Commonwealth - 1996

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This page lists 79 cases, and was prepared on 28 October 2012.

Christensen -v- Scott [1996] 1 NZLR 273
1996 Thomas J	Commonwealth, Company, Damages	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	(New Zealand Court of Appeal) Thomas J said: “the diminution in the value of Mr and Mrs Christensen’s shares in the company is by definition a personal loss and not a corporate loss. The loss suffered by the company is the loss of the lease and the profit which would have been obtained from harvesting the potato crop. That loss is reflected in the diminution in the value of Mr and Mrs Christensen’s shares. They can no longer realise their shares at the value they enjoyed prior to the alleged default of their accountants and solicitors.” and "We do not need to enter upon a close examination of the Newman Industries decision. It has attracted not insignificant and, at times, critical comment. See eg L C B Gower, Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law (5th ed, 1992) at pp 647-653; L S Sealy, "Problems of Standing, Pleading and Proof in Corporate Litigation" (Ed, B.G. Pettit) at p 1 esp at pp 6-10; and M J Sterling, "The Theory and Policy of Shareholder Actions in Tort" (1987) 50 MLR. 468, esp at pp 470-474. It may be accepted that the Court of Appeal was correct, however, in concluding that a member has no right to sue directly in respect of a breach of duty owed to the company or in respect of a tort committed against the company. Such claims can only be bought by the company itself or by a member in a derivative action under an exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. But this is not necessarily to exclude a claim brought by a party, who may also be a member, to whom a separate duty is owed and who suffers a personal loss as a result of a breach of that duty Where such a party, irrespective that he or she is a member, has personal rights and these rights are invaded, the rule in Foss v Harbottle is irrelevant. Nor would the claim necessarily have the calamitous consequences predicted by counsel in respect of the concept of corporate personality and limited liability. The loss arises not from a breach of duty owed to the company but from a breach of duty owed to the individuals. The individual is simply suing to vindicate his own right or redress a wrong done to him or her giving rise to a personal loss. Thomas J continued: "We consider, therefore, that it is certainly arguable that, where there is an independent duty owed to the plaintiff and a breach of that duty occurs, the resulting loss may be recovered by the plaintiff. The fact that the loss may also be suffered by the company does not mean that it is not also a personal loss to the individual. Indeed, the diminution in the value of Mr and Mrs Christensen's shares in the company is by definition a personal loss and not a corporate loss. The loss suffered by the company is the loss of the lease and the profit which would have been obtained from harvesting the potato crop. That loss is reflected in the diminution in the value of Mr and Mrs Christensen's shares. They can no longer realise their shares at the value they enjoyed prior to the alleged default of their accountants and solicitors. (For a discussion of the policy issues which arise in considering these questions, see Sterling (supra) at pp 474-491.) In circumstances of this kind the possibility that the company and the member may seek to hold the same party liable for the same loss may pose a difficulty. Double recovery, of course, cannot be permitted. The problem does not arise in this case, however, as the company has chosen to settle its claim. Peat Marwick and McCaw Lewis accepted a compromise in the knowledge that Mr and Mrs Christensen's claim was outstanding. It may well be, as was acknowledged by Mr Pidgeon in the course of argument, that an allowance will need to be made for the amount already paid to the liquidator in settlement of the company's claim. It is to be acknowledged, however, that the problem of double recovery may well arise in other cases. No doubt, such a possibility is most likely with smaller private companies where the interrelationship between the company, the directors and the shareholders may give rise to independent duties on the part of the professional advisers involved. But the situation where one defendant owes a duty to two persons who suffer a common loss is not unknown in the law, and it will need to be examined in this context. It may be found that there is no necessary reason why the company's loss should take precedence over the loss of the individuals who are owed a separate duty of care. To meet the problem of double recovery in such circumstances it will be necessary to evolve principles to determine which party or parties will be able to seek or obtain recovery. A stay of one proceeding may be required. Judgment, with a stay of execution against one or other of the parties, may be in order. An obligation to account in whole or in part may be appropriate. The interest of creditors who may benefit if one party recovers and not the other may require consideration. As the problem of double recovery does not arise in this case, however, it is preferable to leave an examination of these issues to a case where that problem is squarely in point. " and "Essentially, Mr and Mrs Christensen are alleging that as a result of Peat Marwick and McCaw Lewis's breach of duty owed to them personally they suffered a personal loss, that is, a reduction in the value of their assets. Their assets in this case had been channelled into their company. Thus, it is arguable that the diminution in the value of their shareholding is the measure of that loss. It may well be that when the evidence is heard it will be apparent that Mr and Mrs Christensen's claim is inflated, but that is a matter for the trial. We are not prepared to hold at this stage that they do not have an arguable case to recover damages for the breach of an acknowledged duty.""

Taikato -v- Regina (1996) 186 CLR 454
1996 Brennan CJ	Commonwealth	Casemap 1 Citers
	(High Court of Australia) The court was asked whether an individual carrying a formaldehyde spray possessed it "for a lawful purpose". Held: She did not do so even though it was a purpose not prohibited by law, namely self defence: "'Lawful purpose' in [the relevant legislation] should be read as a purpose that is authorised, as opposed to not forbidden, by law because that meaning best gives effect to the object of the section. The meaning of 'lawful' depends on its context, as Napier J pointed out in Crafter v Kelly [[1941] SASR 237 at 243]. As a result, a 'lawful purpose' may mean a purpose not forbidden by law or not unlawful under the statute that enacts the term…; or it can mean a purpose that is supported by a positive rule of law … As a general rule, interpreting 'lawful purpose' in a legislative provision to mean a purpose that is not forbidden, rather than positively authorised, by law is the interpretation that best gives effect to the legislative purpose of the enactment. This is because statutes are interpreted in accordance with the presumption that Parliament does not take away existing rights unless it does so expressly or by necessary implication… Nevertheless, the purpose, context or subject matter of a legislative provision may indicate that Parliament has used the term 'lawful purpose' to mean a purpose that is positively authorised by law."

