Litigation Practice - 2000
All matters relating to civil litigation practice. See also County Court Rules, Costs. More recent cases will also be found under the Civil Procedure Rules area.
The case shown here are derived from the lawindexpro case law database.
lawindexpro is a low cost case law database, with over 260,000 case listings, and over 200,000 links to full text judgments. The free service below shows the core information on the case, but is restricted in several ways. A small proportion of cases do allow access to the full lawindexpro information. These cases are selected at random, and may be different on your next visit. The active links through to lawindexpro are extremely powerful allowing full access to all linked cases.
This page lists 141 cases, and was prepared on 13 May 2012.
| | |
| Khreino -v- Khreino [2000] 1 FCR 75 |
|
2000 CAThorpe LJ, Mummery LJ |
Family, Litigation Practice, Human Rights |
Casemap
1 Citers
|
The court heard a renewed application for leave to appeal. A single Lord Justice had directed that any oral renewal of the application for permission should be heard by a court of two, of which he was to be a member. Objection was taken to him being a member of the court, having already given his opnion on the papers. Held: The renewed application could by heard by a court including the judge who had rejected the original request on the papers.
Thorpe LJ: "The manifest intention of the practice direction is to enable applications for permission to be dealt with by a single judge of the court on paper in much the same way as the application for permission is dealt with by the trial judge on paper. It is important that the single Lord Justice should have a profound understanding of the case and of the arguments advanced in support of the application for permission. To ensure that he receives such papers as would be conventionally before the court at an oral hearing under the former practice he also now has the advantage of a full skeleton argument supporting the application for permission. Therefore his refusal on paper is a considered and reasoned refusal after full consideration of all relevant material, including the applicant's detailed submissions. In the majority of cases it is intended to be the end of the application for permission unless the single Lord Justice has fallen into manifest error or unless there has been some unexpected subsequent development. So it seems to me that the right to require a subsequent oral hearing has a real purpose and function in the minority of cases. Of course the importance that we attach to oral argument has always been a distinguishing characteristic of our forensic system. But ordinarily there must be more than that to justify renewal. Perhaps on further consideration the advocate has perceived a submission not previously advanced. There might also be circumstances in which subsequent to the signing of the provisional refusal there was some unexpected development in relation to the appeal or some development of the relevant precedent law."
Mummery LJ: "The course taken could not possibly be regarded as a breach of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The first sentence of that Article provides: 'In the determination of his civil rights and obligations everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.' The procedure laid down is that applications for permission to appeal are made ex parte and they are considered on paper. The rules require that, in support of the application for permission to appeal, the party seeking to appeal will submit a skeleton argument. That sets out all the points which he would wish to pursue on the appeal. The single Lord Justice who considers it is able to form a view whether or not the appeal on those grounds has a real prospect of success. There has therefore been a fair hearing, within a reasonable time of an ex parte application. That hearing was before an independent and impartial tribunal. An oral hearing was requested. This oral hearing is in public. There is no breach of any common law principle of procedural fairness which, like Article 6, requires that a hearing takes place before an unbiased tribunal or court. There is no requirement that every application shall receive an oral hearing. It is appropriate that an ex parte application for permission to appeal should be considered initially as a paper application. Mr Turner [counsel making the application] says that if the Lord Justice who has indicated that he is minded to refuse and gives reasons for it sits on the oral hearing that renders the oral hearing pointless, because it is taking place before a judge who has already made