Defamation - 1800- 1849

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This page lists 21 cases, and was prepared on 10 January 2010.

Gurney -v- Longman [1807] EngR 211; (1806, 1807) 13 Ves Jun 493; (1807) 33 ER 379
1 Apr 1807	Defamation
	Link[s] omitted

Carr -v- Hood [1808] 1 Camp 354
1808 QBD Lord Ellenborough	Defamation	Casemap 1 Citers
	Lord Ellenborough said: "it is not libellous to ridicule a literary composition, or the author of it, in so far as he has embodied himself with his work. Every man who publishes a book commits himself to the judgment of the public, and anyone may comment upon his performance. If the commentator does not step aside from the work, or introduce fiction for the purpose of condemnation, he exercises a fair and legitimate right. In the present case, had the party writing the criticism followed the plaintiff into domestic life for the purpose of slander, that would have been libellous: but no passage of this sort has been produced; and even the caricature does not effect the plaintiff, except as the author of the book which is ridiculed."

Tabart -v- Tipper (1808) 1 Camp 350
2 Jan 1808	Defamation	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The plaintiff said that the defendant had libelled him by saying that he was in the habit of publishing immoral and foolish books. Held: It was open to a defendant denying the libel to establish through evidence that the criticism was fair.

Edwards -v- Bell (1824) 1 Bing 403
1824 Burrough J	Defamation	Casemap 1 Citers
	The justification of the sting of a libel is sufficient even if it does not extend to every epithet or detail in the words complained of. Held: “As much must be justified as meets the sting of the charge, and if anything be contained in the charge, which does not add to the sting of it, that need not be justified.”

McPherson -v- Daniels (1829) 10 B & C 263
1829 Bayley, Littledale, Parke JJ	Defamation	Casemap
	Bayley J said: Upon the great point, viz. whether it is a good defence to an action for slander for a defendant to show he heard it from another, and at that time named the author, I am of the opinion that it is not" and "the law will not permit a man to recover damages in respect of an injury to a character which he does not or ought not to possess." Truth is a complete defence.

De Crespigny -v- Wellesley [1829] 5 Bing 392
1829 Best CJ	Defamation	1 Citers
	In an action for a libel, it is no plea, that the defendant had the libellous statement from another, and upon publication disclosed the author's name.

Child -v- Affleck Et Ux [1829] EngR 459; (1829) 9 B & C 403; (1829) 109 ER 150
13 May 1829	Defamation
	In an action for libel, it appeared that the defendant, with whom the plaintiff had lived as servant, in answer to inquiries respecting her character, wrote a letter imputing misconduct to her whilst in that service, and after she left it; and the defendant also made similar parol statements to two persons that had recommended the plaintiff to her: Held, that neither the letter itself nor the parol statements proved malice, and that, consequently the letter was a privileged communication, and the plaintiff not entitled to recover.
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Ward -v- Weeks (1830) 7 Bing 211
1830 Tindal CJ	Defamation	Casemap 1 Citers
	Complaint was made as to the publication of defamatory words addressed to one Bryce who “without any authority from the defendant” repeated the same to Bryer. It was the repetition and not the original statement which “occasioned the Plaintiffs damage”. Held: The plaintiff was non-suited. Tindal CJ: “Every man must be taken to be answerable for the necessary consequences of his own wrongful acts: but such a spontaneous and unauthorised communication cannot be considered as the necessary consequence of the original uttering of the words. For no effect whatever followed from the first speaking of the words to Bryce; if he had kept them to himself Bryer would still have trusted the plaintiff. It was the repetition of them by Bryce to Bryer, which was the voluntary act of a free agent, over whom the defendant had no control, and for whose acts he is not answerable, that was the immediate cause of the plaintiff’s damage.”