Fernando -v- Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation (1996) 1 BHRC 104
1996 Fernando J	Media, Commonwealth, Constitutional	Casemap 1 Citers
	(Sri Lanka) Broadcasts were planned including discussion by experts and listeners. Mr Fernando had participated in these discussions. After criticisms of the government the service came to an end and the broadcasts included little listener participation. Art 14 of the Constitution gave every citizen the freedom of speech and expression including publication”. The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka rejected the contention that the right to freedom of information simpliciter is included in the right to freedom of speech and expression. The right to receive information was in Article 10 of the Constitution that “every person is entitled to freedom of thought” which was the corollary of freedom of speech. Held: The freedom of speech of the petitioner, qua participatory listener, was infringed, because the stoppage of the NFEP prevented his participation. He was in the same position as the contributor of a column in Visuvalingam and the plaintiff in Lamont.

McLaren Transport Ltd -v- Somerville [1996] 3 NZLR 424
1996 Tipping J	Commonwealth, Damages	Casemap 1 Citers
	(New Zealand) Tipping J discussed the award of exemplary damages: “Exemplary damages for negligence causing personal injury may be awarded if, but only if, the level of negligence is so high that it amounts to an outrageous and flagrant disregard for the plaintiff’s safety, meriting condemnation and punishment.”

John Holland Construction and Engineering Pty Ltd -v- Kvaerner R J Brown Pty Ltd [1996] 82 BLR 83
1996 Byrne J	Construction, Commonwealth	Casemap 1 Citers
	(Supreme Court of Victoria) The defendant applied to strike out substantial parts of a statement of claim on grounds including that the defendant faced allegations that by reason of breaches of contract the plaintiff had suffered loss of damage, particulars of which were given in a schedule A in which the loss and damage was calculated in terms of the difference between the tender estimate for the part in question and its actual cost. The defendant attacked the pleading on the grounds that such an allegation was embarrassing since it did not establish a causal link between the breach and the damage alleged. Held: The court considered the treatment of global claims, that is claims where the claimant does not seek to attribute any specific loss to a specific breach of contract, but is content to allege a composite loss as a result of all the breaches alleged: "Where the loss is caused by a breach of contract, causation for the purposes of a claim for damages must be determined by the application of common sense to the logical principles of causation" and ". . . it is possible to say that a given loss was in law caused by a particular act or omission notwithstanding that other acts or omissions played a part in its occurrence. It is sufficient that the breach be a material cause... This last matter may be of particular importance in a case like the present where a number of potential causal factors may be present." The court noted that a global claim had been held to be permissible in the case where it was impracticable to disentangle that part of the loss which is attributable to each head of claim. The particular claim under consideration was a total cost claim: "The logic of such a claim is this: the contractor might reasonably have expected to perform the work for a particular sum, usually the contract price; the proprietor committed breaches of contract; the actual reasonable cost of the work was a sum greater than the expected cost. The logical consequence implicit in this is that the proprietor's breaches caused that extra cost or cost overrun. This implication is valid only so long as, and to the extent that, the three propositions are proved and a further unstated one is accepted: the proprietor's breaches represent the only causally significant factor responsible for the difference between the expected cost and the actual cost. ... The unstated assumption underlying the inference may be further analysed. What is involved here is two things: first, the breaches of contract caused some extra cost; secondly, the contractor's cost overrun is this extra cost. ... It is the second aspect of the unstated assumption ... which is likely to cause the more obvious problem because it involves an allegation that the breaches of contract were the material cause of all of the contractor's cost overrun. This involves an assertion that, given that the breaches of contract caused some extra cost, they must have caused the whole of the extra cost because no other relevant cause was responsible for any part of it."

Tam Wing Chuen -v- Bank of Credit and Commerce Hong Kong Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 69; [1996] UKPC 69
1996 PC Lord Mustill	Commonwealth, Contract	Casemap 1 Citers
	Lord Mustill discussed the need to construe a contract contra preferentem: "the basis of the contra proferentem principle is that the person who puts forward the wording of a proposed agreement may be assumed to have looked after his own interests, so that if words leave room for doubt about whether he is intended to have a particular benefit there is reason to suppose that he is not."
	Link[s] omitted

Board of Trustees of the National Provident Fund -v- Shortland Securities Limited [1996] 1 NZLR 45
1996 Gault J	Landlord and Tenant, Commonwealth	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	(New Zealand Court of Appeal) The court considered whether a review in a lease without a ratchet (upwards only) rent review clause could be exercised only at the instigation of the landlord: "The fact that as a consequence the parties agreed upon assignment of a lease that would not contain a ratchet clause but would provide for rent review at the lessor's discretion is not such an absurdity as justifies departing from the plain meaning of the words used. It is clear that the ability of the lessor to elect not to have the rent reviewed effectively negates the benefit of the exclusion of the ratchet clause. It will be a rare case in which a lessor initiates review without being confident that the rent will increase as a result, but that does not make the provisions inconsistent. The provisions are clear in their terms and are capable of being read and of operating together in that the prospect of rent reduction is preserved in the event of a review. That is what the parties agreed to, albeit because they did not advert to that consequence."

