Estoppel - 1980- 1984

The case shown here are derived from the lawindexpro case law database. lawindexpro is a low cost case law database, with over 130,000 case listings, and over 95,000 links to full text judgments. The free service below shows the core information on the case, but is restricted in several ways. A small proportion of cases do allow access to the full lawindexpro information. These cases are selected at random, and may be different on your next visit. The active links through to lawindexpro are extremely powerful allowing full access to all linked cases.  

This page lists 12 cases, and was prepared on 23 May 2009.

Newbury District Council -v- Secretary of State for the Environment
1980 CA Lord Denning MR	Planning, Estoppel	Casemap 1 Citers
	Lord Denning MR postulated a broad general principle of estoppel or “blowing hot and cold” in planning matters.

Midland Bank Ltd -v- Farmpride Hatcheries (1981) 260 EG 493
1980 CA	Estoppel
	A mortgage had been granted, but a twenty year rent free licence had not been disclosed. The bank came to seek possession, and was met with the assertion of the licence. The court at first instance had refused an injunction, saying that the appellant had behaved unconscionably in failing to disclose the licence. Held: The appellant was estopped from relying upon the licence since he had himself procured the mortgage. The bank was not fixed with notice under section 199 of the Act.
	Law of Property Act 1925 99

Greasley -v- Cooke [1980] 1 WLR 1306
1980	Estoppel	Casemap 1 Citers
	Once it has been established that promises were made, and that there has been conduct by the plaintiff of such a nature that inducement may be inferred then the burden of proof shifts to the defendants to establish that he did not rely on the promises

Salvation Army Trustee Co Ltd -v- West Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council (1980) 41 P & CR 179
1980 Woolf J	Contract, Estoppel	Casemap 1 Citers
	Threatened with a road widening, the plaintiffs left their old property, and began to develop their new one, again, on land owned by the respondent. In practice it was negotiated as an exchange of properties. The negotiations were held 'without prejudice' but treated as if it were 'subject to contract' Held: "In the case of a normal arrangement to sell where there is no contract it would be virtually impossible to rely on the principle of proprietary estoppel". An estoppel can arise in circumstances where an agreement "subject to contract" has been made, but in order to do so, it must be based on something other than the "subject to contract" agreement alone. In these very singular circumstances, the "irretrievably interwoven" dealings were such that the defendant could not lawfully withdraw from the proposal for compulsory purchase of the old site.

Newbury District Council -v- Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 578; [1980] 1 All ER 731
1980 HL Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Scarman, Lord Fraser, Lord Lane	Planning, Estoppel	Casemap 1 Citers
	Issues arose as to a new planning permission for two existing hangars. The question of the validity of conditions attached to planning permissions will sometimes be a difficult one. To be valid, a condition must be imposed for a planning purpose and not for an ulterior one; it must fairly and reasonably relate to the development permitted and must not be so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have imposed it. Viscount Dilhorne summarised four conditions attached to planning permissions: "It follows that the conditions imposed must be for a planning purpose and not for any ulterior one, and that they must fairly and reasonably relate to the development permitted. Also they must not be so unreasonable that no reasonable planning authority could have imposed them." As to existing use rights: "If, however, the grant of planning permission, whether it be permission to build or for a change of use, is of such a character that the implementation of the permission leads to the creation of a new planning unit, then I think that it is right to say that existing use rights attaching to the former planning unit are extinguished." Lord Scarman said that estoppels bind individuals on the ground that it would unconscionable for them to deny what they have represented or agreed. But these concepts of private law should not be extended into "the public law of planning control, which binds everyone." Lord Fraser: "The only circumstances in which existing use rights are lost by accepting and implementng a later planning permission are . . . When a new planning unit comes into existence. . ." Lord Lane: "The holder of planning permission will not be allowed to rely on any existing use rights if the effect of the permission when acted on has been to bring one phase of the planning history of the site to an end and to start a new one." and "The change of use from repository to wholseale warehouse could not by any stretch of the imagination be said to have started a new plannning history or created a new planning unit. Indeed no one has so contended."

