Insolvency - 1993

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This page lists 54 cases, and was prepared on 28 October 2012.

In Re Portbase Clothing Ltd; Mould -v- Taylor [1993] Ch 388
1993 Chadwick J	Insolvency, Company	1 Cites 1 Citers
	The company had given two debentures, one fixed and one floating. Their priority was fixed by a deed of priority. On insolvency the liquidator sought direction as to the application of the assets. Held: The deed made the bank's floating charge subject to the later floating charge. On crystallisation, the later charge took priority. Under the section, the preferential creditors had overall priority. The assets available to pay the liquidation expenses included the assets subject to the floating charge even though that had crystallised before they were incurred: "a holder of a subsequent fixed charge which has been made subject to a prior floating charge – either by express provisions in the fixed charge itself or by a restriction in the floating charge of which the holder of the fixed charge had notice – takes his security upon terms that, if before the charged property has been realised under that fixed charge events occur which cause the floating charge to crystallise, then the proceeds of realisation must be paid to the holder of the floating charge; the holder of the fixed charge can have no claim upon those proceeds until the claims under the floating charge have been paid out."
	Insolvency Act 1984 175(2)

Re Shoe Lace Ltd, Power -v- Sharp Investments Ltd [1993] BCC 609
1993 CA Sir Christopher Slade	Insolvency	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	A debenture was executed on 24th July 1990. Money earlier advanced by the chargee in anticipation of and in consideration for the debenture, including an advance made on 16th July 1990, had not been made "at the same time as" the creation of the charge for the purposes of section 245(2) of the 1986 Act. Held: The debenture holder's appeal failed. Sir Christopher Slade concluded: "The words "at the time of or subsequently to the creation of . . the charge" in sec. 212 of the 1908 Act (just as the words "at the same time as, or after, the creation of the charge" in sec. 245 of the 1986 Act) were clearly included by the legislature for the purpose of excluding from the exemption the amount of moneys paid to the company before the creation of the charge, even though they were paid in consideration for the charge; on any other construction these words would have been mere surplusage." Section 40 of the 1986 Act is concerned with the position where a charge "which as created" was a floating charge, and the date of creation of a charge is the date on which the charge is executed.
	Insolvency Act 1986 40 245

Knight -v- Lawrence [1993] BCLC 215
1993	Insolvency	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	As part of his duty of care, a receiver may be required to take positive steps to maintain the value of the property.

Banque Indosuez -v- Ferromet Resources [1993] BCLC 112
1993 Hoffmann J	Insolvency	Casemap 1 Citers
	There is a general principle in favour of giving judicial assistance to foreign insolvency proceedings by preventing their disruption by the actions of individual creditors.

Re Ledingham-Smith [1993] BCLC 635
1993	Company, Insolvency	Casemap 1 Citers
	The bankrupt's accountants had been paid their fees by standing order. Arrears mounted and the sum was increased. On the bankruptcy, the trustee sought to recover the increased payment. Held: The accountants had continued to act, and therefore were not in a better position than they would have been had they stopped work and not been paid. To be a preference, there had to be shown evidence of a 'preference in fact'
	Insolvency Act 1986 249 435

In re Maxwell Communications plc [1993] 1 WLR 1402
1993 ChD Vinelott J	Company, Insolvency	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	It was argued that the pari passu distribution of assets among unsecured creditors was a general rule of insolvency law from which it was not possible to contract out, even to one's own disadvantage, particularly by analogy with cases on set-off in insolvency. Held: This was not the law. There was no reason why a particular creditor should not waive his right to prove altogether, or save to the extent of assets remaining after another creditor is satisfied, and that he could do this either in the insolvency or in advance of it. Vinelott J explained his decision in In re British & Commonwealth plc (No 3): "I took the view that to the extent that the assets of the company were insufficient to meet the liabilities to unsecured creditors, other than the holders of the loan stock, the holders of the loan stock had no interest in the assets of the company and no right to vote at a meeting of unsecured creditors, that in the very unlikely, indeed, merely theoretical possibility that the realisation of the company's assets would suffice to meet the claims of the scheme creditors, the rights of the holders of the unsecured loan stock would be unaffected by the scheme; and that in these circumstances the liquidator [sic – he must have meant administrator] could properly call a meeting of the scheme creditors alone, and if the scheme of arrangement was approved, apply to the court to sanction the scheme."

