Crime - 1985- 1989
Criminal Law. Generally, this includes all questions as to whether any particular act is a criminal offence.
These cases are extracted from a very large database. The entries on that database are now being published individually to the main swarb.co.uk website in a much improved form. As cases are published here, the entry here will be replaced by a link to the same case in that improved form on swarb.co.uk. In addition the swarb.co.uk site includes very substantial numbers of cases after 2000. Please take the time to look.
This page lists 130 cases, and was prepared on 06 June 2013. These case are being transferred one by one to the main swarb.co.uk site which presents them better, with links to full text where we have it, and much improved cross referencing.
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| Regina -v- Hollinshead [1985] 1 All ER 850 |
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1985 CACDHidgson J |
Crime |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| The defendants appealed against their convictions for conspiracy to aid an abet a fraud under the 1977 Act. Held. The appeal succeeded. There was no offence of conspiracy in the form alleged namely to aid and abet, since aiding and abetting were not a statutory conspiracy within the 1977 Act. The appellants were wholesalers and therefore too remote from the ultimate fraudulent use of their products to be guilty of conspiring to aid and abet, even if such an offence existed. |
| Criminal Law Act 1977 1(1) |
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| Regina -v- Russell (1985) 81 Cr App 315 |
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1985
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Crime |
Casemap

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| Meaning of possession of an offending article |
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| Regina -v- Maloney [1985] AC 905 |
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1985 CACD |
Crime |

1 Citers
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| Regina -v- Rahman [1985] 81 Cr App R 349 |
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1985 CACD |
Crime |

1 Citers
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| False imprisonment is a common law offence, defined as consisting in "the unlawful and intentional or reckless restraint of a victim's freedom of movement from a particular place. In other words it is unlawful detention which stops the victim moving away as he would wish to move." |
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| Regina -v- Cain [1985] AC 46 |
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1985 HLScarman L |
Crime |
Casemap


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| The sentencing judge had exceeded his powers by making a criminal bankruptcy order. S40 appeared to deny a right of appeal against such an order. Held: There is a strong presumption that except by specific provision the legislature will not exclude a right of appeal as of right or with leave where such a right is ordinarily available, and the section must be construed as being subject to an implied limitation that an appeal would lie where the issue raised was that the court in making the order had exceeded the power conferred on it by Parliament. Court orders are effective in law, and must be obeyed, unless and until set aside. "The terms used to formulate the law by the judges of the Court of Appeal (which include myself in Wehner's case) have not been happy. They have spoken of orders being void or null for lack of jurisdiction in the court to make them. But you cannot describe as a nullity an order made by a superior court of record, which is what the Crown Court is: section 4(1) of the Courts Act 1971. Nor is the question really one of jurisdiction: it is a question whether the court has exceeded its power. An order of the Crown Court, once made, may be in excess of its statutory power or otherwise irregular. But it is not a nullity. And it would undermine the authority of the criminal law if orders made by the highest court of trial in criminal matters could be disregarded as nullities. The order of the Crown Court stands unless and until set aside by the court itself upon application or, if appeal lies, by the appellate tribunal to which the appeal is taken. But the terms used by the courts do not vitiate their reasoning. …." |
| Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 39 40(1) |
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| Regina -v- Fritschy [1985] Crim L R 745 |
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1985 CACD |
Crime |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
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| The defendant was instructed by the owner to collect a quantity of krugerrands in London and deliver them to a safe deposit in Switzerland. The defendant, having once collected the coins, took them to Switzerland and there made away with them. The judge had directed the jury if at the time he collected the coins the defendant had formed the dishonest intention of keeping them for himself he was guilty of theft. Held: The conviction for theft was wrong on the ground, following Morris, that there had been no appropriation in England because the defendant had there taken possession of the krugerrands with the owner’s authority. |
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| Regina -v- Roffel [1985] VR 511 |
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1985
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Commonwealth, Crime |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| (Australia - Victoria) A couple ran a clothing manufacturing business. They then formed a limited company of which they became the sole directors and shareholders and sold the business to the company. The price remained unpaid. The company’s premises were destroyed by fire and the proceeds of insurance were paid into the company’s bank account. The company’s debts exceeded the proceeds of the insurance. The husband drew cheques on the company’s account and was prosecuted for theft from the company and convicted. Held: (Majority) The court quashed the conviction. Under the Crimes Act 1958 the necessary element of appropriation required proof of adverse interference with or usurpation of some right or rights of the owner (Regina v. Morris). As the company was a separate legal entity, and in the particular circumstances (through its directing mind and will) had consented to the husband’s drawing the cheques, it could not be said that he had appropriated the company’s property. |
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| Brown, Regina -v- [1985] EWCA Crim 3 |
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18 Jan 1985 CACD |
Crime |
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| Link[s] omitted |
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| Tudhope -v- Mccarthy [1985] ScotHC HCJAC_1 |
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8 Feb 1985 HCJ |
Scotland, Crime |
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| [ Bailii ] |
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| Regina -v- Atkinson [1985] Cr LR 314 |
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1 Mar 1985
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Crime |

1 Citers
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| Jury Directions in diminished responsibility case. |
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| Bird, Regina -v- [1985] EWCA Crim 2 |
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22 Mar 1985 CACD |
Crime |
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| Link[s] omitted |
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| Lloyd and Another, Regina -v- [1985] EWCA Crim 1 |
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23 Apr 1985 CACD |
Crime |
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| [ Bailii ] |
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| Fenning -v- Hm Advocate [1985] ScotHC HCJAC_2 |
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3 May 1985 HCJ |
Scotland, Crime |
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| Link[s] omitted |
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| Libman -v- The Queen (1985) 21 DLR (4th) 174; 1985 CanLII 51 (SCC) |
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10 Oct 1985 Dickson CJ and McIntyre, Chouinard, Lamer, Wilson, Le Dain and La Forest JJ |
Commonwealth, Crime |


