Agency - 1900- 1929
Law relating to Agency, Powers of Attorney, Enduring Powers of Attorney etc.
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This page lists 13 cases, and was prepared on 25 August 2008.
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| Hovenden and Sons –v- Millhoff [1900] 83 LT 41 |
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1900 Romer LJ |
Agency, Torts - Other |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| "The courts of law in this country have always strongly condemned and, when they could, punished the bribing of agents, and have taken a strong view as to what constitutes a bribe. I believe the mercantile community as a whole appreciate and approve of the court's views on the subject. But some persons undoubtedly hold laxer views. Not that these persons like the ugly word "bribe" or would excuse the giving of a bribe if that word be used, but they differ from the courts in their view as to what constitutes a bribe. It may, therefore, be well to point out what is a bribe in the eyes of the law. Without attempting an exhaustive definition I may say that the following is one statement of what constitutes a bribe. If a gift be made to a confidential agent with a view of inducing the agent to act in favour of the donor in relation to transactions between the donor and the agent's principal and that gift is secret as between the donor and the agent – that is to say , without the knowledge and consent of the principal - then the gift is a bribe in the view of the law. If a bribe be once established to the court's satisfaction then certain rules apply. Amongst them the following are now established, and, in my opinion, rightly established in the interests of morality with the view of discouraging the practice of bribery. First, the court will not enquire into the donor's motive in giving the bribe, nor allow evidence to be gone into as to the motive. Secondly, the court will presume in favour of the principal and as against the briber and the agent bribed, that the agent was influenced by the bribe; and this presumption is irrebuttable. Thirdly, if the agent be a confidential buyer of goods for his principal from the briber, the court will assume as against the briber that the true price of the goods as between him and the purchaser must be taken to be less than the price paid to, or charged by the vendor by, at any rate, the amount or value of the bribe. If the purchaser alleges loss or damage beyond this, he must prove it ". |
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| King -v- Hutton [1900] 2 QB 504 CA; [1900] 83 LT 68 |
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1900 CA |
Trusts, Agency |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| "The most compelling indicator for or against a trusteeship of an agent's receipts is the nature of the account agreed to be kept by the agent with his principal. If, after each individual transaction or group of related transactions he effects for his principal, he is to pay over the proceeds in his hands – minus any commission payable – then he will ordinarily be a trustee. But where an agent is effecting both sales and purchases for his principal, or is discharging liabilities for his principal out of monies received, and he keeps a running account with periodic settlement dates at which he pays over the balance of account (if any), he will, ordinarily, be a debtor only – the debtor-only conclusion being reinforced if there are present in the accounts (1) set offs, other than for commission, or (2) interest charges on credits and debits". |
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| The Winkfield [1902] P 42 |
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1902
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Agency |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| A bailee in possession has a right to recover for loss or damage to his bailor's goods even though he would have had a good defence to an action by the bailor. |
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| Millar Son & Co -v- Radford (1903) 19 TLR 575 |
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1903 CASir Richard Henn Collins MR |
Agency, Contract |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| For an estate agent to recover his commission, it was "necessary" to show that the agent's introduction was an "efficient" (namely effective) cause in bringing about the transaction. |
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| Starkey -v- The Bank of England [1903] AC 114 |
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1903 HLEarl of Halsbury LC |
Agency, Financial Services |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| Frederick and Edgar Oliver jointly owned Consols and bank stock. Frederick instructed Starkey a stockbroker to sell them. Frederick signed the necessary powers of attorney in his own name and forged Edgar's signature. Starkey presented the powers of attorney to the Bank of England, who duly affected the transfer. Once the forgery was established the Bank was liable to replace the Consols and the stock, and sued Starkey for breach of warranty of authority. Held: Starkey was liable. The Earl of Halsbury LC set out the notion that it was necessary to establish a contract between the purported principal and the plaintiff as illogical, and confusing the question whether the facts established a contractual warranty between plaintiff and defendant, with the question as to whether a contract follows in consequence of a representation. He said: "that which does enforce the liability is this - that under the circumstances of this document being presented to the Bank for the purpose of being acted upon, and being acted upon on the representation that the agent had the authority of the principal, which he had not, that does import an obligation - the contract being for good consideration - an undertaking on the part of the agent that the thing he represented to be genuine was genuine." |
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| Bartram & Sons -v- Lloyd [1904] 90 LTR 357 |
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1904
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Agency |
Casemap

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| A secret commission had been agreed and paid to the agent. The court was asked whether the principal had elected to affirm the contract with the other party at a later meeting when he was given some information about what had happened. Held: He had not. The principal had still not made his election with full knowledge of the material facts. There had been an inadequate initial disclosure. |
