Insurance - 1849- 1899

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This page lists 46 cases, and was prepared on 28 October 2012.

John Knight, William Ware And Others Against Faith And Another [1850] EngR 797; (1850) 15 QB 649; (1850) 117 ER 605; 117 ER 605
23 Sep 1850 Lord Campbell CJ	Transport, Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	A ship, insured in 1000l. for a year ending 23rd September, was stranded, got off, and brought into the harbour of Sta. Cruz, on September 16th. She remained there with her crew on board till the middle of October, and, during that time, was pumped; and her cargo was discharged into other vessels. Being then beached and surveyed, she was found so much damaged by the accident that the necessary repairs could not be done at Sta. Cruz, there being no dockyard, workmen or materials there ; nor could she be taken to any port where she could prudently have been repaired. Afterwards, in October, the master (who was a part-owner, and interested in the policy) sold her for the benefit of those whom it might concern ; and she fetched 721. No notice of abandonment was given. A special case, in an action against the underwriters, set forth these facts stating also that the vessel, received her death blow,” by the said perils of the seas on September 16th, but that the damage was not ascertained till the 24th. Held : 1. That the sale by the master did not, nor did the other facts, constitute an actual total loss: and that, if there was a constructive total loss which would have entitled the assured to abandon, they could not recover for such loss, not having given notice of abandonment. 2. That the assured were entitled to recover for partial loss by the stranding before September 23d, though the loss was not aecertained till after that day ; the proximate cause of loss, the injury by stranding, having taken place during the year covered by the insurance. 3. That the ultimate loss did not prevent such recovery; for that the partial loss by stranding caused an actual prejudice to the assured, which was not merged in the final loss resulting from the sale, even assuming this to have been a total loss necessarily consequent upon the stranding : the loss being one which, as total, the insurers were not liable to pay for. Lord Campbell CJ said: "the insurer is liable for a loss actually sustained from a period insured against during the continuance of the risk."
	Link[s] omitted

Lea -v- Hinton (1854) 5 De Gex; MacNaghten & Gordon 823; (1854) 43 ER 1090
1854	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	One person may have an insurable interest not only in his own life, but also in the life of another.

Dalby -v- The India and London Life Assurance Company (1854) 15 CB 364; [1843-60] All ER Rep 1040
1854 Parke B	Insurance, Damages	1 Citers
	An insurance company (Anchor) had taken out insurance with the defendant on the life of the Duke of Cambridge in the sum of £1000 for which it paid a yearly premium during the life of the Duke. Anchor had itself granted policies of insurance to a Reverend Wright on the Duke’s life in a total amount of £3000. Anchor’s policy with the Defendant was “a cross or counter-assurance”. Before the Duke died Anchor agreed with the Reverend Wright to the surrender and cancellation of his policies in return for an annuity. The issue was whether or not it sufficed that Anchor had an interest in the Duke’s life when the policy with the Defendant was effected or whether such an interest had to subsist at the time of the Duke’s death. No one seems to have bothered with questions whether or not the Reverend Wright had an interest in the Duke’s life. Held: It was sufficient for the interest to exist at the time the insurance was effected and that its value at that time was recoverable under Section 3. The obligation at that time to pay the Reverend Wright was “unquestionably an interest in the continuance of the life of the Duke” under Section 3. (Parke B) “Now, what is the meaning of this provision? On the part of the plaintiff, it is said it means only, that, in all cases in which the party insuring has an interest when he effects the policy, his right to recover and receive is to be limited to that amount; otherwise, under colour of a small interest, a wagering policy might be made to a large amount, - as it might if the first clause stood alone. The right to recover, therefore, is limited to the amount of the interest at the time of effecting the policy. Upon that value, the assured must have the amount of premium calculated: if he states it truly, no difficulty can occur: he pays in the annuity for life the fair value of the sum payable at death. If he misrepresents, by over-rating the value of the interest, it is his own fault, in paying more in the way of annuity than he ought; and he can recover only the true value of the interest in respect of which he effected the policy: but that value he can recover. Thus, the liability of the insurer becomes constant and uniform, to pay an unvarying sum on the death of the cestui que vie, in consideration of an unvarying and uniform premium paid by the assured. The bargain is fixed as to the amount on both sides. This construction is effected by reading the word “hath” as referring to the time of effecting the policy. By the 1st section, the assured is prohibited from effecting an insurance on a life or on an event wherein he “shall have” no interest, - that is, at the time of assuring: and then the 3rd section requires that he shall recover only the interest that he “hath”. If he has an interest when the policy is made, he is not wagering or gaming, and the prohibition of the statute does not apply to his case. Had the 3rd section provided that no more than the amount or value of the interest should be insured, a question might have been raised, whether, if the insurance had been for a larger amount, the whole would not have been void: but the prohibition to recover or receive more than that amount, obviates any difficulty on that head."
	Insurance Act 1774 3

Waters -v- The Monarch Fire & Life Assurance Co (1856) 5 El & Bl 870
1856	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	The plaintiff must show an insurable interest in goods to make a claim. This will usually means that he is at least either a part-owner or bailee.