up his mind. That is a misunderstanding of the procedure. The Lord Justice who has indicated that he is minded to refuse leave to appeal is obliged to consider the matter at the oral hearing in the light of any further points. The oral hearing is not an appeal from an earlier decision. These points may range from updating the court on matters which have occurred since the application was considered in July; drawing the court's attention to new authorities which had not been discovered at the time of submitting the skeleton argument or had not been decided and reported at that time. The oral hearing also provides an occasion for dealing with errors and omissions in the reasons stated in the minded to refuse letter. The oral hearing is not pointless. I agree with my Lord as to the circumstances in which an application for an oral hearing is conducted after the matter has been fully considered on a paper application. Mr Turner's objection to the propriety or validity of the constitution of this court should be rejected." |
| | |
| L -v- Tower Hamlets London Borough Council and Havering London Borough Council [2000] 3 All ER 346 |
|
2000
|
Children, Litigation Practice |
|
|
| | |
| Omar's Trustees -v- Omar (2000) BCC 434 |
|
2000 ChDJacob J |
Litigation Practice, Legal Professions |
Casemap
1 Citers
|
| The court considered an application for discovery claimed to be protected by litigation privilege: The court founf "that in principle the existence or absence of privilege is not affected by whether the fraud concerns an earlier transaction or the conduct of the proceedings themselves". |
| | |
| Azimi -v- Newham London Borough Council (2000) 33 HLR 51 |
|
2000
|
Housing, Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Citers
|
| In a case where a claimant appealed to the court of appeal from the county court, and where the hearing at the county court had itself been an appeal, such a case was a second appeal, and a much higher threshold had to be passed before it was allowed. |
| | |
| L -v- United Kingdom [2000] 2 FLR 322 |
|
2000 ECHR |
Litigation Practice, Human Rights |

1 Citers
|
| The court coinsidered a claim for the privilege against self-incrimination: "As held in Saunders v. United Kingdom ... the right not to incriminate oneself is primarily concerned with respecting the will of the accused person to remain silent and does not extend to the use in criminal proceedings of material which may be obtained from the accused through the use of compulsory powers and which has an existence independent of the will of the accused ...e.g. documents, breath, blood, urine and tissue samples)." |
| | |
| Sunworld Limited -v- Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [2000] 1 WLR 2102; [1999] EWHC QB 271 |
|
2000 QBDSimon Brown LJ, Turner J |
Litigation Practice, Judicial Review |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
The company faced a prosecution under the 1968 Act, in respect of a brochure. On conviction, the company asked the Crown Court to state a case for the Divisional Court. The Recorder refused as to two points, saying that they were decisions of fact not law. The company sought judicial review for mandamus to require the case to be stated. Held: The court heard an appeal which should have been brought by way of judicial review. The court gave the necessary directions, and proceeded to treat the hearing as such an application.
Simon Brown LJ suggested the appropriate practice: "(1) Where a court, be it a Magistrates' Court or a Crown Court, refuses to state a case, then the party aggrieved should without delay apply for permission to bring judicial review, either (a) to mandamus it to state a case and/or (b) to quash the order sought to be appealed. (2) If the court below has already (a) given a reasoned judgment containing all the necessary findings of fact and/or (b) explained its refusal to state a case in terms which clearly raise the true point of law in issue, then the correct course would be for the single judge, assuming he thinks the point properly arguable, to grant permission for judicial review which directly challenges the order complained of, thereby avoiding the need for a case to be stated at all. (3) If the court below has stated a case but in respect of some questions only, as here, the better course may be to apply for the case stated to be amended unless again, as here, there already exists sufficient material to enable the Divisional Court to deal with all the properly arguable issues in the case. (4) This court for its part will adopt whatever course involves the fewest additional steps and the least expense, delay and duplication of proceedings. Whether, as in Ex Parte Levy, it will be possible to proceed at once to a substantive determination of the issues must inevitably depend in part upon whether all interested parties are represented and prepared, and in part upon the availability of court time." |
