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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The site includes many later cases.  

Evidence - From: 1970 To: 1979

This page lists 23 cases, and was prepared on 16 April 2015.

 In re Bramblevale Ltd; 1970 - [1970] 1 Ch 128

 British Oxygen Co Ltd -v- Board of Trade; HL 15-Jul-1970 - [1971] AC 610; [1970] UKHL 4; [1970] 3 All ER 165; [1970] 3 WLR 488

 British Railways Board -v- Herrington; HL 16-Feb-1972 - [1972] AC 877; [1972] 2 WLR 537; [1971] 1 All ER 749; [1972] UKHL 1

 Regina -v- Kilbourne; HL 1973 - [1973] AC 729
Dunning -v- United Liverpool Hospitals' Board of Governors [1973] 1 WLR 586; [1973] 2 All ER 454
James LJ, Lord Denning MR, Stamp LJ
Evidence, Health Professions
Mrs D had been treated at hospital, and sought release of her records to establish whether she had any basis for a claim in negligence. The court considered whether an application under section 31 of the 1970 Act for pre-action discovery had been properly made. Given the delay, the court was asked whether a claim was 'likely' to be made. Held. Whether the parties are likely to be parties in subsequent proceedings does not depend on the state of affairs prior to pre-action discovery. If one concentrates solely on things as they stand prior to pre-action discovery then it will often be impossible to say that anyone is likely to be a party to any subsequent proceedings.
Lord Denning MR said: "One of the objects of this section is to enable a plaintiff to find out – before he starts proceedings – whether he has a good cause of action or not". “likely” must be given its more extended and open meaning. A more restricted meaning would defeat the purpose of the statute.
James LJ said: "In order to take advantage of the section, the wording of which is no different from that of s 33(2) of the 1981 Act the applicant for relief must disclose the nature of the claim he intends to make and show not only the intention of making it but also that there is a reasonable basis for making it. Ill-founded, irresponsible and speculative allegations or allegations based merely on hope, would not provide a reasonable basis for an intended claim in subsequent proceedings."
Stamp LJ dissented, saying that the expert's opinion was that proceedings were unlikely, and disclosure was unlikely to produce anything to justify it.
Administration of Justice Act 1970 31
1 Citers

 Grant -v- Southwestern and County Properties Ltd; ChD 1974 - [1975] Ch 185; [1974] 2 All ER 465
Lowery -v- The Queen [1974] AC 85
Morris L
Crime, Evidence, Commonwealth
(Victoria) A young girl was sadistically murdered. The two accused, were present and the crime was committed by one or the other, or both. Each brought evidence of the unlikelihood that he could have committed the murder. L emphasised his good character and said that because of fear of K he had been unable to prevent the murder. K said that he had been under the influence of drugs and had been powerless to prevent L from killing the girl. Despite L's objection, K was allowed to call a psychologist as to their respective personalities and, on that evidence, to invite the jury to conclude that it was less probable that K was the killer. They were both convicted. L unsuccessfully appealed to the Supreme Court of Victoria on the ground, inter alia, that the psychologist's evidence ought not to have been admitted. Held: Only in exceptionl circumstances can expert evidence be admissible as to the likelihood of the defendant's veracity. The evidence of the psychologist was relevant in support of K's case to show that his version of the facts was more probable than that put forward by the appellant. Accordingly the Privy Council dismissed the appeal. Evidence is relevant 'if it tended to show that the version of the facts put forward by one co-accused was more probable than that put forward by the other'. The Board approved a statement as to the law: "It is … established by the highest authorities that in criminal cases the Crown is precluded from leading evidence that does no more than show that the accused has a disposition or propensity or is the sort of person likely to commit the crime charged; .. it is, we think, one thing to say that such evidence is excluded when tendered by the Crown in proof of guilt, but quite another to say that it is excluded when tendered by the accused in disproof of his own guilt. We see no reason of policy or fairness which justifies or requires the exclusion of evidence relevant to prove the innocence of an accused person."
1 Citers

 Stafford -v- Director of Public Prosecutions; HL 1974 - [1974] AC 878; [1973] 3 All ER 762; [1973] 3 WLR 719; (1974) 58 Cr App R 256
Gallagher -v- BRS [1974] 2 QB 440

