Legal Professions - 1995

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This page lists 36 cases, and was prepared on 28 October 2012.

Aratra Potato Co Ltd -v- Taylor Joynson Garrett [1995] 4 All ER 695
1995 Garland J	Legal Professions
	The defendant solicitors acted in several matters for a client on terms specifying hourly rates but providing also for "a 20% reduction from solicitor/client costs for any lost cases". Held: The agreement amounted to a contingency fee agreement which was unenforceable as being contrary to public policy. The court rejected the solicitors' argument that the agreement might be saved by severing the offending phrase. The clients were not liable for unpaid bills but, where bills had already been paid, the clients were not entitled to a refund: "Bills paid Can it be said that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover their money because the consideration has wholly failed, being a consideration contrary to public policy or rendered under a contract which was void? If so, should such recovery only be on terms allowing TJG some remuneration including disbursements and profit? Can the concept non in pari delicto apply and, if so, what remedy would be open to the plaintiffs? I freely admit to finding these matters of the greatest difficulty. There is no clear guidance to be found in the authorities or in the textbooks. To allow the plaintiffs to recover but on terms would in effect be to allow TJG to recover on a quantum meruit if not to enforce the agreement. This cannot be right. Conversely, can it be a correct approach to take the view that the agreement is unenforceable and that the parties must therefore be left in the position in which they find themselves? This would enable TJG to take advantage of the champertous agreement dependent upon the plaintiffs' discovery of its true nature. Conversely, is justice done by allowing the plaintiffs to take advantage of the services rendered by TJG without having to pay for them? One aspect of the law is tolerably clear, and that is, where property or goods are transferred under an illegal transaction or a lease granted for an illegal or an immoral purpose, the property will pass and an estate be created (see Feret v Hill (1854) 15 CB 207, [1843–60] All ER Rep 924, Belvoir Finance Co Ltd v Stapleton [1970] 3 All ER 664, [1971] 1 QB 210 and Tinsley v Milligan [1993] 3 All ER 65, [1994] 1 AC 340). At the end of the day I take the view that, subject to any question of severance, where services have been rendered and paid for under an unenforceable contract in circumstances where it cannot be suggested that the payee has, apart from entering into the agreement, acted unconscionably towards the payer or been unjustly enriched at his expense, it is unreal to hold that the consideration, albeit one contrary to public policy, has wholly failed and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the price of those services while retaining the benefit of them. The better rationale is that the champertous agreement is unenforceable rather than void or voidable. This view appears to be consistent with Re Hutley's goods and Cole v Booker (1913) 29 TLR 295. In Rees v De Bernardy [1896] 2 Ch 437 there are references to 'champertous and void' but the agreement was apparently treated as voidable and set aside on the grounds of undue influence. Ratification was argued and negatived on the grounds that the co-heiresses at law never knew of their right to rescind the agreement. There could not have been any question of rescinding a void agreement. Severance Mr Spearman [for the solicitors] submitted that severance could be effected by deleting the words 'for any lost cases' from the sentence ending 'our bills will be delivered when each matter is finalised in all respects with a 20% reduction from solicitor/client costs for any lost cases'. To my mind, this is not severance but an attempt at unilateral rectification by removing, to TJG's pecuniary disadvantage, the words creating a differential fee. Severance is not possible. I therefore conclude as follows: (1) the plaintiffs are not liable for unpaid bills; (2) where bills have been paid, the parties must remain where they find themselves."

Regina -v- Solicitors' Complaints Bureau, ex parte Singh and Chowdury (1995) 7 Admin LR 249
1995 Admn Lord Taylor LCJ	Legal Professions	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court considered the disciplinary duties of the Law Society: "The object of the provision is disciplinary. It is to assist in maintaining the standards to be achieved by solicitors and to provide sanctions in terms of costs and payment if the proper standards are not reached. It is the quality of the service . . . which is of importance."
	Solicitors Act 1974 Sch1A

Nederlandse Reassurantie Groep Holding NV -v- Bacon & Woodrow Holding [1995] 1 All ER 976
1995 Colman J	Legal Professions	Casemap 1 Citers
	The statement of the law in Balabel v Air India does not disturb or modify the principle affirmed in Minter v Priest, that all communications between a solicitor and his client relating to a transaction in which the solicitor has been instructed for the purpose of obtaining legal advice will be privileged, notwithstanding that they do not contain advice on matters of law or construction, provided that they are directly related to the performance by the solicitor of his professional duty as legal adviser of his client.