| Trade Descriptions Act 1968 14(1)(b)(ii) |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| in Re CH (family proceedings: court bundles) [2000] 2 FCR 193 |
|
2000 FDWall J |
Family, Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Citers
|
|
| | |
| Shepherd -v- Wheeler [2000] WTLR 1175 |
|
2000 ChDLawrence Collins QC |
Wills and Probate, Litigation Practice |
Casemap

1 Citers
|
| An application was made without notice for the appointment of an alleged creditor under section 116 as administrator of the deceased's intestate estate. Held: The court applied the standard principles of an enhanced duty of disclosure in without notice applications in probate actions. |
| Supreme Court Act 1981 116 |
| | |
| GKR Karate (UK) Limited -v- Porch, Yorkshire Post Newspaper, Holmes [2000] EWHC QB 180; (2000) EMLR 396 |
|
17 Jan 2000 QBDSir Oliver Popplewell |
Defamation, Litigation Practice, Media |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| The claimant sought damages alleging defamation. The judge ordered certain elements of the case to be heard first, and others, if necessary later. Although the case had been begun under the old rules, the new civil procedure regime gave the judge much wider powers of management, and defamation cases were notoriously expensive and lengthy and the powers were particularly appropriate for use in defamation cases. As to qualified privilege: "A privileged occasion exists if the public is entitled to know the particular information. That is, if it was the journalist's social or moral duty to communicate it and the interest of the particular public to receive it. This is determined in the light of all the circumstances of the publication and, in particular, whether the sources were, or appeared to be reliable, to a reasonable and responsible journalist. While Lord Nicholls' ten examples are not to be taken as written in stone, they form the basic framework upon which a judge can do the balancing exercise." and "In particular, I am adjured to avoid hindsight, attach importance to the freedom of expression, be slow to conclude that publication was not in the public interest, to resolve any lingering doubts in favour of publication, and to be flexible in my approach." |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Field -v- Leeds City Council (2000) 17 EG 165 |
|
18 Jan 2000 CALord Woolf |
Litigation Practice, Housing |
Casemap
1 Citers
|
| The question arose whether the court should give permission for the evidence of a surveyor employed by the City Council to be adduced as expert evidence. It was argued that the surveyor could not bring the necessary objectivity to bear on the issues in the case. Held: A witness can be an expert witness in court proceedings even though he is employed by one of the parties. He needed to demonstrate that he was properly qualified, and that he understood that he first duty was to the court and not to his employer or the party calling him. The judgment could not be made by the judge as to whether he was acceptable without first seeing his report which might demonstrate such matters. |
| | |
| Practice Statement (Companies Court) |
|
19 Jan 2000 ChD |
Company, Litigation Practice |
|
| From January 2000, applications in company matters need not be heard only by a companies judge, and matters which had previously been listed on Mondays for this purpose need no longer be so listed. Urgent applications would also be dealt with by the applications judge. |
| | |
| In Re Westminster Property Management Ltd |
|
19 Jan 2000 ChD |
Litigation Practice, Human Rights, Company |
|
| Since company director disqualification proceedings were not criminal proceedings, even though they involved the imposition of a penalty, they remained civil proceedings in nature. The European Convention on Human Rights did not apply to protect a director against having material, disclosed by him under compulsion in the course of an insolvency, being used against him in disqualification proceedings. |
| European Convention on Human Rights - Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 |
| | |
| Bridgeman -v- Brown [2000] EWCA Civ 524 |
|
19 Jan 2000 CAEvans, Hale, Rattee LJJ |
Personal Injury, Litigation Practice |
|
|
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Morris and Others -v- Bank of America National Trust and Others |
|
