . . . To my mind it is far from clear that an appellant's claim to be housed under Part III of the 1985 Act can be improved in this fashion simply because the local authority accede to a request to review the matter, as this local authority has done after the initial decision was taken." Though it was unnecessary to deal definitively with the point the Lord Justice questioned whether the local authority should have acceded to the request for a review. Simon Brown considered the nature of the authority's residual discretion: "Residual Discretion. That such a discretion exists cannot be doubted. Plainly a local authority are entitled to house an applicant even if he or she has an obvious local connection with some other borough and none at all with their own. To my mind that proposition hardly needs the citation of authority, although I record that it is so stated in R v London Borough of Newham, ex p London Borough of Tower Hamlets (1993) 23 HLR 62 at 71. It should, however, be remembered that this particular legislation is concerned essentially with a local authority's housing function rather than with their social services function. It is not to be thought that a London borough, very hard pressed as doubtless they all are in connection with their public housing stock, will very readily accept on an entirely voluntary basis a housing obligation which, by virtue of section 67, they are perfectly entitled to refer elsewhere and which, indeed some other borough expressly accepts. Nevertheless, I repeat, such a discretion exists. . . . " |
| Housing Act 1985 65(2) 67(2)(a) |
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| Three Rivers District Council -v- Bank of England |
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8 Jan 1996 ComC |
Administrative |
Casemap
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| Regina -v- London Borough of Newham ex parte Bibi, Regina -v- London Borough of Newham ex parte Al-Nashed [1996] EWHC Admin 4 |
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18 Jan 1996 Admn |
Administrative, Local Government, Housing |
Casemap
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1 Citers
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| Link[s] omitted |
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| Regina -v- Home Secretary, ex parte Sherwin Unreported, 16 February 1996 |
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16 Feb 1996 QBD |
Administrative |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| The Benefits Agency was part of the Department of Social Security, having been set up under the prerogative power pursuant to the Prime Minister's statement of 18 February 1988. |
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| Regina -v- Secretary of State for the Environment and Another Ex Parte Kirkstall Valley Campaign Ltd |
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20 Mar 1996 QBD |
Administrative |
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| The rules as to the disqualification of a decision maker for bias were not limited in scope to judicial decisions. |
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| Regina -v- Registrar General for England and Wales Ex Parte P; Same -v- Same Ex Parte G |
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27 Mar 1996 QBD |
Administrative, Discrimination |
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| Sexual identity is fixed at birth. It is not an error capable of being corrected by the Registrar. The Registrar has no power to alter birth register to change the sex as registered after gender re-assignment surgery. |
| Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 1(1) 29(3) |
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| In Re A Subpoena Issued by the Commissioner for Local Administration Times, 04 April 1996 |
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2 Apr 1996 QBDJustice Carnwath |
Administrative, Local Government |
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| Local ombudsman can investigate adoptions and to get confidential papers. His task was not that of a party to litigation, and he may well require more papers than a party to litigation might be entitled to. Even so, and though the sup poena ad duces tecum was confirmed, the Commissioner was invited to reconsider and reduce the scope of the papers requested. |
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| Three Rivers District Council -v- Bank of England [1996] 3 All ER 558; [1996] 3 All ER 634 |
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22 Apr 1996 QBDClarke J |
Constitutional, Administrative, Torts - Other |

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| In an allegation of misfeasance in public office, a complainant who says he has been affected by the alleged misfeasance, has sufficient locus standi to claim. Parliamentary materials are admissible to discover purpose of an Act, and not just in cases of ambiguity. "The tort of misfeasance in public office is concerned with a deliberate and dishonest wrongful abuse of the powers given to a public officer. It is not to be equated with torts based on an intention to injure, although . . it has some similarities to them. . . Malice, in the sense of intention to injure the plaintiff or a person in a class of which the plaintiff is a member, and knowledge by the officer both that he has no power to do the act complained of and that the act will probably injure the plaintiff or a person in a class of which the plaintiff is a member are alternative, not cumulative, ingredients of the tort. To act with such knowledge is to act in a sufficient sense maliciously." |
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| Percy and Another -v- Hall and Others [1997] QB 924 |
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31 May 1996 QBDSimon Brown LJ, Schliemann LJ |
Torts - Other, Police, Administrative |
Casemap
1 Citers
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There was no wrongful arrest where the bylaw under which it was made was invalid. The question is the belief of the arresting officers. The effect of retrospective legislation is not always fully worked through. English law provides no cause of action for invalid administrative acts as such. A "second actor" may be blameless if he detains a person in reliance on what appears to be a lawful authority, whether issued by a "first actor" or otherwise.