Winward Properties Ltd V. The Government of Saint Vincent and The Grenadines Co (Saint Vincent and The Grenadines) [1996] UKPC 60
11 Jan 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

Dr. Rashid Khalife Rahme V. The General Medical Council Co (The General Medical Council) [1996] UKPC 61
16 Jan 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

Wong Mee Wan -v- Kwan Kin Travel Services Ltd, [1996] 1 WLR 38
24 Jan 1996 PC Lord Slynn of Hadley	Contract, Commonwealth, Negligence, Consumer
	(Hong Kong) The plaintiff's daugfhter purchased an all in package tour of China. Having missed a ferry, they were being taken on a speedboat when it crashed, and she died. The driver was negligent, and the company for having failed to ensure that someone competent drove it. Held: Where someone contracted to arrange travel for others there was an implied term to use reasonable skill and care in selecting others to provide any part of those services. Where he contracted to provide service he impliedly contracted to carry them out with reasonable care and skill. That obligation would continue even if others provided the actual services. This was a contract for services. The company was liable for having failed to select a competent boatman, and for his lack of care.

Thomas Reckley -v- Minister of Public Safety and Immigration and Others (Bahamas) (No 2) [1996] UKPC 1; [1996] 1 All ER 562
6 Feb 1996 PC	Constitutional, Criminal Sentencing, Commonwealth
	(The Bahamas) The actual exercise of the prerogative of mercy by a state falls outside the scope of the law. No further stay of execution granted.
	Link[s] omitted

Invercargill City Council V. Hamlin (New Zealand) [1996] UKPC 56
12 Feb 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

Invercargill City Council -v- Hamlin [1996] AC 624
15 Feb 1996 PC Lord Lloyd	Damages, Commonwealth	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	(New Zealand) A Local Authority was liable for economic losses for a negligent inspection of a house during construction. Murphy had not been followed in New Zealand and the Privy Council accepted that this was justified. The Pirelli date of physical damage had also been discarded in favour of the date of discoverability. The decision in Pirelli was unfortunate: Once it is appreciated that the loss in respect of which the plaintiff in the present case is suing is loss to his pocket, and not for physical damage to the house or foundations, then most, if not all the difficulties surrounding the limitation question fall away. The plaintiff's loss occurs when the market value of the house is depreciated by reason of the defective foundations, and not before. If he resells the house at full value before the defect is discovered he suffers no loss. Thus in the common case the occurrence of the loss and the discovery of the loss will coincide . . . But the plaintiff cannot postpone the start of the limitation period by shutting his eyes to the obvious . . . In other words the cause of action accrues when the cracks become so bad and all the defects so obvious, that any reasonable home-owner would call in an expert. Since the defects would then be obvious to a potential buyer or his expert, that marks the moment when the market value of the building is depreciated and therefore the moment when economic loss occurs. Their Lordships do not think it is possible to define the moment more accurately. The measure of the loss will then be the cost of repairs if it is reasonable to repair, or the depreciation in the market value if it is not . . . This approach avoids almost all the practical and theoretical difficulties to which the academic commentators have drawn attention and which led to the rejection of Pirelli by the Supreme Court of Canada . . . The approach is consistent with the underlying principle that a cause of action accrues when, but not before, all the elements necessary to support the plaintiff's claim are in existence. For in the case of a latent defect in a building the element of loss or damage which is necessary to support a claim for economic loss in tort does not exist so long as the market value of the house is unaffected. Whether or not it is right to describe an undiscoverable crack as damage, it clearly cannot affect the value of the building on the market. The existence of such a crack is thus irrelevant to the cause of action . . . Whether Pirelli should still be regarded as good law in England is not for their Lordships to say. What is clear is that it is not good law in New Zealand.

Consolidated Investment and Enterprises Ltd V. The Commissioner of Income Tax Co (Mauritius) [1996] UKPC 62
19 Feb 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	[ Bailii ]

Nankissoon Boodram Also Called Dole Chadee V. The Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago, The Director of Public Prosecutions Co (Trinidad and Tobago) [1996] UKPC 63
19 Feb 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

Nankissoon Boodram -v- Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago (1) [1996] AC 842; (1996) 47 WIR 459
19 Feb 1996 PC Lord Mustill	Criminal Practice, Commonwealth, Media	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court considered the effect of prejudicial reporting on a trial: “In a case such as this, the publications either will or will not prove to have been so harmful that when the time for the trial arrives the techniques available to the trial judge for neutralising them will be insufficient to prevent injustice. The proper forum for a complaint about publicity is the trial court, where the judge can assess the circumstances which exist when the defendant is about to be given in charge of the jury, and decide whether measures such as warnings and directions to the jury, peremptory challenge and challenge for cause will enable the jury to reach its verdict with an unclouded mind, or whether exceptionally a temporary or even permanent stay of the prosecution is the only solution.”

Nicolas Antonio Guevara V. The Queen Co (Belize) [1996] UKPC 65
21 Feb 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

Linsberth Logan V. The Queen Co (Belize) [1996] UKPC 64
21 Feb 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

Devon Simpson, Leroy Morgan and Samuel Williams And, Walford Wallace V. The Queen and Others and Another (Jamaica) [1996] UKPC 66
7 Mar 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

Logan -v- The Queen
8 Mar 1996 PC	Criminal Sentencing, Commonwealth	Casemap 1 Citers
	(Belize) The Privy Council may hear an appeal against the death sentence after a mercy plea had been rejected under the Belize criminal Code.

