Crime - 1992
Criminal Law. Generally, this includes all questions as to whether any particular act is a criminal offence.
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This page lists 39 cases, and was prepared on 15 November 2008.
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| Lloyd -v- Director of Public Prosecutions [1992] 1 All ER 982 |
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1992 QBDNolan LJ, Judge J |
Torts - Other, Crime |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| Mr Lloyd had parked his car in a private car park with five large notices boards located at the entrance to and exit of this private car park positioned at eye-level for car drivers. All those notices warned that unauthorised vehicles would be immobilised. Mr Lloyd's car was found clamped on his return. He contacted the security firm responsible for the clamping who required payment of £25 to release Mr Lloyd's car. Mr Lloyd refused to pay, but later returned and cut the two padlocks. Mr Lloyd's defence when prosecuted was that he had a lawful excuse for damaging the padlocks, namely that a trespass was being committed to his car. He also argued that once he had returned to the car park and requested the removal of the clamp, any consent by him to the clamping of his car ceased, and even if the clamping of the car had not constituted a trespass up to that point it was a trespass thereafter. Held: As to criminal law only, the suggestion of lawful excuse was wholly untenable. At the worst he had suffered a civil wrong. The remedy for such wrongs is available in the civil courts. That is what they are there for. Self-help involving the use of force can only be contemplated where there is no reasonable alternative. Here, as in Stear -v- Scott, there was such an alternative. "The differences between the facts of that case and those of the present case are quite insufficient to my mind to make it distinguishable." |
| Statute References omitted |
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| Regina -v- Egan [1992] 4 All ER 470; [1992] 4 All ER 470 |
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1992 CACD |
Crime |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| Directions to jury in diminished responsibility defence to murder charge. |
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| Regina -v- King [1992] QB 20 |
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1992
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Crime |
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| A CHAPS (clearing house automated payment system) order was held to be a valuable security. |
| Statute References omitted |
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| Regina -v- Central Criminal Court ex parte Porter [1992] Crim LR 121 |
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1992
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Crime |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| Regina -v- Reid [1992] 1 WLR 793 |
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1992 HLLord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Roskill, Lord Ackner, Lord Goff of Chieveley and Lord Browne-Wilkinson |
Road Traffic, Crime |

1 Cites
1 Citers
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The defendant, convicted of causing death by reckless driving contrary asked the House to reconsider its decision in Lawrence on which the trial judge's jury direction had been based. Held: Lawrence remained good. (Lord Keith) "where the driver acted under some understandable and excusable mistake or where his capacity to appreciate risks was adversely affected by some condition not involving fault on his part. There may also be cases where the driver acted as he did in a sudden dilemma created by the actions of others." (Lord Ackner) on "regard must be given to any explanation [the defendant] gives as to his state of mind which may displace the inference", commented "I read this as no more than a cautionary instruction to the jury that, while it would be open to them at first sight to find that the accused was driving recklessly from the mere manner of his driving, if it shows a clear disregard for the lives or safety of others without any explanation for this conduct, yet before reaching any firm conclusions they must have regard to any explanation which accounts for his conduct. In short, they must have regard to all the available evidence." The observations on recklessness were directed to the context of driving only.
