Insurance - 1980- 1984

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This page lists 15 cases, and was prepared on 28 October 2012.

Harker -v- Caledonian Insurance Co [1980] 1 Lloyds Rep 556
1980 Lord Diplock	Insurance, Road Traffic	Casemap 1 Citers
	The monetary limit of the compulsory insurance was to be read into section 10, however "... there are instances, of which costs and interest on the judgment are examples, where the insurer would be liable in the direct action for sums in excess of the permissible monetary limits upon the cover afforded by the policy."
	Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third-Party Risks) Act 10

Spinneys (1948) Ltd -v- Royal Insurance Co Ltd [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep 406
1980 Mustill J	Insurance	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The court considered the meaning of 'war' in the context of an insurance contract: "The issue is not whether the events in Lebanon were recognised in the United Kingdom as amounting to a civil war in the sense in which the term is used in Public International Law with the corollary that this country would, if the occasion had arisen, have accorded to the participants the rights and demanded of them the duties appropriate to belligerents. The question here is whether there was a civil war within the meaning of the policy." and "Methods of pursuing political aims and of waging an armed struggle do not stand still. A situation existing today might fall outside a definition formulated in the past, not because the Judge or scholar who proposed it considered that the situation should be excluded but simply because the possibility that it might exist had not crossed his mind…The same comment applies to a collection of materials relating to Public International Law…The words under construction are to be given their ordinary business meaning, which is not necessarily the same as the one which they bear in Public International Law. The statements of jurists are a useful source of insights, but they do not provide a direct solution..." Three questions were generally involved: (1) Can it be said that the conflict was between opposing "sides"? (2) What were the objectives of the "sides" and how did they set about achieving them? (3) What was the scale of the conflict, and of its effect on public order and on the life of the inhabitants?

The Alfred Trigon [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep 333
1981	Transport, Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court considered the wording, in the context of a second-hand ship sale and purchase market, "average damage". Held. "Average" here could not mean "damage" simpliciter and was understandably construed to mean a particular kind of damage – namely, damage occasioned by a peril ordinarily covered by insurance as opposed to defects through wear and tear or general old age."

Soya GmbH Mainz Kommanditgesellschaft -v- White [1982] 1 Lloyd's Rep 136
1982 CA Donaldson LJ	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	Where insured goods deteriorated during a passage, not because they had been subjected to some external fortuitous accident or casualty, but because of their natural behaviour in the ordinary course of the voyage, then such deterioration amounted to inherent vice or nature of the subject-matter insured. Donaldson LJ (obiter) said: "The only respect in which I would differ from Mr Justice Lloyd is in relation to his findings on causation. The learned Judge said: 'The burden of proving inherent vice undoubtedly rests on the defendants. They have proved that inherent vice was a cause in the sense that without moisture, the damage could not have occurred at all; but they have not succeeded in proving that inherent vice was the cause, the proximate cause, or one of the proximate causes. It was, to use the language which to my mind still expresses the meaning most accurately, a causa sine qua non, but not a causa causans. It may be said that inherent vice must have been the proximate cause if the soya beans were in fact incapable of withstanding the ordinary incidents of the voyage; that is what inherent vice means. I do not agree. Where there is an insurance against risks of heating, and heating occurs because of the conditions under which soya beans were carried on the particular voyage, I am entitled to hold that the cause of the damage were the conditions under which the soya beans were carried, even though the conditions were normal, and even though nothing untoward occurred. I would only be obliged to find that inherent vice was the proximate cause if the soya beans were such that they could not withstand any normal voyage of that duration. For the reasons already mentioned, that was not the case here.' I fully accept his finding that the cause of the loss was the condition under which the soya beans were carried, but I disagree with his conclusion that this does not constitute a loss proximately caused by inherent vice. As I have said, in my judgment a loss is proximately caused by inherent vice if t he natural behaviour of the goods is such that they suffer a loss in the circumstances in which they are expected to be carried. This is the test under a contract of affreightment and the shipowner in this case could have pleaded inherent vice in answer to a claim for damage to the cargo. In holding that inherent vice is only proved if the soya beans could not withstand any normal voyage of that duration, the learned Judge was introducing a different concept, namely that of certainty of loss. That is a quite different defence. It is in any event subject to the qualification that it must be a certainty which is, or should be, known at least to the assured."

Balfour -v- Beaumont [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep 493
1982	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers

Mason -v- Sainsbury (1782) 3 Dougl 61; [1782] EngR 37; (1782) 3 Doug 61; (1782) 99 ER 538
19 Apr 1982 Lord Mansfield CJ, Buller J	Insurance, Police	Casemap 1 Citers
	A claim was made upon insurance after a riot. The court asked asked "Who is first liable?" This was not an issue of chronology but of establishing where the primary responsibility lay to make good the loss. The Act laid the primary responsibility with the inhabitants of the hundred, and it did not matter that the insurer had indemnified the insured. Lord Mansfield said: "The facts of this case lie in a narrow compass. The argument turns much on want of precision in stating the case, as most arguments do. The office paid without suit, not in ease of the hundred, and not as co-obligors, but without prejudice. It is, to all intents, as if it had not been paid. The question, then, comes to this, can the owner, having insured, sue the hundred? Who is first liable? If the hundred, it makes no difference; if the insurer, then it is a satisfaction, and the hundred is not liable. But the contrary is evident from the nature of the contract of insurance. It is an indemnity. Every day the insurer is put in the place of the insured. In every abandonment it is so. The insurer uses the name of the insured. The case is clear: the Act puts the hundred, for civil purposes, in the place of the trespassers; and, upon principles of policy, as in the case of other remedies against the hundred, I am satisfied that it is to be considered as if the insurers had not paid a farthing." Buller J said: "The better way is to consider this as a contract of indemnity. The principle is, that the insurer and insured are one, and, in that light, paying before or after can make no difference. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion, that the hundred cannot avail themselves of this defence." and "It has been admitted, and rightly, that the hundred is put in the place of the trespassers." Willes J said: "I am of the same opinion . . The hundred is not answerable criminally, but they cannot be considered as free from blame. They may have been negligent, which is partly the principle of the Act."
	Riot Act 1714
	Link[s] omitted