Harley Development Inc. And, Trillium Investment Ltd V. Commissioner of Inland Revenue Co (Hong Kong) [1996] UKPC 67
14 Mar 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

Ellis Taibo -v- The Queen Co (Belize) [1996] UKPC 68
26 Mar 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

Tan Te Lam -v- Superintendent of Tai A Chau Detention Centre [1996] UKPC 5; [1997] AC 97; [1996] 4 All ER 256
27 Mar 1996 PC Lord Browne-Wilkinson	Commonwealth, Immigration	Casemap 1 Cites
	(Hong Kong) Migrants from Vietnam of Chinese ethnic origin had landed in Hong Kong by boat, and been refused refugee status. They were detained for several years under section 13D of the Immigration Ordinance "pending . . removal from Hong Kong". However the Ordinance only permitted detention if the period of detention was "reasonable having regard to all the circumstances". It was submitted that the very long period of detention rendered further detention for an indefinite period unreasonable, and therefore unlawful, and that as the Vietnam authorities would not accept repatriation of those they regarded as non-Vietnamese nationals there was no possibility of compulsory removal from Hong Kong, so the detention could not be "pending removal". Held: Adopting the principle set out in Hardial Singh, in the absence of contrary indications in the statute which confers the powers to detain 'pending removal' the power can only be exercised during the period necessary, in all the circumstances of the particular case, to effect removal. Secondly, if it becomes clear that removal is not going to be possible within a reasonable time, further detention is not authorised. Thirdly, the person seeking to exercise the power of detention must take all reasonable steps within his power to ensure the removal within a reasonable time. The burden lies on the executive to prove on the balance of probabilities the facts necessary to justify the conclusion that a detainee is being detained "pending removal".
	(Hong Kong) Immigration (Amendment) Ordinance 1991 2 13D
	Link[s] omitted

Codrington -v- the Queen (Belize) [1996] UKPC 6
27 Mar 1996 PC	Criminal Practice, Commonwealth	Casemap 1 Cites
	The appellant had been convicted of murder. He had two grounds of appeal, that the judge had failed to get right the burden of proof, and that his counsel had not allowed him to give evidence when he had wanted to. The case was remitted. Although the judge's summing up was fair, the committee was unable to asses the truth of what had happened with counsel, and the court of appeal was better placed to make that judgement.
	Link[s] omitted

Lee Hiok Woon and Lee Hiok Tng (Sued As The Excutors and Trustees of The Estate of Lee Wee Nam, Deceased) and Orthers V. Lee Hiok Ping and Others Co (Singapore) [1996] UKPC 70
27 Mar 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

Luc Thiet Thuan -v- The Queen [1996] 2 Crim App R 178; [1997] AC 131; [1996] 2 All ER 1033; [1996] 3 WLR 45; [1996] UKPC 57
2 Apr 1996 PC Slynn, Hoffmann, Clyde, Hobhouse, Millet LL	Crime, Commonwealth	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	(Hong Kong) On a trial for murder the defendant relied on the defences of diminished responsibility and provocation. Medical evidence showed the defendant suffered from brain damage and was prone to respond to minor provocation by losing his self-control and acting explosively. The trial judge directed the jury that this medical evidence was not relevant on the defence of provocation. The jury rejected both defences. The correctness of the judge's direction on provocation was the issue on the appeal. Held: The Board preserved the historic distinction in the defence of provocation, between matters going to the gravity of the provocation (the subjective test), in which all the personal characteristics of the defendant are relevant, and matters going to the required standard of self-control, (the objective test), where the jury should decide the matter simply by reference to the standards of "a person having ordinary powers of self-control". (Majority: ) While there remained an objective element, and not all the personal characteristics of the defendant were potentially relevant to the issue of self-control, the appropriate standards of behaviour to be applied were a matter of fact alone and for the jury. Lord Goff of Chieveley noted that any mental infirmity of the defendant, if itself the subject of taunts by the deceased, may be taken into account as going to the gravity of the provocation: "But this is a far cry from the defendant's submission that the mental infirmity of a defendant impairing his power of self-control should as such be attributed to the reasonable man for the purposes of the objective test." Lord Steyn dissenting: "But even more important than the promptings of legal logic is the dictates of justice. Justice underpinned these decisions".
	Link[s] omitted

The Owners And/Or Demise Charterers of The Ship or Vessel 'Mahkutai' (Indonesian Flag) V. The Owners of Lately Laden On Board The Ship or Vessel 'Mahkutai' (Indonesian Flag) Co (Hong Kong) [1996] UKPC 71
22 Apr 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

The Mahkutai [1996] AC 650; [1996] 3 WLR 1
24 Apr 1996 PC Lord Goff of Chieveley	Transport, Commonwealth, Jurisdiction, Contract	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	(Hong Kong) The question was whether shipowners, who were not parties to the bill of lading contract between the charterers and carriers on the one part, and the cargo-owners, the bill of lading being a charterer's bill, could enforce against the cargo-owners an exclusive jurisdiction clause contained in that contract. Held: Ship owners may not rely on an exclusive jurisdiction clause in a charterer's contract. They could not because the Himalaya clause in the bill of lading, which extended the benefit of all "exceptions, limitations, provision, conditions and liberties herein benefiting the carrier" to "servants, agents and subcontractors of the carrier" did not include the exclusive jurisdiction clause because an exclusive jurisdiction clause is a mutual agreement and does not benefit only one party. Rather the rights conferred entail correlative obligations. A contract (and in particular a Himalaya clause) must be construed to give commercial effect if possible.

Sookermany -v- Director of Public Prosecutions (1996) 48 WIR 346
1 May 1996 de la Bastide CJ	Commonwealth, Crime	Casemap 1 Citers
	The Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago dismissed an appeal against refusal of constitutional relief claimed on the ground of undue delay:- "As there are admittedly measures available to a trial judge to negative the prejudicial effect on the defence of delay, there would seem to me to be no reason why a court following the lead given by the Board in [Boodram] should not in all but the most exceptional circumstances refuse to stay criminal proceedings on a constitutional motion brought for that purpose, and leave it for the trial judge to determine what measures he should take to counteract the prejudicial effect of the delay and if he should conclude that no effective counteraction is possible, himself to order the proceedings stayed."