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CANLII (Supreme Court of Canada) Appellant was committed for trial on seven counts of fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit fraud arising out of the conduct of his Toronto telephone sales solicitation room. Pursuant to appellant's directions, telephone sales personnel telephoned U.S. residents and attempted to induce them to buy shares in two Central American mining companies. Promotional material was mailed from Central America. The sales personnel were directed to make material misrepresentations with respect to their identity, to where they were telephoning from, and to the quality and value of the shares they were selling. As a result of these misrepresentations, a large number of U.S. residents were induced to buy virtually valueless shares in the two mining companies. Their money was sent to Central America, where appellant received his share to take back to Toronto. The accused, by motion, sought to have the committal for trial quashed on the ground that the alleged offences occurred outside Canada, but the motion was refused. An appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal was dismissed. Held: The appeal should be dismissed. The counts of fraud on which appellant stood charged could be properly prosecuted in Canada and nothing in the requirements of international comity dictated that Canada not exercise jurisdiction. The conspiracy count could be proceeded with as the fraudulent activities occurred in Canada. In considering whether a criminal transaction falls outside territorial jurisdiction, account must be taken of all the relevant facts that took place in Canada giving this country an interest in prosecuting the offence and of whether or not anything in those facts offended against international comity. All that is necessary to make an offence subject to the jurisdiction of our courts is that a significant portion of the activities constituting that offence took place in Canada. It is sufficient that there be a "real and substantial link" between an offence and Canada. Sufficient activities preparatory to this fraudulent scheme occurred in Canada to warrant a court's holding that the offence took place in Canada: the scheme was devised here and the whole operation that made it function, including the directing minds and the telephone solicitation, was situated here. The fact that cases where the victims would be harmed outside the country would be caught made no difference. If an accused were prosecuted for the same offence in more than one country, any injustice could be obviated by the pleas of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict. No issue of comity was involved. The interests of other countries are not served by allowing criminals based in this country to prey on their citizens. |
| Link[s] omitted |
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| Kong Cheuk Kwan -v- The Queen (1986) 82 Cr App R 18 |
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1986 PC |
Crime |



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| Two hydrofoils collided, causing deaths. The officers were charged with manslaughter. Held: The Board applied to the situation the law which had developed for road traffic accidents. |
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| Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain -v- Storkwain [1986[ 2 All ER 635 |
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1986 HL |
Crime, Health Professions |
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| The defendant pharmacist had filled a prescription, but unknown to him the prescription was forged. Held: The offence of sale of medicine contrary to the Act was one of strict liability, and was made out. |
| Medicines Act 1968 58(2)(a) |
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| Regina -v- Wells Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Westminster City Council [1986] 1 WLR 1046 |
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1986
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Planning, Crime |
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| The offence provided in section 9 of contravening section 7 is an offence of strict liability. |
| Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 7 9 |
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| Attorney-General's Reference (No 1 of 1985) [1986] 1 QB 491 |
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1986 CACD |
Crime |
Casemap

1 Citers
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| An employee had made a secret profit by selling his own goods on his employer's premises, thereby breaking the terms of his contract of employment. Held: The moneys the employee received from his private customers were not received on account of his employer within the meaning of section 5(4), that the profits made by the employee were not the subject of a constructive trust, and that if they were, that constructive trust did not give the employer a proprietary right or interest in the secret profit within the ambit of section 5(1). "… if the contentions of the Crown are well founded and if in each case of secret profit a trust arises which falls within section 5, then a host of activities which no layman would think were stealing will be brought within the Theft Act 1968 . . . There is a clear and important difference between on the one hand a person misappropriating specific property with which he has been entrusted, and on the other hand a person in a fiduciary position who uses that position to make a secret profit for which he will be held accountable. Whether the former is within section 5, we do not have to decide. As to the latter we are firmly of the view that he is not, because he is not a trustee." |
| Theft Act 1968 5(1) 5(4) |
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| Regina -v- Shivpuri [1987] AC 1; [1986] 2 WLR 988; [1986] 1 All ER 334 |
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1986 HLLord Bridge of Harwich |
Crime |



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Drugs had been imported, and the sentencing would vary according to their classification. Held: Lord Bridge: "It follows from this, applying the reasoning in R v Courtie that each of the three distinct offences has different ingredients and, leaving aside considerations of impossibility arising under the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, part of the actus reus of the offence which must be proved in each case is the importation, actual or attempted, of goods which were in fact of the appropriate category to sustain the offence charged. So far the argument seems to be irrefutable and is not challenged by the Crown." and "It is the next step in the argument which is the critical one. If each of the three offences involves proof of a different element as part of the actus reus, that is importation of the appropriate category of prohibited goods, it follows, so it is submitted, that 'knowingly' wherever it appears in section 170(1) and (2) of the Act of 1979 connotes a corresponding mens rea, that is, knowledge of the importation of goods in the appropriate category. I recognise the force of this submission. The point may be put in the form of a rhetorical question. Can it be supposed that Parliament intended that the mens rea appropriate to an offence carrying a maximum sentence of two years' imprisonment should equally be sufficient to sustain a conviction for an offence carrying a maximum sentence of 14 years' imprisonment?" He explained the history of the 1971 Act: "The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 repealed the earlier legislation and enacted a new and comprehensive code intended, one may reasonably suppose, to arm the courts with all the criminal sanctions they would need to counter the growing drugs problem. Section 8 brought together a number of offences capable of being committed by the occupier or manager of premises and somewhat broadened their scope. " |
| Criminal Attempts Act 1981 1(1) - Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 |
| Link[s] omitted |
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| Houghton -v- Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [1986] 84 Cr App R 31 |
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1986
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Crime, Torts - Other |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| An off-duty policeman was returning from a fancy dress party in a policeman's uniform, carrying a truncheon. The issue arose in the course as to whether or not that would constitute an offence. Held: The words "reasonable excuse" in section 1(1) were wide enough to enable the off-duty police officer to be not criminally liable under section 1, because he had a "reasonable excuse" for carrying the truncheon. |
| Prevention of Crime Act 1953 1 |
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| Regina -v- Roberts [1986] Crim LR 188 |
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1986 CACD |
Crime |


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| The parties to the marriage were living separately under a deed of separation. The husband appealed a conviction for rape. Held: The deed was enough to establish that the husband could not rely upon any implied consent by his wife as a defence. |
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| Regina v Rider [1986] 83 CAR 207 |
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1986 CACD |
Crime |
Casemap