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| Stait -v- Fenner [1912] 2 Ch 504 |
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1912 Neville J |
Trusts, Agency, Landlord and Tenant |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| The beneficiary under a bare trust is not thereby constituted the agent of the trustee. A break clause was operable by the tenant if he gave notice and if he should pay all the rent and perform all the covenants up to the determination of the lease. The question for the court was whether that condition for payment and performance was a condition precedent to be performed before the expiration of the term: "...it must have been intended, in construing a covenant of this kind, that the question whether the lease does or does not exist after the expiration of the seven or fourteen years should be capable of being decided there and then and not left to future contingency leaving both the lessor and the lessee in uncertainty as to whether they are bound by the lease or whether they are not." In this cases the condition was a condition precedent. |
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| Les Affreteurs Reunis SA -v- Leopold Walford (London) Ltd [1919] AC 801 |
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1919 HLLord Birkenhead LC, Viscount Finlay and Lords Atkinson Wrenbury |
Agency, Transport, Contract |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
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| With regard to Robertson -v- Wait: "My Lords, so far as I am aware, that case has not before engaged the attention of this House, and I think it right to say plainly that I agree with that decision and I agree with the reasoning, shortly as it is expressed, upon which the decision was founded. In this connection I would refer to the well-known case of In re Empress Engineering Company. In the judgment of Sir George Jessel MR the principle is examined which, in my view, underlies and is the explanation of the decision in Robertson v. Wait. The Master of the Rolls uses this language: ‘So, again, it is quite possible that one of the parties to the agreement may be the nominee or trustee of the third person. As Lord Justice James suggested to me in the course of the argument, a married woman may nominate somebody to contract on her behalf, but then the person makes the contract really as trustee for somebody else, and it is because he contracts in that character that the cestui que trust can take the benefit of the contract.’ It appears to me plain that for convenience, and under long established practice, the broker in such cases, in effect, nominates the charterer to contract on his behalf, influenced probably by the circumstance that there is always a contract between charterer and owner in which this stipulation, which is to enure to the benefit of the broker, may very conveniently be inserted. In these cases the broker, on ultimate analysis, appoints the charterer to contract on his behalf. I agree therefore with the conclusion arrived at by all the learned judges in Robertson v. Wait, that in such cases charterers can sue as trustees on behalf of the broker." |
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| Said -v- Butt [1920] 3 KB 497 |
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1920 McCardie J |
Contract, Agency |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| The plaintiff wanted to go to a play's first night. He had fallen out with the management of the theatre, and knew that he would not get a ticket in his own name. He got a friend to go to the theatre and buy a ticket for him without disclosing the fact. When he turned up for the performance he was refused admission. Held: His claim was dismissed. A first night is a special event with characteristics of its own, and tickets are only given or sold to persons whom the management selects and wishes to favour. The purchaser's identity was a material element in the formation of the contract and that the failure to disclose the fact that the ticket was bought on his behalf prevented the plaintiff from asserting that he was the undisclosed principal. |
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| Camillo Tank Steamship Company Limited -v- Alexandria Engineering Works (1921) 38 TLR 134 |
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1921
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Agency |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| Viscount Cave (dissenting on other points): "The expression "account stated".....has more than one meaning. It sometimes means a claim to payment made by one party and admitted by the other to be correct. An account stated in this sense is no more than an admission of a debt out of court; and whilst it is no doubt cogent evidence against the admitting party, and throws upon him the burden of proving that the debt is not due, it may, like any other admission, be shown to have been made in error." |
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| Prager -v- Blatspiel, Stamp and Heacock Ltd [1924] 1 KB 566 |
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1924 McCardie J |
Constitutional, Agency |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| McCardie J spoke of the demand of an expanding society for an expanding common law. An agent must act bona fide in the interests of his principal. |
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| J.C Houghton & Co -v- Northard, Lowe & Wills [1928] AC 1 |
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1928 HL |
Agency |
Casemap

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| The law does not make the unreal assumption that agents will reveal to their principals the fraud which they are comitting on them. |
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| Reckitt -v- Barnett Pembroke & Slater Ltd [1929] AC 176 |
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1929 HL |
Agency |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| The House was asked whether a power of attorney included a power to draw cheques on the principal's bank account in order to pay his own debts. The Court of Appeal by a majority, Russell J dissenting, had held that it did having regard to the terms of a letter written by the principal to his bankers. Held: The decision was reversed. A power of attorney is to be construed strictly. The House adopted the statement of Russell LJ: "the primary object of a power of attorney is to enable the attorney to act in the management of his principal's affairs. An attorney cannot in the absence of a clear power to do so, make presents to himself or to others of his principal's property " |
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