Pioneer Concrete (NSW) Pty Ltd -v- Webb (1995) ACSR 418
1995 Simos J	Commonwealth, Legal Professions	Casemap 1 Citers

Bristol & West Building Society -v- A Kramer & Co
26 Jan 1995 ChD	Negligence, Legal Professions
	Solicitors who acted in breach of the Building Society's express instructions in failing to report an adverse change in circumstances were liable to repay mortgage advance.

Practice Direction (Family Proceedings: Case Management)
31 Jan 1995 FD Sir Stephen Brown P	Family, Legal Professions
	The President of the Family Division handed down a Practice Direction on the need to avoiding delay and waste of costs in family proceedings. The courts would be free to take greater control of cases. A party who fails to conduct a matter economically could be subject to a wasted costs order. The court would exercise more readily the powers to limit pleadings, discovery, the length of submissions and cross examinations and otherwise. Unless directed a party's written statement should stand instead of oral evidence, and oral evidence should be restricted to material matters of fact, save for experts. Parties had a duty to the court to give full and frank disclosure in ancillary relief and children matters. The court set down standards for bundles to be used save in the simplest cases, including their supply to the court. Cases expected to last five days or more should have pre-trial reviews at which the intended advocates and judge should attend. Parties should supply to the court a list of the central documents in cases where there was no core bundle. The direction applied in the Family Division and was intended to mirror similar directions in other divisions.

Oxfordshire County Council -v- P (A Minor)
3 Feb 1995 FD	Legal Professions, Children
	A confession to a guardian ad litem in care proceedings is confidential to those proceedings.
	Children Act 1989 98

White and Another -v- Jones and Another [1995] 2 AC 207; [1995] UKHL 5; [1995] 1 All ER 691; [1995] 2 WLR 187
16 Feb 1995 HL Lord Goff, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Keith, Lord Mustill, Lord Nolan	Legal Professions, Professional Negligence	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	A solicitor drawing a will may be liable in negligence to a potential beneficiary, having unduly delayed in the drawing of the will. The Hedley Byrne principle was "founded upon an assumption of responsibility." Obligations may occasionally arise outside the terms of the retainer or where there is no retainer at all. Lord Browne-Wilkinson: ". . . By accepting instructions to draft a will, a solicitor does come into a special relationship with those intended to benefit under it in consequence of which the law imposes a duty to the intended beneficiary to act with due expedition and care in relation to the task on which he has entered . . . the assumption of responsibility referred to is the defendants' assumption of responsibility for the task not the assumption of legal liability. Even in cases of ad hoc relationships, it is the undertaking to answer the question posed which creates the relationship. If the responsibility for the task is assumed by the defendant he thereby creates a special relationship between himself and the plaintiff in relation to which the law (not the defendant) attaches a duty to carry out carefully the task so assumed. If this be the right view, it does much to allay the doubts about the utility of the concept of assumption of responsibility voiced by Lord Griffiths . . ."
	Link[s] omitted

Johnson -v- Bingley and Others
28 Feb 1995 QBD B A Hytner QC	Legal Professions, Professional Negligence
	A breach by a solicitor of the Law Society's 'Guide to Professional Conduct' was not ipso facto negligence. The guide set out what was proper and accepted practice. It was hot however mandatoty to follow it, and the existence of negligence was to be determined in accordance with the principles set out following Donoghue v Stevenson.

Wood -v- Law Society
1 Mar 1995 CA	Negligence, Administrative, Legal Professions	Casemap 1 Cites
	The solicitor had acted for the client in a series of loans, and had not disclosed his own directorship in one or more of the companies. His firm later acted for the lender in recovering possession form their former client. The claimant made several complaints to the Law Society. Held: A damages claim against Law Society for failure to deal properly with a complaint failed. The plaintiff's damages did not arise from the Society's fault, but that of the solicitor.

Boston & Co -v- Roberts
17 Mar 1995 CA	Legal Professions
	Solicitors were wrong to accept a bare guarantee on costs where there was a clear doubt as to ability to pay.

In Re A Barrister (Wasted Costs Order No 4 of 1993)
21 Apr 1995 CA	Legal Professions
	Wasted costs order set aside; no allowance had been made for the vagaries of listing.