Robert Thompson, Joseph Lowes Thompson, And John Thompson -v- Thomas Duck Hopper [1856] EngR 301; (1856) 6 El & Bl 171; (1856) 119 ER 828
23 Feb 1856	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	There is not in general an implied warranty of seaworthiness in a time policy of assurance.
	Link[s] omitted

Fowkes And Another -v- The Manchester And London Life Insurance Company [1862] EngR 50; (1862) 3 F & F 440; (1862) 176 ER 198; [1862] 3 B&S 917
1862	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	Link[s] omitted

Hebdon -v- West (1863) 3 B&S 579
1863 Wightman J	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	Hebdon claimed under a policy with ILA in the sum of £2500 on the life of X. Hebdon was employed in a bank of which X was the senior and managing partner. In 1855 Hebdon was employed on a seven-year contract at £600 a year. He also owed the bank £4700 on loans. X had assured Hebdon that during X’s life Hebdon would not be called upon to repay the loan. Hebdon, with X’s permission, in 1856, insured X’s life with another company (CGLI) for £5000 so as to provide against the loan. 12 months later, the debt having increased to £6000, Hebdon took out the policy with ILA which was the subject of the proceedings. X died in 1861. CGLI paid £5000 which Hebdon paid to the bank. ILA contended that Hebdon had no interest in X’s life within the meaning of the 1774 Act or that his interest was less than the £2500 so that he should recover less pursuant to section 3. Held: There was no insurable interest at all in X’s assurance that the loan would not be called because there was no consideration for the assurance and it was not therefore a binding agreement such as could be “considered as a pecuniary or indeed any appreciable interest in the life of X”. There was an insurable interest in Hebdon’s salary (for 5 more years at £600 a year) at the time the policy was effected, and so in a sum in excess of the value of the ILA policy, but nonetheless that because the value of that interest had been paid by CGLI Hebdon could recover nothing by virtue of section 3 of the Act. The “question” which arose was whether the payment of £5000 by CGLI “is a bar to the plaintiff’s claim by virtue of [Section 3] it being taken as a fact that the £5000 included all the insurable interest that the plaintiff had at the time of making both policies; in fact that the interest of the plaintiff at the time of making the insurance with the defendant was the same as that which he had when he made the insurance with [CGLI] …. It was said that … the object of the statute would be defeated, as a small amount of insurable interest might be made the foundation for a great number of insurances, each to the amount of the whole interest of the insured ….” The court referred to the use of the words “insurer or insurers” in section 3 as an indication that recovery could only be made once (rejecting, to my mind, a compelling submission that the use of the plural contemplated several insurers on one policy) “Looking to the declared object of the legislature, we are of the opinion that though, upon a life policy, the insurable interest at the time of the making the policy, and not the interest at the time of death, is to be considered, it was intended by the 3rd section of the Act that the insured should in no case recover or receive from the insurers (whether upon one policy or many) more than the insurable interest which the person making the insurance had at the time he insured the life. If for greater security he thinks fit to insure with many persons and by different contracts of insurance, and to pay the premiums upon each policy, he is at liberty to do so, but he can only recover or receive upon the whole the amount of his insurable interest, and if he has received the whole amount from one insurer he is precluded by the terms of the 3rd section of the statute from recovering or receiving any more from the others. Any argument arising from the supposed hardship of allowing the insurers in such a case to receive and retain the premiums without being obliged to pay the consideration for which such premiums were paid, would be equally applicable to the case of marine assurances, upon which, however many policies there may be, the underwriters are only liable to the extent of the value insured."
	Insurance Act 1774 3

Lindsay And Another -v- Leathley [1863] EngR 37; (1863) 3 F & F 902; (1863) 176 ER 410
1863	Insurance, Transport
	Link[s] omitted

Jardine And Others -v- Leathley [1863] EngR 260; (1863) 3 B & S 700; (1863) 122 ER 262
10 Feb 1863	Transport, Insurance
	Link[s] omitted

Fowkes And Another, Executors & Co, -v- The Manchester And London Life Assurance And Loan Association [1863] EngR 491; (1863) 3 B & S 917; (1863) 122 ER 343
1 May 1863	Insurance	Casemap 1 Cites
	A life policy of insurance was entered into with a Company on the life of HF, which was founded on a written declaration of the assured agreed to be the basis of the contract between the parties, and contained a proviso that “if any statement in the declaration (which declaration should be considered as much a part of that policy as if the same had been actually set forth therein) was uutrue, or if the assurance by the policy should have been effected by or through any wilful misrepresentation, conceaIment or false averment whatsoever, or if the said K, P, should go to any place beyond the limits of Europe, &c., the policy should be void, and all monies paid in respect thereof should be forfeited (to the said Association.” The proposal and declaration contained the usual patticulars, and proceeded as follows : ‘‘ I do hereby declare that the above written particulars are correct and true throughout, and I do hereby agree that this proposal and decIaration shall be the basis of the contract between me and The Manchester and London Life Assurance Association and if it shall hereafter appear that any fraudulent concealment or designedly untrue statement be contained therin, then all the money which shall have been paid on account of the assurance made in consequence hereof shall be forfeited, and the policy granted in respect of such assurance shall be absolutely null and void.” Held, that the policy and declaration must be read together, and so reading them the policy was not avoided by an untrue statemenit in the declaration, unlesss designedly untrue.
	Link[s] omitted

J Britton -v- Royal Insurance Company (1866) 4 F&F 905
1866 Willes J	Insurance	Casemap
	It was an express condition of the insurance policy that a fraudulent part of a claim would avoid the balance of the claim. In directing the jury: "The law is, that a person who had made such a fraudulent claim could not be permitted to recover at all. The contract of insurance is one of perfect good faith on both sides, and it is most important that such good faith should be maintained. It is the common practice to insert in fire-policies conditions that they shall be void in the event of a fraudulent claim; and there was such a condition in the present case. Such a condition is only in accordance with legal principle and sound policy. It would be most dangerous to permit parties to practise such frauds, and then, notwithstanding their falsehood and fraud, to recover the real value of the goods consumed. And if there is wilful falsehood and fraud in the claim, the insured forfeits all claim whatever upon the policy."

