swarb.co.uk - law index
These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.
Employment - From: 1960 To: 1969
This page lists 31 cases, and was prepared on 12 March 2015.Lee -v- Lee’s Air Farming Limited  3 All ER 420
Commonwealth, Company, Employment
Mr Lee had formed a company, Lee's Air Farming Limited and held nearly all its shares. He was the managing director, but by profession a pilot. The company was formed to conduct an aerial top-dressing business. He appointed himself the chief pilot for the company. In the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, North J said: "These powers were moreover delegated to him for life and there remained with the company no power of management whatsoever. One of his first acts was to appoint himself the only pilot of the company, for, although article 33 foreshadowed this appointment, yet a contract could only spring into existence after the company had been incorporated. Therefore, he became in effect both employer and worker. True, the contract of employment was between himself and the company: see Booth v Helliwell, but on him lay the duty both of giving orders and obeying them. In our view, the two offices are clearly incompatible. There could exist no power of control and therefore the relationship of master-servant was not created." Held: Appeal allowed. "one person may function in dual capacities. " and "Ex facie there was a contract of service. . . . the real issue is whether the position of the deceased as sole governing director made it impossible for him to be the servant of the company in the capacity of chief pilot of the company. . . there was no such impossibility. There appears to be no greater difficulty in holding that a man acting in one capacity can give orders to himself in another capacity than there is in holding that a man acting in one capacity can make a contract with himself in another capacity. The company and the deceased were separate legal entities. The company had the right to decide what contracts for aerial top-dressing it would enter into. The deceased was the agent of the company in making the necessary decisions."
Beetham -v- Trinidad Cement Ltd; 1960 -  AC 132
Annamunthodo -v- Oilfields Workers' Trade Union; PC 1961 -  AC 945
Parsons -v- BNM Laboratories Ltd  2 All ER 658;  1 QB 95;  2 WLR 1273
Sellers LJ, Harman LJ, Pearson LJ
Unemployment benefit was deductible from damages for wrongful dismissal. The benefit was not "purely personal", the employer had made a contribution, and the plaintif had a duty to mitigate his loss (Sellers LJ). The benefit was not "truly analogous" to insurance moneys" (Harman LJ). It was not too remote a consequence of the wrongdoing and was payable as a matter of general right rather than by virtue of a private insurance policy (Pearson LJ).
Amalgamated Engineering Union -v- Minister of Pensions and National Insurance; QBD 1963 -  1 WLR 441
Ridge -v- Baldwin (No 1); HL 1964 -  AC 40;  UKHL 2
Commercial Plastics Ltd -v- Vincent; CA 1964 -  3 WLR 820;  3 All ER 546;  1 QB 623
Printers and Finishers Limited -v- Holloway; 1965 -  RPC 239;  1 WLR 1
Gledhow Autoparts Ltd -v- Delaney; CA 1965 -  1 WLR 1366
J T Stratford & Son Ltd -v- Lindley; HL 1965 -  AC 269
Morren -v- Swinton and Pendlebury Borough Council  1 WLR 576
The court was asked whether the plaintiff had been an employee. Held: 'once the primary facts are found, then it is a pure question of law as to what is the reasonable inference based on the legal interpretation of the contract.'
Veness -v- Dyson Bell & Co; 25-May-1965 - Times, 25 May 1965
Morton Sundour Fabrics -v- Shaw; QBD 1966 - (1966) KIR 1;  ITR 84
O'Reilly -v- National Rail & Tramway Appliances  1 All ER 499
Loudon -v- Crimpy Crisps Ltd; 1966 - (1966) 1 ITR 307
Lavarack -v- Woods of Colchester Ltd  3 All ER 683;  1 QB 278; 1 KIR 312;  3 WLR 706;  EWCA Civ 4
19 Jul 1966
Lord Denning MR, Diplock LJ, Russell LJ
Employment, Contract, Damages
When looking at the damages to be awarded on a breach of contract by an employer, "the first task is to estimate . . what the Plaintiff would have gained . . if the defendant had fulfilled his legal obligation and had done no more."
[ Bailii ]
Sinclair -v- Neighbour; CA 1967 -  2 QB 279
X -v- Netherlands; ECHR 1967 - (1976) 7 DR 161
Sanders -v- Parry  1 WLR 753
Legal Professions, Employment
An assistant employed by a sole practitioner undertook as part of his duties work brought in by an important client. The client having said that if he left to set up on his own account he would transfer his business, the assistant handed in his notice and did so. And the client did follow him. The sole practitioner sued for breach of the implied terms of the contract of employment that the assistant would serve him with good faith and fidelity. The defence was that it was the client who had initiated the arrangement. Held. It did not matter. Even were it to be so, the assistant having accepted the client's offer whilst he was still employed by another and not having informed his employer of the offer was in breach.