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| The defendant had obtained a divorce by forging her husband's signature on the acknowledgment of service and elsewhere, and then swore an affidavit identifying the signature. The only evidence against her on the charge of perjury was her husband's refutation of the signatures. Held. The judge had failed to direct the jury as to section 13 and the need to provide corroboration of the falsity of the statement unless its falsity was admitted. The misdirecion was material but the court applied the proviso to maintain the conviction. |
| Perjury Act 1911 1 13 |
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| In Re K (Deceased) [1986] 1 Ch 180 |
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1986
|
Crime, Wills and Probate |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| The wife who had been subjected to years of abuse shot her violent husband dead in the course of an argument, when a loaded shotgun she had picked up and pointed at him as a threat to deter him from offering her further violence went off accidentally. Held: The 1982 Act could be used in this case to releave the wife of the severe consequences of the forfeiture rule. |
| Forfeiture Act 1982 2 |
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| Regina -v- Renouf [1986] 2 All ER 449; [1986] 1 WLR 522 |
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1986 CACDLawton LJ |
Road Traffic, Crime |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| The defendant had used his car to chase some people who had assaulted him and had so manoeuvred his car as to prevent their escape. The statutory defence in the 1967 Act ("a person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances … in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders") was available against a charge of reckless driving. "This case has to be considered in the light of the evidence which was said to have amounted to reckless driving. This evidence had two facets: one was what the prosecution alleged to be the acts of recklessness; and the other was that these same acts amounted to the use of reasonable force for the purpose of assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders. In our judgment it is only when the evidence has these two facets that s 3(1) of the 1967 Act can apply. This being so, the occasions for relying on that section will be rare, certainly not when the reckless acts were antecedent to the use of force. In our judgment the alleged presence of these two facets in the appellant’s evidence concerning why he did the acts which the prosecution said were reckless was capable of providing him with a defence. It is no answer for the prosecution to submit, as counsel for the Crown did, that the wording of ss 1 and 2 of the Road Traffic Act 1972 shuts out any possibility of such a defence because they contained no words such as ‘lawful excuse’. Nor does s 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861; but s 3(1) has been used to provide a defence to charges under that section." |
| Criminal Law Act 1967 3(1) |
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| Regina -v- Jones (Terence) (1986) 83 Cr App R 375 CA |
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1986 CACD |
Crime |
Casemap

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| The trial judge declined to direct the jury that the defendants were entitled to be acquitted if the jury decided that they were indulging in "rough" and undisciplined sport or play, not intending to cause harm, and genuinely believing that the injuries which occurred in the course of the horseplay occurred with the victim's consent. |
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| Regina -v- Shivpuri [1986] 2 WLR 988; [1986] UKHL 2; [1987] AC 1 |
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15 May 1986 HLLord Hailsham of St. Marylebone L.C., Lord Elwyn-Jones, Lord Scarman, Lord Bridge of Harwich and Lord Mackay of Clashfern |
Crime, Customs and Excise |
Casemap
1 Cites
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cw The defendant had been accused of attempting to import controlled drugs, but the substances actually found were not in fact a controlled drug, though he had believed and intended them to be. Held: His appeal failed. The actus reus of the offence of attempt required an act which was more than merely preparatory to the commission of offence and which the defendant did with the intention of committing an offence, notwithstanding that the commission of the actual offence was on the true facts impossible. He really intended to evade the prohibition on the importation of drugs; his mistake was merely as to the content of the packages. The court could depart from its earlier decision in Anderton despite its being so recent.
The appellant had been convicted of attempting to import controlled drugs, but the substance was not in fact heroin. Held: Where a person was charged with an offence under the 1979 Act, it was sufficient that what was to be imported was unlawful, even if the exact nature was not known. The actus reus of attempt was an act more than merely preparatory. The distinction previously drawn between 'objectively innocent' acts and others could not be sustained. |
| Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 170(1)(b) - Criminal Attempts Act 1981 1 |
| [ Bailii ] |
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| Doughty, Regina -v- [1986] EWCA Crim 1 |
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23 May 1986 CACD |
Crime |
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| Link[s] omitted |
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| Regina -v- Steer [1986] UKHL 6; [1987] 2 All ER 833; [1988] AC 111; [1987] 3 WLR 205 |
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2 Jul 1986 HLLord Bridge of Harwich, Lord Griffiths, Lord Ackner, Lord Oliver of Aylmerton, Lord Goff of Chieveley |
Crime |
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| The respondent went to the house of a partner with whom he had a dispute, and fired three shots into the house. Nobody was injured. He had successfully appealed a conviction for criminal damage being reckless as to whether somebody else's life should be endangered, having argued that any threat to life did not arise from the damages caused by the shot. Held: The prosecutor's appeal failed. The prosecution were required to prove that the danger to life resulted from the destruction of or damage to property; it is not sufficient for the prosecution to prove that it resulted from the act of the defendant which caused the destruction or damage. |
| Criminal Damage Act 1971 1(2)(b) |
| [ Bailii ] |
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| Regina -v- Nedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025; (1986) 8 Cr App R(S); [1986] EWCA Crim 2 |
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10 Jul 1986 CACDLord Lane CJ |
Crime, Criminal Sentencing |

1 Citers
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| The appellant poured paraffin through the front door of a house and set it alight. In the fire a child died. Held: Lord Lane CJ considered whether a simple direction to the jury on intent to either kill or to do serious bodily harm was adequate and said: "Where the charge is murder and in the rare cases where the simple direction is not enough, the jury should be directed that they are not entitled to infer the necessary intention, unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant's actions and that the defendant appreciated that such was the case." |
| [ Bailii ] |
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| Regina -v- O'Grady [1987] 3 WLR 321; [1987] 1 QB 995 |
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1987 CACDLord Lane LCJ |
Crime |


1 Citers
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| The defendant and his associate drank substantial quantities of cider. They then fought and the defendant killed the associate. His defence was that he mistakenly thought his friend was attacking him. He appealed his conviction for manslaughter. Held: The crime of murder required a specific intent to kill or cause serious bodily harm. Manslaughter did not. The conviction for manslaughter stood. A defendant cannot establish self-defence by means of a mistake induced only through a self-induced intoxication. The court had to balance two interests, first that a defendant should be free to defend himself according to his perceptions, and the need to protect others from a drunken mistake. |
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| Regina -v- Mousir [1987] Crim LR 561 |
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1987 CACD |
Crime |


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| The defendant offered money to a 14 year old boy who was on his way home from school to return to his home. The boy continued toward his home, but the defendant committed sexual ssaults on him. Held: The defendant's appeal against attempted abduction was dismissed. Had he persuaded the boy to return with him, he would have been detained in such a way as to constitute an offence under the Act, since he would be kept out of his mother's lawful control.. |
| Child Abduction Act 1984 |
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| Southwell -v- Chadwick [1987] 85 Cr App R 235 |
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1987 CACD |
Crime |


