Adoption - 1995

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This page lists 10 cases, and was prepared on 26 February 2010.

Re H (Adoption: Disclosure of Information ) [1995] 1 FLR 236
1995 Thorpe J	Adoption	Casemap 1 Citers
	An application was made by the sister of an adopted child for disclosure of the records held in order to allow her to make contact and to warn her of the fact that she might have an inherited genetic disease. Held: The jurisdiction to grant such an order "should be exercised very sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances." and "Mr Blake, for the Registrar General, contends that as a matter of public policy the discretion should be exercised very sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances. He prays in aid of his submission the decision of His Honour Judge Blagden almost 40 years ago and the cautious language with which Judge Blagden acceded to the application in circumstances which were clearly exceptional. Mr McFarlane, for NORCAP [the agency seeking the order], submits that had Parliament intended that the discretion should only be exercised very sparingly, and in exceptional circumstances, it would surely have so stated. In the absence of any statutory words Mr McFarlane submits that the burden upon the applicant should be no heavier than the ordinary burden to show cause by establishing a case of sufficient weight and justification so as to persuade the judge of the reasonableness of the order sought. Of the rival submissions I prefer that of Mr McFarlane. Since Judge Blagden considered the parallel section in an earlier statute, attitudes to adoption, its consequences, and the importance of the biological origin and the psychological attachments have changed profoundly."
	Adoption Act 1976 50(5)

D -v- Grampian Regional Council 1995 SC (HL) 1
1995 HL Jauncey L	Scotland, Adoption	Casemap
	The House discussed the nature of an adoption order: "The Act of 1978 provides a comprehensive code for adoption and it is perfectly clear that the whole procedure is intended to produce a permanent result for the adopted child. An adoption order once made is irrevocable only in circumstances which will have no practical effect upon the child's day to day life in contradistinction to an order for custody or access which is always reviewable by the court when circumstances demand".
	Adoption Act 1978

In Re T (A Minor) (Contact Order)
13 Jan 1995 CA	Children, Adoption
	A contact order which was not strictly necessary should not be made in adoption proceedings.
	Adoption Act 1976

In Re D and Another (Minors) (Adoption: Access)
10 Mar 1995 HL	Adoption, Scotland
	A mother may not apply for access rights after her children had been placed with an adoption agency.
	Law Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act 1986

Re B (Adoption Order: Jurisdiction To Set Aside) [1995] EWCA Civ 48; [1995] Fam 239; [1995] 3 FCR 671; [1995] Fam Law 469; [1995] 3 WLR 40; [1995] 3 All ER 333; [1995] 2 FLR 1
17 Mar 1995 CA Swinton Thomas LJ	Adoption
	The appellant was an adult in his thirties. He had been adopted at 3 months by an orthodox Jewish couple, and brought up as a Jew. In reality, his father was a Muslim Arab from Kuwait, and his mother was a Roman Catholic. He wished to settle in Israel, but was suspected of being an Arab spy and was asked to leave. He was also unable to settle in Kuwait. Having discovered his true origins, he applied to have the adoption order set aside. He now appealed against refusal of the order. Held: The appeal failed. Swinton Thomas LJ said: "In my judgment such an application faces insuperable hurdles. An adoption order has a quite different standing to almost every other order made by a court. It provides the status of the adopted child and of the adoptive parents. The effect of an adoption order is to extinguish any parental responsibility of the natural parents. Once an adoption order has been made, the adoptive parents stand to one another and the child in precisely the same relationship as if they were his legitimate parents, and the child stands in the same relationship to them as to legitimate parents. Once an adoption order has been made the adopted child ceases to be the child of his previous parents and becomes the child for all purposes of the adopters as though he were their legitimate child."
	Adoption Act 1976 52
	Link[s] omitted

Re B (Adoption: Setting Aside) [1995] 2 Fam L R 1
22 Mar 1995 CA	Adoption	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	Where the child's natural mother did not receive service of the adoption petition and had no other knowledge that an attempt was being made to adopt the child; in that event it can be considered that there is a fundamental injustice to the natural mother. There was no statutory basis for the setting aside of an adoption order, despite there having been a fundamental mistake. The natural procdure is an appeal.

In Re T (Minors) (Adopted Children: Contact) [1996] Fam 34
8 Aug 1995 CA Balcombe LJ	Adoption	Casemap 1 Citers
	A half-sister had been assured that when her half-sister was adopted she would be given annual reports as to her progress. No report was provided. When she enquired and complained, she was told that the adopters had changed their minds and that it was not in the children's interests for the report to be provided. Furthermore, confidentiality precluded any explanation of the reasons for that refusal. She applied to the court for leave to make an application for contact. The judge refused it. She appealed. Held: She succeeded. The court balanced carefully on the one hand the right of an adoptive family to protection of confidentiality and their right to bring up the adopted child in the way that they thought appropriate, and the inappropriateness of enforcing informal arrangements which might no longer be appropriate and which therefore fell to the prospective adopters to terminate. On the other hand, for the applicant it was argued that if this decision was allowed to stand it meant that adoptive parents could effectively ignore any agreement entered into in the best interests of the child in question, and that that would in fact result in more contests and more difficulties in prospective applications. The court came down firmly in favour of the latter proposition. Guidelines were given on procedures for maintaining parental contact after adoption order. Reasons beyond 'not in Child's interest' are to be given before contact may be withdrawn. Balcombe LJ: "I am not saying that it should never be open to adopters to change their minds and resile from an informal agreement made at the time of the adoption. But if they do so they should, as Butler-Sloss LJ said in In re T (A Minor) (Contact After Adoption) [1995] 2 FCR 537, 543 give their reasons clearly so that the other party to the arrangement, and if necessary the court, may have the opportunity to consider the adequacy of those reasons. Nor need adopters fear that their reasons, when given, will be subjected to critical legal analysis. The judges who hear family cases are well aware of the stresses and strains to which adopters in the position of Mr and Mrs H are subject and a simple explanation of their reasons in non-legal terms would usually be all that is necessary. In my judgment where adopters in the position of Mr and Mrs H simply refuse to provide an explanation for their change of heart, particularly where, as here, the contact envisaged - the provision of a report - is of a nature which is most unlikely to be disruptive of the children's lives, it is not appropriate for the court to accept that position without more."

In Re AB (A Minor)(Adoption: Unmarried Couple)
10 Aug 1995 FD	Adoption
	It was not possible to make adoption order in favour of an unmarried couple, but adoption could be made to one with residence to other.
	Adoption Act 1976 14

Re D (Minors) (Adoption Reports: Confidentiality) [1996] AC 593; [1995] UKHL 17; [1996] 1 FCR 205; [1995] 3 WLR 483; [1995] 4 All ER 385; [1995] 2 FLR 687; [1996] Fam Law 8
1 Sep 1995 HL Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Mustill, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead	Adoption, Administrative	Casemap 1 Cites
	The House considered whether it was right for a tribunal to see and rely upon papers not disclosed to the parties. Lord Mustill: "a first principle of fairness that each party to a judicial process shall have an opportunity to answer by evidence and argument any adverse material which the tribunal may take into account when forming its opinion. This principle is lame if the party does not know the substance of what is said against him (or her), for what he does not know he cannot answer." and "It is a fundamental principle of fairness that a party is entitled to the disclosure of all materials which may be taken into account by the court when reaching a decision adverse to that party."
	Link[s] omitted

Re C (Adoption: Parties) [1995] 2 FLR 483
29 Nov 1995 CA	Adoption
	There is no obligation to join an unmarried father without parental rights, in adoption proceedings. The choice is the mother's.
	Adoption Rules 1984 15(2)