20 Jan 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| The defendant applied to strike out the claimant's statement of case as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. The points of claim ran to 228 paragraphs, and they said that they repeated matters covered in the evidence filed in support. On appeal against dismissal of the application, it was held that there were circumstances where pleadings might have to quote extensively from such materials. Such an application should succeed only if no cause of action could be made out, and a full trial might be avoided. |
| | |
| Arrow Nominees Inc, Blackledge (L) -v- Blackledge (G), Blackledge (M), Blackledge (GR & MM) [2000] EWHC Ch 177 |
|
21 Jan 2000 ChDEvans-Lombe J |
Company, Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| The claimants had begun proceedings claiming unfair prejudice by the defendants in the management of the business. The defendants sought to have the petition struck out saying that the claimants had used falsified documents to base their petition. At one hearing the court had found such behaviour, but had declined to strike out the petition. Held: The court found that the dishonesty of the claimant had extended beyond what he admitted. The papers submitted were not merely fraudulent attempts to recreate lost documents but were in fact entirely false, and it was difficult for the court to trust much of the documentation on which the petition was based. |
| Companies Act 1985 459 461 |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| International Distillers and Vintners Ltd -v- J F Hillebrand (Uk) Ltd and Others |
|
25 Jan 2000 QBD |
Litigation Practice |
|
| An application was made to substitute one defendant in an action for an existing one. Under the old rules, the applicant would have to have shown both that the substitution arose from a genuine mistake and also that the new defendant had not been prejudiced. The new rules stated no such requirements, but the court held that it could not be imagined that such a requirement was not intended under the new rules. |
| Civil Procedure Rules Part 19.4 |
| | |
| DNB Mortgages -v- Bullock and Lees [2000] EWCA Civ 20 |
|
28 Jan 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice |
Casemap

|
| An application on an appeal to allow a new point to be argued should not in any event be entertained unless the facts proposed to found the point, if fully investigated, were clear beyond reasonable doubt. The higher level of proof was set down in Connecticut Fire Insurance Co v Kavanagh. |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| HM Attorney General -v- Ebert [2000] EWHC Admin 286 |
|
31 Jan 2000 Admn |
Litigation Practice |
|
|
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Practice Direction (Mercantile Court: Wales and Chester) |
|
1 Feb 2000 LCJ |
Litigation Practice |
|
| The Lord Chief Justice announced the opening of two new mercantile lists, one in the Cardiff District Registry (the 'Cardiff Mercantile Court List') and the second in Chester (the 'Chester Mercantile Court List'). |
| | |
| Practice Direction (Royal Courts of Justice: Reading List Time Estimates) |
|
1 Feb 2000 ChD |
Litigation Practice |
|
| When filing a bundle with the High Court, the parties must from January 11 2000, also file a reading list and an estimate of the time required for that reading. If the parties are unable to agree that list, then each should submit separate lists and time estimates. |
| | |
| Mont Blanc Simplo Gmbh -v- Sepia Products Inc |
|
2 Feb 2000 ChD |
Intellectual Property, Litigation Practice |
|
| In cases involving allegations of passing off, the judge in the case will usually be able himself to assess whether and to what extent there may have been confusion engendered in the minds of potential customers. Accordingly, there will not always be a necessity for claimants to bring forward evidence of actual confusion in the minds of the public. |
| | |
| Harris -v- Bolt Burdon (A Firm) [2000] EWCA Civ 3037; [2000] CP Rep 70; [2000] CPLR 9 |
|
2 Feb 2000 CA |
Limitation, Professional Negligence, Litigation Practice |
Casemap

|
| A case is suitable for striking out which raises an unwinnable case, where continuance of the proceedings is without any possible benefit and would waste resources on both sides. |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Dew Pitchmastic Plc -v- Birse Construction Ltd [2000] EWHC Technology 169 |
|
2 Feb 2000 TCC |
Construction, Litigation Practice |
|
|
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Instance and Others -v- Denny Bros Printing Ltd and Others [2000] FSR 869 |
|
3 Feb 2000 ChDMr Justice Lloyd |