Collier -v- John Neville Creighton and others [1996] UKPC 7
8 May 1996 PC	Commonwealth, Limitation
	(New Zealand) The plaintiff sought damages for breach of a fiduciary duty by his solicitors. They responded that his claim was out of time. The judge had found an equitable fraud, and therefore time did not begin to run until it was discovered. Held: The Appeal court had been correct in finding that the solicitor had disclosed his interest in the matter, and that therefore time began running then, and the claim was now barred.
	Link[s] omitted

Douglas and others -v- the Right Honourable Sir Lynden Oscar Pindling [1996] UKPC 8
13 May 1996 PC Lord Keith of Kinkel	Banking, Constitutional, Commonwealth	Casemap 1 Citers
	(Bahamas) A commission investigating the activities of a company, sought disclosure of its bankers records. The committee held that this was not a constitutional issue, and that leave to appeal as of right did not exist, but special leave was possible and appropriate. The Act gave wider powers to order inspection than only for special cause. Such a commission was inquisitorial and rules applicable in adversarial proceedings need not apply.
	Bankers Books Evidence Act (Bahamas)
	Link[s] omitted

Wu Chun-Piu V. The Queen Co (Hong Kong) [1996] UKPC 72
14 May 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

Lion Nathan Limited and others -v- C C Bottlers Limited and others (New Zealand) [1996] UKPC 9; [1996] 1 WLR 1438
14 May 1996 PC	Damages, Contract, Company, Commonwealth	Casemap 1 Citers
	A company was sold with a warranty that the sales figures would meet projected earnings. The purchaser successfully complained after the event that the figures were false and misleading. They appealed an order increasing the damages on the basis that the earnings figures had been manipulated. The order stood. The proper measure of damages was at the level of what properly calculated projected earnings would have been. The figures might be averaged for other factors, but otherwise stood. There is no connection between the range of foreseeable deviation in a given forecast and the question of whether the forecast was properly prepared. Whether a forecast was negligent or not depends upon whether reasonable care was taken in preparing it. It is impossible to say in the abstract that a forecast of a given figure "would not have been negligent."
	Link[s] omitted

Wu Chun-Piu -v- the Queen
17 May 1996 PC	Crime, Commonwealth
	(Hong Kong) Admissions made by counsel in mitigation may not preclude an appeal against a conviction.

Bibby and others -v- Sumintra Partap and others [1996] UKPC 13; [1996] 1 WLR 931
20 May 1996 PC	Land, Commonwealth	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	(Trinidad and Tobago) The Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago had the power to suspend a possession order against a trespasser pending the outcome of an appeal.
	Link[s] omitted

Lamey -v- The Queen [1996] UKPC 14; [1996] 1 WLR 902,
20 May 1996 PC	Crime, Commonwealth	Casemap 1 Citers
	(Jamaica) The appellant was convicted of capital murder. Held: Murder was not a terrorist act where fear caused is merely a by-product of the acts and not directly intended. He had had no intention of putting any member of the public in fear. The Board accepted the proposition that there had to be a double intent on the part of the defendant for there to be a conviction for murder " in the course or furtherance of an act of terrorism". That Act required that separate intention, and it had not been shown. The case was remitted for re-sentence as non-capital murder.
	Link[s] omitted

Ming Pao Newspapers Limited and others -v- the Attorney General of Hong Kong (Hong Kong) [1996] UKPC 12
20 May 1996 PC	Media, Constitutional, Commonwealth	Casemap
	A newspaper had been ordered to reveal the source of a story wit regard to a corruption investigation. The statute required such disclosure only with regard to a named individual, and in this case no suspects name was yet known. The courts in the country of origin of the case had a margin of discretion as to the interference with freedom of expression of newspapers.
	Link[s] omitted

Yin -v- Rapian Bin Suhaili and others (Brunei Darussalam) [1996] UKPC 10
20 May 1996 PC	Jury, Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

SOS Kinderdorf International and Others -v- Ebrima B Bittaye [1996] UKPC 11
20 May 1996 PC	Employment, Commonwealth
	(The Gambia) The employee received benefits, including accommodation, over and above his salary. When the company ended his contract, they cut off his electricity and water supply. After dismissal the company discovered misconduct by the appellant. They argued on appeal that should operate to reduce the award of damages. On appeal, the employee's actions were found a breach of trust, and damages were reduced. No punitive award was appropriate.
	Link[s] omitted

Lewis -v- Henry St Hillaire and others [1996] UKPC 16
22 May 1996 PC Lord Keith of Kinkel Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle Lord Steyn Lord Hope of Craighead	Commonwealth, Litigation Practice	Casemap 1 Cites
	(Saint Vincent and The Grenadines) A writ was issued, but little progress was made. The respondent applied for a declaration that the action had been abandoned and was incapable of being revived. Held: The provision was one local to the home country. It was to be interpreted broadly, but words may only be implied in a statutory provision, primary or subordinate, if a strict test of necessity is satisfied. Here, there had been an intention to create a broader ground for striking out actions. The interpretation of the Court of Appeal was not to be disturbed.
	Link[s] omitted

Racoon Limited -v- Harris Turnbull, Executor of James Turnbull (Deceased) and others [1996] UKPC 15
22 May 1996 PC	Commonwealth, Registered Land	Casemap 1 Cites
	(British Virgin Islands) The land registrar had incorrectly registered land without mention of a lease of a right of way. Held: "The philosophy underlying a system of registration of title is that it confers indefeasibility of title to the specified parcel of land upon the registered proprietor and dispenses with any need on the part of persons dealing with him to investigate further his right thereto." The fault had not been obtained by the respondent land owner by fraud or mistake. In a situation where the rights of A extend over B's land it is entirely reasonable and consistent with the scheme of registration that somone dealing with A should satisfy himself as to the validity of his right by examining the registered entry of B. This does not require him to go behind the register but merely to examine two entries instead of one. The purchaser should have inspected both registers. The appeal was dismissed.
	Link[s] omitted