Lord Goff of Chieveley discussed the possibility that the defendant in a reckless driving case was indifferent to the risk created by his driving or has closed his mind to it, in either case failing to give any thought to the possibility of risk: "Every driver knows that driving can be dangerous; and if when a man is in fact driving dangerously in the sense described by Lord Diplock, he does not even address his mind to the possibility of risk, then, absent special circumstances (to which I will refer later) it is right that he should, if the risk was obvious, be held to have been driving recklessly, even though he was not in fact aware of the risk. It cannot be right that in such circumstances he should be able to shelter behind his ignorance, or be given preferred treatment as compared with another person who, having recognised and considered the risk, has wrongly decided to disregard it." |
| Statute References omitted |
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| Regina -v- Shuck [1992] Crim.L R 209 |
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1992 CACD |
Crime |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
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| The defendant was a company officer. He gave instructions to an innocent third party which resulted in the dishonest diversion of substantial sums of the company's money. He appealed the judge's interpretation of the word 'appropriation.' Held: The meaning of appropriation still had its difficulties. If there is an intention on the part of the owner to pass all his property rights to another so that that other gets a voidable title, there is nothing left for him to appropriate. Morris was to be preferred to Lawrence if there was a conflict. The question was whether the agent had exercised independent judgment. The judges direction was correct: 'in the final analysis, what you have to look at as amatter of common sense is who was calling the shots.' |
| Statute References omitted |
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| Regina -v- Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889 |
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1992 CACDLord Taylor |
Crime |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| The appelland sought substitution of a conviction for manslaughter for that of murder. Held: The court emphasised the need for any available relevant evidence to be advanced at trial. The phrase a "sudden and temporary loss of self-control" "encapsulates an essential ingredient of the defence of provocation in a clear and readily understandable phrase. It serves to underline that the defence is concerned with the actions of an individual who is not, at the moment when he or she acts violently, master of his or her own mind." "English cases concerned with the 'reasonable man' element of provocation, and examples given by judges, have tended to focus on physical characteristics. Thus age, sex, colour, race and any physical abnormality have been considered." As to the relevance of an interval between the provocative conduct and the reaction of the defendant to it: "Time for reflection may show that after the provocative conduct made its impact on the mind of the defendant, he or she kept or regained self-control. The passage of time following the provocation may also show that the subsequent attack was planned or based on motives, such as revenge or punishment, inconsistent with the loss of self-control and therefore with the defence of provocation. . . . There are important considerations of public policy which would be involved should provocation be redefined so as possibly to blur the distinction between sudden loss of self-control and deliberate retribution." Addressing the appellant's submission that expert evidence showed that women who have been subjected frequently over a period to violent treatment may react to the final act or words by "slow burn" reaction rather than by an immediate loss of self-control: "We accept that the subjective element in the defence of provocation would not as a matter of law be negatived simply because of the delayed reaction in such cases, provided that there was at the time of the killing a 'sudden and temporary loss of self-control' caused by the alleged provocation. However, the longer the delay and the stronger the evidence of deliberation on the part of the defendant, the more likely it will be that the prosecution will negative provocation." |
| Statute References omitted |
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| Regina -v- Morpeth Ward Justices, ex parte Ward (1992) 95 CAR 215 |
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1992
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Crime |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| A bind-over was upheld on people who had noisily and turbulently disrupted a pheasant shoot. |
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| A -v- Director of Public Prosecutions [1992] Crim LR 34 |
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1992 Bingham LJ |
Crime, Children |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| In the facts of the case, the presumption of doli incapax was not disapplied, but, Bingham LJ said: "children have the benefit of the presumption which in this case and some others seems to me to lead to results inconsistent with common sense." |
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| Regina -v- Davison [1992] Crim LR 31 |
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1992 CACD |
Crime |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| The defendant's conviction of affray where he had "swiped" a kitchen knife towards a police officer was upheld. |
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| Regina -v- Rowley (1992) 94 Cr App R 95 |
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1992 CACDTaylor LJ |
Crime |
Casemap

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| The defendant left notes in public lavatories directed to teenage boys. There were two versions of the notes. The notes in themselves were innocuous. They were designed to effect an introduction between Rowley and any boy who might read the note. Rowley's purpose in leaving those notes in public lavatories was not difficult to see: it was to make contact with teenage boys for immoral purposes. Held: Rowley's acts in leaving the notes in public lavatories could not be described as lewd, obscene or disgusting, and his motive in leaving those notes could not convert what were otherwise ordinary acts into lewd, obscene or disgusting acts. He was not guilty of the offence of outraging public decency. |
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| Regina -v- Henderson Unreported, November 1992 |
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1992 CACD |
Crime, Administrative |
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| The British authorities had, over a period of time, failed to enforce restrictions on the export of military equipment to Iraq and had known that such material was being exported to Iraq via Jordan. The prosecution of the defendant for breach of the regulations collapsed rather than have papers disclosed to the court. Ministers had signed public interest immunity certificates which, if accepted by the trial court, would have prevented disclosure of the equivocal role which the authorities had played. |
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| Cardle -v- Mulrainey 1992 SLT 1152 |
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1992 HCJLord Hope LCJ |
Scotland, Crime |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
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The defendant drank lager into which a third party had put amphetamine. He then tried to start vehicles belonging to others with the intention of taking them away. He also took some property from one of the vehicles. The sheriff acquitted him. The procurator fiscal appealed and the sheriff stated a case, in the course of which he found that: "The respondent was aware of his actions in the early hours of 29 March 1991. He was aware that these actions were wrong, in so far as they comprised the conduct of the respondent found to be criminal herein. The respondent's ability to reason the consequences of his actions to himself was affected by his ingestion of the drug amphetamine. He was unable to take account of the fact that they were criminal in character by reason of his ingestion of amphetamine. The respondent was unable to refrain from these criminal actions by reason of his ingestion of the drug amphetamine." He applied Kidd. Held: The appeal succeded.