Intellectual Property, Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| The dispute arose between parties to without prejudice communications or who had obtained documents from such persons and were commercially connected with them. Held: An implied agreement would bind them as parties or by reason of the source of the documents in their hands. The without prejudice communications were governed by an implied agreement that they will not be used in the current or any subsequent litigation between the same or related parties. It was not appropriate to leave the issue to the foreign court to decide on admissibility, and an injunction was granted against their use. "The present dispute arises between persons who either were parties to the original communications or have obtained the documents from persons who were such parties, and, to the extent that it be relevant, are commercially and corporately connected with such parties. If there was an implied agreement the persons before me are either bound by it as parties or must be taken to be subject to it by reason of the source of the documents in their hands. In my judgment it is very strongly arguable, and indeed probable, that the without prejudice communications are indeed governed by an implied agreement that they will not be used in the current or any subsequent litigation between the same or related parties . . It is correct in my judgment to regard the protection as extending to subsequent litigation because otherwise on the one hand the public policy recognised by Lord Griffiths and other judges and on the other hand the expectation of the parties would not be fulfilled but rather would be subverted. The position may perhaps be different in practice between two parties who are brought together for example by the circumstances of a road accident and may never have anything else to do with each other, but the holders of patents in related areas, whether or not they are to be regarded as competitors, may well, through themselves or their licensees, come up against each other in a number of different commercial circumstances giving rise, not only among the litigation-prone, to several different disputes over time, such that it cannot be assumed that one piece of litigation is the last there will ever be." |
| | |
| Cleveland Structural Engineering (Hong Kong) Ltd -v- Advanced Specialist Treatment Engineering Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 558; [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 189 |
|
7 Feb 2000 ComCColman J |
Arbitration, Litigation Practice |
|
An arbitration claim is said to be commenced when the claim is filed, and not when served. Because of this the respondents to an appeal in such proceedings were to be allowed to see the papers filed in support of an application for leave to appeal, as persons who were an interested party in such an application.
ComC Circumstances in which there may be inspection of arbitration claim forms filed in the Commercial Court Registry which have not yet been served on the respondent. Application of CPR 5-4(1) and (2). |
| | |
| British Technology Group Ltd -v- Boehringer Mannheim Corporation and Deputy Orthopaedics Inc [2000] EWHC Technology 148 |
|
13 Feb 2000 TCC |
Litigation Practice |
|
|
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Dearman -v- Simpletest Ltd |
|
14 Feb 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice, Landlord and Tenant |
|
| Notes in the White Book were procedural rather than black letter law, and a claim for possession was not to be defeated only because the claimant had failed to join in all the parties listed in the note. Such notes were intended to be of assistance to practitioners, and not to create a compulsory requirement. |
| | |
| Riverpath Properties Ltd -v- Brammall |
|
16 Feb 2000 ChD |
Litigation Practice |
|
| The Civil Procedure Rules (at 23-11) allow a court to set aside a court order even after the order had been perfected. The court should have a very wide discretion to alter orders, particularly those made in the absence of a party. |
| | |
| Attorney-General -v- Barker [2001] 1 FLR 759 |
|
16 Feb 2000 CALord Bingham CJ |
Constitutional, Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Citers
|
An order that someone be denied access to the courts save with consent of a judge was a challenge to that individual's constitutional rights, and should only be made if the statutory pre-conditions are fulfilled. It had to be shown that the litigant had habitually and persistently and without reasonable ground instituted vexatious civil proceedings. Without fulfillment of that pre-condition, no discretion lay in the judge to make an order. That precondition was not satisfied in this case, and an order was refused.