In re Parkdawn Ltd Unreported, 1993
1993 ChD Harman J	Insolvency	Casemap 1 Citers
	The section provided sufficient power to allow a court to appoint a new liquidator in the case of a company's liquidation. Though there is no express power, one is assumed within the insolvency rules.
	Incolvency Act 1986 393 - Insolvency Rules 4.116(6)

Aiglon Limited & another -v- Gau Shan Co Limited [1993] BCLC 1321
1993 ChD Hirst J	Litigation Practice, Arbitration, Insolvency	1 Citers
	The defendants had obtained world-wide Mareva injunctions in support of substantive proceedings by way of their counterclaim to enforce an arbitration award against the plaintiffs under section 26 against two companies, Aiglon Limited and L'Aiglon SA (a Swiss company). Held: There was no basis under section 26 for enforcement of the arbitration award against SA, but the question arose whether any other basis for a freezing order against SA existed, having regard to the fact that the defendants' only contractual entitlement was against Limited. There were two bases. It was well arguable that a transfer of assets from Limited to SA fell foul of section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986, thereby giving the defendants a direct cause of action against SA as victims of the transaction. Second, since an administrator or liquidator of Limited (if appointed) could apply to set aside the relevant transaction under section 238 of the Insolvency Act 1986 with the consequence that SA would hold the assets transferred as trustee for Limited, the case fell within the Chabra jurisdiction since it was arguable that SA held assets beneficially belonging to Limited, against which the defendants had a good cause of action. It mattered not that Limited's arguable beneficial interest in assets transferred to SA was contingent both upon the appointment of an administrator or liquidator of Limited, and the successful pursuit by the officeholder of a claim under section 238.
	Arbitration Act 1950 26 - Insolvency Act 1986 423

Re Kumar (A Bankrupt), ex parte Lewis -v- Kumar [1993] 1 WLR 224
1993 Ferns J	Insolvency, Family, Land, Insolvency	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	H had transferred his interest in the jointly owned matrimonial home to W for her promise to have sole liability for the mortgage debt. Nearly a year later her divorce claim for capital provision was dismissed by consent on the basis that H had already transferred his interests to W. H was bankrupted, and his trustee applied under Section 339. The trustee relied on both paragraphs (a) and (c) of Section 339(3). He said that the consideration supporting the transfer of the bankrupt's interest was a release of such claims as she might have had under the 1973 Act, sections 23-25. Held: The assertion failed. The transfer of the property happened before the divorce and there was no evidence to support the contention that the transfer was in return for the Respondent agreeing not to apply for further capital provision under Sections 23-25. Ferns J said: "Re Abbott, although it is a decision on Section 42 of the Act of 1914, is applicable to section 339 to the extent that it decides that a compromise of a claim to a provision in matrimonial proceedings is capable of being consideration in money or money's worth". W's counsel submitted that W had provided consideration. Ferns J said: "I would add that even if I had accepted the argument that there was such a compromise of Dr. Gupta's prospective claim for capital provision as was contended for on her behalf, it appears to me that I would have been driven to substantially the same conclusion. The transfer of Mr. Kumar's interest in 43, Broadwalk was a disposal of his only remaining capital asset of any significance. I cannot believe that any divorce court would have so exercised its jurisdiction under section 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 as to require Mr. Kumar to transfer to Dr. Gupta, who had a superior earning capacity, substantially the whole of his capital, leaving him without the means to contribute from capital to the cost of acquiring a separate home for himself. In my view, in all the circumstances of this case as I find them, the transfer of his interest in 43, Broadwalk, contained a substantial element of bounty on the part of Mr. Kumar even if, as I find not to be the case, Dr. Gupta had agreed in return not to seek further provision out of capital."
	Insolvency Act 1986 339 - Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 23 24 25