Evidence, Contract
Evidence was required to support an assertion of collateral contract.
1 Citers

 Regina -v- Turner; CACD 1974 - [1975] QB 834; 60 Cr App R 80; (1974) 60 Cr App R 80
O’Donnell -v- Reichard [1975] VR 916


1 Citers

Regina -v- Lattimore [1975] 62 Cr App R 53
Scarman LJ
". . . It is also inconceivable that the court would receive inadmissible evidence; for the court must act according to law."
1 Citers

 Mood Music Publishing Co -v- De Wolfe Ltd; CA 1976 - [1976] Ch 119

 Regina -v- Lee; CACD 1976 - [1976] 62 Cr App R 33

 Regina -v- Tate; CACD 1977 - [1977] RTR 17

 McGregor -v- D; 1977 - 1977 SC 330
Reynolds -v- Phoenix [1978] 2 LIR 22
Lord Denning MR
The court discussed the effect of the 1974 Act on the admission of a spent conviction which was relevant or potentially relevant (depending on the trial judge's findings as to "materiality" for insurance purposes) to a liability issue in the case: "The man has to be treated as if he had never been convicted at all .... If he is asked whether he has been convicted he need not answer. He can say "No"."
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974
1 Citers

 Chow Yee Wah -v- Choo Ah Pat; HL 1978 - [1978] 2 MJL 41,

 A & J Inglis -v- Buttery & Co; HL 1978 - (1878) 3 AC 552
Sattin -v- National Union Bank Ltd (1978) 122 SJ 367
21 Feb 1978
Lawton LJ
The plaintiff sought damages from the loss of a diamond deposited with the defendant bank as security. He asked to present evidence about the experience of another customer who had lost jewellery he had deposited with it. Held: The proposed evidence was admissible. (Lawton LJ) If a defendant in this class of case said "My system for safeguarding customers' property is a reasonably safe one" it is relevant for the plaintiff to call evidence to show that experience should have taught the defendant that it was not a safe system. The evidence was also admissible in order to rebut the suggestion that the bank was unfortunate in losing the customer's property albeit they used all reasonable care to safeguard it. "A fundamental principle of the law of evidence, both in civil and criminal cases, is that evidence must be confined to what is relevant. In general, if there is an issue whether A did a particular act on a particular day, then the fact that he may have done the same act on another day is not relevant to that issue. To that fundamental rule there are a number of exceptions." and "That principle of law [from Makin] in criminal cases applies equally in civil cases." (Megaw LJ) "There was a good deal of argument before us by counsel on each side: counsel for the plaintiff appellant seeking to show the similarities between matters arising in the present case and matters involved in the previous incident as to which it is sought to adduce evidence; counsel for the defendant respondent seeking to stress the differences between the two.
It is no objection to such evidence being tendered that it relates to one previous incident only. It does not need to be a defective 'system'. It is no objection to the evidence being tendered that it is going to be contended on behalf of the defendant employer that the previous alleged incident did not happen at all, or that, if it did happen, there were material differences which would prevent it from having any substantial bearing upon the instant case: as, for example, where the claim by the employee is that he tripped over some piece of plant or some object left on the floor which ought not to have been there and evidence is given of another similar accident on a previous occasion, it would be no objection to the admissibility of the evidence if the case for the employer defendant was to be that, on the occasion of the previous incident, if (which he denies) it happened at all, there had been a sudden failure of the lighting system through no fault on the part of the employer. That would not affect the admissibility of the evidence though it might destroy all its weight."
1 Cites

1 Citers

 Harmony Shipping Co SA -v- Saudi Europe Line Limited ('The Good Helmsman'); CA 1979 - [1979] 1 WLR 1380

 Waugh -v- British Railways Board; HL 12-Jul-1979 - [1980] AC 521; [1979] UKHL 2; [1979] 3 WLR 150; [1979] 2 All ER 1169

 Gamlen Chemical Co (UK) Ltd -v- Rochem Ltd; CA 4-Dec-1979 - [1980] 1 WLR 614; [1980] 1 All ER 1049; [1983] RPC 1
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