Damages - 1994
Law relating to Damages. Generally where liability has been established and the issue is the claculation or apportionment of damages. Includes compensation. See also the areas of law in which damages are payable, but particularly personal injury law.
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This page lists 37 cases, and was prepared on 28 October 2012.
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| Stringman (a minor) v McArdle [1994] 1 WLR 1653 |
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1994 CAStuart-Smith LJ |
Personal Injury, Damages |
Casemap
1 Citers
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The young plaintiff, under a disability, had asked for an interim payment of £100,000 to adapt a house already bought. McCullough J upheld the refusal of the district judge to make that interim payment, taking the view that the plans for the conversion of the house were over-elaborate and might leave the plaintiff insufficiently provided for by way of future care. Held. In order to obtain an interim payment, the plaintiff was not to be required to demonstrate any particular need beyond the general need to be paid damages as soon as reasonably possible. The court should not, when considering whether to order such a payment, investigate how the money was going to be used. The court was confident that the claimant was going to recover damages at trial which would substantially exceed the aggregate of the sums sought by way of an interim payment and those sums already paid. Any expenditure would be subject to the control of the Court of Protection.
Stuart-Smith LJ said: "The error into which the judge fell in this case was, in my opinion, when he concerned himself with what was to be done with the damages in the hands of the plaintiff or those responsible for her care. Once the threshold conditions in RSC Ord.29, r.11(1), sub-paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) are satisfied, what the court has to do, if it thinks fit, is to make an interim payment of such amount as it thinks just not exceeding a reasonable proportion of the damages which in the opinion of the court are likely to be recovered by the plaintiff after taking into account contributory negligence and any set-off or counterclaim. It should be noted that the plaintiff does not have to demonstrate any particular need over and above the general need that a plaintiff has to be paid his or her damages as soon as reasonably may be done. It will generally be appropriate and just to make an order where there will be some delay until the final disposal of the case. Therefore what the court is concerned with in fixing the quantum is that it does not exceed a reasonable proportion of the damages which in the opinion of the court are likely to be recovered. It is quite clear here that the amount will on any basis substantially exceed the sum of £187,000, which is the sum awarded by way of interim payment to date plus the £100,000 which is now sought. That is all the judge should have been concerned with. In the case of an adult of sound mind, the court making an order under RSC Ord.29, r.11 is not concerned in any way with what the plaintiff does with his damages. In the case of an infant, the money will normally be paid into court and then the next friend will apply to the district judge for payment out as and when the money is required. Where the Court of Protection is concerned, it is for that court to decide how and when the money is to be spent." |
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| Sampson -v- Wilson [1994] 26 HLR 486 |
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1994
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Housing, Damages |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| The court considered the dangers of a double award of damages for a landlord's breach of his covenant for quiet enjoyment. |
| Hosuing Act 1988 27(5) |
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| Margrie Holdings Ltd -v- City of Edinburgh District Council 1994 SLT 971; 1994 SC 1 |
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1994 IHCSHope, Lord President |
Damages, Scotland |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
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| When asking whether a claim for damages could properly include an additional element to recover additional costs of an impecunious pursuer, the proper approach, consistent with the modern authorities, was to ask whether the loss was or was not foreseeable and that this was ultimately a question of fact in each case. |
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| The Texaco Melbourne [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 473 |
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1994 Lord Goff |
Damages |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| In deciding what should be the appropriate currency for a damages award, no account should be taken of fluctuations in the value of currencies between the date of breach and the date of judgment. |
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| Tredget & Tredget -v- Bexley Health Authority [1994] 5 Med LR 178 |
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1994 His Hon. Judge White |
Damages, Personal Injury |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| (Central London County Court) As a result of the defendant hospital’s negligent management of Mrs Tredget’s labour, her baby was born in a severely asphyxiated state and died two days later. The actual birth of the child with its "chaos" or "pandemonium" was for those immediately and directly involved as each of the parents was frightening and horrifying. The event of the delivery was a powerful factor in contributing to the pathological grief reaction each suffered afterwards. Held: Each of the plaintiffs had established liability even though full appreciation of the gravity of the child’s condition only came during his short struggle for life in intensive care during the forty-eight hours that followed his birth. It is unrealistic to separate out and isolate the delivery as an event, from the other sequence of happenings from the onset of labour to Callum’s death two days later, as a whole. … Although lasting for over forty-eight hours from the onset of labour to the death, this effectively was one event. … The law should be, and in my judgment is, "fluid enough" simply to recognise one type of traumatic event and shut its eyes to another such as that upon which this claim is founded whether or not it is necessary – and in my judgment it is not – to pray in aid the concept of the "aftermath." |