In Re A Firm of Solicitors [1997] Ch 1; [1995] 3 All ER 482
9 May 1995 ChD Lightman J	Legal Professions	Casemap 1 Citers
	A solicitor moving from a firm acting on one side of a dispute to the firm on the other side must be able to show that no conflict of interest would arise. The court should intervene unless it is satisfied that there is no risk of disclosure. It goes without saying that the risk must be a real one, and not merely fanciful or theoretical. But it need not be substantial. Lightman J stated that in a "previous relationship" case, in the ordinary course a court will grant an injunction restraining the solicitor acting. Lightman J said: "The law regulating the freedom of a solicitor who, or whose firm, has at one time acted for a client subsequently to act against that client reflects the need to balance two public interests. First there is the interest in the entitlement of that client to the fullest confidence in the solicitor whom he instructs and for this purpose that there shall be no risk or perception of a risk that confidential information relating to the client or his affairs acquired by the solicitor will be disclosed to anyone else . . Second there is the interest in the freedom of the solicitor to obtain instructions from any member of the public, and of all members of the public to instruct such solicitor, in all cases where there is no real need for constraint; there must be good and sufficient reason to deprive the client of the solicitor or the solicitor of the client of his choice."

Cox -v- Bankside Members Agency Ltd and Others [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep 437
16 May 1995 CA Lord Justice Saville	Litigation Practice, Insurance, Legal Professions	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	Successful Lloyds names were entitled to enforce their claims in the normal time sequence. The transfer of the rights of the insured against the insurer under section 1(1) the 1930 Act takes place on the event of insolvency, even if the insured's liability to the third party has not yet been established. In handling claims, instructing solicitors and so forth, the insurers act as agents for the company and are entitled to reimbursement for their expenses. Lord Justice Saville: "Under the Act the rights of the insured against the insurer are transferred to the third party on (in the case of an insured company) the making of a winding up order etc.: see s.1(b) of the Act. It follows from this that a statutory transfer can take place before the obligation of the insurer to pay arises i.e. before the liability of the insured has been established. In such an event, since it is clear from the authorities that the third party is to be put in no better position than the insured, the third party does not obtain the right to immediate payment until the liability of the insured is established. . . . That right [the right of the third party to immediate payment by the insurers] only arises when, in each case, the claim is established, just as that right, while owned by the insured, would also arise only when the particular claim in question was established. It is only when that right arises that the insurers come under the correlative obligation to make payment. To my mind it follows that as each claim is established (whether before or after the statutory assignment), the right to payment arises and thus the amount of available insurance is in effect diminished, so that when it is exhausted later established claims have no right to an indemnity. . ."
	Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 1(1)(b)

Sampson -v- John Boddy Timber Ltd (1995) CAT 552
17 May 1995 CA Sir Thomas Bingham MR	Legal Professions	Casemap 1 Citers
	A barrister should not liable for wasted costs when he pursues arguable point for his client. Unless a party makes plain its intention that a settlement offer is made on an open basis, it remains covered by the cloak of the without prejudice rule

Alliance & Leicester Building Society and Others -v- Edgestop Ltd and Others (No 2)
23 May 1995 CA	Insolvency, Legal Professions
	A receiver's remuneration may be set by the court on either the standard or indemnity basis.

Penn -v- Bristol and West Building Society and Others [1995] FLR 938
19 Jun 1995 ChD	Legal Professions, Professional Negligence	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	Solicitors acting for a vendor were liable to the buyers' mortgagees for breach of warranty of authority for vendor. The solicitor was negligent in not having verified the instructions from the wife who was the joint tenant.

Halifax Mortgage Services Ltd (Formerly BNP Mortgages Ltd) -v- Stepsky and Another [1996] Ch 1
27 Jun 1995 ChD Edward Nugee QC	Land, Legal Professions, Banking	Casemap 1 Citers
	The knowledge of a solicitor, acting for both the borrower and the lender, of the lay clients intentions as regards the future use of the loan, is not to be imputed to the lender, even though the solicitor acts for both parties, and is the lender's agent.

In Re A Solicitors (Wasted Costs Order) (No 1 of 1994)
27 Jun 1995 CACD	Legal Professions, Costs
	A witness answering and resisting a summons is a sufficient party for 'wasted costs' order purposes.
	Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 111 - Costs in Criminal Cases (General) (Amendment) Regulations 1991 (1991 No 789)

Practice Direction: Court Dress
5 Jul 1995 LCJ	Legal Professions
	After consultation within the professions and elsewhere, the wearing of wigs is not to be extended to solicitor advocates.
	Courts and Legal Services Act 1990

In Re A Solicitor (No S2700 of 1995)
11 Jul 1995 ChD	Legal Professions
	'Dishonesty' in solicitor includes making false entries even where there was no financial loss.
	Solicitors Act 1974