Re Kumar (A Bankrupt), ex parte Lewis -v- Kumar [1993] 1 WLR 224
1993 Ferns J	Insolvency, Family, Land, Insolvency	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	H had transferred his interest in the jointly owned matrimonial home to W for her promise to have sole liability for the mortgage debt. Nearly a year later her divorce claim for capital provision was dismissed by consent on the basis that H had already transferred his interests to W. H was bankrupted, and his trustee applied under Section 339. The trustee relied on both paragraphs (a) and (c) of Section 339(3). He said that the consideration supporting the transfer of the bankrupt's interest was a release of such claims as she might have had under the 1973 Act, sections 23-25. Held: The assertion failed. The transfer of the property happened before the divorce and there was no evidence to support the contention that the transfer was in return for the Respondent agreeing not to apply for further capital provision under Sections 23-25. Ferns J said: "Re Abbott, although it is a decision on Section 42 of the Act of 1914, is applicable to section 339 to the extent that it decides that a compromise of a claim to a provision in matrimonial proceedings is capable of being consideration in money or money's worth". W's counsel submitted that W had provided consideration. Ferns J said: "I would add that even if I had accepted the argument that there was such a compromise of Dr. Gupta's prospective claim for capital provision as was contended for on her behalf, it appears to me that I would have been driven to substantially the same conclusion. The transfer of Mr. Kumar's interest in 43, Broadwalk was a disposal of his only remaining capital asset of any significance. I cannot believe that any divorce court would have so exercised its jurisdiction under section 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 as to require Mr. Kumar to transfer to Dr. Gupta, who had a superior earning capacity, substantially the whole of his capital, leaving him without the means to contribute from capital to the cost of acquiring a separate home for himself. In my view, in all the circumstances of this case as I find them, the transfer of his interest in 43, Broadwalk, contained a substantial element of bounty on the part of Mr. Kumar even if, as I find not to be the case, Dr. Gupta had agreed in return not to seek further provision out of capital."
	Insolvency Act 1986 339 - Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 23 24 25

Whittaker's Trustee -v- Whittaker 1993 SCLR 718
1993 ScSf	Scotland, Insolvency	Casemap

Carr -v- British International Helicopter [1994] ICR 18; [1993] BCC 855; [1994] 2 BCLC 474
1993 EAT Lord Coulsfield	Employment, Insolvency, Scotland	Casemap 1 Citers
	An employee claimed re-instatement following alleged unfair selection for redundancy by an administrator. Held. The effect of the 1986 Act was not that proceedings brought against a company in administration without consent or the permission of the court were a nullity, but only that they were liable to be stayed as other proceedings in section 11(3)(d). Lord Coulsfield said: "It seems to us that there is no way of construing section 11 so as to exclude from its scope claims under the employment protection legislation."
	Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 188 - Insolvency Act 1986 11(3)(d)

Barclays Bank v Homan [1993] BCLC 680
1993 CA Glidewell LJ	Insolvency	Casemap 1 Citers
	If the conduct of a creditor can be castigated as oppressive or vexatious the Court can and should grant relief in order to protect the performance by administrators of their functions and duties.

In re a Debtor (No 32 SD 1991) [1993] 1 WLR 314
1993 ChD Millett J	Insolvency	Casemap 1 Citers
	Insolvency Act 1986 375

In re British and Commonwealth Holdings plc (Nos 1 & 2) [1993] AC 426
1993 HL	Company, Insolvency	1 Citers
	Section 236 extended the power of a liquidator to require from the company's officers all the documents he would reasonably need in order to fulfil his duties under the Act.
	Insolvency Act 1986 236

Re Flint (A Bankrupt)
3 Feb 1993 Chd	Insolvency
	Adjudication of bankruptcy avoided order in matrimonial proceedings.

Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd (in Liquidation) -v- Maxwell [1993] BCC 120
16 Feb 1993 CA Stuart Smith LJ	Company, Insolvency	Casemap 1 Citers
	The fundamental wrong in the directors' acts lay in the signing of transfers of the company's assets and not entirely in their failure properly to enquire as to the nature of other transaction. The breach of fiduciary duty lay in positive acts. Complaint was also made as to the judge's five month delay in handing down his judgement.

In Re Land and Property Trust Co Plc (No 2)
16 Feb 1993 CA	Litigation Practice, Insolvency, Company
	The judge was wrong to refuse an adjournment when he had insufficient evidence before him properly to make his decision, and when a costs order was sought against the company directors personally in respect of an application for the winding up of a company. The directors had not been party to the early part of the proceedings and when told of the application for costs requested the opportunity to adjourn so that they could prepare a case.