Soya GmbH Mainz Kommanditgesellschaft -v- White [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep 122
1983 HL Lord Diplock	Insurance, Transport	Casemap 1 Cites
	The cargo, soya beans, was insured against heating, sweating and spontaneous combustion risks. It arrived in a heated and deteriorated condition. The insurers denied liability saying that the proximate cause of the damage was inherent vice or nature of the subject matter insured, for which they were not liable under section 55(2)(c); and that the cover only extended to heating, sweating or spontaneous combustion brought about by some external cause. Held: As a matter of construction the policy did "otherwise provide" within the meaning of the opening words of section 55(2)(c) so that the perils of heating, sweating and spontaneous combustion arising from inherent vice or nature of the subject matter insured were covered. Lord Diplock suggested a definition of 'inherent vice' in an insurance policy: "The facts as I have summarized them for the purpose of determining the question of construction of the HSSC policy in the instant case, assume that the loss resulting from the deterioration of the soya beans during the voyage was proximately caused by the "inherent vice or nature of the subject-matter insured". This phrase (generally shortened to "inherent vice") where it is used in section 55(2)(c) refers to a peril by which a loss is proximately caused; it is not descriptive of the loss itself. It means the risk of deterioration of the goods shipped as a result of their natural behaviour in the ordinary course of the contemplated voyage without the intervention of any fortuitous external accident or casualty." Inability to withstand the ordinary incidents of the voyage is an appropriate test of inherent vice.
	Marine Insurance Act 1906 55(2)(c)

Petrofina (UK) Ltd -v- Magnaload Ltd [1984] 1 QB 127; [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep 91
1983	Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers

Balfour -v- Beaumont [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep 272
1984	Insurance	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers

Gardner -v- Moore [1984] AC 548
1984 HL Lord Hailsham LC	Insurance, Personal Injury	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The uninsured first defendant deliberately drove a car at the plaintiff who was walking on the pavement, and thus caused serious injuries. The MIB accepted that the trial judge was bound by Hardy to declare that the Bureau was bound to indemnify the plaintiff in respect of his judgment against the first defendant. The Bureau appealed to the House of Lords. Held: The House dismissed the appeal, accepting the principle that a person "may not stand to gain advantage arising from the consequences of his own iniquity", but pointing out that the doctrine has its limits. The terms of policies issued by insurance companies were not relevant to the issues falling for decision in this case.

Container Transport International Inc -v- Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep 476
1984 CA	Insurance	1 Citers
	The plaintiffs operated a scheme relying upon insurance. The insurers refused to renew, and they then approached and obtained insurance from the defendants, but it was alleged without disclosing the full history. Held: The plaintiffs had made representations which were both material and untrue within s20. The circumstances would have been taken account of by a prudent insurer, and the defendant was free to avoid liability. The defendant could not be said to have waived disclosure, and nor was it under constructive notice.
	Marine Insurance Act 1906 18(1) 20

The Padre Island [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 408
1984	Insurance, Insolvency, Arbitration	Casemap 1 Citers
	The 1930 Act creates a statutory assignment of any rights of action in a case where the assured has become bankrupt or been wound up, the party to whom the benefit of a right of action under the liability insurance contract has been transferred may only operate that right in accordance with an arbitration agreement in the contract of insurance even if that agreement is expressed to refer only to the parties to the contract of insurance and not in terms wide enough to cover a statutory assignee.
	Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 1930

Bolivinter Oil SA -v- Chase Manhattan Bank NA [1984] 1 WLR 392; [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep 251
1984 Sir John Donaldson MR	Banking, Insurance	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court emphasised "the great and fundamentally important separation" between bankers and re-insurers.

The Zephyr [1984] 1 Lloyds LR 58; [1985] 2 LLR 529
1984 Hobhouse J	Insurance, Contract	Casemap 1 Citers
	Whilst it is possible to make a contract which is partly oral and partly written, that is not the practice of the marine insurance market. The policy is the formal contractual document issued to the assured and unequivocally contains the terms of the contract. A contract of marine insurance is inadmissible in evidence unless contained in a policy signed by the insurer.

In re Multi Guarantee Company Ltd (No 2) Unreported, 31 July 1984
31 Jul 1984 ChD Harman J	Insurance, Banking	1 Citers
	The court considered whether funds in an account operated in accordance with the rules were held on trust. Having considered the nature of a trust account, the court held: "In my judgment, it is quite impossible to read these rules as creating trusts and requiring the application of ordinary trust principles to these accounts".
	Insurance Brokers Registration Council (Accounts and Business Requirements) Rules Approval Order 1979