Costs - 1970- 1979

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This page lists 13 cases, and was prepared on 28 October 2012.

Mauroux -v- Sociedade Comercial Abel Pereira da Fonseca SARL [1972] 2 All ER 1085; [1972] 1 WLR 962
1972	Legal Professions, Costs	Casemap 1 Citers

Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co Ltd -v- Triplan Ltd [1973] QB 609; [1973] 2 All ER 273
1973	Costs	1 Citers
	The court exercises a full discretion when ordering security for costs.

Rowe & Maw (a firm) -v- Customs and Excise Commissioners [1975] STC 340
1975 QBD Bridge J, Wien J, Eveleigh J	Legal Professions, Costs, VAT	Casemap 1 Citers
	The Court considered two items of expenditure by a solicitor on his own travel expenses. In one case the expenditure related to travel to a Crown Court in connection with the defence of a client; in the other the expenditure was incurred in travelling to Rotterdam in connection with the sale of shares by a client. Held: In neither case did the expenditure constitute a disbursement made on behalf of the clients. Wien J, adopting the VAT tribunal’s views, said: "In our view that supply consisted of what we may comprehensively call the legal services rendered by the appellants in connection with the proposed sale, some of which had to be rendered in Rotterdam and could only be so rendered if a member of the firm travelled there for the purpose. He concluded that the nature of the services provided by the solicitor necessarily involved expenditure on travel tickets, which was a cost component of his services, saying that the expenditure was "something which is not strictly a payment that the client has asked for, either expressly or impliedly, but is part of the whole legal services rendered by the solicitor for which there is a consideration". Bridge J, concurring, identified a class of cases "where the goods or services purchased are supplied to the solicitor, as here in the form of travel tickets, to enable him effectively to perform the service supplied to his client, in this case to travel to the place where the solicitor’s service is required to be performed. In such case, in whatever form the solicitor recovers such expenditure from his client, whether as a separately itemised expense or as part of an inclusive overall fee, value added tax is payable because the payment is part of the consideration which the client pays for the service supplied by the solicitor."

In Re Eastwood [1975] Ch 112
1975 CA Russell LJ	Costs	Casemap 1 Citers
	The conventional method appropriate to taxing the bill of a solicitor in private practice is also appropriate for the bill of an in-house solicitor in all but special cases where it is reasonably plain that that method will infringe the indemnity principle. Such a special case will arise where a sum can be identified, different from that produced by the conventional approach, which is adequate to cover the actual cost incurred in doing all the work done. Such a sum may be identified by concession or, by the factual assessment of the taxing tribunal itself: but that possibility does not justify a detailed investigation in every case. The court warned as to the impracticality and undesirability of requiring a breakdown of all the activities and expenses of an in-house solicitor's department: a process that, in the world of practical justice in which the taxation process moves, the adoption of the conventional approach was designed to avoid.

Property and Reversionary Investment Corporation Ltd -v- Secretary of State for the Environment [1975] 1 WLR 1504
1975 Donaldson J	Costs	Casemap 1 Citers
	In the context of a compulsory purchase of a central London building, the court commented on the various factors which the Order required to be taken into account. In relation to "the amount or value of any money or property involved":- "This is an objective test of the importance of the transaction and strongly influences the responsibility factor: see paragraph (ii) above. In the present case it is, without doubt, the weightiest single factor. However, I should utter a word of warning. In taking account of high values, while it is right in principle to apply a value factor, this factor will vary according to the particular circumstances, and it should be remembered that the burden of responsibility on the solicitor does not increase in direct proportion to the value. The effect of increased value is regressive and the rate of regression increases with the value. Furthermore, it is a matter of broad bands of value, rather than precision. Others might select different bands, but I and the assessors would suggest that, in the light of the current value of money, the divisions between the higher bands might be taken as being at £¼ m.; £1 m.; £2½ m.; £5 m. and £10m. Finer tuning can be achieved by considering whether the value is at the bottom, the middle or the top of the relevant band, and there could be even more refined categorisation, if it was thought appropriate. But the essence of the approach is that it involves classification and not enumeration."
	Solicitors Remuneration Order 1972

Calderbank -v- Calderbank [1976] Fam 93
1975 CA Cairns LJ	Family, Costs	Casemap 1 Citers
	Husband and wife disputed provision under 1973 Act, and a summons under section 17 of the 1882 Act. The wife had offered to transfer a house occupied by his mother, worth about £12,000, in return for him leaving the matrimonial home. He refused the offer as inadequate. Mrs. Justice Heilbron granted a declaration for the wife and ordered £10,000 for the husband out of the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home. He had got rather less than he had been offered. They then disputed costs on appeal. Held: Lord Justice Cairns said: "Before Heilbron J the wife's application for costs was based upon a letter which had been written by the wife's solicitors to the husband's solicitors offering something substantially more than £10,000. Heilbron J, despite that letter being drawn to her attention, made no order as to costs. Immediately after the hearing before her it was discovered that that was a 'without prejudice' letter and very properly at the opening of this part of the appeal Mr. Hordern asked for the court's guidance as to whether in those circumstances he was entitled to rely upon that letter. We formed the opinion that he was not. The letter was written without prejudice. The 'without prejudice' bar had not been withdrawn and therefore we took the view that it was a letter which could not be relied upon either before the judge at first instance or before this court. Mr. Hordern then indicated the difficulty that a party might be in proceedings of this kind when he or she was willing to accede to some extent to an application that was made and desired to obtain the advantages that could be obtained in an ordinary action for debt or damages by a payment into court, that not being a course which would be appropriate in proceedings of this kind." Cairns LJ suggested a formula for future cases to ensure that negotiations could be conducted without prejudice to the issue at the trial, but yet nevertheless be referred to after judgment when the question of costs came to be considered. He said: "There are various other types of proceedings well known to the court where protection has been able to be afforded to a party who wants to make a compromise of that kind and where payment in is not an appropriate method. One is in proceedings before the Lands Tribunal where the amount of compensation is in issue and where the method that is adopted is that of a sealed offer which is not made without prejudice but which remains concealed from the tribunal until the decision on the substantive issue has been made and the offer is then opened when the discussion as to costs takes place. Another example is in the Admiralty Division where there is commonly a dispute between the owners of two vessels that have been in collision as to the apportionment of blame between them. It is common practice for an offer to be made by one party to another of a certain apportionment. If that is not accepted no reference is made to that offer in the course of the hearing until it comes to costs, and then if the court's apportionment is as favourable to the party who made the offer as what, was offered, or more favourable to him, then costs will be awarded on the same basis as if there had been a payment in. I see no reason why some similar practice should not be adopted in relation to such matrimonial proceedings in relation to finances as we have been concerned with. Mr. Millar drew our attention to a provision in the Matrimonial Causes Rules 1968 with reference to damages which were then payable by a co-respondent, provision to the effect that an offer might be made in the form that it was without prejudice to the issue as to damages but reserving the right of the co-respondent to refer to it on the issue of costs. It appears to me that it would be equally appropriate that it should be permissible to make an offer of that kind in such proceedings as we have been dealing with and I think that that would be an appropriate way in which a party who was willing to make a compromise could put it forward. I do not consider that any amendment of the Rules of the Supreme Court is necessary to enable this to be done."

