Employment - 1970- 1979

Employment Law. All matters relating to contracts between individuals and trade unions and employers, and procedural issues in the Industrial Tribunals system. See also Sex Discrimination and Race Relations Law, Health and Safety, and European Law.

These cases are extracted from a very large database. The entries on that database are now being published individually to the main swarb.co.uk website in a much improved form. As cases are published here, the entry here will be replaced by a link to the same case in that improved form on swarb.co.uk. In addition the swarb.co.uk site includes very substantial numbers of cases after 2000. Please take the time to look.  

This page lists 195 cases, and was prepared on 19 May 2014. These case are being transferred one by one to the main swarb.co.uk site which presents them better, with links to full text where we have it, and much improved cross referencing.
Construction Industry Training Board -v- Labour Force; QBD 1970
Smith and another -v- Blandford Gee Cementation Co Ltd [1970] 3 All ER 154
1970

Bridge J
Employment Casemap

The court considered a finding by a tribunal that a contract of services had been transferred: "To my mind, it runs counter to a fundamental principle that a man's contractual position, particularly in such a vital matter as the identity of the master whom he is to serve, shall be crucially affected by an agreement between two other parties, the terms of which are never communicated to him."
Marriott -v- Oxford and District Co-operative Society Ltd (No. 2) [1970] 1 QB 186
1970
CA
Winn LJ
Employment
1 Citers
After pointing out that the statutory definition of 'the relevant date' for redundancy payment purposes . . is the date of the expiry of the notice or (if there is no notice) the date on which the termination takes effect, Winn LJ said: "That is consistent with the whole concept that a contract of employment for the purposes of this statute is brought to an end, i.e., it is terminated, when it is so broken that no further full performance of its terms will occur."
Home Counties Dairies -v- Skilton [1970] 1 WLR 526; [1970] All ER 1227
1970
CA
Employment
1 Citers
In construing an employee's restrictive covenant, a court should disregard fanciful hypotheses or arguments leading to a reductio ad absurdum.
Dunk -v- George Waller & Sons Ltd [1970] 2 QB 163
1970

Widgery LJ
Employment Casemap
1 Citers
"A contract of apprenticeship secures three things for the apprentice: it secures him, first, a money payment during the period of apprenticeship. . ." the range of remedies may be wider than under standard form of employment contact.
Baker -v- Gill; QBD 06-Nov-1970
Mumford -v- Boulton and Paul (Steel Constructions) Ltd [1970] EWCA Civ 1; (1971) 6 ITR 76
3 Dec 1970
CA
Lord Denning MR, Edmund Davies, Megaw LJJ
Employment
Link[s] omitted
Armstrong Whitworth Rolls Ltd -v- Mustard [1971] 1 All ER 598
1971

Employment Casemap
1 Citers
An employee's duties and roll may evolve over time.
Anglia Television -v- Oliver Reed; CA 1971
Leary -v- National Union of Vehicle Builders; 1971
Kleboe -v- Ayr County Council; 1971
Edwards -v- SOGAT [1971] Ch 354
1971
CA
Lord Denning MR, Sachs LJ, Megaw LJ
Employment, Damages


Mr Edwards, who was black, was a skilled worker in a 100-per-cent union printshop. His employers were compelled to dismiss him after his dues had been allowed to fall into arrear through a union official's neglect. He sued the union in contract. He won his action before Buckley J, but the union appealed on quantum. The union had at a late stage agreed to readmit him, but it was too late to put him back in his original job, and he had meanwhile found and then lost another job. Denning MR "I feel that damages in a case such as this are so difficult to assess that I would be inclined to view them somewhat broadly. I would start with the loss of earnings which he might reasonably be expected to have suffered over two years from his expulsion. That is what was suggested by Lord Donovan's Committee. I would then work upwards or downwards from that figure, according to the circumstances of the case." Sachs LJ: "The union's liability in damages being clear, this appeal is concerned with their measure – an important matter in the particular circumstances. These damages, of course, sound in contract and not in tort. It is, however, as well to record at the outset … that certain rules laid down in Addis touching damages for wrongful dismissal have no application to the present type of case. In other words, whereas in the former class of cases the damages can contain no element for the difficulty the dismissal causes to a plaintiff in getting fresh employment, the essence of the measure in the present case is an assessment of the financial consequences of that very difficulty." Megaw LJ, preferred to segregate past loss from future loss. Of the element future loss: "Where there are so many incalculables, it would not be right to seek to give an aura of scientific respectability to the assessment of future damages by purporting to apply arithmetical or actuarial formulae to the assessment, or to any individual factor on which the assessment partly depends. One must try to assess. One cannot calculate."
Young -v- Associated Newspapers; 1971
Malloch -v- Aberdeen Corporation; HL 1971
National Dock Labour Board -v- John Bland and Company Ltd and others [1971] UKHL 4; [1971] 2 Lloyd's Rep 2; [1971] 2 All ER 779; [1972] AC 222; [1971] 2 WLR 1491; [1972] 14 KIR 137; [1971] ITR 152
25 May 1971
HL
Lord Donovan, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Pearson, Lord Diplock, and, Lord Cross of Chelsea
Employment
Docks and Harbours Act 1966 1(1)
[ Bailii ]
McCreadie -v- Thomson & Macintyre (Patternmakers) Limited [1971] UKHL 5; [1971] 1 WLR 1193; 1971 SLT 242; [1971] 2 All ER 1135; 1971 SC(HL) 124
29 Jun 1971
HL
Scotland, Employment
Redundancy Payments Act 1965 2
Link[s] omitted
Marshall -v- Harland & Wolff Ltd [1972] ICR 101
1972
NIRC
Sir John Donaldson (President)
Employment Casemap

The doctrine of frustration can apply to contracts of employment. The Court looked at the situations in which it should extend time for an appeal to be filed: "Was the employee's incapacity, looked at before the purported dismissal, of such a nature, or did it appear likely to continue for such a period, that further performance of his obligations in the future would either be impossible or would be a thing radically different from that undertaken by him and agreed to be accepted by the employer under the agreed terms of his employment?"
Jones -v- Hudson [1972] 2 WLR 210
1972

Lord Diplock
Employment Casemap
1 Citers
East Sussex County Council -v- Walker (1972) IITR 280
1972

Brightman J
Employment Casemap
1 Citers
(National Industrial Relations Court) Mrs Walker was a school cook, who was told that her services were no longer required. She was invited to resign, and did so. The court was asked to decide whether she had resigned or been dismissed. Held: She had been dismissed. Brightman J said: "In our judgment, if an employee is told that she is not longer required in her employment and is expressly invited to resign, a court of law is entitled to come to the conclusion that, as a matter of common sense, the employee was dismissed. Suppose that the employer says to the employee, "Your job is finished. I will give you the opportunity to resign. If you don't, you will be sacked". How, we would ask, is it possible to reach a conclusion other than that the employment is being terminated by the employer, even though the employee takes the first and more respectable alternative of signing a letter of resignation rather than being the recipient of a letter of dismissal? We feel that in such circumstances there really can be no other conclusion than the employer terminated the contract."
Redundancy Payments Act 1965 3(1)(a)
Heaton's Transport (St Helens) Ltd -v- TGWU [1973] AC 15; [1972] IRLR 25
1972
HL
Lord Wilberforce
Employment, Contempt of Court Casemap