Goss and others -v- Laurence George Chilcott As Liquidator of Central Acceptance Limited (In Liquidation) [1996] UKPC 17; [1996] AC 788
23 May 1996 PC Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle, Lord Steyn, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Cooke of Thorndon	Banking, Commonwealth, Equity	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	(New Zealand) Mr and Mrs Goss, had been granted a loan by the claimant finance company under a mortgage instrument that had been avoided by the claimant because it had been fraudulently altered by Mr Haddon, an employee of the claimant, without the claimant's authority. Mr Haddon was the brother of Mrs Goss. The advance from the claimant having been made available to Mr and Mrs Goss, it was as agreed between them and Mr Haddon in fact received by Mr Haddon. Mr and Mrs Goss took no security from Mr Haddon. Mr Haddon was unable to repay the advance. Mr and Mrs Goss argued that their inability to recover the money from Mr Haddon constituted a defence of change of position to the claimant's action for restitution of the money paid for a consideration that had totally failed. Held: The loan remained repayable despite the unenforceability of the mortgage instrument under which it was secured. The defence failed because Mr and Mrs Goss knew that the money lent would have to be repaid to the claimant and, in paying it to Mr Haddon, they had taken the risk that the loss would fall on them. Lord Goff said: "From the beginning, the Defendants were under an obligation to repay the advance once it had been paid to them or to their order; and this obligation was of course unaffected by the fact that they had allowed the money to be paid over to Mr Haddon. The effect of the alteration of the mortgage instrument was that their contractual obligation to repay the money was discharged; but they had nevertheless been enriched by the receipt of the money, and prima facie were liable in restitution to restore it. They had however allowed the money to be paid over to Mr Haddon in circumstances in which, as they well knew, the money would nevertheless have to be repaid to the company. They had, therefore, in allowing the money to be paid to Mr Haddon, deliberately taken the risk that he would be unable to repay the money, in which event they themselves would have to repay it without recourse to him. Since any action by them against Mr Haddon would now be fruitless they are seeking, by invoking the defence of change of position, to shift that loss onto the company. This, in their Lordships' opinion, they cannot do. The fact that they cannot now obtain reimbursement from Mr Haddon does not, in the circumstances of the present case, render it inequitable for them to be required to make restitution to the company in respect of the enrichment which they have received at the company's expense."
	Link[s] omitted

Michael Gayle -v- The Queen
12 Jun 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	PC Jamaica
	[ PC ]

Director of Public Prosecutions -v- Jaikaran Tokai and Others
12 Jun 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	PC Trinidad and Tobago
	Link[s] omitted

Director of Public Prosecutions and others -v- Jaikaran Tokai and others [1996] AC 856; Appeal No 53 of 1995; [1996] UKPC 2; [1996] UKPC 19
12 Jun 1996 PC	Criminal Practice, Commonwealth, Constitutional	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	(Trinidad and Tobago) The appellant had been charged in 1981 with offences alleged to have been committed shortly before. The proceedings continued until his appeal for one was dismissed in 1988. The wounding charges were proceeded with only in 1994. He complained that the delay was an abuse, and his appeal succeeded. The prosecutor now appealed. Held: "this Constitution, unlike some of those in other Caribbean countries and elsewhere, particularly the United States of America and Canada, does not include in the catalogue of fundamental rights and freedoms the right to a speedy trial or trial within a reasonable time." The provisions of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago do not confer on individuals the right to a trial within a reasonable time. The delay was not unjustifiable, the chances of prejudice were small; the trial process would have provided ample protection for the accused; there was no danger of the trial being unfair; finally, the case was not in any sense exceptional so as to justify a stay.
	Link[s] omitted

Ricardo Farrington -v- The Queen [1996] UKPC 20
17 Jun 1996 PC Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle, Lord Steyn	Criminal Practice, Commonwealth, Constitutional	Casemap 1 Cites
	(Bahamas) The applicant sought leave to appeal as a poor person. He had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death. He had sought to argue that the delay in his execution had contravened his right not to be subjected to unusual and cruel punishment as established in Pratt. His application for a stay pending the decision on this constitutional question was dismissed, but a stay pending the appeal was allowed. Held: The decision to reject a stay of execution without making a formal dismissal grounded an appeal, and leave was given, but "On the other hand, for the avoidance of doubt their Lordships make clear that even in a case where an appeal lies as of right their Lordships consider that it would be inappropriate to grant special leave to appeal as a poor person where it is plain beyond rational argument that the appeal is doomed to fail."
	[ Bailii ]

Board of Trustees of the National Provident Fund -v- Brierley Investments Limited (New Zealand) [1996] UKPC 22
24 Jun 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

Gordon -v- the Queen (Jamaica) [1996] UKPC 21
24 Jun 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

Michael Gayle -v- the Queen (Jamaica) Appeal No 40 of 1995; Appeal No 40 of 1995; [1996] UKPC 3; [1996] UKPC 18; [2012] ECHR 1636; [2012] ECHR 1635; [2012] ECHR 1637; [2009] ECHR 619
2 Jul 1996 PC	Jurisdiction, Criminal Practice, Commonwealth
	The judicial Committee of the Privy-Council is not to be used as second court of appeal on matters of fact.
	Link[s] omitted

Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (in Liq) -v- Webb and others [1996] 39 NSWLR 601; 14 ACLC 1
5 Jul 1996 Meagher, Sheller JJA, Waddell AJA	Commonwealth, Legal Professions	1 Citers
	Austlii (Court of Appeal of New South Wales) COMPANY LAW - s556 (1) Companies (NSW) Code; s592 (1) Corporations Law; liability of directors for debt of company - legal professional privilege - distinction between joint and common interest privilege - waiver.
	Link[s] omitted

Chung Ping Kwan and others -v- Lam Island Development Company Limited [1996] UKPC 23
8 Jul 1996 PC Lord Keith of Kinkel Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead Lord Steyn Sir Christopher Slade	Commonwealth, Limitation, Landlord and Tenant	Casemap 1 Cites
	(Hong Kong) Various provisions had been made for the termination of long leases in Hong Kong. Land had come to be occupied by adverse possession. At first instance the judge had given judgment against the squatters, but then retracted after a later court of appeal decision. The Court of Appeal re-instated the first order. Held: The squatter against a leasehold title could acquire only a title equivalent to that of the leasehold interest. When a squatter on land held under a renewable lease is sued and pleads a limitation defence, the lessee is unable to respond by relying upon the (deemed) new lease as a new title setting time running afresh.
	Link[s] omitted

Holder -v- The State [1996] UKPC 27
9 Jul 1996 PC	Commonwealth	Casemap 1 Cites
	(Trinidad and Tobago) The Board granted special leave for the defendant to appeal his conviction for murder and sentence to death. The murder was committed during a violent robbery and the defendant convicted as part of the joint enterprise. He said the judge had misdirected the jury as to the elements of joint enterprise, saying the actual killer had acted outside the expected scope of the robbery. Held: The appeal failed. A possible confusion of the intentions and consequences had been cured by other parts of the direction. In fact the judge had been more generous to the defendant than was required. There had also been a slight misdirection as to the possibility that the actual killer had additional motives. Again the result caused no prejudice.
	Link[s] omitted

Milton -v- the Queen (Jamaica) [1996] UKPC 24
9 Jul 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

E Johnson & Co (Barbados) Limited -v- N S R Limited (Barbados) [1996] UKPC 25
9 Jul 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

E Johnson & Co (Barbados) Ltd -v- Nsr Ltd
24 Jul 1996 PC	Land, Commonwealth
	Sale contract not frustrated by notice of possible compulsory purchase.

Ng Enterprises Limited -v- the Urban Council (Hong Kong) [1996] UKPC 30
29 Jul 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

Moses -v- The State [1996] UKPC 29; [1997] AC 53
29 Jul 1996 PC Lord Mustill, Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Steyn, Lord Hoffmann, Sir Ralph Gibson	Commonwealth, Crime	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	(Trinidad and Tobago) The appellant had been convicted under the felony murder rule, where if a victim dies in the course of the defendant committing a felony, the defendant is guilty of murder. Held: The distinction between felony and murder had been abolished in 1979, but no provision was made for the felon/murder rule. The abolition had not simply followed the English model, and express provision had been made applying the law of misdemeanours instead of the law of felony. The felony/murder rule must have fallen with the new law. The was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction without that rule.
	Link[s] omitted

Yassin v Attorney-General of Guyana (unreported), Unreported, 30 August 1996
30 Aug 1996 Fitzpatrick JA	Commonwealth, Criminal Sentencing	Casemap 1 Citers
	(Court of Appeal of Guyana) “Add to this the notorious fact that in Guyana for some years as a matter of executive policy the death penalty is only implemented in some, not all, cases of persons convicted of murder, and the ‘sifting out’ of those cases in which the [offenders] are found not to warrant the ultimate penalty is done by means of the exercise of the prerogative of mercy rather than by amendment of the law relating to capital punishment.”

Byers -v- the Queen (Antigua and Barbuda) [1996] UKPC 31
2 Oct 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	[ Bailii ]

Brisbane South Regional Health Authority -v- Taylor [1996] HCA 25; (1996) 186 CLR 541; (1996) 139 ALR 1; (1996) 70 ALJR 866
2 Oct 1996	Commonwealth, Limitation	Casemap 1 Citers
	(High Court of Australia) McHugh J said that the public interest requires disputes to be settled as quickly as possible.
	Link[s] omitted

Tai and others -v- Wu Yau Loi (Hong Kong) [1996] UKPC 33
10 Oct 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

Dwight Lamott Henfield -v- The Attorney General of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas (Appeal No 26 of 1996) and Ricardo Farrington -v- The Attorney General of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas [1996] UKPC 36; [1997] AC 413; Appeal No 26 of 1996 and Appeal No 37 of 1996; [1996] UKPC 4
14 Oct 1996 PC	Human Rights, Criminal Sentencing, Commonwealth	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	(The Bahamas) A delay in carrying out an execution for 3.5 years, where the target delay had been set at 2 years, was inhuman treatment, and the execution should be set aside. The essential question in Pratt was whether the execution of a man following long delay after his sentence to death can amount to inhuman punishment contrary to Article 17(1).
	[ PC ] - [ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ] - [ PC ]

Berry -v- Director of Public Prosecutions and others (Jamaica) [1996] UKPC 37
17 Oct 1996 PC	Commonwealth, Crime
	Link[s] omitted

Wu Koon Tai and Another -v- Wu Yau Loi
25 Oct 1996 PC	Land, Commonwealth
	Inability of devisee to convey land until vested does not stop contract to do so.

Berry -v- Director of Public Prosecutions and Another
28 Oct 1996 PC	Criminal Practice, Commonwealth
	The remission of a case to a court with judges who had already expressed opinions was not unfair.