Simon Brown LJ said of a byelaw under consideration: "Better . . to treat the instrument as valid unless so uncertain in its language as to have no ascertainable meaning, or so unclear in its effect as to be incapable of certain application in any case." |
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| John Seifert -v- Pensions Ombudsman; E Kural; P Helm; a Lynch; Fairmount Trustee Services Limited; Seifert Limited; Guardian Assurance Plc Co, Anthony Lynch; Philip Helm -v- Julian Farrand and Erdogan Kural [1996] EWHC Admin 13 |
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1 Jun 1996 Admn |
Administrative |
Casemap
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1 Citers
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| The Ombudsman must follow both statutory rules and natural justice principles. |
| Pensions Schemes Act 1993 149(1) |
| [ Bailii ] |
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| Regina -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex Parte Urmaza [1996] COD 479 |
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23 Jul 1996 QBDSedley J |
Immigration, Administrative |
Casemap
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| A deportee after a marriage was to be treated in the same way as others despite desertion from ship. The application of the Home Secretary's discretion under the Policy was in issue. The case "raises a novel question about the extent to which departmental policy is amenable to judicial review". "these legal controls upon the deployment of discretion and the implementation of policy demonstrate that the courts do not limit themselves to a bare rationality test ... such cases, as authority demonstrates, are not limited to irrationality; they include cases where an international policy has been disregarded or misapplied by one or more of a Minister's officials". And "the modern approach to a departmental policy document" by saying that "it follows that those cases in which the challenge has been predicated upon pure irrationality are illustrative but not exhaustive of the grounds of challenge". Policies should be applied consistently: "… similar situations not to be treated differently and different situations not to be treated in the same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified." |
| Immigration Act 1971 11(5) |
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| Boddington -v- British Transport Police |
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23 Jul 1996 QBD |
Administrative |

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| A defendant may not challenge the validity of bylaws in course of a criminal prosecution. |
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| Regina -v- Monopolies and Mergers Commission Ex Parte Stagecoach Holdings Plc |
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23 Jul 1996 QBD |
Administrative, Natural Justice |
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| Monopolies and Mergers Commission decisions are to be judged on an test of whether they comply with natural justice and not as to whether only they are Wednesbury unreasonable. |
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| Stovin -v- Wise, Norfolk County Council (Third Party) [1996] AC 923; [1996] UKHL 15; [1996] 3 All ER 801; [1996] 3 WLR 389 |
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24 Jul 1996 HLLord Hoffmann, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead |
Administrative, Personal Injury, Local Government |

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The mere existence of statutory power to remedy a defect cannot of itself create a duty of care to do so. A highway authority need not have a duty of care to highway users because of its duty to maintain the highway. The two stage test "involves starting with a prima facie assumption that a duty of care exists if it is reasonably foreseeable that carelessness may cause damage and then asking whether there are any considerations which ought to 'negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of it may arise'. Subsequent decisions in this House and the Privy Council have preferred to approach the question the other way round, starting with situations in which a duty has been held to exist and then asking whether there are considerations of analogy, policy, fairness and justice for extending it to cover a new situation: see for example Lord Bridge in Caparo (supra) ... It can be said that, provided that the considerations of policy etc. are properly analysed, it should not matter whether one starts from one end or the other. On the other hand the assumption from which one starts makes a great deal of difference if the analysis is wrong. The trend of authorities has been to discourage the assumption that anyone who suffers loss is prima facie entitled to compensation from the person (preferably insured or a public authority) whose act or omission can be said to have caused it. The default position is that he is not." "A common law duty must not be inconsistent with the performance by the authority of its statutory duties and powers in the manner intended by Parliament, or contrary in any other way to the presumed intention of Parliament." and "the minimum preconditions for basing a duty of care upon the existence of a statutory power, if it can be done at all, are, first, that it would in the circumstances have been irrational not to have exercised the power, so that there was in effect a public law duty to act, and secondly, that there are exceptional grounds for holding that the policy of the statute requires compensation to be paid to persons who suffer loss because the power was not exercised."