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| It was a reasonable excuse for a person to have in his possession a machete knife in its scabbard and a catapult for use for killing grey squirrels, so that he could obtain food for his wild birds. The court was mainly concerned as to whether the items found were dangerous per se. |
| Prevention of Crime Act 1953 1 |
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| Regina -v- Southwood [1987] 1 WLR 1361 |
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1987
|
Consumer, Crime |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
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| Trade Descriptions Act 1968 |
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| Regina -v- Sharpe [1987] 1 QB 583 |
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1987
|
Crime |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| A member of a gang of robbers sought to establish a defence of duress. The trial judge had directed the jury " . . . but in my judgment the defence of duress is not available to an accused who voluntarily exposes and submits himself to illegal compulsion . . . it is not merely a matter of joining in a criminal enterprise; it is a matter of joining in a criminal enterprise of such a nature that the defendant appreciated the nature of the enterprise itself and the attitudes of those in charge of it, so that when he was in fact subjected to compulsion he could fairly be said by a jury to have voluntarily exposed himself and submitted himself to such compulsion." |
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| regina -v- Cristini (1987) Crim LR 504 |
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1987
|
Crime |

1 Citers
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| Broome -v- Perkins [1987] Crim LR 271 |
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1987
|
Crime |
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| Regina -v- Boswell [1987] 1 WLR 705 |
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1987 CACD |
Crime |
Casemap

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| Regina -v- White (1987) Crim LR 505 |
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1987
|
Crime |
Casemap

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| Regina -v- Kowalski (1987) 86 Cr App R 339 |
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1987 CACD |
Crime |

1 Citers
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| Regina -v- Roberts (William) [1987] 84 Cr App R 117 |
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1987 CACD |
Crime |
Casemap

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| A Ghosh direction can be misleading for a jury. |
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| Regina -v- Cooke [1987] 84 Crim App R 286 |
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1987 CACD |
Crime |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| The defendant faced trial on offences of conspiracy to commit forgery and other related offences. It was alleged that he had made admissions to a police officer in a related case but involving a different defendant. The jury had acquitted the defendant in circumstances which strongly suggested that the police officer had been lying because, in that case too, he had alleged that there had been a confession in interview. The question posed was whether the police officer could be cross-questioned about that earlier acquittal. The judge held that he could not. Held: He had been wrong to reach that conclusion. |
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| Regina -v- Tandy [1989] 1 WLR 350; [1987] 87 CAR 45 |
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1987 CACD |
Crime |

1 Citers
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| The issue of alcoholism in a murder case may be dealt with solely under diminished responsibility. |
| Homicide Act 1957 2 |
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| Regina -v- Mavji [1987] 84 Cr App R 34; [1987] 2 All ER 758 |
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1987 CACDMichael Davies J |
Crime |
Casemap

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| The court considered the offence of cheating the public revenue. Held: Cheating might include any form of fraudulent conduct which resulted in diverting money from the revenue and depriving the revenue of money to which it was entitled. Michael Davies J: "In our judgment, "cheating the revenue" can take place without any positive act of deceit or, to adopt and respectfully endorse the words of Drake J when ruling on this matter in the appellant's first trial: "The common law offence of cheating does not necessarily require a false representation, either by words or conduct. Cheating can include any form of fraudulent conduct which results in diverting money away from the Revenue and in depriving the Revenue of money to which it is entitled." This appellant was in circumstances in which he had a statutory duty to make the VAT returns and to pay over to the Crown the VAT due. He dishonestly failed to do either. Accordingly he was guilty of cheating Her Majesty the Queen and the Public Revenue. No further act or omission required to be alleged or proved." |
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| IPH -v- Chief Constable of South Wales [1987] Crim LR 42 |
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1987 QBD |
Crime, Children |
Casemap

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| The 11 year old defendant joined others in smashing the windows of a motor van, scraping its paintwork and pushing it into a post. He appealed his conviction for malicious damage. Held. The conviction was quashed. There had been no evidence before the Magistrates that he knew that what he was doing was wrong. |
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| Attorney-General of Hong Kong -v- Nai-Keung [1987] 1 WLR 1339 |
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1987 PC |
Commonwealth, Crime |


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| Textile export quotas (a permission to export textiles) which were surplus to the exporter's requirements, which could be bought and sold under the apprpriate Hong Kong legislation, may be "property" for the purposes of the law of theft. |
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| Regina -v- Campbell (1987) 84 Cr App R 255 |
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1987
|
Crime |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| Given psychiatric evidence given at the trial, the judge should have directed the jury not only on provocation but also on diminished responsibility. |
| Homicide Act 1957 2 |
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| Regina -v- Roberts [1987] 78 Cr App R 41 |
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1987 CACDLawton LJ |
Crime |

1 Citers
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| The court considered the situation which arose when the cases against two defendants charged with conspiracy diverged. Held: "Our reading of the relevant passage in the judgment of Longman's case really comes to this. When a judge has to sum up in a conspiracy case, involving only two accused, he has to make up his mind, on the evidence, whether or not it is possible, as a matter of law, for one of the accused to be convicted and the other acquitted. That must necessarily be a matter for the judge to decide. Once he has decided it, he must direct the jury accordingly. When he comes to decide it, a factor he should keep in mind is whether the two cases are different to a substantial degree; but that is a matter for his assessment and not for the jury's. If it were otherwise, there would be a danger of the jury becoming confused by being invited consider two different approaches to their task. Confusion is liable, in the experience of this court, to lead to inconsistent verdicts." |
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| Regina -v- Shepherd (1987) 86 Cr App R 47 |
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2 Jan 1987 CACDLord Lane CJ, Farquharson and Gatehouse JJ |
Crime |

1 Cites
1 Citers
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| The court considered the direction to be given on a defence of duress: "….. where a person has voluntarily, and with knowledge of its nature, joined a criminal organisation or gang which he knew might bring pressure on him to commit an offence and was an active member when he was put under such pressure, he cannot avail himself of the defence of duress." The jury should have been (but were not) directed to consider "whether the appellant could be said to have taken the risk of P's violence simply by joining a shoplifting gang of which he [P] was a member". |
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| Silverman, Regina -v- [1987] EWCA Crim 3 |
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31 Mar 1987 CACD |
Crime |
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| [ Bailii ] |
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| Ministère public -v- Oscar Traen and others C-372/85; [1987] ECR 2141 |
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12 May 1987 ECJ |
European, Crime, Environment |
Casemap
1 Cites