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| Taylorson -v- Shieldness Produce Ltd [1994] PIQR 329 |
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1994
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Personal Injury, Damages |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| A fourteen year old boy died three days after he had been crushed by a reversing vehicle. The appellants were informed of the accident soon after it occurred and went to the hospital. The boy was seen in the ambulance and as he was rushed to the Intensive Care Unit the parents stayed with their son during the two days he was on the life support machine and saw him grievously injured. When there was no significant improvement the father bravely took upon himself the task of switching off the life support machine. The parents’ claim failed. The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of Kennedy J. as he then was that the mother had a dawning consciousness that they were going to lose their son and he declined to extend the notion of proximity to this "elongated process". The court rejected the argument that the post-accident treatment continued up to the time of this boy’s death. Moreover on the medical evidence the real psychiatric damage resulted from grief at their son’s death and the parents’ illnesses were not shown to have been caused by the shocking events relied upon. |
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| Cassel -v- Riverside Health Authority [1994] PIQR Q168 |
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1994
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Personal Injury, Damages |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| A person who has been rendered a patient as a result of the actions of a tortfeasor is entitled to require the tortfeasor to bear the costs of the receiver as part of the damages and, as part of the damages, they cannot escape a discount for contributory negligence. |
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| Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd -v- Forsyth |
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7 Jan 1994 CA |
Damages, Construction |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| The damages payable for the wrong building of a swimming pool may be the cost of rebuilding it according to correct specification. |
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| Beoco Ltd -v- Alfa Laval Co Ltd and Another |
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12 Jan 1994 CA |
Damages |
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| The tort loss of profit principles can apply in contract cases for damages. |
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| Beoco Ltd -v- Alfa Laval Co Ltd |
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24 Jan 1994 CA |
Damages |
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| No economic loss damages were to be claimed after a supervening incident prevented a return to work. |
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| Toneguzzo-Norvell -v- Burnaby Hospital [1994] 1 SCR 114 |
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27 Jan 1994
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Damages |
Casemap
1 Citers
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(Supreme Court of Canada) A catastrophically injured plaintiff claimed for loss of earnings both during the period she would live and during the period in which, as result of the injury complained of, she would not live. Held: It was well "established that a deduction for personal living expenses must be made from the award for lost earning capacity for the years she will actually live" and "A number of considerations suggest that a deduction for personal living expenses should be made from the award for lost earning capacity during the 'lost years'. The first is the fact that the projected earnings could not have been earned except on the supposition that the plaintiff would have been alive to earn them. There can be no capacity to earn without a life. The maintenance of that life requires expenditure for personal living expenses. Hence the earnings which the award represents are conditional on personal living expenses having been incurred. It follows that such expenses may appropriately be deducted from the award. Against this, it is argued that if Jessica had been born a millionaire, her personal living expenses during the 'lost years' would have been met from other sources. But this does not negate the fact that in order to earn income one must live and incur the attendant expenses. It can be argued that not to make a deduction for personal living expenses is to introduce into the award for lost earning capacity for the 'lost years' a measure of overcompensation akin to the duplication which the law avoids in the case of an award for lost earnings during the plaintiff's actual lifespan. This deduction has been justified for the years before the plaintiff's actual projected death, on the ground that it avoids duplication between the award for cost of care and the award for lost earning capacity. But in fact, the 'lived years' and the 'lost years' cannot be so easily distinguished. The same reasoning applies to both: had the plaintiff been in a position to earn the monies represented by the award for lost earning capacity, she would have had to spend a portion of them for living expenses. Not to recognize this is to introduce an element of duplication and to put the plaintiff in a better position than she would have been in had she actually earned the monies in question." |
| Link[s] omitted |
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| Marc Rich & Co Ag and Others -v- Bishop Rock Marine Co Lt and Others; The Nicholas H |
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3 Feb 1994 CASaville LJ |
Negligence, Damages |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| The duty of care does not vary with the nature of damage, as to whether it is physical or financial. The relationship of the parties is to be taken into account in assessing the extent of damage. "... the three so-called requirements for a duty of care are not to be treated as wholly separate and distinct requirements but rather as convenient and helpful approaches to the pragmatic question whether a duty should be imposed in any given case. In the end whether the law does impose a duty in any particular circumstances depends upon those circumstances ..." |