Taylor Fashions Ltd -v- Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd [1982] QB 133; [1981] 2 WLR 576; [1981] 1 All ER 897; [1979] 251 EG 159; [1979] EWHC Ch 1
1981 ChD Oliver J	Estoppel, Equity	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The fundamental principle that equity is concerned to prevent unconscionable conduct permeates all the elements of the doctrine of estoppel. In the light of the more recent cases, the principle "requires a very much broader approach which is directed rather at ascertaining whether, in particular individual circumstances, it would be unconscionable for a party to be permitted to deny that which, knowingly or unknowingly, he has allowed or encouraged another to assume to his detriment than to enquiring whether the circumstances can be fitted within the confines of some preconceived formula serving as a universal yardstick of unconscionable behaviour." A party who seeks to set up an estoppel, whether a proprietary estoppel, estoppel by acquiescence or estoppel by encouragement, must establish that it would be unconscionable for the other party to be permitted to deny what he has allowed or encouraged the first party to assume to his detriment. Estoppel is a principle of broad even protean application: "Furthermore the more recent cases indicate, in my judgment, that the application of the Ramsden v. Dyson LR 1 HL 129 principle – whether you call it proprietary estoppel by acquiescence or estoppel by encouragement is really immaterial – requires a very much broader approach which is directed rather at ascertaining whether, in particular individual circumstances, it would be unconscionable for a party to deny that which, knowingly or unknowingly, he has allowed or encouraged another to assume to his detriment than to inquiring whether the circumstances can be fitted within the confines of some preconceived formula serving as a universal yardstick for every form of unconscionable behaviour." The court considered the situations in which an estoppel may arise: "Furthermore the more recent cases indicate, in my judgment, that the application of the Ramsden v Dyson L.R. 1 H.L. 129 principle - whether you call it proprietary estoppel, estoppel by acquiescence or estoppel by encouragement is really immaterial - requires a very much broader approach which is directed rather at ascertaining whether, in particular individual circumstances, it would be unconscionable for a party to be permitted to deny that which, knowingly, or unknowingly, he has allowed or encouraged another to assume to his detriment than to inquiring whether the circumstances can be fitted within the confines of some preconceived formula serving as a universal yardstick for every form of unconscionable behaviour." and "The inquiry which I have to make therefore, as it seems to me, is simply whether, in all the circumstances of this case, it was unconscionable for the defendants to seek to take advantage of the mistake which, at the material time, everybody shared, and, in approaching that, I must consider the cases of the two plaintiffs separately because it may be that quite different considerations apply to each."
	Link[s] omitted

Western Fish Products Ltd -v- Penwith District Council [1981] 2 All ER 204
1981 CA Megaw LJ	Administrative, Estoppel	Casemap
	The court tried to reconcile invocations of estoppel with the general principle that for a public authority: "an estoppel cannot be raised to prevent the exercise of a statutory discretion or to prevent or excuse the performance of a statutory duty."

Hunter -v- Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529
1982 HL Lord Diplock	Legal Professions, Police, Estoppel	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	An attempt was made to open up in a civil action, allegations of assaults by the police prior to the making of confessions which had been disposed of in a voir dire in the course of a criminal trial. Held: This was a collateral attack amounting to an abuse of process, not because of the the limits of police immunity, but to provide an effective immunity. Unless debarred from doing so, defendants convicted after a full and fair trial who failed to appeal successfully, may challenge their convictions by suing advocates who appeared for them. Public policy requires a defendant, who seeks to challenge his conviction, to do so directly by seeking to appeal his conviction. Lord Diplock said: "this is a case about abuse of the process of the High Court. It concerns the inherent power which any court of justice must possess to prevent misuse of its procedure in a way which, although not inconsistent with the literal application of its procedural rules, would nevertheless be manifestly unfair to a party to litigation before it, or would otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right-thinking people. The circumstances in which abuse of process can arise are very varied; those which give rise to the instant appeal must surely be unique. It would, in my view, be most unwise if this House were to use this occasion to say anything that might be taken as limiting to fixed categories the kinds of circumstances in which the court has a duty (I disavow the word discretion) to exercise this salutary power."
	Civil Evidence Act 1968 11

Amalgamated Property Co -v- Texas Bank [1982] 1 QB 122
1982 CA Lord Denning MR	Estoppel	Casemap 1 Citers
	Referring to proprietary estoppel, estoppel by representation of fact, estoppel by acquiesence and promissory estoppel, (Lord Denning): "All these can be seen to merge into one general principle shorn of limitations. When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption - either of fact or of law, due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference - on which they have conducted the dealings between them - neither of them will be allowed to go back on that assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so."