In Re Seagull Manufacturing Co Ltd (In Liquidation); Tucker [1993] Ch 345
22 Feb 1993 CA Dillon LJ, Peter Gibson J	Company, Insolvency	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The court has jurisdiction to order the public examination of a company director in in a compulsory liquidation about the affairs of the company, even though he might not be within the jurisdiction. The court found no reasons of comity which would prevent those who voluntarily were officers or otherwise participated in the formation or running of an English company to be capable of being summoned by the English court for public examination. Further, Parliament had provided for the winding up of foreign companies, where there was a sufficient connection with the jurisdiction, knowing that section 133 should apply in such a case, thus indicating an intention that officers who may well not be within the jurisdiction should be examined publicly. Peter Gibson J said: "Where a company has come to a calamitous end and has been wound up by the court, the obvious intention of this section was that those responsible for the company's state of affairs should be liable to be subjected to a process of investigation and that investigation should be in public. Parliament could not have intended that a person who had that responsibility could escape liability to investigation simply by not being within the jurisdiction. Indeed, if the section were to be construed as leaving out of its grasp anyone not within the jurisdiction, deliberate evasion by removing oneself out of the jurisdiction would suffice. That seems to me to be a wholly improbable intention to attribute to Parliament. Further, section 133 must be construed in the light of circumstances existing in the mid-1980s when the legislation was enacted. By use of the telephone, telex and fax machines English companies can be managed perfectly well by persons who need not set foot within the jurisdiction. There is no requirement that an officer of an English company must live in England, nor of course need an officer of an overseas company which may be wound up by the court. Such a company is very likely to have officers not within the jurisdiction."
	Insolvency Act 1986 133

Re A Debtor (No 68 of 1992)
1 Mar 1993 Chd	Insolvency
	Date on which 'grounds' must exist for annulment of order. A bankrupt applying to annul an order must establish the grounds for annulment not at the date of the hearing of that application, but rather at the date when the order itself was made.
	Insolvency Act 1986 282(1)

Macmillan Inc -v- Bishopsgate Investment Trust Plc
17 Mar 1993 Chd	Litigation Practice, Company, Insolvency	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	Evidence given to a liquidator was not discoverable in civil proceedings.
	Companies Act 1985

in Re Pavlou (A Bankrupt) [1993] 1 WLR 1046; [1993] 3 All ER 955
17 Mar 1993 ChD Millett J	Insolvency, Land, Equity	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	Mr and Mrs Pavlou bought a house for £12,500 with a mortgage of £9,500. After the husband left, the wife remained in sole occupation, and paid the mortgage instalments as they fell due. Thirteen years after the marriage Mrs Pavlou obtained a decree nisi of divorce, and less than a year later the husband was made bankrupt. The joint tenancy was thereby severed, and they then owned the property as tenants in common in equal shares. It was agreed that there would have to be an order for sale and an equitable accounting. Held: There would have to be an inquiry whether an occupation rent should be set-off against the mortgage interest payments. A court of equity will order an inquiry and payment of occupation rent, not only in the case where the co-owner in occupation has ousted the other, but in any other case in which it is necessary in order to do equity between the parties that an occupation rent should be paid. If a tenant in common leaves the property voluntarily, but would be welcome back and would be in a position to enjoy his or her right to occupy, it would normally not be fair or equitable to the remaining tenant in common to charge him or her with an occupation rent which he or she never expected to pay. Millett J said: "The trustee in bankruptcy submits that there is no equitable accounting between beneficial joint tenants but only between tenants in common, on the ground that beneficial joint tenants own the entire property per mie et per tout, so that expenditure by one is expenditure on his or her own property, and cannot be described as laid out in part in the improvement of the share of the other co-owner. Accordingly, he submits, the wife is not entitled to be reimbursed for any expenditure by her before the date of the bankruptcy order. In my judgment there is no distinction between a beneficial tenancy in common and a beneficial joint tenancy. In neither case could a co-owner obtain contribution from his or her co-owner; any reimbursement had to wait a suit for partition or an order by the court for sale of property. On a partition suit or an order for sale, adjustments could be made between the co-owners, the guiding principle being that neither party could take the benefit of an increase in the value of the property without making an allowance for what had been expended by the other in order to obtain it: see Leigh v Dickeson (1884) 15 QBD 60, [1881–5] All ER Rep 1099. That was a case of tenants in common, but in my judgment the same principle must apply as between joint tenants; the question only arose on a partition or on the division of the proceeds of sale, the very point of time at which severance occurred if there was a joint tenancy. The guiding principle for the court of equity is that the proportions in which the entirety should be divided between former co-owners must have regard to any increase in its value which has been brought about by means of expenditure by one of them." As to occupation rents, Millet J said: "I take the law to be to the following effect. First, a court of equity will order an inquiry and payment of occupation rent, not only in the case where the co-owner in occupation has ousted the other, but in any other case in which it is necessary in order to do equity between the parties that an occupation rent should be paid. The fact that there has not been an ouster or forceful exclusion therefore is far from conclusive. Secondly, where it is a matrimonial home and the marriage has broken down, the party who leaves the property will, in most cases, be regarded as excluded from the family home, so that an occupation rent should be paid by the co-owner who remains. But that is not a rule of law; that is merely a statement of the prima facie conclusion to be drawn from the facts. The true position is that if a tenant in common leaves the property voluntarily, but would be welcome back and would be in a position to enjoy his or her right to occupy, it would normally not be fair or equitable to the remaining tenant in common to charge him or her with an occupation rent which he or she never expected to pay."