An order had been made requiring the union not to 'black' the lorries of particular firms. Proceedings for contempt were brought against the union after blacking had continued, despite the fact that the union through its national and local officers had advised its shop stewards to obey the court order, which advice had been rejected. Held. The union's appeal failed. The union had been responsible for taking all possible steps to stop the blacking, including the unequivocal withdrawal of the shop stewards' authority and, if necessary, disciplinary action. The court had been fully entitled to conclude that the union had not taken such, or any adequate, action to comply with its injunction.
Lord Wilberforce said: "The question to be considered is whether the disobedience was 'wilful' in accordance with the established meaning of that word in relation to contempt of court by disobedience to an order of the court. It is important to note that there is no question here of contumacious or insulting behaviour or interference with the administration of justice. There has been simply a disobedience to the court's injunction by the party restrained by the injunction, and the disobedience has been committed by that party through its agents."
In considering the established meaning of 'wilful' for the purposes of the law of contempt, Lord Wilberforce reviewed a number of authorities, in the light of which he said that the statement of the law by Warrington J in Stancomb had acquired high authority: "It is also the reasonable view, because the party in whose favour an order has been made is entitled to have it enforced, and also the effective administration of justice normally requires some penalty for disobedience to an order of a court if the disobedience is more than casual or accidental and unintentional".
Heaton's Transport (St Helen's) Ltd -v- Transport and General Workers' Union; HL 1972
Secretary of State for Employment -v- ASLEF (No 2); CA 1972
Global Plant Ltd -v- Secretary of State for Social Services [1972] 1 QBD 139
1972

Lord Widgery
Contract, Employment Casemap
1 Citers
Lord Widgery: "One must not overlook that the intention of the parties was that the relationship should be that of an independent contractor, and although the parties cannot by intention make a transaction into something which it is not, yet it is recognised that such intention is a factor for consideration in these cases."
Brindle -v- Smith [1972] IRLR 125
1972
CA
Lord Denning MR, Megaw LJ
Employment Casemap
1 Citers
A question arose as to the position of an employee wrongfully dismissed just before the end of his first 104 weeks of service where he would have qualified to have a right not to be unfairly dismissed if he had been given proper notice. Held: The dismissal took place when the contract was terminated, and that the termination took place when the notice expired or was due to expire. "I would add at this point that I do not think the Act can be got round by wrongfully dismissing a person summarily or by giving him a notice that is too short. No person should be able to take advantage of his own wrong in that way. If an employer should try to escape the Act by giving no notice at all or a notice that was too short, I should have thought that the tribunal, by means of a claim for wrongful dismissal (see s 113 of the Act), or by some such way, would see that the employee would get the same compensation as he would have done if he had been given notice of a proper length."
Lord Advocate -v- Babcock & Wilcox (Operations) Ltd [1972] UKHL 8; [1972] 1 WLR 488; [1972] 1 All ER 1130; [1972] SLT 103; [1972] SC (HL) 1; (1972) 12 KIR 329
15 Mar 1972
HL
Employment, Scotland Casemap
1 Citers
Link[s] omitted
Norton Tool Co Ltd -v- Tewson [1972] IRLR 86 NIRC; [1973] 1 WLR 45; [1972] ICR 501
30 Oct 1972
NIRC
Donaldson P
Employment, Damages
1 Cites
1 Citers
(National Industrial Relations Court) The court was asked to calculate damages on a dismissal, and particularly as to whether the manner of the dismissal should affect the damages. Held: The common law rules and authorities on wrongful dismissal are irrelevant. That cause of action is quite unaffected by the Act which has created an entirely new cause of action, namely, the "Unfair Industrial Practice" of unfair dismissal. The measure of compensation for that statutory wrong is itself the creature of statute and is to be found in the Act of 1971 and nowhere else.
Donaldson P said: “The amount to be awarded is that which is just and equitable in all the circumstances, having regard to the loss sustained by the complainant. “Loss” in the context of section of 116 does not include injury to pride or feelings. In its natural meaning the word is not to be so construed, and that this meaning is intended seems to us to be clear from the elaboration contained in section 116(2). The discretionary element is introduced by the words “having regard to the loss”. This does not mean that the court of tribunal can have regard to other matters, but rather that the amount of the compensation is not precisely and arithmetically related to the approved loss . . The circumstances of the dismissal were relevant only if they were such as to cause or to be likely to cause future loss. Injury to the employee’s pride or feelings is not loss and is irrelevant . . We need only consider whether the manner and circumstances of his dismissal could give rise to any risk of financial loss at a later stage by, for example, making him less acceptable to potential employers or exceptionally liable to selection for dismissal.” It was good industrial relations practice for an employer who dismisses without notice to make a payment in lieu of notice. Where such sums are paid, no credit has to be given by the employee for monies earned by the employee from other employers in the notice period. It was held that damages for unfair dismissal should therefore include full pay for the notice period without reduction for mitigation.
Industrial Relations Act 1971 116(1)
Link[s] omitted
Stekel -v- Ellice; ChD 1973
Sutcliffe -v- Hawker Siddley Aviation Limited; NIRC 1973
Earl -v- Slater & Wheeler (Airlyne) Ltd [1973] 1 WLR 51
1973

Sir John Donaldson
Employment

Sir John Donaldson said: "With respect to the tribunal, we think that it erred in holding that an unfair procedure which led to no injustice is incapable of rendering unfair a dismissal which would otherwise be fair. The question in every case is whether the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating the reason as sufficient for dismissing the employee and it has to be answered with reference to the circumstances known to the employer at the moment of dismissal. If an employer thinks that his accountant may be taking the firm's money, but has no real grounds for so thinking and dismisses him for this reason, he acts wholly unreasonably and commits the unfair industrial practice of unfair dismissal, notwithstanding that it is later proved that the accountant had in fact been guilty of embezzlement. Proof of the embezzlement affects the amount of the compensation, but not the issue of fair or unfair dismissal."
M & W Grazebrook Ltd -v- Wallens; 1973
Hebden -v- Forsey & Son [1973] ICR 60
1973
NIRC
Sir Hugh Griffiths
Employment Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
The court referred to the test for frustration set down in Marshall and added: "This is a test to enable the court to determine whether the incapacity is of such a nature that it strikes at and destroys the root of the contract and thus the relationship of employer and employee, for it is only then that the contract is frustrated."
Heath and Another -v- JP Longman (Meat Salesman) Limited; 1973
Dedman -v- British Building and Engineering Appliances; CA 1973
Robert Normansell (Birmingham) Ltd -v- Barfield; 1973
Vokes Ltd -v- Bear; 1973
Wellman Alloys Ltd -v- Russell [1973] ICR 616
1973