Currie & Co -v- The Law Society [1977] QB 990; [1976] 3 All ER 832; [1976] 3 WLR 785
1976 May J	Legal Aid, Legal Professions, Costs	Casemap 1 Citers

Leopold Lazarus -v- Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (1976) Costs Law Reports, Core Volume 62
1976	Costs, Legal Professions	Casemap 1 Citers
	The general principle governing the calculation of costs rates should allow for two elements, the value of the subject matter or amount at stake, and the expense of providing the service.

Pearson -v- Naydler [1977] 1 WLR 899; [1977] 3 All ER 531
1977 Megarry V-C	Costs, Litigation Practice	Casemap 1 Citers
	That the staute required it to be likely that a company might find it difficult to pay costs before allowing a requirement for security for costs, indicated that an order may be expected to cause difficulty. However the court will not allow an impoverished company to use its inability to pay costs as a weapon against a more prosperous company.

McDonnell -v- McDonnell [1977] 1 WLR 34
1977 CA Ormrod LJ	Family, Costs	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	In family proceedings, a costs letter had been written in the form suggested in Calderbank. Held: The court accepted and endorsed the practice suggested by Cairns LJ. Ormrod LJ said: "The important factor which distinguishes this case is the fact that the appellant husband's solicitors took advantage of a recent decision of this court in Calderbank v. Calderbank. On December 16, 1975, shortly after serving the notice of appeal, they wrote a letter to the wife's solicitors offering to withdraw the appeal altogether if the wife would agree to a modification of Mrs. Justice Lane's order in respect of the house. In accordance with the procedure suggested in Calderbank, they headed the letter 'Without Prejudice' but reserved the right to bring it to the attention of the court after judgment on the question of costs." and "Clearly this is a very important consideration in exercising the court's discretion with regard to costs.It would be wrong, in my judgment, to equate an offer of compromise in proceedings such as these [ancillary proceedings following a divorce] precisely to a payment into court. I see no advantage in the court surrendering its discretion in these matters as it has to all intents and purposes done where a payment into court has been made. A Calderbank offer should influence but not govern the exercise of the discretion. The question to my mind is whether, on the basis of the facts known to the wife and her advisers and without the advantage of hindsight, she ought reasonably to have accepted the proposals in the letter of December 16, bearing always in mind the difficulty of making accurate forecasts in cases such as this. On the other hand, parties who are exposed to the full impact of costs need some protection against those who can continue to litigate with impunity under a civil aid certificate."

Denne -v- Denne (1977) CAT 4743
1977	Costs, Litigation Practice	Casemap
	Where the parties, having settled their case, agreed for a costs judge to fix the costs, there was no appeal from his judgment.

Maltby -v- D J Freeman [1978] 1 WLR 431
1978 Walton J	Costs, Wills and Probate	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court laid down guidance for solicitors in charging in the administration of estates: "when one comes to translate value into terms of the legal bill, the approach involves two ingrained habits of legal thought. There is nothing strictly logical about either, but they are so ingrained that all approaches have to take them into consideration. The first is that the correct method of charging is by means of a method of percentages, and the second is that the percentage is not a flat rate applied throughout the scale, but declines on a regressive scale as the value of the matters involved increases. In the Property and Reversionary Corporation case a strenuous effort was made to persuade the court, in the light of the fact that that Order - very similar in terms to the rules in the present case - did not prescribe any bands or percentages, that a flat rate ought to be taken over the whole. This was rejected by Donaldson J. in accordance with the general feeling of the profession." The court set down sliding regressive yardsticks for assessing the costs applicable.
	Solicitors Remuneration Order 1972

Treasury Solicitor -v- Regester [1978] 1 WLR 446
1978 Donaldson J	Costs, Legal Professions	Casemap 1 Citers
	A challenge was made as to the legal costs on the grant of a lease of a valuable commercial property. Held: In relation to the time spent on the business which was the third factor in the 1972 Order: "The magnetic attraction of factor (iii) as a foundation for assessment of fair and reasonable remuneration is that, in the absence of an approved scale applied to value, it is the only figure which is readily calculable. It is an attraction which must be sternly resisted in cases of this sort where one or more of the other factors is such as to dwarf it into insignificance."
	Solicitors Remuneration Order 1972