England -v- Lord Tredegar [1866] EngR 65; (1866) 35 Beav 256; (1866) A)
22 Jan 1866	Insurance
	Link[s] omitted

Branford -v- Howard [1866] EngR 70; (1866) 35 Beav 613; (1866) 55 ER 1034
26 Jan 1866	Insurance
	[ Commonlii ]

W Kemp, Executor Of E Kemp, v Halliday [1866] EngR 153; (1866) 6 B & S 723; (1866) 122 ER 1361
10 May 1866	Insurance
	[ Commonlii ]

Dickenson -v- Jardine (1868) LR 3 CP 639
1868	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers

Re London Marine Insurance Association (1869) LR 8 Eq 176
1869 Sir William James V-C	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers

Joyce -v- Realm Marine Insurance Co (1872) LR 7 QB 580
1872 Lush J	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	The insurance covered (inter alia) cargo from ports in West Africa with outward cargo to be considered homeward interest 24 hours after the ship’s arrival at her first port of discharge. The reinsurance was at and from West African ports "to commence from the loading of the goods." Goods shipped at Liverpool were lost 24 hours after the ship’s arrival at the port of Cabenda. Held. “loading” in the reinsurance applied to outward cargo from Liverpool to West Africa which was left on board and considered as homeward cargo under the insurance. The terms in the reinsurance in the light of the insurance showed that "what was meant between the parties was not the actual loading, but a constructive loading, which was what the original underwriters had agreed to treat as a loading on board for the purpose of the homeward voyage."

Commercial Union Assurance v Lister (1874) LR9 Ch App 483
1874 CA James LJ	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	James LJ referred to the insured having an equitable duty or obligation but did not further define it.

Jackson -v- Union Marine Insurance Co Ltd [1874] LR 10 CP 125; [1874-80] All ER REP 317; 44 LJCP 27; [1874] 31 LT 789; [1874] 23 WR 169; [1874] 2 Asp MLC 435
1874 CCP Baron Bramwell	Contract, Transport, Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	The plaintiff ship owner, contracted under a charterparty to proceed with all possible dispatch to Newport. He insured the cargo. The ship ran aground before the cargo could be collected, and was delayed. The charterers threw up the charterparty and contracted elsewhere for the delivery of the goods. The plaintiff claimed under his insurance. Held: The delay had been so long as to put an end to the contractual obligations. The charterers were therefore not obliged to load the cargo, and the loss constituted a loss of the chartered freight by perils of the sea. It was the happening of the event and not the fact that the event was the result of a breach by one party of his contractual obligations that relieved the other party from further performance of his obligations: "There are the cases which hold that, where the shipowner has not merely broken his contract, but has so broken it that the condition precedent is not performed, the charterer is discharged. Why? Not merely because the contract is broken. If it is not a condition precedent, what matters it whether it is unperformed with or without excuse? Not arriving with due diligence or at a day named is the subject of a cross-action only. But not arriving in time for the voyage contemplated, but at such a time that it is frustrated is not only a breach of contract, but discharges the charterer. And so it should though he has such an excuse that no action lies".

Anderson -v- Morice (1875) LR 10 CP 609 (Exch Ch)
1875 Blackburn J	Insurance	1 Citers
	A purchaser of a cargo was held to have no insurable interest in the cargo itself until the risk had passed to him on completion of loading. The only possible insurable interest was on the profits from sale of the cargo but not on the cargo itself which alone was the subject matter of the relevant insurance.

Steel -v- State Line Steamship Co (1877) 3 AC 72
1877 Lord Blackburn	Insurance	Casemap
	An insured ship should be "in a condition to encounter whatever perils of the sea a ship of that kind and laden in that way may be fairly expected to encounter." However, an express exception of negligence did not cover loss due to unseaworthiness. Lord Blackburn distinguished between (i) a port hole left open on the orlop deck with cargo piled up high against it, where no one could see whether the port hole had been left open or not, in circumstances where it would require a great deal to time to remove the cargo; and (ii) a porthole left open in a cabin which could be shut at a moment's notice as soon as the sea became rough. In the latter case the vessel would not be unfit to encounter the perils of the voyage because the matter could be set right within a few minutes and "if they did not put it right after such a warning, that would be negligence on the part of the crew, and not unseaworthiness of the ship".

Simpson & Co -v- Thomson (1877) 3 App Cas 279
1877 HL Lord Cairns	Scotland, Insurance	Casemap 1 Cites
	The House discussed the extent of an insurer's right of subrogation: "My Lords, these authorities seem to me to be conclusive that the right of the underwriters is merely to make such claim for damages as the insured himself could have made, and it is for this reason that (according to the English mode of procedure) they would have to make it in his name;"

North British and Mercantile Insurance Company -v- London Liverpool and Globe Insurance Company (1877) 5 Ch D 569
1877 Baggallay JA	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	In a dispute between insurers as to who should bear the loss, it was held that the loss should be borne by the wharfinger's insurer because "the primary liability" was that of the wharfinger. The customary strict responsibility of a wharfinger for the safe custody of goods entrusted to him by customers was held to be primary and his liability for the loss of the goods by fire was not discharged by a payment under the customer's insurance policy.

Branford -v- Saunders (1877) 25 WR 650
1877	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	One person may have an insurable interest in the life of another.

Dudgeon -v- Pembroke (1877) 2 AC 284
1877	Insurance	Casemap
	If there are two concurrent causes of a loss, one falling within the policy, the other simply not covered by the terms of the policy, the insured may recover.