Employment, Damages
1 Cites
1 Citers
Only economic losses are recoverable following a dismissal.
Steckel -v- Ellice; 1973
Stepek (J) Ltd -v- Hough [1973] 8 ITR 516 NIRC
1973
NIRC
Employment, Damages Casemap

1 Citers
Rogers -v- Bodfari (Transport); NIRC 1973
Tarmac Roadstone Holdings Ltd -v- Peacock [1973] ICR 273
1973
CA
Lord Denning MR
Employment Casemap
1 Citers
Overtime hours are not part of normal working hours when calculating redundancy payments unless they are obligatory on both sides, that is, contractually guaranteed by the employer and compulsory for the employee.
Lord Denning MR said: "First, where there is a fixed number of compulsory working hours, and thereafter overtime is voluntary on both sides - so that the employer is not bound to employ the man for any overtime and the employee is not bound to serve it - then, although the overtime is worked regularly each week, nevertheless, being voluntary, it does not count as part of the normal working hours. Such a situation is covered by paragraph 1(1).
Second, when there is a fixed number of compulsory working hours and in addition a fixed period of overtime which is obligatory on both sides - so that the employer is bound to provide that overtime and the employee bound to serve it - then that fixed period of overtime is added to the fixed period of compulsory working hours so that the total number counts as the normal working hours. Such a situation is covered by paragraph 1(2). In short, "guaranteed overtime" counts as part of normal working hours.Third, where there is a fixed number of compulsory working hours, and overtime is obligatory on the man if asked but not on the employer - so that the employer is entitled to call on the man to work overtime but is not bound to call upon him to do so, then the overtime does not come within the normal working hours. Such a case seems to me to come within paragraph 1(1). It comes within the words "the employee is entitled to overtime pay when employed for more than a fixed number of hours in a week..." It does not come within the words of paragraph 1(2), because the contract of employment does not "fix" the number of hours of employment. The overtime is not fixed but is at the option of the employer."
Singh -v- Post Office; NIRC 1973
Chapman -v- Goonvean and Rostowrack China Clay Co Ltd (1973) ICR 310; [1973] EWCA Civ 1; [1973] 2 All ER 1063; [1973] ICR 310; [1973] 1 WLR 678; (1974) 9 ITR 379
16 Apr 1973
CA
Lord Denning MR, Buckley, Orr LJJ
Employment
Several of the company's employees were given transport to work as part of their contract. After redundancies, the remaining number of employees so entitled made the service uneconomic, and the company withdrew it. The seven appellants had to leave being unable to get to work. The court was asked whther these dismissals were also for redundancy. Held:
[ Bailii ]
Malloch -v- Aberdeen Corporation; SCS 01-Jun-1973
Stenhouse Australia Ltd -v- Phillips [1974] AC 391; [1973] UKPC 1; [1974] 1 All ER 117; [1974] 2 WLR 134
2 Oct 1973
PC
Lord Wilberforce
Employment, Commonwealth Casemap

(Australia) An employer's claim for protection from competition by a former employee under a restrictive covenant must be based upon the identification of some advantage or asset inherent in the business which can properly be regarded as, in a general sense, his property, and which it would be unjust to allow the employee to appropriate for his own purposes, even though he, the employee, may have contributed to its creation.
Lord Wilberforce said: "The employer's claim for protection must be based upon the identification of some advantage or asset inherent in the business which can properly be regarded as, in a general sense, his property, and which it would be unjust to allow the employee to appropriate for his own purposes, even though he, the employee, may have contributed to its creation." and
"The question is not how long the employee could be expected to enjoy, by virtue of his employment, a competitive edge over others seeking the clients' business. It is, rather, what is a reasonable time during which the employer is entitled to protection against solicitation of clients with whom the employee had contact and influence during employment and who were not bound to the employer by contract or by stability of association. This question, secondly, their Lordships do not consider can advantageously form the subject of direct evidence. It is for the judge, after informing himself as fully as he can of the facts and circumstances relating to the employer's business, the nature of the employer's interest to be protected, and the likely effect on this of solicitation, to decide whether the contractual period is reasonable or not. An opinion as to the reasonableness of elements of it, particularly of the time during which it is to run, can seldom be precise, and can only be formed on a broad and common sense view."
[ Bailii ]
Langston -v- Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers [1973] EWCA Civ 7; [1974] ICR 180; [1974] 1 All ER 980; [1974] 1 WLR 185,
19 Dec 1973
CA
Lord Denning MR
Employment
1 Citers
Unless there is an express provision for this an employer must provide work to an employee when there is available work to be done
Link[s] omitted
Broome -v- Director of Public Prosecutions; HL 20-Dec-1973
Cocking -v- Sandhurst (Stationers) Ltd; NIRC 1974
Spencer Jones -v- Timmens Freeman [1974] IRLR 325
1974

Employment Casemap
1 Citers
The applicant was a hairdresser, who refused to work on Saturday afternoons and was told at a meeting with her employers that they were not prepared to employ her any longer on that basis and that she would have to go. She left before the formal dismissal and claimed to have been dismissed. Held: She was dismissed and had not resigned voluntarily.
Dada -v- Metal Box Co Ltd [1974] ICR 559
1974
NIRC
Sir John Donaldson
Employment Casemap
1 Citers
Sir John Donaldson sets out the considerations when a witness order is sought in an employment dispute before the court. He said: "We are quite clear that tribunals have a discretion in deciding whether or not to issue witness orders. There is no automatic right to witness orders. But that discretion must be exercised judicially and it must be exercised with due regard to the fact that a tribunal is dealing with litigants in person who may not have the benefit of any advice. . It seems to the court that there are only two matters of which tribunals should be satisfied before they issue a witness order. The first is that the witness prima facie can give evidence which is relevant to issues in dispute. For that purpose they will no doubt wish to ask the applicant what evidence can be given by the person who is the proposed subject of the witness order. We do not suggest that the tribunal should ask the applicant to give a full proof of that evidence, but applicants should indicate the subject matter of the evidence and show the extent to which it is relevant. The second matter of which the tribunal should be satisfied is that it is necessary to issue a witness order. In the present case the tribunal seem to have taken the view that it would be wrong, indeed, in their letter of March 11, 1974, they say that it would not be possible, to issue a witness order, unless they could be satisfied that the person concerned was unwilling to attend voluntarily. We think that this policy is erroneous to the point of amounting to an error of law. . . We do not seek in any way to fetter the discretion of tribunals. What we are saying is that tribunals should be satisfied that the witness can give relevant evidence and that it is necessary to issue a witness order. But if they are satisfied on both those matters they ought to issue such an order."
Abernethy -v- Mott Hay & Anderson; CA 1974
Hilti (Great Britain) Ltd -v- Windridge; EAT 1974
Gardiner -v- Newport County Borough Council [1974] IRLR 262
1974