Target Holdings Ltd -v- Redferns (A Firm) and Another [1996] 1 AC 421; [1995] UKHL 10; [1995] 3 All ER 785
21 Jul 1995 HL Lord Browne-Wilkinson	Legal Professions, Trusts, Damages	Casemap 1 Cites
	The defendant solicitors had acted for a purchaser, Crowngate, which had agreed to buy a property from a company called Mirage for £775,000. Crowngate had arranged however that the property would first be passed through a chain of two intermediate purchaser companies, Panther and Kohli, with Kohli then selling to Crowngate at a stated price of £2,000,000. Crowngate applied to Target for a loan to fund the purchase from Kohli based on this higher sale price, supported by a valuation of the property at £2m. The solicitors also acted for Target and were aware of the chain arrangement that inflated the purchase price, but did not disclose it to Target which agreed to lend £1.7m on the security of the property, of which about £1.5m was to fund the price payable to Kohli. The solicitors received the £1.5m on 28 June 1989. The following day they paid most of it to Panther (not Kohli) and on 30 June Panther used part of those funds to complete its purchase from Mirage at the agreed price of £775,000. Held: A solicitor, when he receives the money, does so as agent of the lending institution and holds it as bare trustee for the lending institution. Such a trustee acting in breach of trust is liable only for damages flowing from the breach itself. Trustees are not liable for a beneficiary's loss if that loss is not a consequence of the breach. Damages payable for money paid out in breach of trust may be reduced by inevitable losses which would have run in any event. Lord Browne-Wilkinson held the basic rule to be: "that a trustee in breach of trust must restore or pay to the trust estate either the assets which have been lost to the estate by reason of the breach or compensation for such loss. Courts of Equity did not award damages but, acting in personam, ordered the defaulting trustee to restore the trust estate. If specific restitution of the trust property is not possible, then the liability of the trustee is to pay sufficient compensation to the trust estate to put it back to what it would have been had the breach not been committed."
	[ Bailii ]

Mortgage Express Ltd -v- Bowerman & Partners (A Firm) [1996] 2 All ER 836
1 Aug 1995 CA Millett LJ, Bingham LJ	Legal Professions	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	A solicitor acting for both a lender and a borrower was under a duty to disclose relevant information to the lender client. Millett LJ: "A solicitor who acts for both a purchaser and a mortgage lender faces a potential conflict of duty. A solicitor who acts for more than one party to a transaction owes a duty of confidentiality to each client, but the existence of this duty does not affect his duty to act in the best interests of the other client." Bingham LJ: "A client cannot expect a solicitor to undertake work he has not asked him to do, and will not wish to pay him for such work. But if in the course of doing the work he is instructed to do the solicitor comes into possession of information which is not confidential and which is clearly of potential significance to the client, I think that the client would reasonably expect the solicitor to pass it on and feel understandably aggrieved if he did not."

Barclays Bank Plc -v- Eustice [1995] 1 WLR 1238
3 Aug 1995 CA	Legal Professions	Casemap 1 Citers
	No professional legal privilege existed for a lawyer client communication 'in iniquity', though before disclosure was ordered there should be a strong prima facie case of criminal or fraudulent conduct.

Re A Solicitor
4 Sep 1995 ChD	Legal Professions
	Law Society Council has authority to pass resolution on client's funds held in Society.
	Solicitors Act 1974 Sch 1 Para 6

Joyce -v- Kammac (1988) Ltd
16 Oct 1995 QBD	Legal Professions, Costs
	A contract between a lawyer and his client to recover only the excess of the costs over the 'Green Form' costs the lawyer which would be allowed, was illegal and a sham. Those excess costs could not therefore be recovered from a third party.