Kaltenbach -v- Mackenzie [1878] 3 CPD 467
1878 CA Brett LJ, Cotton LJ	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court described the origin of the necessity of giving a notice of abandonment in a shipping insurance claim and explained its function. Brett LJ: "This case raises the questions of abandonment and notice of abandonment on a policy of marine insurance. Before I enter upon the merits of the present case I think it desirable to state my view of the law. I agree that there is a distinction between abandonment and notice of abandonment, and I concur in what has been said by Lord Blackburn, that abandonment is not peculiar to policies of marine insurance; abandonment is part of every contract of indemnity. Whenever, therefore, there is a contract of indemnity and a claim under it for an absolute indemnity, there must be an abandonment on the part of the person claiming indemnity of all his right in respect of that for which he receives indemnity. The doctrine of abandonment in cases of marine insurance arises where the assured claims for a total loss. There are two kinds of total loss; one which is called an actual total loss, another which in legal language is called a constructive total loss; but in both the assured claims as for a total loss. Abandonment, however, is applicable to the claim, whether it be for an actual total loss or for a constructive total loss. If there is anything to abandon, abandonment must take place; as, for instance, when the loss is an actual total loss, and that which remains of a ship is what has been called a congeries of planks, there must be an abandonment of the wreck. Or where goods have been totally lost, as in the case of Roux v. Salvador, but something has been produced by the loss, which would not be the goods themselves, if it were of any value at all, it must be abandoned. But that abandonment takes place at the time of the settlement of the claim; it need not take place before. and With regard to the notice of abandonment, "I am not aware that in any contract of indemnity, except in the case of contracts of marine insurance, a notice of abandonment is required. In the case of marine insurance where the loss is an actual total loss, no notice of abandonment is necessary; but in the case of a constructive total loss it is necessary, unless it be excused. How, then, did it arise that a notice of abandonment was imported into a contract of marine insurance? Some judges have said it is a necessary equity that the insurer, in the case of a constructive total loss, should have the option of being able to take such steps as he may think best for the preservation of the thing abandoned from further deterioration. I doubt if that is the origin of the necessity of giving a notice of abandonment. It seems to me to have been introduced into contracts of marine insurance – as many other stipulations have been introduced – by the consent of shipowner and underwriter, and so to have become part of the contract, and a condition precedent to the validity of a claim for a constructive total loss. The reason why it was introduced by the shipowner and underwriter is on account of the peculiarity of marine losses. These losses do not occur under the immediate notice of all the parties concerned. A loss may occur in any part of the world. It may occur under such circumstances that the underwriter can have no opportunity of ascertaining whether the information he received from the assured is correct or incorrect. The assured, if not present, would receive notice of the disaster from his agent, the master of the ship. The underwriter in general can receive no notice of what has occurred, unless from the assured, who is the owner of the ship or the owner of the goods, and there would therefore be great danger if the owner of a ship or of goods – that is the assured – might take any time that he pleased to consider whether he would claim as for a constructive total loss or not – there would be great danger that he would be taking time to consider what the state of the market might be, or many other circumstances, and would throw upon the underwriter a loss if the market were unfavourable, or take to himself the advantage if the market were favourable. These are the reasons why I think the assured and the underwriters came to the conclusion that it should be a part of the contract and a condition precedent that, where the claim is for a constructive total loss, there must be notice of abandonment, unless there were circumstances which excused it." and "Notice of abandonment, therefore, being a part of the contract, questions arose as to the time when that notice should be given. The first question which arose was whether the notice must be given at the first moment that the assured heard of the loss, or at some subsequent period. It was, however, decided that it is not at the moment of the first hearing of the loss notice of abandonment must be given, but that the assured must have a reasonable time to ascertain the nature of the loss with which he is made acquainted; if he hears merely that his ship is damaged, that may not be enough to enable him to decide whether he ought to abandon or not; he must have certain and accurate information as to the nature of the damage. Now, sometimes the information which he receives discloses at once the imminent danger of the subject-matter of insurance becoming and continuing a total loss; as, for instance, if he hears his ship is captured in time of war, it must be obvious to everybody, unless the ship is re-captured, it would be a total loss; or if he hears that the ship is stranded, and her back is broken, although she retains her character as a ship, if he gets information upon which any reasonable man must conclude that there is very imminent danger of her being lost, the moment he gets that information he must immediately give notice of abandonment. The law that has been laid down is, that immediately the assured has reliable information of such damage to the subject-matter of insurance as that there is imminent danger of its becoming a total loss, then he must at once, unless there be some reason to the contrary, give notice of abandonment; but if the information which he first receives is not sufficient to enable him to say whether there is that imminent danger, then he has a reasonable time to acquire full information as to the state and nature of the damage done to the ship. and "But then there arose another question. Ships, or goods, or the subject-matters of marine insurance, are liable to danger at various parts of the globe, where neither the assured nor the underwriter is present; and upon the emergency the master of the ship being there alone, must act. Now, under those circumstances, masters have often sold either ship or goods; and masters have had to consider whether they would sell the ship or goods even in cases where such ship or goods are not insured. The general rule with regard to the propriety of a master selling the ship or the goods, is that he has no right to sell either the ship or the goods without the consent of the owner, but if necessity arises the master becomes what is called, from the necessity of the thing, the agent to bind his owner by a sale, or to bind the owner of goods by a sale. Now, the rule I should say from the necessity of things, at all events from the justice of things, is this, that if the circumstances are such that any reasonable person having authority from the owner would sell, then the master is entitled to sell, although he has not such authority. The question, I think, as between the person to whom a master sells and the owner of the property, is whether the circumstances were those which would have caused a reasonable owner, had he been present, to sell. If that state of things exists, the master has authority to sell, and his act is binding upon the owner of the ship or goods. Where, therefore, there has been a constructive total loss of either ship or goods, circumstances may have arisen which would justify the master in selling, or they may not; there may be a constructive total loss without any sale, and there may also be a constructive total loss accompanied by a sale. If the first information which the assured,, not being present, has of the damage which has occurred to his ship, or being the owner of goods of the damage which has occurred to his goods, although they were not an actual total loss by reason of the perils of the seas, is accompanied also by information that the master has sold, and if the circumstances of that sale were justifiable, so that the property passed to the vendee, under those circumstances that is the time when, if at all, the assured would be bound to give notice of abandonment; but in others that doctrine seems to be questioned. In Rankin v. Potter the law was established that where at the time when the assured receives information which would otherwise oblige him to give notice of abandonment, at the same time he hears that the subject-matter of the insurance has been sold so as to pass the property away, inasmuch as there was nothing of the subject-matter of the insurance which he could abandon, notice of abandonment was not necessary. No doubt the reason given for this was that notice at that time and under such circumstances would be a mere idle ceremony; it could be of no use. That was the point decided in Rankin v. Potter. In those particular circumstances it was held that notice of abandonment need not be given because there was nothing to abandon. That in one sense is true; but if goods had been sold it is obvious there must be something to abandon, that is the proceeds of the sale; the money which is the proceeds of the sale, when the insurance is settled, is abandoned; but where there is nothing of the subject-matter of insurance to abandon, there is no ship to abandon, there are no materials of the ship to abandon, there are no goods to abandon, notice of abandonment under those circumstances was said to be futile. But Rankin v. Potter went no further; it did not decide – because the point was not raised – that if, at the time when the assured had to make up his mind and when otherwise he ought to abandon, there was no sale of the subject-matter of the insurance, the assured would be excused from giving notice of abandonment if he was able to shew that, had he given such notice, in the result it would have turned out to be of no use. It was argued before us that the necessary inference to be drawn from Rankin v. Potter was, although there had been no sale of the subject-matter of the insurance when information of the disaster was received by the assured, yet if he could shew that before any notice of abandonment could reach the underwrite and before the underwriters orders could reach the assured a sale could take place, so that had the assured given notice of abandonment such notice would have been of no use to the underwriter, the assured would be excused from giving it. That point, however, is not raised here, and therefore it becomes unnecessary to decide it. I am not prepared to say that if it could be shewn that the subject-matter of insurance, at the time when the assured has information upon which otherwise he would be bound to act, is in such a condition that it would absolutely perish and disappear, before notice could be received or any answer returned, that that might not excuse the assured from giving notice of abandonment, but I am prepared to say that nothing short of that would excuse him; and although I do not say what I have stated would excuse him, I am not prepared to say it would not; that is the limit to which I think the doctrine could be carried, and it seems to me that to go further than that would let in the danger to provide against which the doctrine of notice of abandonment was introduced into the contract and made a part of the contract". Cotton LJ: "I give no opinion on the question which arises when the state of the thing insured is such that before the communication could have reached the underwriters it must, so far as human probability goes, have ceased to be in specie."