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| Attorney General of Ghana -v- Texaco Overseas Tank Ships Ltd |
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16 Feb 1994 HL |
Damages |
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| Damages for non-delivery are to be set in the context of where the goods were to be delivered. |
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| Regina -v- Northavon District Council ex parte Palmer |
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22 Feb 1994 QBD |
Damages |
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| No damages were available for a breach of a public law duty to ask why the applicant was homeless. |
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| Malik and Another -v- Bank of Credit and Commerce International Sa |
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23 Feb 1994 Chd |
Employment, Damages |

1 Cites
1 Citers
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| A stigma arising from an association with a notorious employer gave rise to no cause of action. |
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| Banque Bruxelles Lambert Sa -v- Eagle Star Ins Co Ltd and Others [1995] 2 All ER 769 |
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7 Mar 1994 QBDPhillips J |
Negligence, Damages |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| A negligent valuer was liable for the loss arising from an overvaluation, but not from losses attributable to a general fall in the market. |
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| Smith New Court Securities Ltd -v- Scrimgeour Vickers (Asset Man) Ltd |
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8 Mar 1994 CA |
Damages, Company, Financial Services |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| Where shares had been purchased at an artificially inflated price, after a fraudulent misrepresentation, the loss was calculated on the value they would have had on the market with full knowledge of the company's affairs, absent that misrepresentation. |
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| Gillette Uk Ltd and Another -v- Edenwest Ltd |
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9 Mar 1994 ChD |
Damages, Intellectual Property |
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| The innocence of the infringer, is no bar to an award of damages, if a trade mark is infringed, or in the case of passing off. |
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| Balfour Beatty Construction (Scotland) Ltd -v- Scottish Power Plc [1994] UKHL 11; [1994] CLC 321; 1994 SC (HL) 20; 1994 SLT 807 |
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23 Mar 1994 HL |
Damages, Scotland |
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| A supplier was not to be imputed with knowledge of his purchaser's technical processes. |
| Link[s] omitted |
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| Reilly and Another -v- Merseyside Regional Health Authority [1994] EWCA Civ 30 |
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28 Apr 1994 CA |
Personal Injury, Damages |
Casemap
1 Cites
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| Link[s] omitted |
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4 May 1994 CA |
Damages, Personal Injury |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
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| The plaintiff was driving his car at 30 miles an hour when the defendant turned right immediately into his path. In the accident both cars suffered damage but the occupants all escaped physical injury. The Plaintiff, however, had suffered for 20 years from chronic fatigue syndrome, which manifested itself from time to time. The judge held that the shock of the accident reactivated this condition which was now in all probability permanent and that it was unlikely that the plaintiff would be able to return to full-time employment, and he awarded damages of £162,153. Held: Allowing the defendants' appeal on the ground that psychiatric injury was not a foreseeable consequence of the accident. A claim for damages for pure nervous shock requires that the psychiatric injury should be a foreseeable result. |
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| Baldwin -v- British Coal Corporation |
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11 May 1994 QBDGarland J |
Employment, Damages |
Casemap
1 Cites
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| The employee had been selected for redundancy. In order for him to qualify for the employer's suplementary redundancy scheme an arrangement was made whereby he was given short notice. As a result he received an additional £5,000. He now applied for payment of the full notice period. Held: He had to give credit for the money received under the short notice in order to qualify for a supplementary redundancy payment. The £5,000 was quite separate from the basic redundancuy payments the stautory and contractual sums. Had the employer not given short notice, the plaintiff would have received the £3,000 notice, but lost the £5,000 received. Credit had to be given. |
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| Bateman and Howse, Regina (on the Application Of) -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (1995) 7 Admin LR 175; [1994] EWCA Civ 36; [1994] COD 504 |
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17 May 1994 CASir Thomas Bingham MR, Farquharson, Simon Brown LJJ |
Damages, Prisons |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
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The plaintiff had been convicted of several counts of receiving stolen goods and sentenced to six years' imprisonment. He had appealed to the Court of Appeal on the ground that he had been convicted on the basis of evidence in statement form given by witnesses from New Zealand. His appeal failed. Some time later his case was referred back to the Court of Appeal under section 17 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. This time his appeal succeeded on what was essentially the same ground as that which had failed before and his convictions were quashed. Held: The plaintiffs' appeals were dismissed. Compensation should be payable to prisoners wrongly convicted only after new facts were discovered, not where the release came after a ruling which changed the law. In this case "the ground of the reversal was not . . the discovery of a new or newly discovered fact, but a legal ruling on facts which had been known all along."