Lord Bingham CJ: "'Vexatious' is a familiar term in legal parlance. The hallmark of a vexatious proceedings is in my judgment that it has little or no basis in law (or at least no discernible basis); that whatever the intention of the proceeding may be, its effect is to subject the defendant to inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to any gain likely to accrue to the claimant; and that it involves an abuse of the process of the court, meaning by that a use of the court process for a purpose or in a way which is significantly different from the ordinary and proper use of the court process." and "From extensive experience of dealing with applications under section 42 the court has become familiar with the hallmark of persistent and habitual litigious activity. The hallmark usually is that the plaintiff sues the same party repeatedly in reliance on essentially the same cause of action, perhaps with minor variations, after it has been ruled upon, thereby imposing on defendants the burden of resisting claim after claim; that the claimant relies on essentially the same cause of action, perhaps with minor variations, after it has been ruled upon, in actions against successive parties who if they were to be sued at all should have been joined in the same action; that the claimant automatically challenges every adverse decision on appeal; and that the claimant refuses to take any notice of or give any effect to orders of the court. The essential vice of habitual and persistent litigation is keeping on and on litigating when earlier litigation has been unsuccessful and when on any rational and objective assessment the time has come to stop." |
| Supreme Court Act 1981 42(1) |
| | |
| Messier-Dowty Ltd and Another -v- Sabena Sa and Others [2000] EWCA Civ 48; [2000] 1 WLR 2040 |
|
21 Feb 2000 CALord Mustill, The Master Of The Rolls Lady Justice Hale |
Litigation Practice, Jurisdiction |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| The defendants sought a declaration that they would not be liable in respect of their potential involvement in a pending action. The appellants asserted that such a declaration could not be granted since no proceedings were yet in issue. The court said that such orders might be useful in simplifying international court actions, and that a primary motive for seeking the order was to establish a UK jurisdiction was not determinative. Lord Woolf summarised the modern position on granting negative declarations: "The approach is pragmatic. It is not a matter of jurisdiction, it is matter of discretion. The deployment of negative declarations should be scrutinised and their use rejected where it would serve no useful purpose. However, where a negative declaration would help to ensure that the aims of justice are achieved the court should not be reluctant to grant such declarations. They can and do assist in achieving justice . . . While negative declarations can perform a positive role they are an unusual remedy insofar as they reverse the more usual roles of the parties. The natural defendant becomes a claimant and vice-versa. This can result in procedural complications and possible injustice to an unwilling 'defendant'. This in itself justifies caution in extending the circumstances where negative declarations are granted, but, subject to the exercise of appropriate circumspection, there should be no reluctance to their being granted when it is useful to do so." |
| Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (1968) (Cmnd 7395) |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Re B (Sexual Abuse: Expert's Report) [2000] EWCA Civ 516; [2000] 2 FCR 8; [2000] Fam Law 479; (2000) 164 JPN 624; [2000] 1 FLR 871 |
|
22 Feb 2000 CA |
Children, Litigation Practice |
|
|
| [ Bailii ] |
| | |
| Allergan Inc and Another -v- Sauflon Pharmaceuticals Ltd [2000] EWHC Patents 168 |
|
24 Feb 2000 PatC |
Litigation Practice, Intellectual Property |
|
| A claimant in patent infringement proceedings sought leave to join in the defendant's Spanish supplier as a joint tortfeasor. The application was refused because before exposing a foreign party to the expense of defending such proceedings there had to be shown an arguable case. Here what was shown was compatible with proper acts of a supplier supporting his customer with information as to the product being sold, the market and providing information which might assist the defendant to defend. |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
|
24 Feb 2000 ChD |
Litigation Practice, International |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| In a dispute between an Italian company and British one, each sought to have the case heard in its own country. The British company asserted that the case begun in Italy had been begun after at best misrepresentation by the other company, and sought an injunction preventing its being heard in Italy. The UK court refused to issue the injunction. It had the power to do so, but the parties must rely upon the Italian courts to discover the truth, and was asserted fell short of abuse of process. |
| Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Comercial Matters 1965 Cmd 3986 - Brussels Convention on Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1968 |
| | |
| Annodeus Ltd and Others -v- Gibson and Others |