Lord Hoffmann "In my view the creation of a duty of care upon a highway authority, even on grounds of irrationality in failing to exercise a power, would inevitably expose the authority's budgetary decisions to judicial inquiry. This would distort the priorities of local authorities, which would be bound to try to play safe by increasing their spending on road improvements rather than risk enormous liabilities for personal injury accidents. They will spend less on education or social services. I think that it is important, before extending the duty of care owed by public authorities, to consider the cost to the community of the defensive measures which they are likely to take in order to avoid liability. . ." Statutory bodies do not occupy a special position so far as liability for nuisance is concerned unless statute puts them in that special position: "Since Mersey Docks and Harbour Board Trustees v Gibbs (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 93 it has been clear law that in the absence of express statutory authority, a public body is in principle liable for torts in the same way as a private person. But its statutory powers or duties may restrict its liability. For example, it may be authorised to do something which necessarily involves committing what would otherwise be a tort. In such a case it will not be liable: Allen v Gulf Oil Refining Ltd [1981] AC 1001. Or it may have discretionary powers which enable it to do things to achieve a statutory purpose notwithstanding that they involve a foreseeable risk of damage to others. In such a case, a bona fide exercise of the discretion will not attract liability: . . . .". |
| Highways Act 1980 41(1) |
| Link[s] omitted |
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| Stevenage Borough Football Club Ltd -v- the Football League Ltd |
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1 Aug 1996 ChD |
Administrative, Judicial Review |
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| The Football League is a body subject to judicial review, since it exercises its control over members in the public interest. |
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| Stevenage Borough Football Club Limited -v- Football League Limited [1996] EWCA Civ 569; [1996] EWCA Civ 570 |
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6 Aug 1996 CA |
Administrative |
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| Unfair changes to the rules for the promotion of sports clubs between leagues could not be challenged retrospectively after the team in question had impliedly accepted the rules. |
| [ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ] |
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| Regina -v- West Sussex Family Health Services ex parte Boots Ltd [1996] EWHC Admin 65 |
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21 Aug 1996 Admn |
Health Professions, Administrative |
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| [ Bailii ] |
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| Regina -v- Rent Officer Service and Another Ex Parte Muldoon; Same -v- Same Ex Parte Kelly |
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12 Sep 1996 HL |
Judicial Review, Administrative |
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| The Secretary of State has no locus to insist on joining in on judicial review proceedings despite being the eventual payer of the benefit payment decision being reviewed. |
| Rules of the Supreme Court O 53 r593) |
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| Regina -v- Broadcasting Complaints Commission ex parte Barclay [1996] EWHC Admin 83 |
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4 Oct 1996 Admn |
Media, Administrative |
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| Link[s] omitted |
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| Regina -v- Broadcasting Complaints Commission Ex Parte Barclay and Another |
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11 Oct 1996 QBD |
Media, Administrative |
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| The Commission can only consider a claim of invasion of privacy after a programme has been broadcast. |
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| Anderton and Co (a Firm) ex parte -v- George F Cawood [1996] EWCA Civ 721 |
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15 Oct 1996 CA |
Legal Professions, Administrative |
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| Link[s] omitted |
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| Regina -v- Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration ex parte Maurice and Audrey Balchin [1996] EWHC Admin 152 |
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25 Oct 1996 AdmnSedley J |