Rivaz -v- Gerussi Brothers & Co (1880) 6 QBD 222
1880 Brett LJ	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	Underwriters were held entitled to avoid insurance policies because of concealment of the undervalue of the insured shipments: "Here it was not only a concealment, but a fraudulent concealment, for the matter concealed was kept back from the knowledge of the underwriters in order that the assured might thereby derive an advantage. Being therefore fraudulent, it seems to me there should be no return of premium..."

London Guarantie Company -v- Fearnley (1880) 5 App Cas 911
1880 HL Lord Blackburn	Contract, Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	Lord Blackburn: "My Lords, it has long been the practice of companies insuring against fire, for the purpose of their own security, to incorporate in their policies, by reference to their proposals, various stipulations for matters to be done by the assured making a claim before the company is to pay them, and (as the remedy by action for not complying with these stipulations would not afford them any protection) to make the fulfillment of those conditions a condition precedent to their obligation to pay. There was much controversy on the subject about a century ago; but since the case of Worsley v Wood (1) it has been settled law that this mode of protecting themselves is effectual." and "It seems to me, therefore, that the whole question is reduced to that of the construction of an ill-penned instrument: a matter on which opinions always may differ, and in this case have differed. I do not think that the rules which are laid down as to the construction of agreements in which there are cross contracts, in order to see whether those cross contracts are dependent or independent, are of much assistance, where, as here, the question is, whether a matter is expressly made a condition precedent, nor that much good can be done by arguing on the words used, or citing cases: it would be merely repeating what has been said below. All agree that the question is, what is the intention to be collected from the words. I agree that the intention is obscurely expressed; and that the obscurity is the fault of the language used by the company, which can be amended in future by so framing the policy as to leave no doubt as to its meaning; and this is, I think, the strongest argument against putting on the instrument the construction which I do. But, after making all due allowance for this, I am obliged to come to the conclusion that the intention must have been what I have last stated, and that it is sufficiently expressed to have the effect of making this a condition precedent."