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| Articles 8 to 12 of Directive 75/442 on waste cover all waste-disposal activities and do not impose any limitation relating to the legal status of the operator or the frequency or purpose of the activities concerned. Article 5 of the directive does not lay down any restrictive criteria concerning the "competent ... Authorities to be responsible, in a given zone, for the planning, organization, authorization and supervision of waste-disposal operations" which are to be established or designated by the member states and the latter are therefore unrestricted in their choice of such authorities. The permit provided for in article 8 of the directive is issued by those authorities and cannot be replaced by the consent of the owner or occupier of the land where the waste is discharged . An owner or occupier of land, as an operator tipping his own waste on that land, does not need a permit under article 8 but a measure subjecting him to such a requirement may be adopted as one of the necessary measures to be taken by the member states under article 4 of the directive. Subject to the usual limitations on the exercise of a discretionary power, the power enjoyed by the member states regarding organization of the supervision provided for in article 10 of the directive is qualified only by the requirement that the objectives of that directive, namely protection of human health and of the environment, must be complied with. A directive may not of itself impose obligations on an individual and a provision of a directive may not therefore be relied upon as such against such a person . |
| [ Europa ] |
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| O'Grady, Regina -v- [1987] EWCA Crim 2 |
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11 Jun 1987 CACD |
Crime |
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| [ Bailii ] |
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| Beckford -v- The Queen [1988] 1 AC 130; [1987] UKPC 1 |
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15 Jun 1987 PCLord Griffiths |
Crime, Commonwealth |

1 Cites
1 Citers
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| (Jamaica) Self defence permits a defendant to use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances as he honestly believed them to be. 'If then a genuine belief, albeit without reasonable grounds, is a defence to rape because it negatives the necessary intention, so also must a genuine belief in facts which if true would justify self-defence be a defence to a crime of personal violence because the belief negatives the intent to act unlawfully.' At a practical level, where there are no reasonable grounds to hold a belief it will only exceptionally that a jury will conclude that such a belief was or might have been held. "There may be a fear that the abandonment of the objective standard demanded by the existence of reasonable grounds for belief will result in the success of too many spurious claims of self defence. The English experience has shown this not to be the case." |
| [ Bailii ] |
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| Bland, Regina -v- [1987] EWCA Crim 1 |
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21 Jul 1987 CACD |
Crime |
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|
| Link[s] omitted |
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| Jessop -v- Stevenson (Stewart) [1987] ScotHC HCJ_1 |
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13 Nov 1987 HCJ |
Scotland, Crime |
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| Link[s] omitted |
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| Criminal proceedings against Graziano Mattiazzo C-422/85 |
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17 Dec 1987 ECJ |
European, Crime |
|
| Europa Approximation of laws - credit institutions - directive 77/780 - scope -determination of the status of credit institutions and the criminal liability of their employees - power of member states (directive 77/780). Directive 77/780 does not detract from the power of the member states to lay down rules on the legal status of credit institutions. The classification of employees of credit institutions as "public officials" or as "persons responsible for a public service" for the purposes of the application of the criminal law of a member state is not contrary to the provisions or the objective of that directive. |
| Link[s] omitted |
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| Tandy, R. v [1987] EWCA Crim 5 |
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21 Dec 1987 CACD |
Crime |
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| Link[s] omitted |
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| Hughes -v- Holley [1988] 86 CAR 130 |
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1988 Lord Justice Glidewell |
Crime |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| Lord Justice Glidewell said that behaviour contra bonos mores meant “conduct which has the property of being wrong rather than right in the judgment of the majority of contemporary fellow citizens.” |
| | |
| Director of Public Prosecutions -v- Marshall [1988] 2 All ER 683 |
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1988
|
Crime |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| | |
| Regina -v- Pinfold (1988) 87 Cr App R 15 CA |
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1988 CACDLord Lane CJ |
Crime |
Casemap

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Once a person convicted of an offence on indictment appeals against that conviction and that appeal has been determined on its merits, the court has no jurisdiction to re-open it on fresh evidence coming to light. Lord Lane CJ considered the feasibility of re-opening an appeal: "it is in the interests of the public in general that there should be a limit or a finality to legal proceedings, sometimes put in a Latin maxim, but that is what it means in English. We have been unable to discover, nor have counsel been able to discover any situation in which a right of appeal couched in similar terms to that, has been construed as a right to pursue more than one appeal in one case. So far as the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 is concerned, there are perhaps two possible exceptions, or apparent exceptions because that is what they are, to that rule: first of all, where the decision on the original appeal, if I may call it that, can be regarded as a nullity. This is more commonly applied where there has been an application to treat a notice of abandonment as a nullity. The second occasion, which may be simply an example of the first, is where, owing to some defect in the procedure the appellant has on the first appeal being dismissed suffered an injustice, where, for example, he has not been notified of the hearing of the appeal or counsel has been unable to attend, circumstances such as that." |
| | |
| Director of Public Prosecutions -v- Billington (1988) 87 Cr App R 68 |
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1988
|
Crime |
Casemap

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| | |
| Regina -v- Hutchins [1988] Crim LR 379 |
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1988 CACD |
Crime |


1 Citers
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| The defendant was at a party where he took a range of drugs. He was accused of attacking one girl, and then imprisoning another with a neighbour. He appealed against his convictions for unlawful imprisonment and kidnapping. Held. The appeal was dismissed. For the crime of unlawful imprisonment, mens rea is required even though it is an offence of basic intent, though it can be committed intentionally or being reckless as to the victim's consent. |
| | |
| Regina -v- Osei (1988) 10 Cr App R (S) 289; |
|
1988
|
Crime |

1 Citers
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| The defendant appealed a confiscation order. She was a drug courier armed with a sum of cash to enable her to show that she could support herself in order to enter the country. Held: The word "payment" was apt to cover not merely a profit or fee but also a payment of this kind. |
| | |
| Regina -v- Gillard (1988) 87 Cr App R 189 |
|
1988
|
Crime |
Casemap

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| The defendant was guilty of an offence of administering a poison where he sprayed it directly in the victim's face. |
| Offences against the Person Act 1861 23 |
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| Regina -v- Micthell and King [1990] Crim LR 496; (1988) 163 JP 75 |
|
1988 CACDOtton LJ |
Crime |
Casemap

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| The court considered whether the defendants had continued to be involved in a criminal action where they were originally involved, but claimed to have ceased involvement. Held. In considering whether a person had withdrawn, there must usually be some act and not merely a mere mental change of intention or physical change of place by the person contending he had withdrawn. The jury should be directed that they must be satisfied (a) that the fatal injuries were sustained when the joint enterprise was continuing and that the defendant was still acting within that joint enterprise, and (b) that the acts which caused the death were within the scope of the joint enterprise. |
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| Regina -v- O'Loughlin and McLoughlin [1988] 2 All E R 431 |
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1988
|
Crime |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| Regina -v- McHugh (1988) 88 Cr App R 385 |
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1988 CACD |
Crime, Company |


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| In cases alleging corporate fraud it is necessary to look very carefully at the nature and limits of the authority before considering whether the questioned transaction is in truth a transaction authorised by the company. |
| Theft Act 1968 |
| | |
| Chan Man-sin -v- The Queen [1988] 1 WLR 196 PC |
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1988 PC |
Commonwealth, Crime |
Casemap