Havers J said: "Now in my view there was a duty on the defendant at all times during the substance of the (employment) agreement to protect his master's interests, especially to do his best to retain Mr Tully as a client for his master .... I am satisfied that in accepting the offer, by such conduct the defendant was guilty of breach of duty in regard to the agreement implied therein by law that the defendant would serve the plaintiff with good faith and fidelity." and "In my view it was the duty of the defendant to have reported this dissatisfaction of the secretary to his principal to give him an opportunity, as far as he could, to satisfy her. Instead of forwarding his principal's interests he was concerned only in promoting his own. He made this alternative offer to Mrs Stanford which she accepted and the result of it and the result of that alone was that she left Mr Sanders and joined the defendant. That was in my view a breach of contract"
Lavarack -v- Woods of Colchester Ltd; CA 1967 -  1 QB 278;  EWCA Civ 4;  3 All ER 683;  1 KIR 312;  3 WLR 706
Morgan -v- Fry; QBD 1967 -  2 All ER 386
Landesversicherungsanstalt Rheinland-Pfalz -v- Joseph Welchner; ECJ 5-Dec-1967 - C-14/67; R-14/67;  EUECJ R-14/67
Watts -v- Monmouthshire County Council and Another  66 LGR 171
The Plaintiff, a teacher had had a number of accidents at school and applied for and was granted a short service gratuity from the Ministry of Education being agreed to be permanently incapable of serving efficiently as a teacher of the appropriate kind. The employer did not give him any notice of dismissal. Held: Under the regulations he had been entitled to three months' notice. The teacher sued for damages, including damages in that he had not been given pay for the period of notice that would have been applicable had notice of dismissal been given. "Having regard to the correspondence, I now come to the question of whether there was frustration of this contract. It is quite clear, in my view, that the mere inability of the Plaintiff to perform his duties by reason of illness or accident does not in itself amount to frustration of the contract. The regulations regarding tenure clearly contemplate that, even if the teacher does become ill or suffers an accident, the contract shall continue in existence in spite of that. But as a matter of common sense it seems to me that an application for and acceptance by the plaintiff of a gratuity on the basis that he had become permanently incapable of serving efficiently as a teacher is wholly inconsistent with the continued existence of a contract by the County Council to employ him as a teacher and by him to serve the County Council as a teacher." After drawing attention to the Act, "I consider that it is plain that the whole basis of this gratuity is that the teacher has become permanently incapable of serving efficiently as a teacher. In my judgment, it is impossible for the plaintiff at the same time to accept a gratuity on the basis that he is permanently incapable of serving as a teacher and also to continue to serve as such. Having accepted this gratuity, the plaintiff was not, in my view, eligible to return to the service of the County Council. In my view the foundation of the contract was destroyed when the plaintiff accepted the gratuity and the contract then came to an end by frustration. If there is frustration, there is no need for either party to give any notice terminating the date of it. The determination is automatic."
Teachers' (Superannuation) Act 1925
Dutton -v- C H Bailey Ltd; QBD 1968 - (1968) 3 ITR 355
Ready Mixed Concrete Southeast Ltd -v- Minister of Pensions and National Insurance; 1968 -  2 QB 497;  1 All ER 433;  2 WLR 775
Morgan -v- Fry  All ER 3 452
Employment, Torts - Other
Vaux & Associated Breweries Ltd -v- Ward  3 ITR 385
Definition of the phrase "work of a particular kind".
Lloyd v Brassey  2 WLR 310;  1 All ER 382;  2 QB 98
Lord Denning MR, Salmon LJ
A farm was sold as a going concern with land and all stock-in-trade. Held. This was a "transfer of a trade, business, or undertaking." It was the same business being carried on both before and after the transfer. The same staff were employed. Lord Denning MR considerd the nature of a redundancy payment: "As I read the Act, a worker of long standing is now recognised as having an accrued right in his job ; and his right gains in value with the years. So much so that if the job is shut down, he is entitled to compensation for loss of the job - just as a Director gets compensation for loss of office. The director gets a golden handshake. The worker gets a redundancy payment. It is not unemployment pay. I repeat 'not'. Even if he gets another job straightaway, he nevertheless is entitled to full redundancy payment. It is, in a real sense, compensation for long service."
Salmon LJ said: "Of the many factors to be taken into account in considering whether or not a change in the ownership of a business has occurred, none by itself nor a combination of any of them together is necessarily conclusive. Everything depends on a broad view of all the circumstances of each particular case. In this case, having come to the conclusion that there was ample evidence to support the tribunal's finding, I would allow the appeal."
Market Investigations -v- Minister of Social Security; 1969 -  2 QB 173;  2 WLR 1;  3 All ER 732
John -v- Rees and Others; Martin and Another -v- Davis and Others; ChD 1969 -  1 Ch 345;  2 All ER 275
Fitzgerald -v- Hall Russell & Co Ltd; HL 21-Oct-1969 -  UKHL 7;  AC 984;  3 WLR 868;  3 All ER 1140
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