Administrative |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| The role of the Parliamentary Commissioner "as an investigator is not limited to the strict terms of the issue posed by the complaint". Sedley J accepted that injustice had been widely interpreted: ". . so as to cover not merely injury redressible in a court of law, but also 'the sense of outrage aroused by unfair or incompetent administration, even where the complainant has suffered no actual loss'" It followed "that the defence familiar in legal proceedings, that because the outcome would have been the same in any event there has been no redressible wrong, does not run in an investigation by the commissioner." |
| Link[s] omitted |
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| Regina -v- Leicester Crown Court ex parte Kaur [1996] EWHC Admin 170 |
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30 Oct 1996 AdmnPotts J |
Criminal Practice, Administrative |
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| The claimant sought leave to bring judicial review of decisian forst to estreat her recognisance of £150,000 and second not to deal with her complaint about the behaviour of the Crown Court. Held: The request for a review was out of time. The decisions followed a finding that the applicant was both unreliable in her evidence and culpable in failing to ensure the attendance of her son for trial. The request was refused. |
| Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 31(1) |
| Link[s] omitted |
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| Regina -v- Secretary of State for Home Department ex parte Gangadeen [1996] EWHC Admin 237; [1998] INLR 206 |
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15 Nov 1996 AdmnHirst LJ Swinton Thomas LJ and Sir Brian Neill |
Administrative |
Casemap

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| The Court should not intervene in a minister's decision in application of his own policy unless he disregarded it or the decision was inherently irrational. |
| Link[s] omitted |
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| Regina -v- Press Complaints Commission and Ian Stewart-Brady (By Next Friend Graeme Edward Kerr) [1996] EWCA Civ 986; (1996) 9 Admin LR 274 |
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18 Nov 1996 CA |
Media, Administrative |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| Judicial review of a decision of the Press Complaints Commission was not appropriate. |
| Link[s] omitted |
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| Regina -v- Secretary of State for Home Department and Governor of Her Majesty's Prison Risley ex parte Hargreaves, Briggs and Green [1996] EWCA Civ 1006; [1997] 1 WLR 906 |
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20 Nov 1996 CAHirst LJ |
Prisons, Criminal Practice, Administrative |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| No sufficient expectation which could form the basis of a judicial review arose from an agreement for prison home leave which was later denied. The only legitimate expectation of the prisoners was to have their applications individually considered in light of whatever policy was in force at the time. |
| Link[s] omitted |
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| In Re L (a Minor) (Adoption: Disclosure of Information) [1996] EWCA Civ 1195 |
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12 Dec 1996 CA |
Adoption, Administrative, Adoption |
Casemap
1 Cites
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| A request was made for an order that the Registrar General should provide information from his registers and records to enable a registered charity called the Post Adoption Centre to trace the applicant's adopted daughter P, who had been made the subject of an adoption order very many years ago. Held: A clear benefit to an adopted child is needed, before any disclosure is to be made to the natural parent. The words of section 50(5) were mandatory, and disclosure should be given in only exceptional cases. |
| Adoption Act 1976 50(5) |
| Link[s] omitted |
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| Regina -v- Beatrix Potter School ex parte Kanner [1996] EWHC Admin 397 |
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20 Dec 1996 Admn |
Education, Administrative |
Casemap
1 Cites
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| The applicant's child had been offered a place by the respondent. The offer was withdrawn. Held: The school when deciding was entitled to look to the need for efficiency in education. On appeal, the committee may go against that need. The appeal committee refused the child's appeal on the grounds of efficiency. Many more children had applied for places than were available, and many more had succeeded at appeal. The school needed urgently to reduce the numbers, and claimed the offer had been made without authority. Then arrangements were made to increase capacity, and two children who had been offered places withdrew. The appeal was on the ground of the school's failure to take account of parental choice, and on the legitimate expectation created. Held: It was impossible to describe the withdrawal of the offer as Wednesbury unreasonable, and the appeal failed. |
| Education Act 1980 6 - Education Reform Act 1988 26 |
| Link[s] omitted |
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