Animals - 1985- 1989

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This page lists 1 cases, and was prepared on 25 August 2008.

Breeden -v- Lampard 21 March 1985 (Unreported)
21 Mar 1985 CA Oliver and Lloyd LJJ and Sir George Waller	Animals	Casemap 1 Citers
	A riding accident occurred at a cubbing meet. The plaintiff's leg was injured when the defendant's horse kicked out. A claim was advanced under section 2. This horse, like any horse, was liable to kick out when approached too closely, or too quickly, from behind, but there was no evidence to suggest that it was anything more than a normal 5-year old horse. Held: If liability is based on the possession of some abnormal characteristic known to the owner, then there is no sense in imposing liability when the animal is behaving in a perfectly normal way for all animals of that species in those circumstances, even though it would not be normal for those animals to behave in that way in other circumstances, for example, a bitch with pups or a horse kicking out when approached too suddenly, or too closely, from behind. The second limb of requirement (b) is 'refining what is meant by abnormality, not imposing a head of liability contrary to the main thrust of section 2(2)(b)'. Oliver LJ said he could not believe Parliament intended to impose liability for what was essentially normal behaviour in all animals of the species, and "In relation to a characteristic which is not infrequently, although not invariably, found in domestic animals of a particular species in particular circumstances, so that the exhibition of that characteristic in those circumstances cannot be said to be abnormal in the species, it is still necessary in my judgment to show that the keeper knew of the existence of that characteristic in the particular animal in those particular circumstances. In my judgment it is not sufficient to say that the behaviour complained of is behaviour which, in the particular circumstances, is sufficiently common to put the keeper on notice that because the animal belongs to the relevant species there is a risk that in the particular circumstances it may prove (there having been no previous knowledge on the part of the keeper that the particular animal is prone so to behave) to be one of those animals which does in those circumstances behave in that way."
	Statute References omitted