Regina -v- Derby Magistrates Court Ex Parte B [1996] AC 487; [1995] UKHL 18; [1996] 1 FLR 513; [1996] 1 Cr App R 385; (1995) 159 JP 785; [1996] Fam Law 210; [1995] 3 WLR 681; [1995] 4 All ER 526
19 Oct 1995 HL Lord Taylor of Gosforth CJ	Criminal Practice, Legal Professions	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	B was charged with the murder of a young girl. He made a confession to the police, but later changed his story, saying his stepfather had killed the girl. He was acquitted. The stepfather was then charged with the murder. At his committal for trial, B was called as a prosecution witness. He was asked by the defence about the instructions he had given his solicitors in relation to his original account of what had taken place. He declined to waive privilege. Held: Witness orders were not to be used to breach solicitor and client professional privilege. Legal professional privilege may protect all papers. The privilege is of overriding importance. "The law has been established . . subject to recognised exceptions, communications seeking professional legal advice, whether or not in connection with pending court proceedings, are absolutely and permanently privileged from disclosure even though, in consequence, the communications will not be available in court proceedings in which they might be important evidence." Lord Taylor of Gosforth CJ said: "A man must be able to consult his lawyer in confidence, since otherwise he might hold back half the truth. The client must be sure that what he tells his lawyer will never be revealed without his consent. Legal professional privilege is much more than an ordinary rule of evidence, limited in its application to the facts of a particular case. It is a fundamental condition on which the administration of justice as a whole rests. It is not for the sake of the applicant alone that the privilege must be upheld. It is in the wider interests of all those who might otherwise be deterred from telling the whole truth to their solicitors." and "Putting it another way, if a balancing exercise was ever required in the case of legal professional privilege, it was performed once and for all in the 16th century, and since then has applied across the board in every case, irrespective of the client's individual merits." Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead drew attention to the tension between the LPP rule on the one hand and, on the other, the public interest: "that all relevant material should be available to courts when deciding cases. Courts should not have to reach decisions in ignorance of the contents of documents or other material which, if disclosed, might well affect the outcome." He went on to reject the idea that a balancing exercise could be conducted as regards LPP on the facts of the particular case.
	Magistrates Courts Act 1980 97
	Link[s] omitted

Giles -v- the Law Society [1995] 8 Admn LR 105
20 Oct 1995 CA Sedley LJ	Legal Professions	1 Citers
	A notice of the Law Society's suspicion of dishonesty founding an intervention in a solicitor's practice, did not need to particularise the acts suspected. Sedley LJ said: "it is by common consent a matter for the court's judgment [on an application under paragraph 6(4) of schedule 1] (I prefer not to use the word discretion in this context) whether it should direct withdrawal – a judgment which may be significantly, though not conclusively, affected by the Law Society's own view of the facts, since the view taken by the professional body charged with the regulation of solicitors' practices is in itself a relevant evidential factor to which the judge not only can but must have regard."
	Solicitors Act 1974 Sch I Part II para 6

Ablitt -v- Mills & Reeve (A Firm) and Another
24 Oct 1995 ChD Blackburne J	Litigation Practice, Legal Professions	1 Citers
	A solicitor receiving privileged documents where there had been an obvious, error should return them. The defendant solicitors who, on their client's instructions, reviewed privileged information sent to them in error by counsel for the other party, were restrained from continuing to act. Blackburne J said: "it offends elementary notions of fairness and justice" if, by knowingly taking advantage of the mistaken delivery of privileged papers, a party to litigation, "although not itself told what those papers contain, can continue to have the services in the action of those who on its instructions have read all the papers and who, as a result, have a very accurate perception of just how those who act for the plaintiff view the merits of the plaintiff's claim and of the steps, tactically and otherwise, which they are advising the plaintiff to take in pursuit of his claim".

In Re P (Minors) (Representation) Times, 16 November 1995
16 Nov 1995 FD	Children, Legal Professions
	One counsel was unable to represent both the Local Authority and a child who appeared with proposals.

Gebhard -v- Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano C-55/94; [1995] ECR 1-4165; [1995] EUECJ C-55/94
30 Nov 1995 ECJ	Legal Professions, European	1 Cites 1 Citers
	Practice by lawyers in other European jurisdictions were governed by the general principles of freedom of establishment under the Treaty: "National measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfil four conditions: they must be applied in a non discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it." Europa A national of a Member State who pursues a professional activity on a stable and continuous basis in another Member State where he holds himself out from an established professional base to, amongst others, nationals of that State comes under the chapter relating to the right of establishment and not the chapter relating to services. As appears from the third paragraph of Article 60 of the Treaty, the rules on freedom to provide services cover ° at least where the provider moves in order to provide his services ° the situation in which a person moves from one Member State to another, not for the purposes of establishment there, but in order to pursue his activity there on a temporary basis. The temporary nature of the activities in question has to be determined in the light of its duration, regularity, periodicity and continuity. This does not mean that the provider of services within the meaning of the Treaty may not equip himself with some form of infrastructure in the host Member State (including an office, chambers or consulting rooms) in so far as such infrastructure is necessary for the purposes of performing the services in question. 3. The possibility for a national of a Member State to exercise his right of establishment, and the conditions for his exercise of that right, must be determined in the light of the activities which he intends to pursue on the territory of the host Member State. Where the taking-up of a specific activity is not subject to any rules in the host State, a national of any other Member State will be entitled to establish himself and pursue that activity there. On the other hand, where the taking-up or the pursuit of a specific activity is subject to certain conditions in the host Member State, a national of another Member State intending to pursue that activity must in principle comply with them. Such conditions, which may consist in particular of an obligation to hold particular diplomas, to belong to a professional body or to comply with certain rules of professional conduct or with rules relating to the use of professional titles, must fulfil certain requirements where they are liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty, such as freedom of establishment. There are four such requirements: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it. As far as conditions relating to the possession of a qualification are concerned, Member States must take account of the equivalence of diplomas and, if necessary, proceed to a comparison of the knowledge and qualifications required by their national rules and those of the person concerned.
	EC Treaty 43 - Council Directive 77/249/EEC
	Link[s] omitted