Employment

S & U Stores Ltd -v- Wilkes; NIRC 1974
Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd -v- Crabtree; CA 1974
Vaughan -v- Weighpack Ltd; NIRC 1974
Harold Fielding Ltd -v- Mansi [1974] ICR 347
1974
NIRC
Sir John Donaldson
Employment

An employee had been employed by two partners and later by one of them. Held: Mr Mansi could not bring himself within the provision because: "Where one of two partners leaves the partnership, there are no partners, but only a sole proprietor, after the change. Paragraph 9(5) does not cover the situation although perhaps it should."
Contracts of Employment Act 1972 Sch 1 Par 9
Maurice Graham Ltd -v- Brunswick [1974] 16 KIR 158
1974

Contract, Employment Casemap
1 Citers
Bessenden Properties Limited -v- Corness; CA 1974
E T Marler Limited -v- Robertson [1974] ICR 72
1974

Sir Hugh Griffiths
Employment Casemap
1 Citers
A frivolous claim is one that has no substance in it and is bound to fail or on the face of it is so manifestly misconceived that it has no prospect of success: "If the employee knows that there is no substance in his claim and that it is bound to fail, or if the claim is on the face of it so manifestly misconceived that it can have no prospect of success, it may be deemed frivolous and an abuse of the procedure of the tribunal to pursue it."
The court commented on the uncertainty of litigation: "Ordinary experience of life frequently teaches us that that which is plain for all to see once the dust of battle has subsided was far from clear to the contestants when they took up arms".
Lees -v- Arthur Greaves (Lees) Limited; CA 1974
Everwear Candlewick Ltd -v- Isaac; EAT 02-Jan-1974
Gascol Conversions Ltd -v- Mercer [1974] EWCA Civ 11; [1974] ITR 282; [1974] IRLR 155; [1974] ICR 420; [1975] KIR 149
29 Jan 1974
CA
Employment
Link[s] omitted
Sanders & Others -v- Ernest A Neale Limited; NIRC 05-Jul-1974
Van Binsbergen -v- Bedrijfsvereniging Voor De Metaalnijverheid [1974] ECR 1299 [13]:; C-33/74
3 Dec 1974
ECJ
European, Employment
A Member State cannot be denied the right to take measures to prevent the exercise by a person providing services whose activity is entirely or principally directed towards its territory of the freedom guaranteed by Article 59 [on freedom to provide services] for the purpose of avoiding the professional rules of conduct which would be applicable to him if he were established within the State.
Link[s] omitted
Van Duyn -v- Home Office; ECJ 04-Dec-1974
Pascoe -v- Hallen & Medway; 1975
Scott -v- Formica Ltd [1975] IRLR 104
1975

Employment Casemap
1 Citers
The applicant was employed as a process worker who refused to accept a transfer to a different task. He was given the choice of resigning or being dismissed. She left but claimed to have been dismissed. Held: She had been dismissed.
Flint -v- Eastern Electricity Board; EAT 1975
Chappell & Others -v- The Times Newspapers Ltd & others [1975] IRLR 90
1975
CA
Stephenson LJ, Geoffrey Lane LJ
Employment Casemap

Six employees asked for an interim injunction to prevent their employers terminating their contracts of employment in the context of an industrial dispute. Their union had been threatening to take industrial action. The plaintiffs asserted that they should be regarded as individuals, separate from their union but the respondents asserted that the facts and circumstances showed that, in threatening to take industrial action, the union was acting as their agent. The issue for the court was whether or not interim injunction should be granted not whether or not the union was acting as agent of the plaintiffs. Held. Stephenson LJ said: "The argument that this second master of the men is also in some respects their agent will need evidence to support it"
Geoffrey Lane LJ said: "It is not possible, for instance, to say how far, if at all, the union may have been acting as agent for individual members, in dealing with the employers."
BBC -v- Ioannou; CA 1975
Lomax -v- Ladbroke Racing Limited; 1975
Ferguson -v- John Dawson & Partners (Contractors) Ltd; CA 1976
Watling -v- William Bird & Son Contractors Limited; EAT 1976
Bugden & Co -v- Thomas; 1976
Charles Letts & Co -v- Howard; EAT 1976
Shell -v- Lovestock [1976] 1 WLR 1187
1976

Lord Denning (dissenting)
Employment Casemap
1 Citers
Blackwell -v- GEC Elliott Processes [1976] IRLR 144
1976

Employment, Damages Casemap

1 Citers
Gilbert -v- Goldstone Ltd; EAT 1976
Grundy -v- Willis [1976] ICR 323
1976

Phillips J
Employment

Phillips J said: "So the duty of a tribunal is to take into account the reason . . and all the other facts and circumstances known to the employer, and ask whether for that reason, and in those circumstances, having regard to equity and the substantial merits of the case, the employer acted reasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee. And it has, of course, to judge that in the capacity of what has been described as an "industrial jury".
Ahmad -v- Inner London Education Authority; EAT 1976
Sorbie -v- Trust House Forte Hotels; EAT 1976
Spencer -v- Paragon Wallpapers Ltd; 1976
Bentley Engineering Co Ltd -v- Crown and Another; QBD 05-Mar-1976
Thompson and others -v- Eaton Ltd; EAT 14-Apr-1976
Mills -v- EIB (Judgment) C-110/75; [1976] EUECJ C-110/75; [1976] EUECJ C-110/75
15 Jun 1976
ECJ
European, Employment
Europa By its use of the words 'any dispute between the community and its servants' article 179 is not restricted exclusively to the institutions of the community and their staff but also includes the bank as a community institution established and with legal personality conferred by the treaty. Under this article the court thus has jurisdiction in any dispute between the bank and its servants.
The system adopted for the relations between the bank and its employees is contractual. The contract may be repudiated and terminated by either of the parties on the conditions laid down both in the regulations and in the contract itself.
If the contract is terminated contrary to the provisions of the individual contract or of the staff regulations of the european investment bank which are deemed to be an integral part thereof the party having illegally terminated the contract must be ordered to compensate the other party for the material and non-material damage occasioned to the latter by such illegality.
Both the provisions of the contract and the general principles of the law of master and servant impose limits on the intention of the parties. Termination of a contract which exceeds those limits may be void and it will be for the court having jurisdiction, in this case the court of justice, to make a declaration to that effect.
Link[s] omitted
George Whiley Ltd -v- Anderson [1977] ICR 167
1 Jul 1976

Employment Casemap


Moon -v- Homeworthy Furniture (Northern) Ltd; EAT 13-Jul-1976
Brack -v- Insurance Officer C-17/76
29 Sep 1976
ECJ
European, Benefits, Employment
Europa The provision in paragraph 1 of point I (United Kingdom) of annex V to Regulation no 1408/71, far from restricting the definition of the term 'worker' as it emerges from clarify the scope of subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph vis-a-vis British legislation. A person who:- was compulsorily insured against the contingency of ' sickness ' successively as an employed person and as a self-employed person under a social security scheme for the whole working population; - was a self-employed person when this contingency occurred; - at the said time and under the provisions of the said scheme, nevertheless could have claimed sickness benefits in cash at the full rate only if there were taken into account both the contributions paid by him or on his behalf when he was an employed person and those which he made as a self-employed person;

constitutes, as regards british legislation, a 'worker' within the meaning of article 1(a)(ii) of regulation no 1408/71 for the purposes of the application of the first sentence of article 22(1)(ii) of that regulation.