Sir Thomas Bingham discussed the suggestion that the success of an appeal meant that the court felt there had been a miscarriage of justice, and said: "Therefore, it follows, he says, that he is a victim of a miscarriage of justice and from that it follows that he is entitled to compensation. To deny him compensation is, he argues, to undermine his acquittal and the presumption of innocence which flows from the fact that his convictions have been quashed. I am, for my part, unable to accept that argument, although I hasten to assure Mr Bateman that in doing so I have no intention whatever to undermine the effect of the quashing of his convictions. He is entitled to be treated, for all purposes, as if he had never been convicted. Nor do I wish to suggest that Mr Bateman is not the victim of what the man in the street would regard as a miscarriage of justice. He has been imprisoned for three-and-a-half years when he should not have been convicted or imprisoned at all on the second decision of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). The man in the street would regard that as a miscarriage of justice and so would I. But that is not, in my judgment, the question. The question is whether the miscarriage of justice from which Mr Bateman has suffered is one that has the characteristics which the Act lays down as a pre-condition of the statutory right to demand compensation. That, therefore, is the question to which I now turn." there was no new or newly discovered fact, so that Mr Bateman could not satisfy the relevant criteria under section 133. |
| Criminal Justice Act 1988 133 |
| Link[s] omitted |
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| Hepworth Building Products Ltd -v- British Coal Corporation |
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18 May 1994 CA |
Damages |
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| Compensation under the Act was for damage flowing from the mining subsidence only, and did not include a claim for consequential losses. |
| Coal Industries Act 1975 2(4) |
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| Regina -v- Secretary of State for Home Department Ex Parte Fire Brigades Union and Others |
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24 May 1994 QBDStaughton LJ and Buckley J |
Personal Injury, Judicial Review, Damages |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| The Home Secretary was under no duty to bring the new statutory CICB scheme into force on any particular date. He was free to continue to use his own. The court refused to order a judicial review. |
| Criminal Justice Act 1988 17(1) 108 109 110 8111 112 113 114 115 116 117 |
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| Sion -v- Hampstead Health Authority [1994] 5 Med LR 170 |
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10 Jun 1994 CAPeter Gibson L.J, Staughton L.J |
Limitation, Damages, Personal Injury |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| An amendment to pleadings was allowed after the limitation period had expired in order to add a claim based on the same facts. The claim was brought by the father of a young man injured in a motor cycle accident. For fourteen days the father stayed at his son’s bedside, watching him deteriorate in health and fall into a coma and then die. Held: Appeal dismissed, finding that there was no trace in the medical report of "shock" no sudden appreciation by sight or sound of a horrifying event. The report described a process continuing for some time, from first arrival at the hospital to the appreciation of medical negligence after the inquest. In particular the son’s death when it occurred was not surprising but expected. There was no reason in logic why a breach of duty causing an incident involving no violence or suddenness, such as where the wrong medicine is negligently given to a hospital patient, could not lead to a claim for damages for nervous shock, for example where the negligence has fatal results and a visiting close relative, wholly unprepared for what has occurred, finds the body and thereby sustains a sudden and unexpected shock to the nervous system. |
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| Regina -v- Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd, ex Parte Bowden and Another |
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30 Jun 1994 CA |
Damages, Financial Services |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
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| The Scheme must award compensation in accordance with accepted methods of calculating damages. It had no authority to limit payment of legal fees of applicants to £500.00. |
| Financial Services Act 1986 |
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| Wards Construction (Medway) Ltd -v- Barclays Bank Plc and Another (1994) 2 EGLR 32; (1994) 68 P&CR 391 |
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1 Jul 1994 CALord Justice Nourse Lord Justice Beldam Lord Justice Simon Brown |
Land, Damages |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
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| Land with an existing use value of £3,000 had been valued by the Lands Tribunal for purchase at £2.15m. Held: The ransom value decision by the Lands Tribunal was not wrong in law and was upheld. It was necessary to value the land by imagining the state of affairs that would have existed in the no-scheme world but assuming that planning permission existed for the scheme development. "In order correctly to apply the Point Gourde principle it necessary, first, to identify the scheme and, secondly, its consequences. The valuer must then value the land by imagining the state of affairs, usually called "the no-scheme world", which would have existed if there had been no scheme." |
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| Jaggard -v- Sawyer and Another [1995] 1 WLR 269; [1994] EWCA Civ 1; [1995] 13 EG 132; [1995] 2 All ER 189; [1995] 1 EGLR 146; [1994] EGCS 139 |
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18 Jul 1994 CASir Thomas Bingham MR, Millett LJ |
Litigation Practice, Damages, Land |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
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A court may substitute damages for the grant of an injunction if an injunction would be oppressive. Referring to Wrotham Park, Sir Thomas Bingham MR said: "I cannot, however, accept that Brightman J's assessment of damages in the Wrotham Park case was based on other than compensatory principles. The defendants had committed a breach of covenant, the effects of which continued. The judge was not willing to order the defendants to undo the continuing effects of that breach. He had therefore to assess the damages necessary to compensate the plaintiffs for this continuing invasion of their right. He paid attention to the profits earned by the defendants, as it seemed to me, not in order to strip the defendants of their unjust gains, but because of the obvious relationship between the profits earned by the defendants and the sum which the defendants could reasonably have been willing to pay to secure a release from the covenant. I am reassured to find that this is the view taken of the Wrotham Park case by Sir Robert Megarry V-C in Tito v Waddell (No.2) [1977] Ch 106, 335."