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| Regina -v- Governor of Pentonville Prison, Ex Parte Osman [1990] 1 WLR 277 |
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30 Mar 1988 QBDLloyd L.J. and French J. |
Crime, Evidence, Extradition, Police |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
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| The applicant had been committed to prison pending extradition proceedings brought by Hong Kong alleging substantial fraud. He challenged the committal on the grounds that since the allegations involved transmission of funds over international borders, if he had committed the acts alleged in the UK an offence would not have been committed, since the funds were transmitted from abroad, and the offences were extra-territorial. Held: The act of appropriation occurred when the defendant assumed the rights of an owner. His sending of the telex was the last act he needed to do, and that would not be extra territorial. The evidence required was that upon which a properly directed jury could commit. Last, the procedure under the 1967 Act was to be similar to that in the 1870 Act. Accordingly the list of offences could be phrased in general terms, and was capable of amendment. As regards evidence from computer printouts, the provisions of subsection 2 were alternatives, and not cumulative, since section 68(1)(b) required any one of them to be present. If there was no internal evidence of malfunction, such a printout should be admitted under section 69. Once documents which may have had legal professional privilege had been produced that did not affect their later admission. Police powers of arrest and search were the same on a domestic crime as under the 1967 Act. |
| Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 5 7(5) 8 - Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 68(1)(2) - Theft Act 1968 (c. 60) 3(1) - Extradition Act 1870 |
| [ lip ] |
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| Muller And Others -v- Switzerland [1991] 13 EHRR 212; 10737/84; [1988] ECHR 5; (1988) 13 EHRR 212; [1988] ECHR 5; [1988] ECHR 5 |
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24 May 1988 ECHR |
Human Rights, Human Rights, Crime, Media |


|
The Court considered a complaint that Article 10 had been infringed by the applicant's conviction of an offence of publishing obscene items, consisting of paintings which were said "mostly to offend the sense of sexual propriety of persons of ordinary sensitivity". Held: There was no breach of Article 10 "Artists and those who promote their work are certainly not immune from the possibility of limitations as provided for in paragraph (2) of Article 10. Whoever exercises his freedom of expression undertakes, in accordance with the express terms of that paragraph, "duties and responsibilities"; their scope will depend on his situation and the means he uses. In considering whether the penalty was "necessary in a democratic society", the Court cannot overlook this aspect of the matter."
Freedom of expression is one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and "it is applicable not only to "information" or "ideas" that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any section of the population". |
| European Convention on Human Rights 10 - Eurpean Convention on Human Rights 810 |
| Link[s] omitted |
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| Regina -v- Bray Times, 04 July 1988 |
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4 Jul 1988 CA |
Crime |

1 Citers
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| Criminal Proceedings Against X (Rec 1988,P 5099) (Judgment) C-228/87 |
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22 Sep 1988 ECJ |
European, Crime |
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|
| Link[s] omitted |
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| Attorney-General's Reference (No 1 of 1988) Times, 19 October 1988 |
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19 Oct 1988 CACD |
Crime, Company |

1 Cites
1 Citers
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| The defendant received price-sensitive information. The Attorney-General appealed his acquittal, the judge having directed the jury that in order to have 'obtained' information within the subsection, he must have carried out some act, that he had expended some effort or acquired the information on purpose. Held: The meaning was wider than as stated by the judge, and included any individual who had obtained information from another. No more was required than to receive the information. |
| Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 1(3) |
| | |
| Regina -v- Minors, Regina -v- Harper [1989] 1 WLR 441 CA |
|
14 Dec 1988 CACDWatkins L.J., Bush and Steyn JJ |
Evidence, Crime |


1 Citers
|
In each case, the prosecution had produced a computer record to the court as evidence. The record was a computer print out. They challenged their convictions. Held: To admit such evidence, the court had to see compliance with both sections. There should if necessary, be a trial within a trial first, to decide whether the document would generally be admissible under section 68, followed by a test of whether the specific provisions for computer data were also met.
cw Crime - Evidence - Documents, admissibility of - Computer print- outs - Computer records of stolen tickets and records of building society account - Procedure for admitting computer printouts in evidence - Whether printouts admissible in evidence |
| Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 68 69 |
| Link[s] omitted |
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| Attorney General's Reference (No 1 of 1989) (1989) 11 Cr App R(S) 4109 |
|
1989 CACD |
Crime |
Casemap
1 Citers
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|
| | |
| Regina -v- Gamble [1989] NI 268 |
|
1989 Carswell J |
Crime, Northern Ireland |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| Four members of the Ulster Volunteer Force had combined to inflict punishment on an allegedly delinquent member of the organisation. The punishment was to consist of knee-capping (the firing of a bullet or bullets into a knee or other joint, so as to cripple but not kill the victim) and a beating. In the event the victim died. Several bullets caused wounds which could, but need not, have proved fatal. The cause of his death was the extremely forceful cutting of his throat. The court considered the liability of secondary party defendants for murder within a joint enterprise. Held: The court rejected the prosecution argument that since there was an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm, and that satisfied the mens rea requirement of murder, the deliberate killing of the victim was not very different in kind from what was contemplated. Carswell J said that they "must be taken to have had within their contemplation the possibility that life might be put at risk. The issue is whether it follows as a consequence that they cannot be heard to say that the murder was a different crime from the attack which they contemplated, and so cannot escape liability for the murder an the ground that it was outside the common design. To accept this type of reasoning would be to fix an accessory with consequences of his acts which he did not foresee and did not desire or intend. The modern development of the criminal law has been away from such an approach and towards a greater emphasis on subjective tests of criminal guilt, as Sir Robin Cooke pointed out in Chan Wing-Siu. Although the rule remains well entrenched that an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm qualifies as the mens rea of murder, it is not in my opinion necessary to apply it in such a way as to fix an accessory with liability for a consequence which he did not intend and which stems from an act which he did not have within his contemplation. I do not think that the state of the law compels me to reach such a conclusion, and it would not in my judgment accord with the public sense of what is just and fitting." |
| | |
| Regina -v- Hill and Hall [1989] 89 Cr App R 74 |
|
1989 CACDLord Lane LCJ |
Crime |