Link[s] omitted
Capper Pass Ltd -v- Lawton [1976] UKEAT 346_76_1076; [1977] 2 WLR 26; [1977] QB 852; [1976] IRLR 366; (1976) 11 ITR 316; [1977] 2 All ER 11
19 Oct 1976
EAT
Employment, Discrimination
Link[s] omitted
Dugdale -v- Kraft Foods Ltd [1976] UKEAT 277_76_1076; [1976] 1 WLR 1288; (1979) 11 ITR 309; [1977] 1 All ER 454; [1977] IRLR 160
28 Oct 1976
EAT
Employment, Discrimination
Link[s] omitted
Ahmad -v- Inner London Education Authority; CA 1977
Egg Stores (Stamford Hill) Limited -v- Leibovici; EAT 1977
Dorothy Perkins Ltd -v- Dance; 1977
Littlewoods Organisations Ltd -v- Harris; CA 1977
Electrolux -v- Hudson; 1977
Amies -v- Inner London Education Authority; EAT 1977
Turner -v- London Transport Executive [1977] ICR 952
1977
CA
Employment Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
Chesham Shipping Ltd -v- Rowe [1977] IRLR 391
1977

Employment Casemap

102 Social Club and Institute Ltd -v- Bickerton [1977] ICR 911
1977

Phillips J
Employment Casemap
1 Citers
Philips J set out the consequences of the 1971 Act: 'Before 1971 there was perhaps a tendency to find in contracts of employment elements of a public character which would enable the court to extend to the employee the protection flowing from "the right to be heard" enjoyed by the holders of an office. Since the fundamental change of the law brought about by the Industrial Relations Act 1971, which for the first time created the right of an employee not to be unfairly dismissed, the problem has arisen, which previously was not of much importance, of defining the circumstances in which an office-holder was said to be employed. Previously, it was a case of defendants seeking to deny an office-holder a right of complaint on the ground that he was party to a "pure contract of service"; now it is a question of defendants seeking to deny employees the right not to be unfairly dismissed on the ground that in reality they are not employees but "pure office-holders".'
Industrial Relations Act 1971
Oxford -v- Department of Health and Social Security [1977] ICR 885
1977

Philips J
Employment

The tribunal had declined a submission of no case to answer ""It seems to us that that the [decision] was a very proper course to have adopted, and we recommend it as being the course which is in most circumstances the right course to adopt. It further seems to us that, while the burden of proof lies upon the applicant, it would only be in exceptional or frivolous cases that it would be right for the Industrial Tribunal to find at the end of the applicant's case that there was no case to answer and that it was not necessary to hear what the respondent had to say about it."
Watts -v- Rubery Owen Conveyancer Limited; EAT 1977
Lowndes -v- Specialist Heavy Engineering Ltd [1977] ICR 1
1977

Employment Casemap

Nelson -v- British Broadcasting Corporation; CA 1977
National Union of Taylors & Garment Workers -v- Charles Ingram & Company Ltd; EAT 1977
British Broadcasting Corporation -v- Hearn; CA 1977
Nash -v- Ryan Plant International Limited (1977) ICR 560
1977

Employment

The court considered the meaning of the word 'refer' in the section. Held: Words such as "deliver" or "present" ordinarily require that the transfer shall be completed. Words like "send" or "despatch" do not. The argument on the word "referred", suggest that its meaning is imprecise, and that it is much coloured, as meaning either "send" or "present," according to the context. The court sought assistance from the regulations underlying the section. In this context, it meant 'sent' and a matter had bee referred once the application was sent and whether or not it was received.
Redundancy Payments Act 1965 21
Simmons -v- Hoover Ltd; EAT 1977
David -v- New England College of Arundel [1977] 1 ICR 6
1977

Employment, Contract

Industrial Rubber Products -v- Gillon; 1977
Peake -v- Automotive Products Ltd [1977] UKEAT 443_76_1702
17 Feb 1977
EAT
Employment, Discrimination
Link[s] omitted
East Lindsey District Council -v- Daubney; EAT 20-Apr-1977
W Devis & Sons Ltd -v- Atkins [1977] IRLR 314; [1977] AC 931; [1977] ICR 662; [1977] UKHL 6; [1977] 3 All ER 40; [1977] 3 WLR 214; (1978) 13 ITR 71; 8 BLR 57
6 Jul 1977
HL
Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Simon of Glaisdale
Employment Casemap


The 'just and equitable' test warranted the reduction or extinction of compensation for an employee who has been unfairly dismissed and then found to have been liable to summary dismissal. "The paragraph does not, nor did s. 116 of the Act of 1971, provide that regard should be had only to the loss resulting from the dismissal being unfair. Regard must be had to that, but the award must be just and equitable in all the circumstances, and it cannot be just and equitable that a sum should be awarded in compensation when in fact the employee has suffered no injustice by being dismissed."
Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1971
[ Bailii ]
British United Shoe Machinery Co Ltd -v- Clarke; EAT 11-Jul-1977
Price -v- Civil Service Commission and others [1977] UKEAT 1_77_1507
15 Jul 1977
EAT
Employment
[ Bailii ]
Massey -v- Crown Life Insurance Company [1977] EWCA Civ 12; [1978] 1 WLR 676; [1978] ICR 590
4 Nov 1977
CA
Lord Denning MR, Lawton LJ, Eveleigh LJ
Contract, Employment