CS Millett LJ: "It has always been recognised that the practical consequence of withholding injunctive relief is to authorise the continuance of an unlawful state of affairs. If, for example, the defendant threatens to build in such a way that the plaintiff's light will be obstructed and he is not restrained, then the plaintiff will inevitably be deprived of his legal right. This was the very basis upon which before 1858 the Court of Chancery had made the remedy of injunction available in such cases. After the passing of Lord Cairns's Act many of the judges warned that the jurisdiction to award damages instead of an injunction should not be exercised as a matter of course so as to legalise the commission of a tort by any defendant who was willing and able to pay compensation." Damages awarded under section 50 may relate not only to extant breaches of obligation, but also to future breaches. |
| Supreme Court Act 1981 50 - Chancery Amendment Act 1858 5 |
| Link[s] omitted |
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| Henderson -v- Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145; [1994] 3 All ER 506; Times, 26 July 1994; [1994] UKHL 5; [1994] 3 WLR 761 |
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25 Jul 1994 HLLord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Browne-Wilkinson |
Professional Negligence, Damages, Agency |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
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Managing agents conducted the financial affairs of the Lloyds Names belonging to the syndicates under their charge. It was alleged that they managed these affairs with a lack of due careleading to enormous losses. Held: The assumption of responsibility principle enunciated in Hedley is not confined to statements but may apply to any assumption of responsibility for the provision of services. This extended Hedley Byrne principle is the rationalisation or technique adopted to provide a remedy for the recovery of damages in respect of economic loss caused by the negligent performance of services. Once a case falls within the extended Hedley Byrne principle, there is no need to embark on any further inquiry whether it is "fair, just and reasonable" to impose liability for economic loss. Further "reliance upon [the assumption of responsibility] by the other party will be necessary to establish a cause of action (because otherwise the negligence will have no causative effect)." The existence of a contractual duty of care between the parties does not preclude the concurrence of a tort duty in the same respect. Professional advisers may owe to the same client a duty to exercise reasonable care and skill derived from both contract and tort law. |
| Link[s] omitted |
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| Ministry of Defence -v- Cannock and Others [1994] ICR 918 |
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2 Aug 1994 EATMorison J |
Employment, Discrimination, Damages |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| Compensation awarded for a pregnancy dismissal was to assume that the worker would ready to work again after six months. Review and guidelines of damages for unfair dismissal for pregnancy. The hypothetical question requires careful thought before it is answered. It is a difficult area of the law. It is not like an issue of primary fact, as when a court has to decide which of two differing recollections of past events is the more reliable. The question requires a forecast to be made about the course of future events. It has to be answered on the basis of the best assessment that can be made on the relevant material available to the court. That includes statistical material. Morison J said: "statistics are going to prove a good starting point" in relation to the question of the length of service, which the applicant has hypothetically lost. Such chances "must be assessed sensibly having regard to what happens in real life." |
| Sex Discrimination Act 1975 |
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| Hunt -v- Severs [1994] 2 AC 350; [1994] UKHL 4; [1994] 2 All ER 385 |
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7 Sep 1994 HLLord Bridge of Harwich |
Personal Injury, Damages |

1 Cites
1 Citers
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| The tortfeasor, a member of the claimant's family provided her with voluntary nursing care after the injury. The equivalent cost of that care, was recoverable, but would be held on trust for the carer. The underlying rationale of English Law is to enable the voluntary carer to receive proper recompense for his or her services: "Thus in both England and Scotland, the law now ensures that an injured plaintiff may recover the reasonable value of gratuitous services rendered to him by way of voluntary care by a member of his family … [T]he underlying rationale of the English law … is to enable the voluntary carer to receive proper recompense for his or her services." The policy considerations which underlie the exceptions were "well understood" . . "But I find it difficult to see what considerations of public policy can justify a requirement that the tortfeasor himself should compensate the plaintiff twice over for the self-same loss. If the loss in question is a direct pecuniary loss (eg loss of wages), Hussain's case is clear authority that the defendant employer, as the tortfeasor who makes good the loss either voluntarily or contractually, thereby mitigates his liability in damages pro tanto." |