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| The defendants were separately tried for possession of an article with intent to damage property contrary to section 3. In each case the article in question was a hacksaw blade and it was the prosecution case that each of the applicants intended to use one to cut part of the perimeter fence of a United States Naval Facility. The defence in each case was one of lawful excuse. It was put forward that the actions were aimed at forcing the United Kingdom to abandon nuclear weapons; thereby saving their own property and that of their neighbours from destruction. The trial judges directed the jury to convict on the basis, first, that the causative relationship between the acts and the alleged protection was so tenuous and nebulous the acts could not, objectively, have amounted to protection. On applications to appeal against conviction it was contended that the test was a subjective one and that it should have been left to the jury as a question of fact as to what in each case the applicant believed. A further point was taken that the judge had been wrong to direct the jury to convict. Held: "There are two aspects to this type of question. The first aspect is to decide what it was that the applicant in this case, Valerie Hill, in her own mind thought. The learned judge assumed, and so do we, for the purposes of this decision, that everything she said about her reasoning was true. I have already perhaps given a sufficient outline of what it was she believed to demonstrate what is meant by that. Up to that point the test was subjective. In other words one is examining what is going on in the applicant's mind. . . . Having done that the judges in the present cases and the judge particularly in the case of Valerie Hill turned to the second aspect of the case and that is this. He had to decide as a matter of law, which means objectively, whether it could be said that on those facts as believed by the applicant, snipping the strand of wire, which she intended to do, could amount to something done to protect either the applicant's own home or the home of her adjacent friends in Pembrokeshire. . . . He decided again quite rightly in our view that that proposed act on her part was far too remote from the eventual aim at which she was targeting her actions to satisfy the test." |
| Criminal Damage Act 1971 3 |
| | |
| Regina -v- Price (Herbert) [1969] 1 QB 541 |
|
1989 CACDSachs LJ, Fenton Atkinson and Cusack JJ |
Crime, Health Professions |
Casemap
1 Citers
|
| A woman went to consult the defendant, a doctor, as she thought she was pregnant and did not wish to have the child. It was common ground that she told the defendant she thought she was some three months pregnant, that she desired not to have the child and that there was talk of going to Harley Street if there was any question of terminating any pregnancy. Although she exhibited most of the classic symptoms of being pregnant the defendant apparently told her that he did not think she was. The defendant suggested that she should be fitted with a Gynekoil, an IUD, according to the defendant, because she was frightened of becoming pregnant, and according to the woman, to procure an abortion. Two days later, the coil was inserted. The following day the woman went to a police surgeon who concluded she was pregnant and would shortly miscarry which she did on the following day, the foetus being some ten weeks old. The defendant was convicted by the jury of using an instrument – the Gynekoil – with intent to procure a miscarriage, contrary to section 58 of the 1861 Act. Held: The judge had misdirected the jury in failing to warn them of the dangers of convicting the defendant on the uncorroborated evidence of the woman – she being in law an accomplice. Sachs LJ: “The essential issue for the jury was, did the defendant at the time that he inserted the Gynekoil with the insertion tube know or believe that [she] was pregnant and accordingly introduce the instrument with intent to produce a miscarriage, or did he, as it was his case for the defence, think that she was not pregnant and introduce it for the purpose of allaying anxieties on her behalf as regards the future.” |
| | |
| Regina -v- Saraswati (1989) 18 NSWLR 143 |
|
1989 Toohey J, McHugh J |
Commonwealth, Crime |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| (Criminal Court of Appeal - New South Wales) The defendant appealed convictions on counts of indecency with a child, the only evidence relied on, in relation to some counts, being evidence of full sexual intercourse. Statutory time limits precluded prosecution for unlawful sexual intercourse and indecent assault. It was held at trial not to be an abuse of process for the prosecution to rely on the evidence of sexual intercourse to establish the charge of indecency Held: (Majority) The High Court applied a "rule that, when a statute specifically deals with a matter and makes it the subject of a condition or limitation, it excludes the right to use a general provision in the same statute to avoid that condition or limitation". The court did not accept that when Parliament amended the relevant Act to criminalise acts of indecency it intended that general power to be used to circumvent the time limit placed on prosecutions under the specifically applicable sections of the same statute. |
| | |
| G -v- Federal Republic of Germany (1989) 60 DR 256 |
|
1989 ECHR |
Human Rights, Crime |
Casemap

|
| A norm cannot be regarded as a law unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to foresee, if need be with appropriate advice, the consequences which a given course of conduct may entail. However, the law may be clarified and adapted to new circumstances which can reasonably be brought under the original concept of the offence. |
| | |
| Regina -v- Philippou (1989) 89 Cr App R 290; Times, 06 April 1989 |
|
1989 CA |
Crime, Company |

1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| The defendants were sole directors and shareholders of their company. They appealed a conviction of theft from the company. Held: The convictions stood. "Appropriates" is to be given its ordinary English meaning, namely, "takes as one's own or to oneself". |
| Theft Act 1968 |
| | |
| Regina -v- Mackenzie 1989 SLT 121 |
|
1989 HCJLord Justice General Emslie |
Crime, Scotland |
Casemap

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|
| Misiuse of Drugs Act 1971 28(2) |
| | |
| Attorney-General's Reference (No 1 of 1988) [1989] 2 WLR 729 |
|
1989 HLLord Lowry |
Company, Crime |



|
| The defendant received price-sensitive information. He was acquitted of 'obtaining' the information, the judge finding that he had done nothing positive to acquire it. On appeal the court held that no such act was required, Held: Nothing further was required than to have received the information, to be found to have obtained it. Parliament must have intended the wider meaning to include 'coming into possession of'. The court followed three steps in interpreting the provision. The literal approach was insufficient, and nor was the purposive approach. They applied the Black-Clawson approach in resolving the ambiguity found in the statute. Nevertheless the defendant was acquitted. |
| Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 1(3) |
| | |
| Director of Public Prosecutions -v- Kitching [1990] COD 149; [1990] CLR 394; Times, 17 November 1989 |
|
1989
|
Crime, Police |
Casemap
1 Citers
|
| The statutory power of arrest in section 91 of the CJA 1967 for the offence of drunk and disorderly in a public place was not repealed by section 26(1), despite the absence of any reference thereto in Schedule 2 to PACE. |
| Criminal Justice Act 1967 91(1) - Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 25 26 |
| | |
| Atkin -v- Director of Public Prosecutions [1989] 89 Cr App R 199 |
|
1989 CACDTaylor LJ |
Crime |
Casemap
1 Citers
|
| "The phrase 'uses towards another person' means, in the context of section 4(1)(a) 'uses in the presence of and in the direction of another person directly.'" |
| Public Order Act 1986 4(1)(a) |
| | |
| Regina -v- Central Criminal Court ex parte Francis and Francis [1989] 1 AC 347 |
|
1989 HLLord Griffiths, Lord Goff of Chieveley |
Legal Professions, Crime |
Casemap