In Re Kentish Homes Ltd [1993] BCLC 1375
31 Mar 1993 Chd Sir Donald Nicholls V-C	Insolvency, Rating	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The question was whether a post-liquidation liability to community charge on empty flats was an expense of the liquidation. Held: The company was the chargeable person in respect of the flats for the relevant periods, but the liability was nevertheless not a liquidation expense. It would rank as such only if the court, as a matter of discretion, directed the liquidators to discharge the obligation out of the assets in their hands. There was however no ground upon which the court should do so.

Re: New Bullas Trading Ltd Ind Summary, 05 April 1993; [1993] BCC 251
5 Apr 1993 ChD Knox J	Company, Insolvency	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	A fixed charge in a debenture without restrictions on dealing with monies received must be a floating charge.
	Insolvency Act 1986 40

MEPC Plc -v- Scottish Amicable Life Assurance Society and Another: N R European Community (Third Party)
6 Apr 1993 CA	Insolvency, Landlord and Tenant
	An insolvency trustee's notice of disclaimer was effective to disclaim a lease.
	Insolvency Act 1986

Re Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd
8 Apr 1993 CA	Criminal Practice, Insolvency
	Serious Fraud Office can still require production of Insolvency Act 1986 interviews taken before charge from the liquidator even after he has been charged..
	Criminal Justice Act 1987 2 - Insolvency Act 1986 236

Re Headington Investments Ltd
9 Apr 1993 CA	Insolvency, Criminal Practice
	Transcripts of Insolvency examinations need not be disclosed to defendant, if they were disclosed to the Serious Fraud Office.
	Insolvency Act 1986 236

Woodley -v- Woodley (2) [1994] 1 WLR 1167
12 Apr 1993 CA Balcombe LJ	Insolvency	1 Citers
	A stay of execution of an order against matrimonial assets was not defeated by bankruptcy. As to the interplay of the Insolvency Rules and matrimonial proceedings: "Before those rules came into force orders for periodical payments were not provable in bankruptcy… whereas an order for a lump sum was provable…. That position is understandable. However r 12.3(2)(a), by making any obligation arising under an order made in family proceedings, ie including a lump sum order, not provable, has changed that position. Whether it was the intention of those who drafted the 1986 rules to bring about this change I know not. It may be that it was considered that as a debt arising from an order made in family proceedings is not released upon the discharge of the bankrupt (s 281(5) (a) of the 1986 Act) therefore it should not be provable. However there is no necessary or logical link between the provability of a debt and its release on discharge. In some cases there is such a link see, eg a fine imposed for an offence which is not provable under r 12.3(2)(a) and is not released on discharge under s 281(4). On the other hand a liability to pay damages in respect of personal injuries is a provable debt in bankruptcy, not being the subject of any exclusion under r 12.3, but is not released on discharge: s 281(5)(a). It seems, therefore, that any link between provability and release on discharge is a matter of policy and I can see good policy grounds for saying that a lump sum order made in family proceedings should (like damages for personal injuries) be both provable in bankruptcy and yet not be released on discharge. "
	Debtors Act 1869 5 - Insolvency Rules 1986