Burnand -v- Rodocanachi (1882) 7 App Cas 333
1882 HL Lord Selborne LC, Blackburn, Watson and Fitzgerald LL	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	The respondents took valued insurance, including war risks, on a cargo which was later destroyed by the Confederate cruiser Alabama. The underwriters paid to the respondents as on an actual total loss the valued amounts, which were less than the real value. Under a subsequent Act of Congress which created a compensation fund, the US paid to the respondents the difference between their real total loss and the sums received from the underwriters. Under the Act, no claim was allowed for any loss for which the party injured would have received compensation from any insurer, but if such compensation should not have been equal to the loss actually suffered, allowance might be made for the difference; and no claim was allowed by or on behalf of any insurer either in his own right or in that of the party insured. Held. The underwriters were not entitled to recover the compensation paid by the US government from the respondents. The payment did not reduce the loss, not having been intended to do so. The English and American Governments agreed that the sums which were to be paid were to be paid not in respect of the loss, but in respect of something else, and therefore the payment could not be a reduction of the loss. Lord Selborne LC said: "Now it appears to me that for every other purpose collateral to the contract [of insurance] for the purpose of every question as to whether a particular claim to something which has arisen aliunde is or is not within those rights which result in law from the contract, there is no more reason for holding the valuation to be conclusive between the parties or to operate by way of estoppel than there is in the case in which it is admitted that in England it does not so follow. The title to a particular indemnity granted in particular terms out of a particular fund at the disposal of the United States of America by an Act of the supreme legislature of the United States is not a title which I think can possibly result in law from the contract itself. If such a right exists, it must exist by the combined effect of the contract between the assurer and the assured, and the Act of Congress. It cannot follow from the contract of insurance alone without the Act of Congress. If the Act of Congress is consistent with such a right, having regard to the contract of insurance, still more if the Act of Congress fairly and equitably interpreted confers such a right, there is no reason whatever why the right should not receive full effect. But how is it possible that such an effect can be produced as to a right which could have no existence apart from the Act of Congress, if the Act of Congress itself expressly excludes it? I cannot for a moment understand the doctrine of moral right and obligation or implied €trusts affecting supreme governments and independent states, as applied to a question of this kind. The rights resulting from the contract must be such as in point of law the contract makes: the rights resulting from the Act of Congress must be such as according to its true construction and legal effect the Act of Congress makes; and the rights resulting from both together must be such as are consistent with and flow from the legitimate operation of the whole. Here it is admitted that there is in the Act of Congress everything said and done which a supreme legislature could possibly say or do for the purpose of excluding the present claim and attributing that fund which has been appropriated in this case to the sufferers by the capture, not to the valued part but to the unvalued part of the loss. That distinction, which in my opinion does exclude for this purpose the part covered by the valuation of the policy of insurance, is made by the Act of Congress. It was a true and bona fide valuation but it did not cover the actual loss. The fund awarded by the Act of Congress of the United States is only for that part of the actual loss which the valuation did not cover and which the insurers have not paid. Whatever views of moral obligation may be entertained with regard to the Act of Congress, I think it is correctly described by Brett L.J. as an act of pure gift from the American Government. We cannot go behind it and inquire into the motives for an act of a supreme legislature on a matter within their legislative powers; and that being so, I am entirely unable, for any practical purpose, to distinguish this case - in which the supreme Government of the United States having absolute power of disposition over this fund have by a solemn Act of their Congress declared that it should be given, not in respect of the loss which had been indemnified as between the assurers and the assured but in respect of the loss which the assured had suffered beyond that amount - from the case of a voluntary gift by an individual in the same terms. Mr. Butt, in his able argument, which was as candid I think as it was able, admitted that if a member of the family of the shipowner who had suffered the loss, or the owner of the cargo, had, after the insurers had paid the loss, made a will in the precise terms of this Act of the Congress of the United States, and had given a fund, over which he had absolute control, for the purpose of indemnifying his relatives or his friends for that portion of the loss which the insurance had not covered, the insurers could not have claimed the gift. I am unable to see, for any legal purpose, a distinction between such a case and the present." Lord Blackburn said: "The general rule of law (and it is obvious justice) is that where there is a contract of indemnity (it matters not whether it is a marine policy, or a policy against fire on land, or any other contract of indemnity) and a loss happens, anything which reduces or diminishes that loss reduces or diminishes the amount which the indemnifier is bound to pay; and if the indemnifier has already paid it, then, if anything which diminishes the loss comes into the hands of the person to whom he has paid it, it becomes an equity that the person who has already paid the full indemnity is entitled to be recouped by having that amount back. The first question is this. There had been a policy of insurance and a total loss by capture and destruction of the property insured and a payment of the full value insured - a payment of the total loss under that policy. Subsequently to that payment there came the Treaty of Washington; and afterwards, in consequence of an Act of Congress, a sum of money was paid to the persons who had received payment under the policy; and the question, I apprehend, comes to be, Was that sum or was it not paid so as to be a reduction or diminution of their loss? . . In the present case the government of the United States did not pay it with the intention of reducing the loss. Lord Coleridge says in his judgment, and says very truly, that the Government of the United States cannot by any action of theirs deprive a man suing in this country of any right which he has. I quite agree in that; but I think that Lord Coleridge, if he had taken the same view as I do of the matter, would have seen that an Act of Congress of the United States might effectually prevent any such right arising. If once the right had vested to recover any such sum, of course an Act of Congress could not take it away; but when Congress in express terms say, ´We do not pay the money for the purpose of repaying or reducing the loss against which the insurance company have indemnified, but for another and a different purpose,' it effectually prevents the right arising. Bramwell L.J. in his judgment has used the phrase, ´It was not given as salvage'. I should myself prefer to use my own phrase expressing the same idea and to say that it was not paid in such a manner as to reduce the loss against which the plaintiffs had to indemnify the defendants; it is the same thing but rather differently expressed."