Harvey -v- French [1832] EngR 140; (1832) 1 Cr & M 11; (1832) 149 ER 293
1832	Defamation
	Link[s] omitted

Cook -v- Stokes And Wife [1832] EngR 922; (1832) 1 M & Rob 237; (1832) 174 ER 81 (A)
18 Dec 1832	Defamation
	An allegation of slanderous words, accompanied with an assertion of a fact as the foundation of the words, is not supported by evidence of the words, accompanied with an assertion of the speaker's belief only of the fact.
	Link[s] omitted

Toogood -v- Spyring (1834) 1 CM & R 181; [1834] EngR 363; (1834) 1 CrM & R 181; (1834) 149 ER 1044
1834 Parke B	Defamation	1 Citers
	The defence of qualified privilege arises where the statement in question "In general, an action lies for the malicious publication of statements which are false in fact, and injurious to the character of another (within the well-known limits as to verbal slander), and the law considers such publication as malicious, unless it is fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, whether legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs, in matters where his interest is concerned. In such cases, the occasion prevents the inference of malice, which the law draws from unauthorised communications, and affords a qualified defence depending upon the absence of actual malice. If fairly warranted by any reasonable occasion or exigency, and honestly made, such communications are protected for the common convenience and welfare of society; and the law has not restricted the right to make them within any narrow limits."
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Chalmers -v- Payne [1835] 2 Cr M&R 156
1835 B Alderson	Defamation	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court considered the bane and antidote doctrine in defamation: “But the question here is, whether the matter be slanderous or not, which is a question of the Jury; who are to take the whole together and say whether the result of the whole is calculated to injure Plaintiffs character. In one part of this publication something disreputable to the Plaintiff is stated but that is removed by the conclusion: the bane and the antidote must be taken together.”

Duncombe -v- Daniell (1837) 8 C & P 222
1837 Coleridge J, Lord Denman CJ	Defamation	Casemap 1 Citers
	The defendant was a voter in a parliamentary election. He wrote two letters which were published in a newspaper, the "Morning Post," which reflected upon the character of one of the candidates in his constituency. The plaintiff was awarded damages. The defendant applied for a new trial on the grounds inter alia was that it was justifiable for an elector bona fide to communicate to the constituency any matter respecting a candidate which he believed to be true and believed to be material to the election. The application was refused. The defendant had to go further and show that the elector was entitled to publish it to all the world, as the publication was in a newspaper. Counsel for the defendant submitted that if no more was done than was necessary to make the matters known to the electors the publication was privileged, and that whether or not anything more was done was a question for the jury. (Lord Denman CJ) "However large the privilege of electors may be, it is extravagant to suppose that it can justify the publication to all the world of facts injurious to a person who happens to stand in the situation of a candidate."

Day -v- Bream (1837) 2 Moody and Robinson 54
1837 Patteson J	Defamation	Casemap 1 Citers
	A printed handbill, contained imputations on the plaintiff clearly libellous. The plaintiff lived at Marlborough; the defendant was the porter of the coach-office at that place, and it was his business to carry out and deliver the parcels that came by the different coaches to the office. For the plaintiff it was shewn that the defendant had delivered on the same day papers parcels, tied up, and containing a large quantity of the handbills in question, to two or three inhabitants of the place, to whom the parcels were directed. The court "in summing up, left it to the jury to say whether the defendant delivered the parcels in the course of his business without any knowledge of their contents; if so, find for him, observing, that prima facie he was answerable, inasmuch as he had in fact delivered and put into publication the libel complained of, and was therefore called upon to shew his ignorance of the contents."

Empson -v- Griffin [1839] EngR 1130; (1839) 11 Ad & E 186; (1839) 113 ER 385
27 Nov 1839	Defamation
	Where one of several counts in a declaration for slander was bad, and some of the defamatory words in it were proved at the trial, and the jury found a general verdict, with damages, for the plaintiff the Court set aside an order of the Judge who tried the cause to confine the verdict and damages to one of the good counts, and awarded a venire de novo.
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Regina -v- Lovett [1841] EngR 101; (1841) 9 Car & P 462; (1841) 173 ER 912
1841	Defamation, Litigation Practice
	If the manuscript of a libel be proved to be in the handwriting of the defendant, and it be also proved to have been printed and published, this is evidence to go to the jury that it was published by the defendant, although there there be no evidence given to shew that the printing aud publication were by the direction of the defendant. If a paper, published by the defendant, has a direct tendency to cause unlawful meetings and disturbances, and to lead to a violation of the laws, it is a seditious libel; and with respect to the intent every one must be taken to intend the natural consequences of what he has done. A and B were separately indicted for publishing the same libel. Both indictments containing the same prefatory allegations. A was tried first. and on the trial of B such of the witnesses as had been also examined on the trial of A. had (by consent) their evidence read over to them from the Judge's notes, B being allowed to further cross-examine them. A defendant, who surrenders to take his trial on a charge of miisdemeanor, need not stand at the bar to be tried, but may be allowed a place at the table of the Court.
	[ Commonlii ]