Stein -v- Blake [1994] Ch 16
13 May 1993 CA Balcombe LJ	Insolvency	Casemap 1 Citers
	The plaintiff argued that: "Nothing in the wording of section 323 changes the nature of set-off as it operates between solvent parties; it merely widens the categories of claim capable of being, and which must be, set off." Held: The decision in Farley was wrong and that the separate causes of action survived the bankruptcy and could be assigned, subject to the "equity" of the bankruptcy set-off.
	Insolvency Act 1986 323f

In Re Devon and Somerset Farmers Ltd [1993] BCC 410
25 May 1993 ChD Hague QC J	Insolvency, Company	1 Cites
	An Industrial & Provident Societies Act society is unregistered and is therefore not a company for the purposes of s40. Had that been intended express statutory provision would have been made.
	Insolvency Act 1986 40 251 - Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965 - Companies Act 1985 735

Power -v- Sharp Investments Ltd and Another
3 Jun 1993 CA	Insolvency
	Money paid at same time as charge delivered not exempt.
	Insolvency Act 1986 245 (2)

Platts -v- Western Trust & Savings Ltd [1996] BPIR 339
9 Jun 1993 CA Sir Christopher Slade	Insolvency	Casemap
	The court examined the extent of the Judge's discretion on hearing an application to set aside a statutory demand. When property was valued for the purposes of a statutory demand, it should be as on a forced sale. A "forced sale" was taken as one requiring completion within four months. The judge, in dealing with the application to set aside the statutory demand, had refused to allow cross-examination of conflicting valuation evidence in order to establish the value of the security. The Appeal Court was asked if that had been his last opportunity to chalenge the valuation. Held: rr 7.51 and 7.57 of the 1986 Rules would give the court which heard the petition power to determine the value of the security on proper evidence from both sides, in a case where the debtor satisfied it that there were substantial grounds for thinking that the petitioning creditor might be fully secured.
	Insolvency Act 1986 267 268

In Re Baku Consolidated Oilfields Ltd
7 Jul 1993 ChD	Insolvency
	Collectors of share certificates are not members - have no right to share in compensation.
	Insolvency Act 1986 112

Re: A Debtor (No 90 of 1992)
12 Jul 1993 ChD	Insolvency
	There is no room for conditional orders in the statutory demand procedure. Rules have been made to allow the court to set aside an application on a statutory demand.
	Insolvency Act 1986 - Insolvency Rules 1986 (1986 No 1925)

A Debtor -v- Focus Insurance Co Ltd (In Liquidation)
12 Jul 1993 ChD Mummery J	Insolvency
	An expedited bankruptcy petition could be filed, despite the existence of an outstanding application to set aside the statutory demand on which it was based. Section 270 overrides s267(2(d).
	Insolvency Act 1986 270 - Insolvency Rules 1986 (1986 No 1925)

Midrome Ltd -v- Shaw
26 Jul 1993 CA	Insolvency
	Leave was required for an appeal to the Court of Appeal from the High Court under the Insolvency rules.

Mordant -v- Hallas
2 Aug 1993 ChD	Insolvency, Family	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	A debt due which consisted of a matrimonial lump sum order is not provable in a bankruptcy.

Heath -v- Tang, Stevens -v- Peacock
11 Aug 1993 CA	Insolvency	Casemap 1 Citers
	A bankrupt may not personally appeal against the judgment on which the bankruptcy order made. The court set out the duties of court in supervising actions for and against a bankrupt.
	Insolvency Act 1986 306 285(3)

Hocking -v- Walker
11 Aug 1993 CA	Insolvency
	A bankrupt resisting a security for costs order in Bank proceedings must show an arguable case.

In Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International Sa, In Re BCCI (Overseas) Ltd (No 9) [1994] 2 BCLC 636
11 Aug 1993 ChD Rattee J	Insolvency, Company	Casemap 1 Cites
	An English Court has the jurisdiction and discretion to apply English insolvency law to a foreign registered company.