Lord Hope LCJ said: "Where, as in the present case, the accused knew what he was doing and was aware of the nature and quality of his acts and that what he was doing was wrong, he cannot be said to be suffering from some total alienation of reason in regard to the crime with which he is charged which the defence requires. The sheriff found in finding 16 that the respondent's ability to reason the consequences of his actions to himself was affected by his ingestion of the drug. The finding narrates that he was unable to take account in his actions of the fact that they were criminal in character and to refrain from them. But this inability to exert self control, which the sheriff has described as an inability to complete the reasoning process, must be distinguished from the essential requirement that there should be a total alienation of the accused's mental faculties of reasoning and of understanding what he is doing. As in the case of provocation, which provides another example of a stimulus resulting in a loss of self control at the time of the act, this may mitigate the offence but it cannot be held to justify an acquittal on the ground that there is an absence of mens rea. . . It is clear therefore that not every weakness or aberration of the mind will amount to insanity. So it is in the case of the defence with which the decision in Ross was concerned. Not every weakness or aberration induced by the external factor will provide the defence. Hence the insistence in Ross on a total alienation of reason in relation to the crime charged. This is necessary in order to distinguish the condition from other conditions which may be regarded at best as merely mitigating the offence. What will amount to a total alienation of reason, or as was said in Ross, 1991 S.L.T. 564, 572A, a total loss of control of the accused's actions in regard to the crime with which he is charged, must be a question of fact in each case. But so far as the present case is concerned the sheriff has made express findings in regard to several of the crimes with which the respondent was charged that he intended to do what he did. There are findings that he intended to start the motor vehicles, steal them and drive them away. In the light of these findings the sheriff's conclusion that the respondent's ability to reason the consequences of his actions to himself was affected by his ingestion of the drug and that he was unable to refrain from them was relevant at best only to mitigation. He should have held that the respondent's reason in relation to the crimes charged was not totally alienated and that he did not have a proper basis for the defence." |
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| Regina -v- Ashton [1992] Crim LR 667 |
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1992 CACD |
Crime |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| The court held that the learned judge had been wrong in directing the jury that it was a situation in which they must return the same verdict in relation to each of the co-accused where they were charged with a conspiracy. |
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| Regina -v- Boyea Unreported 28 January 1992 |
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28 Jan 1992 CACD |
Crime |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
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| The defendant was accused of having, with or without the consent of his victim, caused her physical damage by inserting his hand in her vagina and twisting it. Held: "the extent of the violence inflicted … went far beyond the risk of minor injury to which, if she did consent, her consent would have been a defence" . In fact she did not consent and the defence did not arise. "As a generality, the level of vigour in sexual congress which is generally acceptable, and therefore the voluntarily accepted risk of incurring some injury is probably higher now than it was in 1934. It follows in our view that the phrase "transient or trifling" " |
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| Regina -v- Goodard [1992] Crim LR 588 |
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25 Feb 1992 CACD |
Crime |
Casemap

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| The defendant appealed his conviction after he was found to have offered to supply a controlled drug. At his trial he had claimed that he had not intended to supply the drug. Held: The appeal failed. The trial judge had correctly directed the jury that it was no defence to show that he had not intended to supply the drug. The offence of offering to supply was complete when the offer was made. |
| Statute References omitted |
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| Regina -v- Effik; Same -v- Micthell [1992] 95 Cr App 427; Times, 23 March 1992 |
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23 Mar 1992 CACDSteyn LJ |
Crime |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
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| The police had unlawfully intercepted telephone calls made by the defendant. Held: the evidence had been properly admitted notwithstanding its unlawful origins. |
| Statute References omitted |
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| Regina -v- Brown (Anthony); Regina -v- Laskey; Regina -v- Jaggard; Regina -v- Lucas; Regina -v- Carter; Regina -v- Cadman [1992] QB 491; [1992] 2 All ER 552; [1992] 2 WLR 441 |
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15 Apr 1992 CACD |
Crime |
Casemap

1 Citers
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| The defendants appealed their convictions for offences under the 1861 Act of assaults inflicting injury. They said that as sado-masochists, they had mutually consented to the assaults and that no offences had been commited, but pleaded gulty after the judge ruled that consent was not a defence. Held: In the case of a mere assault, consent was a defence, but once a serious wound or actual bodily harm was inflicted without good reason, consent was no longer a defence. The satisfaction of sado-masochistic libido was no sufficient reason in law for committing a serious assault on a willing victim. |
| Statute References omitted |
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15 Apr 1992 CACD |