Amalgamated Investment and Property Co Ltd -v- Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1982] QB 84
1982 CA Lord Denning MR	Equity, Land, Estoppel	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court explained the nature of an estoppel by convention. Lord Denning MR said: "The doctrine of estoppel is one of the most flexible and useful in the armoury of the law. But it has become overloaded with cases. That is why I have not gone through them all in this judgment. It has evolved during the last 150 years in a sequence of separate developments: proprietary estoppel, estoppel by representation of fact, estoppel by acquiescence, and promissory estoppel. At the same time it has been sought to be limited by a series of maxims: estoppel is only a rule of evidence, estoppel cannot give rise to a cause of action, estoppel cannot do away with the need for consideration, and so forth. All these can now be seen to merge into one general principle shorn of limitations. When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption – either of fact or of law – whether due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference – on which they have conducted the dealings between them – neither of them will be allowed to go back on that assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so. If one of them does seek to go back on it, the courts will give the other such remedy as the equity of the case demands." and "If parties to a contract, by their course of dealing, put a particular interpretation on the terms of it -- on the faith of which each of them -- to the knowledge of the other -- acts and conducts their mutual affairs -- they are bound by that interpretation just as much as if they had written it down as being a variation of the contract. There is no need to inquire whether their particular interpretation is correct or not -- or whether they were mistaken or not -- or whether they had in mind the original terms or not. Suffice it that they have, by their course of dealing, put their own interpretation on their contract, and cannot be allowed to go back on it."

Avon County Council -v- Hewlett [1983] 1 WLR 605
1983 CA	Estoppel	Casemap 1 Citers
	Estoppel cannot operate pro tanto. Therefore if a defendant has innocently changed his position by disposing of part of the money, a defence of estoppel would provide him with a defence to the whole of the claim.

Agip SpA -v- Navigazione Alta Italia SpA, "The Nai Genova" [1984] 1 Lloyds Law Reports 353
1984 CA Slade LJ	Equity, Contract, Estoppel	Casemap 1 Citers
	Rectification was sought of an escalation clause in a charter-party which provided for a base figure in US dollars to be increased by reference to Italian inflation. The plaintiffs claimed that an accord had been reached that the base figure should be in lire rather than dollars, but that when the defendants prepared a draft charter-party, they put the base figure in dollars. Held: The claim failed. The effect of allowing rectification for unilateral mistake was to impose on the defendants a contract which, at the time of its execution, they did not intend to make. In the absence of estoppel, fraud, undue influence or a fiduciary relationship between the parties, the authorities did not in any circumstances permit the rectification of a contract on the grounds of unilateral mistake, unless the defendant had actual knowledge of the existence of the relevant mistaken belief at the time when the mistaken plaintiff signed the contract. The authorities required actual knowledge by the defendant of the existence of the plaintiff's mistake. There could be a case of an implied misrepresentation that a proffered draft gave effect to an accord and of a resultant estoppel if it was intended or reasonably foreseeable that the representation would be relied on and if the representee relied on that representation. On the facts those conditions were not satisfied. It had not been shown that the defendants intended or foresaw that the plaintiff would rely on any such representation when the defendants could have reasonably assumed that the plaintiffs would have read the escalation clause for themselves and would have noted any objection when discussing the clause with the defendants. The greater the degree of the carelessness in not detecting the error, the more unrealistic it became for the plaintiffs to assert that the reliance on the representation was foreseeable. The plaintiff's witnesses did not attempt to blame the defendants for their mistake. The court was unpersuaded that there had been sharp practice by the defendants or that it would be inequitable to allow them to resist the claim for rectification. "As the law stands, the conditions which must be satisfied if rectification is to be granted on the grounds of common mistake may, in my opinion, be summarized as follows: First, there must be a common intention in regard to the particular provisions of the agreement in question, together with some outward expression of accord. Secondly, this common intention must continue up to the time of the execution of the instrument. Thirdly, there must be clear evidence that the instrument as executed does not accurately represent the true agreement of the parties at the time of its execution. Fourthly, it must be shown that the instrument, if rectified as claimed, would accurately represent the true agreement of the parties at that time. . . . The standard of proof required in an action of rectification to establish the common intention of the parties is the civil standard of balance of probabilities. Nevertheless, parties who append their signature to a written instrument prima facie indicate, by the very fact of their signatures, their assent to all the terms contained in it. In these circumstances"