| Link[s] omitted |
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| Treadaway -v- Chief Constable of West Midlands |
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23 Sep 1994 QBD |
Damages, Police |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
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| The torture of a suspect by police justified aggravated and exemplary damages, in this case £50,000. Damages for a serious assault by police are not to be reduced for the character of the plaintiff. |
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| Arab Monetary Fund -v- Hashim Times, 11 October 1994 |
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11 Oct 1994 Chadwick J |
International, Damages |
Casemap
1 Citers
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| In cases under the 1978 Act the court does not ask whether, under some rule of English private international law to be found independently of that Act, the contribution claim is to be determined by reference to the 1978 Act. Rather, the court asks whether, under the provisions of the 1978 Act itself, the contribution claim ought to succeed. Chadwick J said: "If B and C were each persons against whom liability had been or could be established in an action brought against them by A in an English court, applying the appropriate law in accordance with English private international law rules, then the Act conferred on B a right of contribution against C to which the court had to give effect. There was no preliminary question as to proper law the answer to which determined, independently of the Act, whether the Act applied." |
| Civil Liability Contribution Act 1978 |
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| Torvald Klaveness A/S -v- Arni Maritime Corporation (The Gregos) [1994] 1 WLR 1465; [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep 1 |
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28 Oct 1994 HLLord Mustill |
Transport, Contract, Damages |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
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In a continuing charter when it was clear that the time of the charter will be exceeded, the contract allows an action for an anticipatory breach. Any new redelivery order was to be obtained after after it first became impossible to meet the charter terms. Time was of the essence. The correct date for assessment of the legitimacy of the order was the date on which the vessel completed discharged and was ready to proceed on her last voyage, by which time, on the facts it had become apparent that she could not complete that voyage and be redelivered in accordance with the charterparty. The order previously given then became invalid and the charterers' persistence in requiring it to be obeyed was repudiatory.
Lord Mustill: "Finally, some of the legal consequences of late redelivery have been worked out. There remain a number of unanswered questions, with some of which your Lordships are now concerned." and "At first sight, this apparently anomalous result is a good reason for questioning whether the claim for repudiation was soundly based. On closer examination, however, the anomaly consists, not so much in the size of the damages, but in the fact that damages were awarded at all. Imagine that the without prejudice agreement had not been made, and that the owners, having treated the charter as wrongfully repudiated, had accepted a substitute fixture with Navios. If one then asked what loss had the repudiation caused the owners to suffer, the answer would be - None. On the contrary, the charterers' wrongful act would have enabled the owners to make a profit. Even if they had not accepted the substitute employment they might very well have suffered no loss, since they would have been in the favourable position of having their ship free in the right place at the right time to take a spot fixture on a rising market. In neither event would the owners ordinarily recover any damages for the wrongful repudiation." |
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| Firsteel Cold Rolled Products Ltd -v- Anaco Precision Pressings Ltd |
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21 Nov 1994 QBD |
Damages |
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| No claim for stress caused to company even via stress caused to personnel. |
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| C F & M G Roberts -v- South Gloucestershire District Council ACQ/90/93; [2001] EWLands ACQ_90_1993 |
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31 Dec 1994 LTP R Francis |
Land, Damages |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
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| LT COMPENSATION – Compulsory purchase of land for the construction of a road – value – assumed planning permission – value of minerals – planning permission for a commercial minerals operation not granted or to be assumed – compensation assessed on basis of agricultural value at £17,000 - Alternative valuation (Rule 50(4) Lands Tribunal Rules 1996) £86,000 – Land Compensation Act 1961 s.5 rules (2), (3) & (4), ss.6 and 14 -18. |
| Land Compensation Act 1961 5 - Lands Tribunal Rules 1996 50(4) |
| Link[s] omitted |
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