Adoption - 1970- 1979
Law relating to Adoption and associated issues including procedure.
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This page lists 6 cases, and was prepared on 04 October 2008.
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| In re W (An Infant) [1971] AC 682 |
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1971 HLLord Hailsham LC |
Adoption |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| The court considered the reasonability of parental disagreement in applications for adoption: "Two reasonable parents can perfectly reasonably come to opposite conclusions on the same set of facts without forfeiting their title to be regarded as reasonable. The question in any given case is whether a parental veto comes within the band of possible reasonable decisions and not whether it is right or mistaken. Not every reasonable exercise of judgment is right, and not every mistaken exercise of judgment is unreasonable. There is a band of decisions within which no court should seek to replace the individual's judgment with his own." and ". . . the test is reasonableness and not anything else. It is not culpability. It is not indifference. It is not failure to discharge parental duties. It is reasonableness, and reasonableness in the context of the totality of the circumstances. But, although welfare per se is not the test, the fact that a reasonable parent does pay regard to the welfare of his child must enter into the question of reasonableness as a relevant factor. It is relevant in all cases if and to the extent that a reasonable parent would take it into account. It is decisive in those cases where a reasonable parent must so regard it." |
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| In re D (An Infant) (Adoption: Parent's Consent) [1977] AC 602 |
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1977 HLLord Wilberforce |
Adoption |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| The father opposed adoption of a child by the mother and her new husband. The House was asked whether his opposition was unreasonable: "What, in my understanding, is required is for the court to ask whether the decision, actually made by the father in his individual circumstances, is, by an objective standard, reasonable or unreasonable. This involves considering how a father in the circumstances of the actual father, but (hypothetically) endowed with a mind and temperament capable of making reasonable decisions, would approach a complex question involving a judgment as to the present and as to the future and the probable impact of these upon a child." |
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| X and Y -v- United Kingdom (1978) 12 D & R 32 |
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1978 ECHR |
Human Rights, Adoption |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| (Commission) A boy of 14, X's nephew, was adopted under Indian law by two Sikhs, who were UK citizens. He was 14 years when adopted. He had been denied entry clearance into the UK on the grounds that, even if the adoption was valid according to Indian law, there had been no genuine transfer of parental responsibility to X, since Y's natural parents were able to care for him. The Commission rejected the applicants' complaint under article 8 because: “This adoption is neither recognised nor eligible for recognition in English law. The first applicant has apparently since made financial contributions towards the upkeep of the second applicant. However, throughout his life, both before and after the adoption, he has lived with his natural parents in India. It appears that they have been and are fully capable of supporting him. In these circumstances the applicants have not, in the Commission's opinion, established a relationship between them which amounted at any material time to “family life” within the meaning of Article 8, notwithstanding their blood relationship and any legal relationship created under Indian law by the adoption. The Commission does not consider that the second applicant's relationship with the first applicant is at all comparable to that of a new-born child with its parents, where “family life” might be held to exist from the moment of birth.” |
| Statute References omitted |
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| Marckx -v- Belgium 6833/74; (1979) 2 EHRR 330; [1979] ECHR 2 |
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13 Jun 1979 ECHRSir Gerald Fitzmaurice |
Human Rights, Children, Adoption, Wills and Probate |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| The complaint related to the manner in which parents were required to adopt their own illegitimate child in order to increase his rights. Under Belgian law, no legal bond between an unmarried mother and her child results from the mere fact of birth. A recognised "illegitimate" child's rights of inheritance on intestacy are less than those of a "legitimate" child. Held: The Belgian system nfringed the right to private and family life by reducing inheritance rights for illegitimate children. The object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities. Nevertheless, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective ‘respect’ for family life. Where there are no property rights which pre-exist the interference complained of, the article is not engaged. Family life “includes at least the ties between near relatives, for instance, those between grandparents and grandchildren, since such relatives play a considerable part in family life.” Article 8 makes no distinction between the legitimate and illegitimate family. |
| Statute References omitted |
| Link[s] omitted |
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