Crime |
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| A conviction for assault when resisting an unlawful arrest, (no theft was later proved) could not stand. |
| Statute References omitted |
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3 Jun 1992 CACD |
Crime |
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| A temporary manager brought in for a week was not a responsible officer for fire precautions' breaches. |
| Statute References omitted |
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3 Jun 1992 CACD |
Crime |
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| The obtaining of a self employed post as an accountant by deceit constituted the obtaining of a pecuniary advantage. |
| Theft Act 1968 16(1) |
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3 Jun 1992 CACD |
Crime |
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| The offence of 'unlawful wounding' included a deliberate act which might (not would) cause injury. |
| Statute References omitted |
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| Regina -v- Pawlicki; Regina -v- Swindell |
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3 Jun 1992 CACD |
Crime |
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| The defendant was properly convicted of having a firearm with intent to rob despite the gun being in a car 50 yards away from the offence. The phrase 'having with him a firearm' is to be construed purposely. Accessibility was the issue. |
| Statute References omitted |
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| Regina -v- Gotts [1992] 2 AC 412; [1992] 2 WLR 284 |
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3 Jun 1992 HL |
Crime |

1 Cites
1 Citers
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| The defendant had been convicted of attempted murder, and appealed the rejection of his defence of duress. Held: The defence of duress is not available to an accused facing a charge of attempted murder as a matter of policy, since it would not be available for the full offence of murder. |
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| Attorney-General's Reference (No 1 of 1991) [1993] QB 94 |
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16 Jun 1992 CACDLord Taylor of Gosforth CJ, Macpherson of Cluny and Turner JJ |
Crime, Evidence |
Casemap
1 Citers
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cw Crime - Computer misuse - Unauthorised access - Person using one computer to obtain from it unauthorised benefit - Whether unauthorised use of single computer within statute - "Access to any program or data held in any computer.
The defendant was accused of misusing computer access to put himself in a position to carry out a fraud. The judge held that the section required more than one computer to have been involved. The court was asked to answer whether this was the case. Held: The charge under section 1(1)(a) of using "a computer to perform any function with intent to secure access to any program or data held in any computer," did not require the misuse of one computer to access another. Section 1(1) could be satisfied by causing a computer to perform a function with intent to secure unauthorised access to any program or data held in the same computer. |
| Statute References omitted |
| Link[s] omitted |
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| Regina -v- Naillie; Regina -v- Kanesarajah |
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24 Jun 1992 CACD |
Crime, Immigration |
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| An applicant for asylum was not an illegal immigrant, despite his use of a false passport. |
| Statute References omitted |
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2 Sep 1992 CACD |
Crime |
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| A Judge may make assumptions, but must decide to a criminal standard of proof in order to make a confiscation order. |
| Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 2(3) |
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9 Sep 1992 CA |
Crime |
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| Procedures for appeal against orders preventing naming of children. |
| Statute References omitted |
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| Harris -v- Director of Public Prosecutions; Fehmi -v- Director of Public Prosecutions |
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9 Sep 1992 CACD |
Crime |
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| A lockable folding knife was a fixed blade knife - process to fold required. |
| Statute References omitted |
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| Regina -v- Lewes Crown Court ex parte Sinclair |
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16 Sep 1992 QBD |
Crime |
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| A civil court has no jurisdiction to interpret a sentence of a criminal court. |
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16 Sep 1992 CA |
Crime |
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| A plea of autrefois convict was not available as between civil contempt and criminal proceedings. |
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| Vince and Another -v- Chief Constable of Dorset Police |
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16 Sep 1992 CA |
Crime |
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| Custody sergeant need only be available to be called in readily, not present. |
| Statute References omitted |
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| Director of Public Prosecutions -v- Gregson [1993] 96 Cr App R 240 |
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23 Sep 1992 QBDMcCowan LJ |
Crime |
Casemap
1 Cites