1 Citers
|
The police had obtained an ex parte order for the production of files from a firm of solicitors relating to financial transactions of one of their clients. The police believed that the client had been provided with money to purchase property by an alleged drug trafficker. The solicitors relied on the exemption in section 27(4)(ii) that the material to which the order related included 'items subject to legal privilege'. The definition of 'items subject to legal privilege' was to be found in section 10(1) of the 1984 Act. Held: On a purposive construction of section 10(2), the relevant "intention" did not have to belong to the particular person holding the items; rather, if the intention of furthering a criminal purpose were held by anyone, the items would lose their privilege. A drug trafficker with criminal intent could not protect himself by placing his documents in the hands of a solicitor. Privilege belonged to the client, not the solicitor, and a criminal intent disentitled the client to privilege." A solicitor ought to consult his client before relying upon a claim for legal professional privilege for that client's documents. (Lord Griffiths) "I have no doubt that … if an order to give access to documentation is made under section 27, the solicitor-client relationship provides a reasonable excuse within the meaning of the section for the solicitor to take his client's instructions as to whether the order should be contested." Lord Goff: Section 10 expresses, but does not amend or vary, the common law position with regard to legal professional privilege.
The House approved the first part of Glidewell LJ's reasoning in Snaresbrook:- "I have to recognise that . . . my conclusion in the present case undermines part of the reasoning of Glidewell LJ [in the Snaresbrook case]. But it does not necessarily undermine the conclusion of the Divisional Court in that case. This is because I am inclined to agree with Glidewell LJ that the common law principle of legal professional privilege cannot be excluded, by the exception established in R v Cox and Railton 14 QBD 153 in cases where a communication is made by a client to his legal adviser regarding the conduct of his case in criminal or civil proceedings, merely because such communication is untrue and would, if acted upon, lead to the commission of the crime of perjury in such proceedings" (emphasis supplied). |
| Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 27(4)(ii) - Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 10(1) 27(4(1) |
| | |
| S -v- HM Advocate 1989 SLT 469 |
|
1989 HCJLord Emslie |
Scotland, Crime |
Casemap
1 Citers
|
| Rape is regarded as an aggravated assault, of which the achievement of sexual intercourse is the worst aggravating feature. |
| | |
| Horner -v- Kingsley Clothing Limited [1989] Crim LR 911 |
|
1989 QBD |
Crime |
Casemap
1 Citers
|
| The court described the process for considering whether an offence had been committed under the Act: "The proper approach is to consider the matter in four stages; (1) Had a trade description been applied to the goods? (2) Was that description false in any particular? (3) If it was, was it false to a material degree? (4) If it was not, the justices should put themselves in the position of the ordinary shopper to decide if it was misleading." |
| | |
| Regina -v- Court [1989] AC 28 |
|
1989 HLAckner L |
Crime |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
When considering whether an action constituted an indecent assault, the jury was to be asked whether "right-minded persons would consider the conduct indecent or not."
Lord Ackner: "It was common ground before your Lordships, and indeed it is self evident, that the first stage in the proof of the offence is for the prosecution to establish an assault. The "assault" usually relied upon is a battery the species of assault conveniently described by Lord Lane in Faulkner v Talbot [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1528 at 1534 as "any intentional touching of another person without the consent of that person and without lawful excuse. It need not necessarily be hostile or rude or aggressive, as some of the cases seem to indicate." |
| | |
| Regina -v- Smith (Ian) [1989] 1 WLR 765 |
|
1989 CACD |
Crime |
Casemap

|
| The defendant had been convicted of supplying cannabis resin. He received a payment £2,500 and appealed a confiscation order for that amount, saying that the profit was much less. Held: In section 2(1)(a) the phrase 'any payments' had a wide interprettion and was not restricted to the net profits of trafficking. It can include any payment, and even one made in kind. |
| Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 1 2(1)(a) 4(3) |
| | |
| Regina -v- Conway [1989] QB 290; (1989) 88 Cr App Rep 159 |
|
1989 Woolf LJ |
Road Traffic, Crime |

1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| The defendant said that he had driven recklessly because he was in fear for his life and that of his passenger. Held: The court was bound by Willer to rule that a defence of duress was available. It was convenient to refer to this type of duress as "duress of circumstances". |
| | |
| Regina -v- Grundy (1989) 89 Cr App R 333 |
|
1989 CACD |
Crime |
Casemap

|
|
| | |
| Regina -v- Ciccarelli (1989) 54 CCC (3d) 121 |
|
1989 CACD |
Crime |

1 Citers
|
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| | |
| Regina -v- Windass (1989) 89 Cr App Rep 258 |
|
1989 CACDLord Lane CJ |
Crime |

1 Citers
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The defendant had been cross-examined by reference to a diary found in the possession of his girl friend which was inadmissible against him. He was repeatedly asked what the writer meant by her entries. He appealed his conviction. Held: The use made of the diary was improper. There had been a material irregularity. Lord Lane CJ: "It seems to us there are two objections which should properly be made to that line of cross-examination. First of all it is quite improper to ask a witness to explain what a third party means by a document written by that third party. No doubt if this witness had been more experienced, he would have said that that was impossible, but then he would have run the risk of being thought to be too clever. As it was, he found himself in the position of trying to explain to the jury what a third party meant by a document written by that third party without his collaboration. Secondly, perhaps more importantly, it is, in our judgment, quite improper for counsel to take in his hands a statement which is inadmissible vis-a-vis the witness whom he is cross-examining, let alone allowing the jury to have a copy of the statement in their hands whilst he is doing that, and then to ask the witness to explain, almost sentence by sentence, the highly damaging statements, inadmissible against him, which the maker of the document had written. It is of course perfectly possible and perfectly proper for questions to be put in cross-examination such as ‘were you in such and such a public house on such and such a day? Were you with such and such a person?’ But to link it, as was done here, with the contents of a document inadmissible against the witness being cross-examined was, in our judgment, a matter which should not have occurred.” |
| | |
| Hennessy, Regina -v- [1989] EWCA Crim 1 |
|
27 Jan 1989 CACD |
Crime |
|
|
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Roberts -v- Hamilton [1989] ScotHC HCJ_1 |
|
10 Mar 1989 HCJ |
Scotland, Crime |
|
|
| [ Bailii ] |
| | |
| Johnson, Regina -v- [1989] EWCA Crim 289 |
|
21 Apr 1989 CACD |
Crime |
|
|
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Ford -v- Guild [1989] ScotHC HCJ_2 |
|
18 Oct 1989 HCJ |
Scotland, Crime |
|
|
| [ Bailii ] |
|