Re Vedmay Ltd
6 Sep 1993 ChD	Landlord and Tenant, Company, Insolvency, Landlord and Tenant
	A statutory tenant has a sufficient locus standi to request the vesting in him of a house disclaimed by the owner company's liquidator.
	Insolvency Act 1986 181

In Re Paramount Airways Ltd (In Administration)
14 Sep 1993 ChD	Insolvency, Employment	Casemap 1 Cites
	Administrators may adopt employment contracts without attracting personal liability.
	Insolvency Act 1986 19-5

Re A Debtor No 64 of 1992
12 Nov 1993 ChD	Insolvency
	Creditor not having had properly served on him a notice of the s257 meeting was not bound by an arrangement agreed at the meeting.
	Insolvency Act 1986 257 260(2)(b)

Re BCCI Sa & Bcci (Overseas) Ltd
17 Nov 1993 ChD	Insolvency
	Court may assist Cayman court to enforce insolvency jurisdiction.

In Re A Company (No 007946 of 1993) [1994] 2 WLR 439
18 Nov 1993 ChD Morritt J	Insolvency, Company, Northern Ireland
	A Northern Ireland company can be wound up in England and Wales if its principal place of business had been in England and Wales. The company incorporated in Northern Ireland became insolvent. It sought to strike out the Secretary of State's petition under 124A, and said it could not apply to a Northern Ireland Company. Held: The definition of an incorporated company included a company incorporated anywhre in the UK.
	Insolvency Act 1986 124A 220

Sargent -v- Commissioners of Customs & Excise
18 Nov 1993 ChD	VAT, Landlord and Tenant, Insolvency	Casemap 1 Cites
	VAT in rents received by receiver was payable to customs. Receiver is VAT taxable person even if he is appointed under a floating charge.

Western Counties Cons Ltd -v- Witney Town F & S Club
19 Nov 1993 ChD	Insolvency
	A football club was not an unregistered company for the purposes of winding-up procedures.
	Insolvency Act 1986 220

Regina -v- Brockley [1994] 99 Cr App R 385
25 Nov 1993 CACD	Insolvency, Company, Crime	Casemap 1 Citers
	The offence of acting as a company director whilst being an undischarged bankrupt is an absolute offence.
	Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 11(1)

Liquidators of First Tokyo Index Trust Ltd -v- Morgan Stanley Trust Co and Others
1 Dec 1993 OHCS	Insolvency
	Company Liquidators have no authority to disclose evidence to creditor.
	Insolvency Act 1986 236 & 237

In Re A Debtor (No 415-SD-11993)
8 Dec 1993 ChD	Insolvency
	A creditor was not obliged to take an offer of security where there was unsecured debt.
	Insolvency Act 1986 268

Menzies -v- National Bank of Kuwait Sak [1994] 2 BCLC 306
13 Dec 1993 CA	Insolvency	Casemap 1 Citers
	It must only in exceptional circumstances that a company other than company in liquidation may be alloweed to pursue a debt for the company.

In Re Port (A Bankrupt) (No 516 of 1987) Port -v- Auger
16 Dec 1993 ChD	Litigation Practice, Insolvency
	'Ordinary application' in Insolvency Rules not a pleading to be struck out. Court may strike out 'ordinary application' only if no basis at all for claim.
	Rules of the Supreme Court Order 18 rule 19

Chohan -v- Saggar and Another [1994] 1 BCLC 706
27 Dec 1993 CA Nourse LJ	Insolvency	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The word 'and' in sections 423(2)(a) and 423(2)(b) is to be read conjunctively not disjunctively. Section 238(3) is to be interpreted as requiring restoration of the former position 'as far as possible' or 'as far as practicable', and that accordingly subsequent events were not an absolute bar against setting aside the sale. Nourse LJ: "The object of ss 423 to 425 being to remedy the avoidance of debts, the "and" between para (a) and (b) of 423(2) must be read conjunctively and not disjunctively. Any order under this section must seek, so far as practicable, both to restore the position to what it would have been if the transaction had not been entered into and to protect the victims of it. It is not a power to restore generally, but in such a way as to protect the victims' interests; in other words, by restoring assets to the debtor to make them available for execution by the victims. So the first question the judge must ask himself is what assets have been lost to the debtor. His order should, so far as practicable, restore that loss."
	Insolvency Act 1986 238(3) 423

Short's Trustee -v- Keeper of the Registers of Scotland
30 Dec 1993 IHCS	Insolvency, Registered Land, Scotland	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	Trustee may not register decree but can seek to have register amended.