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| A knife fell from the defendant's jeans during the course of a police search. He claimed to have forgotten about it. Held: It is important to concentrate on the time in respect of which the defendant is charged. Six days earlier he had the knife on him for a good reason, because the justices found that it was a knife that he used in his work and would have had with him at his work and might well have put into his pocket at work six days earlier. But did he have it with him for a good reason at the time of his arrest? Could having it for work reasons six days earlier be a good reason for having it on him six days later when not at work. The question, therefore, it seems to me, boils down to whether forgetfulness at the relevant time was a good reason. It does appear that the justices found that he had forgotten that he had it on him. This was odd having regard to the finding of fact that the knife fell not from his jacket pocket where the knife, he said, had been put by him at the time of his work, but from his jeans, and the further finding that when that happened he offered no specific reason or excuse for having it with him. However, they did in fact find, as I understand it, that they believed that he had forgotten that he had the knife with him. Was that a good reason? Forgetfulness may be an explanation. It cannot be a good reason. The fact that a defendant has forgotten that he has an article cannot constitute a defence of good reason within the section. |
| Statute References omitted |
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| D'Souza -v- Director of Public Prosecutions [1992] UKHL 10; [1992] 4 All ER 545; [1992] 1 WLR 1073 |
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15 Oct 1992 HLLord Keith of Kinke, Lord Roskil, Lord Jauncey of Tullichettl, Lord Lowr, Lord Browne-Wilkinson |
Crime, Police |
Casemap

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| The police went to detain the appellant under the 1983 Act. To do so they entered the property against her wishes. She resisted detention, and now appealed her conviction for assault the Police officers in the execution of their duty, saying that the entry was unlawful, and that detention under the 1983 Act was not an arrest. Held: The officers could not claim to have been in pursuit of her so as to justify the entry to the property. The case was remitted for the convictions to be discharged. |
| Statute References omitted |
| Link[s] omitted |
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| Airedale NHS Trust -v- Bland [1993] 2 WLR 316 |
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19 Nov 1992 FDSir Stephen Brown P |
Crime, Health, Health Professions, Administrative |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
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| The patient had suffered catastrophic injuries in 1989, leaving him in a persistent vegetative state (PVS). The doctors sought leave to discontinue life maintaining treatment and medical support. The inevitable result would be his death. The application was for an order discharging them from any civil or criminal liability. Held: The provision of food by naso-gastric tube was medical treatment. The decision to withdraw it would be a medical decision. The true cause of the death was the accident. The judge made no declaration as to potential criminal liability, since the action would be within standard and proper medical practice. Future similar decisions should continue to be made after applications to court. |
| Link[s] omitted |
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| Austin -v- Director of Public Prosecutions; Blake -v- Director of Public Prosecutions [1993] Crim LR 586 |
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2 Dec 1992 QBD |
Crime |
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| Location of observation posts withheld properly against risk of harassment. |
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| Regina -v- Gomez [1993] AC 442 |
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3 Dec 1992 HLLord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle, Lord Lowry (dissenting), Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Slynn of Hadley |
Crime |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
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| The defendant worked as a shop assistant. He had persuaded the manager to accept in payment for goods, two cheques which he knew to be stolen. The CA had decided that since the ownership of the goods was transferred on the sale, no appropriation of property belonging to another had taken place. Held: An appropriation of goods sufficient to found a charge of theft may occurr when the consent to the act is obtained by a deception, and which deception results in the voidable transfer of ownership. Goods obtained by a deception might also be subject to a theft charge, because of the assumption of the rights of an owner. |
| Statute References omitted |
| Link[s] omitted |
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| Airedale NHS Trust -v- Bland [1993] 2 WLR 316 |
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9 Dec 1992 CASir Thomas Bingham MR, Butler-Sloss and Hoffmann LJJ |
Crime, Health, Health Professions, Administrative |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
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| The official Solicitor appealed a decision that doctors could withdraw medical treatment including artificial nutrition, from a patient in persistent vegetative state. Held: The doctors sought permission to act in accordance with recommended medical practice. Agreement was universal that there was no prospect of the patient's improvement, nor any purpose in continued treatment. The purpose of medical treatment was to act for the benefit of the patient, and no benefit was being derived. The inviolability of life is not an absolute, and hear no direct interference was proposed, but rather the withdrawal of support. The appeal failed. |
| Link[s] omitted |
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21 Dec 1992 CACDMcCowan LJ Schiemann and Curtis JJ |
Crime |
Casemap
1 Cites
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| The defendant and another had vitamin C tablets which were believed to be ecstacy. The defendant was arrested on trying to sell a tablet. He appealed a conviction for conspiracy to offer to supply a controlled drug. Held: The appeal failed. The offence was committed on the making of the offer, and irrespective of whether what he thought he would be supplying were or were not in fact controlled substances. |
| Statute References omitted |
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