Castellain -v- Preston (1883) 11 QBD 380
1883 Brett LJ	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court emphasised the amplitude of the insurer's right of subrogation which gave him "the advantage of every right of the assured, whether such right consists in contract, fulfilled or unfulfilled, or in remedy for tort capable of being insisted on or already insisted on, or in any other right, whether by way of condition or otherwise, legal or equitable . . . The second right vested in the insurer by the doctrine of subrogation is to claim from the assured any benefit conferred on the assured by third parties with the aim of compensating the assured for the loss in respect of which the insurer has indemnified him. The right is usually exercised by an insurer claiming from the assured a sum equivalent to any sum of damages paid to the assured by a third party legally liable for the loss. The right is wider in scope than that, however, and the insurer is entitled to moneys paid to the assured ex gratia to diminish his loss unless intended by the donor to benefit the assured to the exclusion of the insurers." The doctrine of subrogation is based on the fact that a contract of insurance is a contract of indemnity, and that the insurer is placed in the shoes of the insured in respect of claims whereby the insured loss is diminished

In re Leslie; Leslie -v- French (1883) 23 ChD 552
1883 ChD Justice Fry	Insurance, Equity	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court gave guidance as to the circumstances in which an individual who had paid a premium on a policy belonging to someone else could claim an interest in the policy:- "In my opinion a lien may be created upon the moneys secured by a policy by payment of premiums in the following cases: First. By contract with the beneficial owner of the policy. Secondly. By reasons of the right of trustees to an indemnity out of their trust property for money expended by them in its preservation. Thirdly. By subrogation to this right of trustees of some person who may at their request have advanced money for the preservation of the property. Fourthly. By reason of the right vested in mortgagees, or other persons having a charge upon the policy, to add to their charge any moneys which have been paid by them to preserve the property ...”. And “... except under the circumstances to which I have referred, no lien is created by the payment of the premiums by a mere stranger or by a part owner”.

Cory -v- Burr (1882-83) LR 8 App Cas 393; 1883 WL 19057
1883 HL Lord FitzGerald, Earl of Selborne LC, Lord Blackburn and Lord Bramwell	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	"'Seizure' seems to be a larger term than 'capture' and goes beyond it, and may reasonably be interpreted to embrace every act of taking forcible possession either by a lawful authority or by overpowering force."

Thomson -v- Weems [1884] 9 AC 671
1884 HL Lord Blackburn	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	Where a basis of the contract clause makes the correctness or completeness of the insured's disclosure into a warranty, a breach of that warranty has the effect that the insurance cover never attaches under the contract. Lord Blackburn said: "In policies of marine insurance I think it is settled by authority that any statement of a fact bearing upon the risk introduced into the written policy is, by whatever words and in whatever place, to be construed as a warranty, and prima facie, at least that the compliance with that warranty is a condition precedent to the attachment of the risk."

Stock -v- Inglis [1884] 12 QBD 564
1884 CA Brett MR	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	Buyers of sugar to whom the risk of loss of the sugar but not the property in it had passed had an insurable interest. Held: “Nobody can deny that this is a case of extreme difficulty and of great nicety. In my opinion it is the duty of a Court always to lean in favour of an insurable interest, if possible, for it seems to me that after underwriters have received the premium, the objection that there was no insurable interest is often, as nearly as possible, a technical objection, and one which has no real merit, certainly not as between the assured and the insurer. Of course we must not assume facts which do not exist, nor stretch the law beyond its proper limits, but we ought, I think, to consider the question with a mind, if the facts and the law will allow it, to find in favour of an insurable interest.”

Smith -v- Chadwick (1884) 9 App Cas 187
1884 HL Lord Blackburn	Contract, Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	An inference of inducement can be made or rebutted on evidence: "I think if it is proved that the defendants with a view to induce the plaintiff to enter a contract made a statement to the plaintiff of such a nature as would be likely to induce a person to enter into a contract, and it is proved that the plaintiff did enter into the contract, it is a fair inference of fact that he was induced to do so by the statement.

Blackburn, Low & Co -v- Vigors (1886) 17 QBD 553
1886 CA Lord Esher MR, Lindley LJ,	Agency, Insurance, Torts - Other	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	Lord Esher MR: "This seems to me to be the true doctrine. The freedom from mis-representation or concealment is a condition precedent to the right of the assured to insist on the performance of the contract, so that on a failure of the performance of the condition the assured cannot enforce the contract." Lindley LJ: "It is a condition of the contract that there is no misrepresentation or concealment either by the assured or by anyone who ought as a matter of business and fair dealing to have stated or disclosed the facts to him or to the underwriter for him." Lord Halsbury LC warned against "the somewhat vague use of the word 'agent'" which, he said, "leads to confusion" in insurance cases.

Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co Ltd -v- Hamilton, Fraser & Co (1887) 12 AC 484
1887 Lord Macnaghten	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	Lord MacNaghten noted that: "In marine insurance it is above all things necessary to abide by settled rules and to avoid anything like novel refinements or a new departure".

Wilson Sons & Co -v- Owners of Cargo per the 'Xantho' (1887) 12 App Cas 503
1887 Lord Herschell, Lord Bramwell	Transport, Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	A cause of damage otherwise satisfying the established definition may be a peril of the sea even though caused by a shipowner's negligence. Lord Herschell said: "If that which immediately caused the loss was a peril of the sea, it matters not how it was induced, even if it were by the negligence of those navigating the vessel." A shipowner owes the bill of lading holder a bailee's duty of care and accordingly, construing the bill of lading contract as a whole, the shipowner could not rely on the "perils of the sea" exception to oust his duty of care. the words in a cancellation clause to "perils or danger and accidents of the sea" bear the same meaning, as a matter of construction, in a bill of lading or contract of carriage as in an insurance policy. The words "perils of the sea": "do not protect, for example, against that natural and inevitable action of the wind and waves, which results in what may be described as wear and tear. There must be some casualty, something which could not be foreseen as one of the necessary incidents of the adventure. The purpose of the policy is to secure an indemnity against accidents which may happen, not against events which must happen."