1 Citers
The plaintiff sought compensation under the 1974 Act, alleging that his dismissal had been unfair. The company said that he was an independent contractor, not an employee. He had been an employee, but at his own request had been treated as self employed. Held: The deed prepared by the plaintiff and accepted by the company was entered into freely and was clear. He was not an employee and had no right not to be dismissed unfairly.
Lawton LJ said: "the union of fairness, commonsense and the law is a highly desirable objective. If the law allows a man to claim that he is a self-employed person in order to obtain tax advantages for himself and then allows him to deny that he is a self-employed person so that he can claim compensation, then in my judgment the union between fairness, commonsense and the law is strained almost to breaking point."
Lord Denning MR said: "The law, as I see it, is this: If the true relationship of the parties is that of master and servant under a contract of service, the parties cannot alter the truth of that relationship by putting a different label upon it. If they should put a different label upon it and use it as a dishonest device to deceive the Revenue, I should have thought it was illegal and could not be enforced by either party and they could not get any advantage out of it - at any rate not in any case where they had to rely upon it as the basis of a claim. See Alexander v. Rayson (1936) 1 King's Bench 169. An arrangement between two parties to put forward a dishonest description of their relationship so as to deceive the Revenue would clearly be illegal and unenforceable.
On the other hand, if their relationship is ambiguous and is capable of being one or the other, then the parties can remove that ambiguity, by the very agreement itself which they make with one another. The agreement itself then becomes the best material from which to gather the true legal relationship between them."
Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 30(1)
[ Bailii ]
Smith -v- Macarthys Ltd; EAT 14-Dec-1977
Massey -v- Crown Life Insurance Co [1978] ICR 590
1978

Employment Casemap


Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd -v- Sharp; CA 1978
Ridley -v- GEC Machines Ltd; 1978
Walker -v- Josiah Wedgwood & Sons Ltd [1978] ICR 744
1978

Arnold J
Employment
1 Citers
"The general approach, as we think, must be that in cases concerned with unfair dismissal, whether it be constructive dismissal or direct dismissal, the conception of submission of no case to answer is somewhat out of place."
Retarded Childrens Aid Society -v- Day; CA 1978
Palmanor Ltd -v- Cedron [1978] ICR 1008
1978

Employment Casemap

The use of foul language can undermine a contract of employment and be a foundation for a claim for constructive dismissal.
Nothman -v- Barnet London Borough County Council; HL 1978
Barley -v- Amey Roadstone Corporation Ltd (No.2); EAT 1978
Association of Patternmakers & Allied Craftsmen -v- Kirvin Ltd; EAT 1978
Talke Fashions Ltd -v- Society of Textile Workers; EAT 1978
Clarks of Hove Ltd -v- Bakers' Union; EAT 1978
TGWU -v- Gainsborough Distributors; EAT 1978
British Midland Airways Limited -v- Lewis; EAT 1978
Joshua Wilson & Bros Ltd -v- USDAW [1978] ICR 614
1978

Employment Casemap


Redundancy consultation - protective award
Kumchyk -v- Derby County Council; EAT 1978
Notts County Council -v- Bowley [1978] IRLR 252
1978

Employment

The public employee had been cautioned for gross indecency, and dismissed for a subsequent conviction. Held: The dismissal was fair.
Gorman -v- London Computer Training Centre; EAT 1978
Parsons (C A ) & Co Ltd -v- McLoughlin [1978] IRLR 65 EAT
1978
EAT
Employment

Priddle -v- Dibble; EAT 1978
National Union of Gold, Silver & Allied Trades -v- Albury Brothers Ltd; EAT 1978
Gouriet -v- Union of Post Office Workers; HL 1978
British Home Stores Ltd -v- Burchell; EAT 1978
Adams -v- Charles Zub Associates Ltd [1978] IRLR 551
1978

Employment Casemap

Gale Ltd -v- Gilbert; EAT 1978
Turner -v- D T Kean Ltd [1978] IRLR 110
1978

Employment

Cartiers Superfoods Ltd -v- Laws; EAT 1978
Naqvi -v- Stephens Jewellers Ltd; EAT 1978
Walls Meat Company Limited -v- Khan [1979] ICR 52; [1978] IRLR 499
1978
CA
Brandon LJ, Dennning L MR
Employment
Brandon LJ said: "With regard to ignorance operating as a similar impediment, I should have thought that, if in any particular case an employee was reasonably ignorant of either (a) his right to make a complaint of unfair dismissal at all, or (b) how to make it, or (c) that it was necessary for him to make it within a period of three months from the date of dismissal, an industrial tribunal could and should be satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for his complaint to be presented within the period concerned.
For this purpose I do not see any difference, provided always that the ignorance in each case is reasonable, between ignorance of (a) the existence of the right, or (b) the proper way to exercise it, or (c) the proper time within which to exercise it. In particular, so far as (c), the proper time within which to exercise the right, is concerned, I do not see how it can justly be said to be reasonably practicable for a person to comply with a time limit of which he is reasonably ignorant.
While I do not, as I have said, see any difference in principle in the effect of reasonable ignorance as between the three cases to which I have referred, I do see a great deal of difference in practice in the ease or difficulty with which a finding that the relevant ignorance is reasonable may be made. But, where a person is reasonably ignorant of the existence of the right at all, he can hardly be found to have been acting unreasonably in not making enquiries as to how, and within what period, he should exercise it. By contrast, if he does not know of the existence of the right, it may in many cases at least, though not necessarily all, be difficult for him to satisfy an industrial tribunal that he behaved reasonably in not making such enquiries."
Dennning L MR said: "It is simply to ask this question:- Had the man just cause or excuse for not presenting his complaint within the prescribed time? Ignorance of his rights – or ignorance of the time limit – is not just cause or excuse, unless it appears that he or his advisers could not reasonably have been expected to have been aware of them. If he or his advisers could reasonably have been so expected, it was his or their fault, and they must take the consequences."
Robert Whiting Designs Ltd -v- Lamb; EAT 1978
Nottinghamshire County Council -v- Bowly [1978] IRLR 252
1978

Employment
1 Citers
Smith -v- Hayle Town Council; CA 1978
Blackpole Furniture Ltd -v- Sullivan; EAT 1978
Wells -v- Derwent Plastics Limited; EAT 1978
D G Moncrieff (Farmers) -v- MacDonald; EAT 1978
Open University -v- Triesman; EAT 1978
Bentley Engineering Co Ltd -v- Mistry; EAT 1978
Dixon -v- BBC [1978] QB 438
1978
CA
Lord Denning
Employment Casemap
1 Cites

The fact that a term of employment is determinable by notice does not preclude the term being a fixed term.
Wilson -v- Maynard Shipbuilding Consultants AB; CA 1978
Wetherall (Bond Street W1) Ltd -v- Lynn [1978] 1 WLR 200
1978

Employment
1 Citers
The court considered a claim of constructive dismissal against a claim by an employee that the employer had failed to meet its duty of care to protect an employee against bullying or ill treatment by other members of staff.
Robinson -v- British Island Airways Ltd; EAT 1978
Barratt Developments (Bradford) Ltd -v- UCATT; EAT 1978
Wynne -v- Hair Control [1978] ICR 870
1978

Employment Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
A sole proprietorship gave way to a partnership of which the previous sole proprietor was a member. The employee's continuous employment was broken.
Todd -v- British Midland Airways; CA 02-Jan-1978
Mulcahy -v- Commission C-110/77; [1978] EUECJ C-110/77
1 Jun 1978
ECJ
European, Employment
Europa Officials - recruitment - consideration of applications - professional experience - equivalence to university degree - appraisal (staff regulations, article 5) in the matter of promotion it is for the appointing authority to appraise whether professional experience is equivalent to university education evidenced by a degree.
Link[s] omitted
Defrenne -v- Sabena Airlines [1979] ECR 1365; C-149/77; R-149/77; [1978] EUECJ R-149/77
15 Jun 1978
ECJ
European, Employment, Discrimination
1 Cites
LMA Ms Defrenne was an air hostess employed by SABENA, a Belgian airline company. She brought an action against the airline based on Art.119 [now141] EC. Ms Defrenne claimed that in paying their male stewards more than their air hostesses, when they performed identical tasks, Sabena were in breach of Art.119EC. The question to the ECJ was whether, and in what context, Art.199EC was directly effective. The ECJ held "the prohibition on discrimination between men and women applies not only to the action of public authorities but also extends to all agreements which are intended to regulate paid labour collectively, as well as to contracts between individuals"
Europa Article 119 of the EEC Treaty, which is limited to the question of pay discrimination between men and women workers, constitutes a special rule, whose application is linked to precise factors. It cannot be interpreted as prescribing, in addition to equal pay, equality in respect of the other working conditions applicable to men and women. The fact that the fixing of certain conditions of employment - such as a special age-limit - may have pecuniary consequences is not sufficient to bring such conditions within the field of application of article 119, which is based on the close connection which exists between the nature of the services provided and the amount of remuneration.
Fundamental personal human rights form part of the general principles of community law, the observance of which the court has a duty to ensure. The elimination of discrimination based on sex forms part of those fundamental rights. However, it is not for the court to enforce the observance of that rule of non-discrimination in respect of relationships between employer and employee which are a matter exclusively for national law.
[ Europa ] - [ Bailii ]
Taplin -v- C Shippam Ltd [1978] UKEAT 117_78_0707; [1978] ICR 1068; [1978] IRLR 450; (1978) 13 ITR 532
7 Jul 1978
EAT
Slynn J
Employment
[ Bailii ]
Dixon -v- British Broadcasting Corporation [1978] EWCA Civ 4; [1979] ICR 281; [1979] QB 546; [1979] 2 WLR 647; [1979] 2 All ER 112
5 Oct 1978
CA
Employment
[ Bailii ]
Sheffield -v- Oxford Controls Co Ltd; EAT 18-Dec-1978
Migwain Limited (In Liquidation) -v- Transport and General Workers Union; 1979
British Railways Board -v- Natarajan; EAT 1979
Courtaulds Northern Textiles Ltd -v- Andrew; EAT 1979
Wigan Borough Council -v- Davies; EAT 1979
Bastick -v- James Lane (Turf Accountants) Ltd; 1979
National Union of Gold, Silver & Allied Trades -v- Albury Brothers Ltd; CA 1979
Secretary of State for Employment -v- Globe Elastic Thread Co Ltd [1980] AC 506; [1979] IRLR 327
1979
HL
Lord Wilberforce
Employment

The employee worked for Company A from 1948 to 1970. In 1970 he accepted employment with a related Company B, on the understanding that his employment with A would be treated as continuous. Upon his dismissal by B in 1975 on grounds of redundancy, he claimed a redundancy payment on the basis of continuous service since 1948. Held: He could only count service with B from 1970 for the purposes of his redundancy entitlement. The reason was that under the statute A and B were not associated employers. Accordingly there was no continuity of service following the change of employer. A personal estoppel cannot extend the statutory jurisdiction of the Indistrial Tribunal or create a jurisdiction which the statute did not in fact confer
Sun and Sand Ltd -v- Fitzjohn [1979] IRLR 154
1979

Arnold J
Employment, Damages Casemap
1 Citers
The EAT considered the deduction of sickness benefit from the compensatory award. Arnold J said: "The appellants before us say that that amount of sickness benefit should be deducted from the amount awarded within the compensatory award for the 13 weeks of pay between the date of dismissal and the date of new employment. The matter for consideration seems to us to depend upon whether the amount of the loss sustained by Miss Fitzjohn in consequence of her dismissal was the whole amount of lost pay or was the amount of lost pay less the sickness benefit. If the applicant was entitled to retain the sickness benefit to which she was justly entitled, so long as her employment continued, in addition to receiving her pay, the loss would in our judgment be the net pay lost without any deductions; but if either she was obliged to accept some reduced amount of pay by reference to the sickness benefit she had received or so long as she was being paid under a continuing contract of employment was disentitled from receiving sick benefit at all, then in either of those cases it seems to us that the compensatory award for lost pay should be reduced by the amount of the sickness benefit which she received. It is not contended by the appellants that so long as her contract of employment continued she would have been obliged to accept any deduction from her wages by reference to the amount of sickness benefit she had received or otherwise obliged to account to her employers for the amount of that sickness benefit. They do however submit that the applicant was not in fact entitled to receive sickness benefit so long as her contract of employment continued and that therefore all that she lost, if she had received no more than she was justly entitled to, would have been the net pay and it would follow from that that, since during the period of unemployment she received in fact sickness benefit, then her loss would be the amount of net pay less the amount of sickness benefit. For this proposition the appellants rely on the language of s.14(1)(b) of the Social Security Act 1975; the relevant part of the sub-section reads thus:
'A person shall be entitled to unemployment benefit in respect of any day of unemployment which forms part of a period of interruption of employment and to sickness benefit in respect of any day of incapacity for work which forms part of such a period'
and they point out that 'such a period' plainly means a period of interruption of employment. So they say she is entitled to sickness benefit only during a period of unemployment since this is what 'interruption of employment' means, so that if she had continued to be employed by the appellants she would not, so long as that employment continued, notwithstanding that she was off work for sickness, be entitled to sickness benefit. The answer to that proposition is in our judgment plainly contained in the definition which is to be found in s.17(1)(c) of the Social Security Act 1975, which provides that the expression 'day of interruption of employment' means a day which is a day of unemployment or incapacity for work. It follows from this, in our judgment, that where a person suffers from an incapacity for work such as that from which Miss Fitzjohn suffered during the relevant period it matters not that she has the benefit of a current contract of employment, in relation to her entitlement to sickness benefit.
Knight -v- Attorney General [1979] ICR 194
1979

Employment, Legal Professions

A judge's status does not bring her within the scope of the 1975 Act as an 'employee'.
Sex Discrimination Act 1975
Fisher -v- York Trade Leco Ltd [1979] IRLR 386
1979

Slynn J
Employment Casemap
1 Citers
Slynn J said: "It seems to us that where what is being relied upon by an employer or an employee is not a resignation or a dismissal but conduct which is said to be a fundamental breach of the contract and where the parties said to have been in breach, has not indicated that it considers the contract to be at an end, then the accounts of a fundamental breach, if such it be does not itself determine the contract. The contract is determined when the fundamental breach is accepted, it is the acceptance by the employee in the case of an alleged fundamental breach by the employer which constitutes the termination by the employee."
Zarczynska -v- Levy [1979] ICR 184; [1978] IRLR 532
1979

Discrimination, Employment
1 Citers
A white barmaid was dismissed for refusing to turn away black customers. She claimed in race discrimination. Held: Treating people less favourably not because of their race but because of the race of others is also discrimination on grounds of race. The black customers were not in fact treated less favourably, as the white employee refused to carry out the unlawful order to treat them less favourably. It was the white employee who was treated less favourably "on racial grounds" because he was dismissed for refusing to carry out his employer's racially discriminatory policy or practice to discriminate against others on racial grounds.
Green -v- Hampshire County Council [1979] ICR 954
1979

Employment
1 Citers
A decision of an Employment Tribunal on a particular issue is capable of establishing an issue estoppel between the parties as to that issue.
Hugh-Jones -v- St John's College, Cambridge [1979] ICR 848
1979

Slynn J
Employment

An office holder can agree to execute work or labour without becoming an employee.
Riley -v- Tesco Stores Ltd [1979] ICR 223
1979

Employment

Hamish Armour (Receiver of Barry Staines Ltd) -v- ASTMS [1979] IRLR 24; [1979] IRLR 24
1979

Employment Casemap
1 Citers
Where an employer is contemplating making collective redundancies, it may be appropriate to disclose the information required under a confidentiality agreement. In order to demonstrate a "special circumstances" defence an employer must show "something out of the ordinary, something uncommon".
Syed -v- Ford Motor Co [1979] IRLR 335
1979

Employment
1 Cites
1 Citers
The actions and failures of a trade union representative can be attributed to the claimant.
Pritchard-Rhodes Limited -v- Boon and Milton; EAT 1979
British Labour Pump Co Ltd -v- Byrne; EAT 1979
Spillers French (Holdings) Ltd -v- Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW); EAT 1979
Coral Squash Clubs Ltd -v- Matthews; 1979
Pirelli General Cable -v- Murray [1979] IRLR 19
1979

Employment Casemap
1 Citers
Pillinger -v- Manchester Area Health Authority [1979] IRLR 430
1979

Employment Casemap

The claimanat said his dismissal had not been a redundancy, since the person who replaced him did the same work. Held: The dismissal must have been for some other reason. It was not a redundancy. The court discussed the meaning of the phrase 'work of a particular kind' in redundancies. Qualifications are not relevant the relevance except in so far as they imply special skills, attributes or knowledge.
Barthope -v- Exeter Diocesan Board of Finance; EAT 1979
Khanum -v- Mid Glamorgan Area Health Authority; EAT 1979
NWL Ltd -v- Woods; HL 1979
Hollister -v- National Farmers Union (NFU) [1979] IRLR 238; [1979] ICR 542
1979
CA
Lord Denning MR
Employment Casemap
1 Citers
The correct approach for the Industrial Tribunal looking at a company re-organisation is to make a finding as to the advantages to the employers of a proposed re-organisation and whether it was reasonable for them to implement it by terminating existing contracts and offering employees new ones. If there is a sound good business reason for the particular reorganisation the unreasonableness or reasonableness of the employer's conduct has to be looked at in the context of that re-organisation.
It is not right to go through the reasoning of Tribunals with a toothcomb to see if some error can be found. The findings of a Tribunal should be looked at by the EAT "broadly". If it appeared that they had applied the right test and that their conclusion was broadly reasonable it should not be interfered with.
Lord Denning MR said: "The question which is being discussed in this case is whether the reorganisation of the business, which the National Farmers' Union felt they had to undertake in 1976, coupled with Mr Hollister's refusal to accept the new agreement, was a substantial reason of such a kind as to justify the dismissal of the employee. Upon that there have only been one or two cases. One we were particularly referred to was the case of Ellis v Brighton Co operative Society Ltd [1976] IRLR 419, where it was recognised by the Court that reorganisation of business may on occasion be a sufficient reason justifying the dismissal of an employee. They went on to say: 'Where there has been a properly consulted-upon reorganisation which, if it is not done, is going to bring the whole business to a standstill, a failure to go along with the new arrangements may well -it is not bound to but it may well constitute "some other substantial reason".' Certainly, I think, everyone would agree with that. But in the present case Mr Justice Arnold expanded it a little so as not to limit it to where it came absolutely to a standstill but to where there was some sound, good business reason for the reorganisation. I must say I see no reason to differ from Mr Justice Arnold's view on that It must depend in all the circumstances whether the reorganisation was such that the only sensible thing to do was to terminate the employee's contract unless he would agree to a new arrangement. It seems to me that that paragraph may well be satisfied, and indeed was satisfied, in this case, having regard to the commercial necessity of rearrangements being made and the termination of the relationship with the Cornish Mutual, and the setting up of a new relationship via the National Farmers' Union Mutual Insurance Limited."
Carter -v- Credit Change Ltd; CA 02-Jan-1979
Claudino Rossi -v- Caisse de compensation pour allocations familiales des régions de Charleroi et Namur C-100/78
6 Mar 1979
ECJ
European, Employment
Link[s] omitted
Crowley -v- Ashland (UK) Chemicals Ltd; EAT 20-Apr-1979
Gozdzik and Scopigno -v- Chlidema Carpet Co Ltd; EAT 26-Apr-1979
Science Research Council -v- Nassé; Science Research Council -v- Nasse [1979] ICR 921; [1979] 3 All ER 673; [1980] AC 1028; [1979] 3 WLR 762; [1979] UKHL 9
1 Nov 1979
HL
Templeman, Salmon, Watkins LJJ
Employment, Litigation Practice, Discrimination Casemap


Recent statutes had given redress to anyone suffering unlawful discrimination on account of race sex or trade union activities. An employee sought discovery of documents from his employer which might reveal such discrimination. Held: The court ought not to order breach of properly given confidences unless it is necessary in the interests of justice.
Lord Salmon said: "If the tribunal is satisfied that it is necessary to order certain documents to be disclosed and inspected in order fairly to dispose of the proceedings, then, in my opinion, the law requires that such an order should be made; and the fact that the documents are confidential is irrelevant. The law has always recognised that it is of the greatest importance from the point of view of public policy that proceedings in the courts or before the tribunals shall be fairly disposed of. This, no doubt, is why the law has never accorded privilege against discovery and inspection of confidential documents which are necessary for fairly disposing of the proceedings."
Employment Protection Act 1975 - Sex Discrimination Act 1975 - Race Relations Act 1976 - European Convention of Human Rights 6
Link[s] omitted