Mary Griffiths -v- Lewis [1845] EngR 665; (1845) 7 QB 61; (1845) 115 ER 411
21 Apr 1845	Defamation	1 Citers
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Coxhead -v- Richards [1846] EngR 379; (1846) 2 CB 569; (1846) 135 ER 1069
31 Jan 1846 Cresswell J	Defamation	1 Citers
	A complaint was made as to a warning of suspected misconduct of ship's captain communicated to a shipowner. It did not involve a risk to the life of those on board, but the court considered what the position might have been if it had. Cresswell J said: "It is so manifestly for the advantage of society that that those who are about to employ a servant should be enable to learn what his previous conduct has been, that it may be well deemed the moral duty of the former employer to answer inquiries to the best of his belief".
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Mary Griffiths -v- Lewis [1846] EngR 593; (1846) 8 QB 841; (1846) 115 ER 1091
27 Apr 1846	Defamation	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	Where a declaration in slander sets out words alleged to have been uttered, some in one discourse, and the remainder in a second discourse, and there are in form but two counts, each containing only the words alleged to have been uttered in one discourse, the declaration will be treated as containing only two counts, though each of such two counts contains a separate allegations of the uttering of different words in the particular discourse. Therefore, if in each count there be any words set out which are slanderous, judgment for plaintiff will not be arrested after verdict, though the damages be general and some of the separate allegations recite only words not actionable. The original publisher of a defamatory statement had no privilege to repeat it when asked for an explanation.
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Duke of Brunswick -v- Harmer (1849) 14 QB 185
1849 QBD Coleridge J	Defamation, Limitation	Casemap 1 Citers
	On 19 September 1830 an article was published in the Weekly Dispatch. The limitation period for libel was six years. The article defamed the Duke of Brunswick. Seventeen years after its publication an agent of the Duke purchased a back number containing the article from the Weekly Dispatch's office. Another copy was obtained from the British Museum. The Duke sued on those two publications. The defendant contended that the cause of action was time barred, relying on the original publication date. Held: The delivery of a copy of the newspaper to the plaintiff's agent constituted a separate publication in respect of which suit could be brought: "The defendant, who, on the application of a stranger, delivers to him the writing which libels a third person, publishes the libellous matter to him, though he may have been sent for the purpose of procuring the work by that third person. So far as in him lies, he lowers the reputation of the principal in the mind of the agent, which, although that of an agent, is as capable of being affected by the assertions as if he were a stranger. The act is complete by the delivery: and its legal character is not altered, either by the plaintiff's procurement or by the subsequent handing over of the writing to him."

The Duke Of Brunswick and Luneberg -v- Harmer [1849] EngR 915; (1849) 14 QB 185; (1849) 117 ER 75
2 Nov 1849	Defamation, Limitation	Casemap
	The first count, in an action for a libel, was in respect of a newspaper published more than seventeen years before action brought. The Statute of Limitations being pleaded: Held, that the plea was negatived by proof that a single copy had been purchased from defendant for the plaintiff by plaintiff's agent, within the six years. Other counts were in respect of other libels, alleged to impute to plaintiff the libellous matter charged in the first count, which was set out by way of unducement in each count. The libels themselves, in these other counts, did not refer to that in the first count. The Statute of Limitations was pleaded to so much of these counts as related to the matter in the first count. Held, that the plea was negatived as to these counts also; and, further, that it was not necessary to tell the jury, in estimating the damages as to such matter, to take into consideration the fact that the only pubiication proved had been the sale to the agent.
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