Berridge and others -v- Benjies Business Centre [1996] UKPC 38
7 Nov 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	(Antigua and Barbuda)
	Link[s] omitted

Mak -v- Wocom Commodities Limited [1996] UKPC 40
11 Nov 1996 PC Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Lord Nolan, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Sir John May	Financial Services, Agency, Commonwealth	Casemap 1 Cites
	(Hong Kong) The appellant had placed foreign exchange transactions with the respondents. He claimed that they were acting as his agents, and claimed that they had made undisclosed profits. They claimed to have been acting as principals. He now appealed a finding that he knew that they were so acting. Held: The issue turned on the credibility of witnesses. Where there had been to consistent findings of fact in the lower courts, the settled procedure of the Board was not itself to make such an assessment. Matters such as the weight to be attached to particular evidence did not come within any exception to that rule.
	Link[s] omitted

Kin-Hung -v- The Queen [1996] UKPC 39
11 Nov 1996 PC Lord Browne-Wilkinson Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead Lord Steyn Lord Hoffmann Lord Cooke of Thorndon	Commonwealth, Criminal Practice	Casemap 1 Cites
	(Hong Kong) Despite the judge's sympathetic directions as to the inadeqacy of the prosecution case, the defendant was convicted of two rapes. Held: The test whether each member of an appellate court considers the verdicts "unsafe or unsatisfactory" is part of the very alphabet of the criminal law. The statement that the verdicts were not perverse was shorthand for saying that there was evidence upon which a properly directed jury (as this jury was) could conscientiously have convicted. The court of appeal had applied the law correctly, and the appeal was dismissed.
	[ Bailii ]

Nguyen Tuan Cuong and others -v- The Director of Immigration and others (Hong Kong) [1996] UKPC 43; [1997] 1 WLR 68
21 Nov 1996 PC Lord Goff and Lord Hoffmann (Dissenting)	Commonwealth, Immigration	Casemap 1 Citers
	(Dissenting judgment) A person who satisfies [the Convention] definition is said to have refugee status. The Convention imposes obligations towards persons having that status. For immigration, Article 31 forbids the imposition of penalties on refugees arriving in another country without authorisation - unlike article 33, it is derogable under article 42. Refugee status is not an international passport which entitles the bearer to demand entry without let or hindrance into the territory of any contracting state. It is always a status relative to a particular country or countries. The obligations of contracting states are, first, not to punish a refugee who has entered directly from the country in which his life or freedom was threatened for a Convention reason and secondly, not to return him across the frontier of that country. In all other questions of immigration control: for example, punishment for illegal entry from a third country, or expulsion to a third country from which there is no danger of refoulement to a country falling within article 33, the question of whether a person has refugee status is simply irrelevant.
	Link[s] omitted

Jeewooth -v- the Government of Mauritius (Mauritius) [1996] UKPC 45
26 Nov 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

Juana -v- Leo Lee (Hong Kong) [1996] UKPC 44
26 Nov 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

Rangatira Limited -v- The Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1996] UKPC 54; [1996] New Zealand UKPC 46
2 Dec 1996 PC	Income Tax, Commonwealth	Casemap 1 Cites
	Link[s] omitted

Wallace and others -v- The Queen (Jamaica) [1996] UKPC 47
3 Dec 1996 PC	Criminal Practice, Commonwealth
	There is no general principle within criminal law that the judge should give reasons for his decisions.
	Link[s] omitted

Queen -v- Secretary of State for Home Department ex parte Rosa Ines Agudelo Velasquez [1996] EWHC Admin 350
11 Dec 1996 Admn	Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

Campbell -v- the Queen (Jamaica) [1996] UKPC 49
16 Dec 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

Culverden Retirement Village Limited -v- The Registrar of Companies [1996] UKPC 50
16 Dec 1996 PC	Commonwealth, Company
	(New Zealand)
	Link[s] omitted

Henderson Real Estate Agency Limited -v- Lo Chai Wan (Hong Kong) [1996] UKPC 51
16 Dec 1996 PC	Commonwealth
	Link[s] omitted

Attorney General of Hong Kong -v- Fairfax Limited [1996] UKPC Hong Kong 52; [1996] UKPC 55; [1997] 1 WLR 149
17 Dec 1996 PC Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord Cooke of Thorndon	Commonwealth, Land	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	(Hong Kong) A lease had been granted containing a covenant that the tenant would build villa residences only on the land. In breach of that covenant many high rise properties had been erected over many years. The applicant, now respondents, had sought a declaration that it could likewise erect a multi-story building, saying that the crown, the landlord, had acquiesced in the breach over many years and could not now enforce it. Held: The Crown's appeal failed. "A man cannot acquiesce in conduct of which he is ignorant. Whilst their Lordships accept that proof of such knowledge is essential, there is here overwhelming proof." and "the only possible inference from the fact that over a period of forty years multi-storey blocks have been built over virtually the whole of Lot 757 is that everyone, including the Crown, must have been aware of those facts. An area of 22 acres has been transformed into an area of high-density high-rise buildings. It would take compelling evidence, which is lacking, to rebut the inference that everyone concerned with that land was well aware that it was not being used for villas."
	Link[s] omitted

Melanesian Mission Trust Board -v- Australian Mutual Provident Society [1996] UKPC 53; [1997] 2 EGLR 128
17 Dec 1996 PC Lord Hope	Commonwealth, Contract	1 Citers
	(New Zealand) Lord Hope said: "The intention of the parties is to be discovered from the words used in the document. Where ordinary words have been used they must be taken to have been used according to the ordinary meaning of these words. If their meaning is clear and unambiguous effect must be given to them because that is what the parties are taken to have agreed by their contract."
	Link[s] omitted