Halifax Mortgage Services Ltd (Formerly BNP Mortgages Ltd) -v- Stepsky and Another [1996] Ch 207
1 Dec 1995 CA Morritt LJ	Agency, Legal Professions, Banking	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The knowledge of a solicitor, acting for both the borrower and the lender, of the lay clients intentions as regards the future use of the loan, is not to be imputed to the lender, even though the solicitor acts for both parties, and is the lender's agent. Morritt LJ discussed section 199: "Counsel for the wife submitted that it did not apply as the knowledge came to the knowledge of the solicitors for the lender as such when they were instructed to act on behalf of the lender on 19 June 1990. In the case of the wife it was submitted that the solicitors were not instructed by her as "agents to know." I do not accept either of these submissions. In my view the section has to be applied in accordance with its terms to the facts of this case. There is no doubt that the information as to the true purpose of the remortgage loan imparted by the husband came to the knowledge of the solicitors on 12 June 1990 as the solicitors for the husband and wife alone for they were not instructed to act for the lenders until 19 June at the earliest. That knowledge once acquired remained with the solicitors and cannot be treated as coming to them again when they were instructed on behalf of the lenders. As counsel for the wife accepted, their knowledge cannot be treated as divided or disposed of and reacquired in that way. The conclusion seems to me to be inescapable, namely that knowledge of the relevant matters facts or things did not come to the solicitors as the solicitors for the lenders. Accordingly it did not come to them "as such." It was not disputed that the lender is a purchaser within the definition contained in section 205(1)(xxi) of the Law of Property Act 1925. Consequently section 199(1)(ii)...b) precludes the solicitors' knowledge of the relevant matters or facts being imputed to the lender."
	Law of Property Act 1925 199

In Re Freudiana Holdings Ltd
4 Dec 1995 CA	Legal Professions	Casemap
	A judge can discharge his own wasted costs order when issues came to required the re-litigation of the case.

Thatcher -v- Douglas and Another
19 Dec 1995 CA	Legal Professions, Registered Land	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The Court rejected the contention that Celsteel was wrongly decided and that the Rule only applied to legal easements. The court followed Celsteel and applied it to equitable easements, holding them to be overriding interests by virtue of Rule 258. A barrister was wrong to make allegations against a judge without having supporting evidence.
	Land Registration Rules 1925 8258

Kershaw -v- Whelan
20 Dec 1995 QBD	Legal Professions	Casemap 1 Citers
	A claimant against a solicitor was deemed to have waived legal privilege for all relevant documents.

Tolstoy-Miloslavsky -v- Aldington [1996] 1 WLR 736
27 Dec 1995 CA Rose LJ	Costs, Defamation, Legal Professions	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	Solicitors who unreasonably commence proceedings may be subject to a wasted costs order, but there should be no award of costs against a solicitor solely because he acted without a fee. An award of costs should not be made against a solicitor who had acted for a client in a defamation action which was lost, and where the costs would be irrecoverable from the plaintiff, solely because the solicitor had acted without a fee. Rose LJ said: "Section 51(1) and (3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 do not confer jurisdiction to make an order for costs against legal representatives when acting as legal representatives." and "In my judgment Mr Mansfield is correct in his submission that there are only three categories of conduct which can give rise to an order for costs against a solicitor: 1. It is within the wasted costs jurisdiction of section 51(6) and (7); 2. It is otherwise a breach of duty to the court, such as even before the Judicature Acts could found an order, eg if he acts even unwittingly without authority or in breach of an undertaking; 3. If he acts outside the role of solicitor, eg in a private capacity or as a true third party funder for someone else."
	Supreme Court Act 1981 51(6) 51(7)