Blackburn Low & Co -v- Haslam (1888) 21 QBD 144
1888	Legal Professions, Insurance

Cornish -v- The Accident Insurance Co. Ltd (1889) 23 QBD 453
1889 CA Lindley LJ	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	A policy covered the insured against accidental death or injury but excluded injuries happening by exposure of the insured to obvious risk of injury. The insured was killed by a train while attempting to cross a railway line in circumstances that made it difficult to understand how he could not have seen or heard the train approaching. The issue between the parties, therefore, was whether he had exposed himself to an obvious risk of injury within the meaning of the policy. Held: The contract should not be construed in a way that would make it practically illusory and in a case of real ambiguity the court should lean in favour of the insured. However, the court warned against creating doubts or magnifying ambiguities in order to reach a decision in favour of the insured. "The words are "exposure of the insured to obvious risk of injury." These words suggest the following questions: Exposure by whom? Obvious when? Obvious to whom? It is to be observed that the words are very general. There is no such word as "wilful," or "reckless," or "careless"; and to ascertain the true meaning of the exception the whole document must be studied and the object of the parties to it must be steadily borne in mind. The object of the contract is to insure against accidental death and injuries, and the contract must not be construed so as to defeat that object, nor so as to render it practically illusory. A man who crosses an ordinary crowded street is exposed to obvious risk of injury; and, if the words in question are construed literally, the defendants would not be liable in the event of an insured being killed or injured in so crossing, even if he was taking reasonable care of himself. Such a result is so manifestly contrary to the real intention of the parties that a construction which leads to it ought to be rejected. But, if this be true, a literal construction is inadmissible, and some qualification must be put on the words used. In the American cases cited by Mr. Jelf, the language of the policy was different, but the foregoing reasoning was adopted by the Court. The real difficulty is to express the necessary qualification with which the words must be taken. In a case on the line, in a case of real doubt, the policy ought to be construed most strongly against the insurers; they frame the policy and insert the exceptions. But this principle ought only to be applied for the purpose of removing a doubt, not for the purpose of creating a doubt, or magnifying an ambiguity, when the circumstances of the case raise no real difficulty. Without attempting to paraphrase the language so as to meet all cases, it is, we think, plain that two classes of accidents are excluded from the risks insured against, viz. (1) accidents which arise from an exposure by the insured to risk of injury, which risk is obvious to him at the time he exposes himself to it; (2) accidents which arise from an exposure by the insured to risk of injury, which risk would be obvious to him at the time, if he were paying reasonable attention to what he was doing. "

Sickness and Accident Assurance Association -v- General Accident Assurance Corporation Limited (1892) 19 R 977
1892 OHCS Lord Low	Insurance, Scotland	Casemap 1 Citers
	An insurance company, after paying to a tramway company a sum due under a policy insuring against loss by accident, raised an action in its own name against another insurance company for contribution on the ground that it had insured the same risk. "In marine insurance a rule which has long been recognised is that when the insured has recovered to the full extent of his loss under one policy, the insurer under that policy can recover from other underwriters who have insured the same interest against the same risks a rateable sum by way of contribution. The foundation of the rule is that a contract of marine insurance is one of indemnity, and that the insured, whatever the amount of his insurance or the number of the underwriters with whom he has contracted, can never recover more than is required to indemnify him. The different policies being all with the same person, and against the same risk, are therefore regarded as truly one insurance, and if one of the underwriters is compelled to meet the whole claim, he is entitled to claim contribution from the other underwriters, just as a surety or cautioner who pays the whole debt is entitled to claim rateable relief against his co-sureties or co-cautioners."

In re Eddystone Marine Insurance Co, ex parte Western Insurance [1892] Ch 423
1892	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers

Cleaver -v- Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association [1892] 1 QB 147
1892 CA Fry LJ	Insurance, Wills and Probate	Casemap 1 Citers
	The deceased's executors, objected to his widow maintaining action on a trust created by an insurance policy in her favour under the Act. She had been convicted of his murder. The executors' case was that "it is against public policy to allow a criminal to claim any benefit by virtue of his crime." Held: Fry LJ said: "The principle of public policy invoked is in my opinion rightly asserted. It appears to me that no system of jurisprudence can with reason include amongst the rights which it enforces rights directly resulting to the person asserting them from the crime of that person. If no action can arise from fraud it seems impossible to suppose that it can arise from felony or misdemeanour . . This principle of public policy, like all such principles, must be applied to all cases to which it can be applied without reference to the particular character of the right asserted or the form of its assertion." and "In the construction of Acts of Parliament . . general words which might include cases obnoxious to this principle (of public policy) must be read and construed subject to it."
	Married Women's Property Act 1882 11

D'Autremont -v- Fire Association of Philadelphia 65 Hun 475 (1892)
1892 Macomber J	Insurance, International	Casemap 1 Citers
	(USA) The insured was insane when he started a fire. The insurance company refused to pay. Held: The claim succeeded. Macomber J said: "In actions upon policies to cover damages occasioned by loss through fire, it is not a defence which the insurance company may avail itself of to show that the loss was caused by the carelessness, negligence, or want of care of the insured, or any of his agents or servants. The insurance company, in order to establish such a defence, must go further and show that the act was so grossly negligent as to indicate an intention to commit a fraud on the rights of the insurer . . I am unable to see that an insane person can form a fraudulent or wrongful design in the destruction of his own property, so as to defeat a policy of insurance thereon, any more than I can see that he could form a criminal intent in the commission of crime."

Reischer -v- Borwick [1894] 2 QB 548
1894 CA Lindley LJ	Insurance
	If there are two concurrent causes one falling within the policy, the other simply not covered by the terms of the policy, the insured may recover. For the purposes of a contract of insurance it is sufficient if an insured event is, in this sense, a co-operating cause of the loss. The proximate cause rule was based upon "the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract into which they have entered", and is to be "applied with good sense so as to give effect to, and not to defeat, those intentions."

Bensaude -v- Thames & Mersey Marine Insurance Co Ltd [1897] AC 609
1897 HL	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers