Equity - 2000

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This page lists 20 cases, and was prepared on 28 October 2012.

Lansing Linder Ltd -v- Alber [2000] Pensions LR 15
2000 ChD Rimer J	Equity, Financial Services	1 Cites 1 Citers
	Pension scheme rules were amended varying the ages etc for retirement. The rules gave the company power to amend the rules with the consent of the Trustees. The original rules permitted early retirement on an immediate, but actuarially reduced, pension. Under the original rules, members of the scheme in service (actives) required the consent of the trustees and the company to take early retirement; those who had left service (deferreds) required the trustees' consent. The company claimed that the omission of the requirement for consent in the new rules was in error and that it was always intended that the right should be subject to consent of the company and trustees. The cost to the company of there being no requirement of consent was considerable, particularly with regard to the valuation of the benefits of deferreds. The memoranda and minutes of the trustees' meetings made no reference to consent being required for early retirement. Held: In relation to the actives, there was insufficient evidence that the absence in the new rules of the need for consent for early retirement between 60 and 65 on an unreduced pension failed to give effect to the intentions of the company and the trustees. But with regard to the deferreds, there was no positive intention to change their position. Rectification was refused, even as regards the deferreds, because "The evidence shows that, when they executed the deed, they had no clear common understanding of what it provided, and no clear common intention as to what it should provide. The only common thread of intention which appears to link the signatories was an intention to sign, wholly blindly, the document which was put before them on the basis that, as it was prepared by [the scheme administrators and scheme solicitors], it must be one they could safely sign. In short, their intention was no more complicated than to sign a deed in the form produced to them, whatever it in fact provided, and knowing that in material respects it had gone beyond the limits of what had been resolved ..." In any event there was no outward expression of accord. Responding to the argument that, since this was not a contract case, the applicable principles were those in Re Butlin's Settlement, and there was no need for outward expression of accord, "I agree... that the present claim is not one to rectify a contract, since no authority has been cited to me which expressly identifies the rectification requirements in a claim such as the present. I agree also that it may be said that to apply the Rose v Pim requirement of an outward expression of accord to the present case does involve a development of the principles. If so, however, I take the view that such a development requires only the smallest of steps."

Philip Collins Limited -v- Davis [2000] 3 All ER 808
2000 Jonathan Parker J	Equity	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court discussed the change of position needed to be established by a defendant resisting a claim for restitution of money paid under a mistake: The "change of position . . must, on the evidence, be referable in some way to the payment of [the] money." and "whether or not a change of position may be anticipatory, it must . . have been made as a consequence of the receipt of, or (it may be) the prospect of receiving, the money sought to be recovered."

Green -v- Cobham (2002) STC 820; [2000] EWHC 1564 (Ch); (2001-02) 4 ITELR 785; [2000] WTLR 1101; [2002] STC 820; [2002] STI 879; [2002] BTC 170
19 Jan 2000 ChD Jonathan Parker J	Capital Gains Tax, Equity	Casemap 1 Citers
	cw The Trustees had overlooked the fact that a Will Trust and two sub-settlements together constituted a single composite settlement for the purposes of CGT with a single body of trustees. As a result of his retirement from practice the solicitor to a non-resident will trust was no longer treated as non-resident for capital gains tax purposes, with the result that there was no longer a majority of non-resident trustees and the will trust became a United Kingdom resident trust. Held: The deed of appointment was set aside. The exercise of the power of appointment, by trustees failing to take any account of the potentially adverse capital gains tax consequences, was invalid.
	Link[s] omitted

Pappadakis -v- Pappadakis
19 Jan 2000 ChD	Equity, Contract
	Where a party sought rectification of a contract to supply into the contract an element without which the contract was intrinsically invalid, that application could only succeed if there was clear and convincing evidence that the parties had intended another effect, and precisely what that effect was. Here an assignment to unidentified trustees which was ineffective because of the uncertainty could not be repaired since the evidence required was not available.

Collins -v- Jones and Others
3 Feb 2000 ChD	Equity
	A unilateral document could not be rectified to make it into something which it was not intended to be at the time it was executed, even if the alteration would give better effect to the general intention of the parties. The choice of different means to achieve the same object was not to be allowed by rectification.

Anthony Wroe (T/a Telepower) -v- Exmos Cover Limited [2000] EWCA Civ 31
8 Feb 2000 CA	Landlord and Tenant, Equity
	A licensee was in occupation of premises under an agreement which clearly denied the intention to create a tenancy. He refused to leave when requesting asserting that he was a tenant. Mistaking the law the landlord treated the occupier as a tenant and sought possession as such. Held: The court refused jurisdiction, and the landlord was not to be estopped from returning to his assertion that the occupier was a mere licensee. There was no evidence that the occupier had relied upon any assertion that a tenancy existed to his detriment.
	Link[s] omitted

Banner Homes Group Plc -v- Luff Developments and Another [2000] EWCA Civ 18; [2002] 2 All ER 117; [2000] EWCA Civ 3016; [2000] 2 WLR 772; [2000] Ch 372
10 Feb 2000 CA Chadwick LJ	Trusts, Equity, Company	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	Competing building companies agreed not to bid against each other for the purchase of land. One proceeded and the other asserted that the land was then held on trust for the two parties as a joint venture. Held: Although there was no formal agreement, the first company had allowed its position to be worsened relying upon the expectation which the second party had allowed to arise, and had not informed the claimant before the purchase of its intention not to honour the agreement. At the date of exchange: "It is clear, therefore, that, to Banner's knowledge, exchange of contracts was to occur, and did occur, before the parties were signed up to any formal written agreement. It is equally clear that Luff had given Banner to understand that it was content to exchange contracts without requiring any form of separate guarantee committing Banner to contribute one half of the costs of the net site and that the reason for this was that the mutual rights and obligations of the parties would be set out in the shareholder agreement. It is also clear that both sides intended to enter into the shareholder agreement as soon as possible, the only reason for the delay being Mr. Vass's absence on holiday. At no stage was any indication given that reasons existed why the agreement should not be entered into. Specifically nothing was said on either side to indicate that any difference of principle existed which would prevent the parties from agreeing terms."
	Link[s] omitted

Gillett -v- Holt and Another [2000] EWCA Civ 66; [2001] Ch 210; [2000] 2 All ER 289; [2000] 2 WTLR 195; [2000] Fam Law 714; [2000] 1 FCR 705; [2000] 3 WLR 815; [2000] 2 FLR 266
23 Mar 2000 CA Lord Justice Beldam, Lord Justice Waller and Lord Justice Robert Walker	Estoppel, Equity	1 Cites
	Repeated assurances, given over years, that the claimant would acquire an interest in property on the death of the person giving the re-assurance, and upon which the claimant relied to his detriment, could found a claim of equitable estoppel. The need for some detriment was clear. There was no need to show some additional act of the promissor which would make the promise irrevocable. It was the act of the claimant, in relying upon the promise, which would make it unconscionable for the promissor to be released from his promise. "But although the judgment is, for convenience, divided into several sections with headings which give a rough indication of the subject matter, it is important to note at the outset that the doctrine of proprietary estoppel cannot be treated as subdivided into three or four watertight compartments. Both sides are agreed on that, and in the course of the oral argument in this court it repeatedly became apparent that the quality of the relevant assurances may influence the issue of reliance, that reliance and detriment are often intertwined, and that whether there is a distinct need for a "mutual understanding" may depend on how the other elements are formulated and understood. Moreover the fundamental principle that equity is concerned to prevent unconscionable conduct permeates all the elements of the doctrine. In the end the court must look at the matter in the round."
	Link[s] omitted

In Re the Estate of Ronald Ernest Chittock (Deceased); Chittock -v- Stevens and Others (2000) 1 WTLR 643
5 Apr 2000 ChD David Donaldson QC	Wills and Probate, Equity	Casemap 1 Cites
	A widow had thought that she was to receive the bulk of her husband's estate by survivorship, but discovered, only out of time and after the six months limit, that this was not the case. She applied for leave to apply out of time to rectify the will, saying that the revocation of the necessary provision was an error. Held: The application should be decided on similar principles to applications for an extension of time under the Inheritance etc Act. The failure to proceed arose from a fundamental mistake as to the value of the estate. The beneficiaries had operated under the same misapprehension, and had not therefore acted to their detriment because of the delay. Leave was given.
	Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 - Administration of Justice Act 1975 4

Foskett (Suing on His Own Behalf and On Behalf of All Other Purchasers of Plots of Land at Mount Eden, Herradodo Cerro Alto Diogo, Martins, Algarve, Portugal -v- Mckeown and Others [2000] UKHL 29; [2000] 3 All ER 97
18 May 2000 HL Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Steyn, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Millett	Insurance, Equity, Trusts	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	Two groups of innocent parties disputed the rights to a death benefit of about £1m. paid by insurers pursuant to a whole life policy. A trustee had misappropriated trust funds and used them in part to pay premiums on life insurance policies for the benefit of his own children. Held: The misappropriated funds could be traced through the insurance policies into the hands of the beneficiaries of the policies. Where part of the premiums had been paid properly, a mixed fund, akin to a bank account, was created, and the interest was according to the proportions. The interest was a property interest in the fund, and the court had no discretion as to its distribution. There is no rule in English law that in the case of a mixed substitution the beneficiary is confined to a lien. "Where a trustee wrongfully uses trust money to provide part of the cost of acquiring an asset, the beneficiary is entitled at his option either to claim a proportionate share of the asset or to enforce a lien upon it to secure his personal claim against the trustee for the amount of the misapplied money. It does not matter whether the trustee mixed the trust money with his own in a single fund before using it to acquire the asset, or made separate payments (whether simultaneously or sequentially) out of the differently owned funds to acquire a single asset." Lord Millett said: "Following is the process of following the same asset as it moves from hand to hand. Tracing is the process of identifying a new asset as the substitute for the old. Where one asset is exchanged for another, a claimant can elect whether to follow the original asset into the hands of the new owner or to trace its value into the new asset in the hands of the same owner…. Tracing is thus neither a claim nor a remedy. It is merely the process by which a claimant demonstrates what has happened to his property, identifies its proceeds and the persons who have handled or received them, and justifies his claim that the proceeds can properly be regarded as representing his property. Tracing is also distinct from claiming. It identifies the traceable proceeds of the claimants' property. It enables the claimant to substitute the traceable proceeds for the original asset as the subject matter of his claim. But it does not affect or establish his claim." Lord Steyn: "In truth tracing is a process of identifying assets: it belongs to the realm of evidence. It tells us nothing about legal or equitable rights to the assets traced."
	Link[s] omitted

Crantrave Ltd (In Liquidation) -v- Lloyd's Bank Plc [2000] EWCA Civ 127; [2000] QB 917; [2000] 4 All ER 473; [2000] 3 WLR 877
18 May 2000 CA	Contract, Banking, Equity	Casemap 1 Cites
	The bank received a garnishee order nisi, but acted before it was made absolute to pay the judgment creditor. Held: The bank had no defence against the customer claiming restitution relying on the equitable doctrine that one person paying the debts of another without authority was allowed the benefit of the payment. To establish that, the bank would have to show that the act had been subsequently ratified, or that it had been made on his behalf. The mere absence of loss to the customer is insufficient. " in the absence of authorisation or ratification by the company of the bank’s payment to the third party, the “mere fact” that the bank’s payment enured to the benefit of the company does not establish an equity in favour of the bank against the company."
	Link[s] omitted

Collins, Etridge; Gonzalez -v- Union Bank of Switzerland Barclays Bank Plc Richard Caplan and Co (a Firm) St Georges Street Trustees Limited St James's Trustees Limited [2000] EWCA Civ 176
25 May 2000 CA Otton LJ, Buxton LJ	Land, Equity, Banking, Legal Professions
	The claimants sought permission to appeal after their claim had been struck out. The claim had alleged fraud against the first defendant, and the court had found that claim to have no real prospect of success. They said that the bank had provided a financial reference upon which they relied in turning down one offer for a golf course development in Spain in favour of an offer apparently supported by the reference. The judge had held that they had not relied on the reference. Held: The documentation made the position clear, and no businessman of any experience would have relied on the purported reference, and the reference was also subject to an effective disclaimer. The evidence now sought to be admitted could with reasonable diligence have been obtained for the trial. No important point of law or practice arose, and leave was refused.
	[ Bailii ]

Fyffes Group Ltd and Others -v- Templeman and Others [2000] 2 Lloyds Rep 643
14 Jun 2000 QBD Toulson J	Agency, Equity	Casemap 1 Citers
	A person who bribed an agent to award a contract was liable to account for profits secured by the bribery as was the agent he bribed, but unlike for the agent, the extent of his liability was limited to exclude profits which he would have earned in any event. The recompense in damages should not be allowed to lead to the unjust enrichment of the injured party.

Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd and Another -v- Akindele [2001] Ch 437; [2000] EWCA Civ 502; [2000] Lloyd's Rep Bank 292; [2000] 4 All ER 221; (1999-2000) 2 ITELR 788; [2000] 3 WLR 1423; [2000] WTLR 1049; [2000] BCC 968
22 Jun 2000 CA Nourse, Ward and Sedley LJJ	Equity, Torts - Other	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The test of whether a person who received funds held them on constructive trust, was not whether he himself was dishonest, but rather whether he had knowledge of circumstances which made it unconscionable to hold on to the money received. In respect of commercial transactions actual knowledge rather than mere constructive knowledge was required. The court distinguished between cases of knowing receipt and cases of knowing or dishonest assistance. Just as "there is now a single test of dishonesty for knowing assistance, so ought there to be a single test of knowledge for knowing receipt. The recipient’s state of knowledge must be such as to make it unconscionable for him to retain the benefit of the receipt. A test in that form, though it cannot, any more than any other, avoid difficulties of application, ought to avoid those of definition and allocation to which the previous categorisations have led. Moreover, it should better enable the courts to give commonsense decisions in the commercial context in which claims in knowing receipt are now frequently made."
	Link[s] omitted

In Re Eurofinance Group Ltd
6 Jul 2000 ChD	Equity, Company
	Where a quasi-partnership had been created with the expectation that a party would be involved in the management of the business, it was a breach of his right to exclude him. This was a consequence of the restraint imposed by equity on relations between majority and minority partners, and not the cause of it. Because the continuing partners would continue the business, the share of the partner ordered to be purchased, should be valued as a going concern.

Walker and others -v- Stones and others [2000] Lloyds Rep PN 864
19 Jul 2000 CA Sir Christopher Slade	Company, Legal Professions, Trusts, Equity, Vicarious Liability	Casemap 1 Citers
	Beneficiaries under a trust sought damages from a solicitor trustee, and the firm of which he was a partner. Held: Where a trustee acted in breach of trust in a claimed belief that he was acting in the interests of the beneficiaries, but no reasonable trustee in his place could have that belief, then an allegation against him of dishonesty should proceed. A trusteeship is not part of the normal duties of a partner of a firm, and the firm is not vicariously liable for the acts of a partner in such trusts. The court rejected the 'Robin Hood' test of dishonesty (a person is only regarded as dishonest if he transgresses his own standard of honesty, even if that standard is contrary to that of reasonable and honest people) saying: "A person may in some cases act dishonestly, according to the ordinary use of language, even though he genuinely believes that his action is morally justified. The penniless thief, for example, who picks the pocket of the multi-millionaire is dishonest even though he genuinely considers that theft is morally justified as a fair redistribution of wealth and that he is not therefore being dishonest." "a claimant is entitled to recover damages where: (a) the claimant can establish that the defendant's conduct has constituted a breach of some legal duty owed to him personally (whether under the law of contract, torts, trusts or any other branch of the law) AND (b) on its assessment of the facts, the Court is satisfied that such breach of duty has caused him personal loss, separate and distinct from any loss that may have been occasioned to any corporate body in which he may be financially interested. I further conclude that, if these two conditions are satisfied, the mere fact that the defendant's conduct may also have given rise to a cause of action at the suit of a company in which the claimant is financially interested (whether directly as a shareholder or indirectly as, for example, a beneficiary under a trust) will not deprive the plaintiff of his cause of action; in such a case, a plea of double jeopardy will not avail the defendant."

Companhia De Seguros Imperio -v- Heath (REBX) Ltd and Others [2001] 1 WLR 112; [2000] EWCA Civ 219
20 Jul 2000 CA Waller LJ	Equity, Limitation	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	Although a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, as a claim in equity, was not subject to the same limitation periods imposed by the Act as claims in tort or contract, a court exercising an equitable jurisdiction should apply similar periods under the equitable principle of acquiescence. A six year limitation period should be applied by analogy to a claim for equitable compensation for dishonest breach of fiduciary duty by an underwriter. Claims against the underwriter in contract and tort based on the same facts were statute barred under sections 2 and 5 of the 1980 Act. More than six years had expired since the accrual of the cause of action. The analogy of the six year time limit for claims in contract and tort would have been applied by a court of equity before 1 July 1940 to the claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
	Limitation Act 1980 2 5
	Link[s] omitted

Collinge -v- Lee and Another
26 Oct 2000 CA	Registered Land, Equity
	Where land had been registered in the name of a transferee as a result of a fraud and where there had been no consideration and it had been in breach of a fiduciary duty, the owners retained an overriding interest under the act, and the transferee held the land as trustee for the defrauded party. The fraudulent transfer did transfer the legal title, but not any equitable title. The legal title was at all times capable of being set aside, but that was not the limit of the applicants' rights.
	Land Registration Act 1925 70

Fisher -v- Wychavon District Council
30 Nov 2000 CA	Planning, Equity
	A planning permission was given, with several references to it being temporary. Nevertheless no reference was made to the extent in time of the permission. Despite this, an application to remove the references to temporary status and to upgrade it to permanent was refused. There appears to be no power in equity to rectify a unilateral transaction consisting of a notification of a planning consent, even if it might be available for other unilateral acts. The notice was clearly intended to be temporary.

AMP (UK) Plc and Another -v- Barker and Others HC 001897; [2000] EWHC Ch 42; [2001] OPLR 197
8 Dec 2000 ChD Mr Justice Lawrence Collins	Equity, Financial Services	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The claimants were interested under a pension scheme. Alterations had been made, which the said had been in error, and they sought rectification to remove a link between early leaver benefits and incapacity benefits. The defendant trustees agreed that there had been a mistake, but chose not to correct it. The potential cost to the Scheme of such an increase in early leaver benefits would be enormous. Held: When one is considering the intentions of a collective body such as a group of trustees it is their collective intention which is relevant. It would be a very odd case if that collective intention were not objectively manifested. The claimant had failed to show convincingly a continuing common intention by the Trustees to affect only incapacity benefits. Nevertheless, the employees were affected by the mistake, that the rectification sought would be effective. Rectification was therefore granted. There is a wide equitable jurisdiction to relieve from the consequences of mistake, and the court would have decided that this would have been an appropriate case for setting aside NPI's consent for mistake.
	[ Bailii ]