|
2 Mar 2000 ChDNeuberger J |
Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Citers
|
| The court listed relevant issues for any strike out application on the grounds of want of prosecution, including the length of delay, the degree of compliance with court rules and orders, any prejudice to the defendant, and any effect on the trial and other parties, any contribution by the defendant to the delay, the respective conduct of the claimant and defendant, and any other relevant factors |
| | |
| Commissioners of Customs & Excise -v- Eastwood Care Homes (Ilkeston) Ltd and Others |
|
7 Mar 2000 QBD |
Litigation Practice |
|
| Under the new litigation regime, the objective of serving justice required a fundamentally different approach to applications for extension of time for service of a notice of appeal. Under the earlier system inadvertence by a legal representative might well be fatal to such an application, but not so now. |
| | |
| Ashe -v- Mumford and Others |
|
7 Mar 2000 ChD |
Litigation Practice, Insolvency |
|
| The Regulation under question was procedural;, and a failure to comply with its requirements was not to be deemed fatal. The requirement for a trustee to identify the transactions to be set aside did not require every single part of the scheme to be detailed, provided as in this case the purpose of the scheme was clearly to defeat creditors and the trustee in bankruptcy. The mother of a bankrupt purchased her council house with a fifty per cent discount, and was funded as to the rest by the bankrupt's wife. |
| Insolvency Rules 1986 (1986 No 1925) 7.3 |
| | |
| Anglo Group Plc, Winther Brown & Co Ltd -v- Winter Brown & Co Ltd, BML (Office Computers) Ltd, Anglo Group Plc, BML (Office Computers) Ltd [2000] EWHC Technology 127 |
|
8 Mar 2000 TCCToulmin QC J |
Litigation Practice, Contract, Agency |
Casemap
1 Cites
|
cs Contract - Contract for provision of computer services - purchaser contract with finance company - duty of co-operation to be implied in computer contracts - practice - responsibilities of expert witnesses generally - whether computer company liable to purchaser - whether purchaser liable to finance company.
The parties disputed the delivery and quality of a computer system. The buyer complained of many defects and eventually sought to reject the system. Held: Anglo's claim succeeded. The court provided updated Ikarian Reefer guidelines for expert witnesses. The court criticised one expert witness for failing to keep separate his role as negotiator and witness. It is normally inappropriate to seek to combine the two.
The court gave Ikarian Reefer guidelines updated to comply with the CPR: "1.An expert witness should at all stages in the procedure, on the basis of the evidence as he understands it, provide independent assistance to the court and the parties by way of objective unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his expertise. This applies as much to the initial meetings of experts as to evidence at trial. An expert witness should never assume the role of an advocate. 2. The expert's evidence should normally be confined to technical matters on which the court will be assisted by receiving an explanation, or to evidence of common professional practice. The expert witness should not give evidence or opinions as to what the expert himself would have done in similar circumstances or otherwise seek to usurp the role of the judge. 3.He should co-operate with the expert of the other party or parties in attempting to narrow the technical issues in dispute at the earliest possible stage of the procedure and to eliminate or place in context any peripheral issues. He should co-operate with the other expert(s) in attending without prejudice meetings as necessary and in seeking to find areas of agreement and to define precisely arrears of disagreement to be set out in the joint statement of experts ordered by the court. 4.The expert evidence presented to the court should be, and be seen to be, the independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form or content by the exigencies of the litigation. 5.An expert witness should state the facts or assumptions upon which his opinion is based. He should not omit to consider material facts which could detract from his concluded opinion. 6.An expert witness should make it clear when a particular question or issue falls outside his expertise. 7.Where an expert is of the opinion that his conclusions are based on inadequate factual information he should say so explicitly. 8.An expert should be ready to reconsider his opinion, and if appropriate, to change his mind when he has received new information or has considered the opinion of the other expert . He should do so at the earliest opportunity." |
| Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 9 |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Victor Chandler International -v- Commissioners of Customs and Excise and another [2000] EWHC Admin 299; [2000] 1 WLR 1296 |
|
8 Mar 2000 CASir Richard Scott, Lord Justice Chadwick, Lord Justice Buxton |
Media, Licensing, Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| A teletext page can be a document for gaming licensing purposes. A bookmaker sought to advertise his services via a teletext page. His services were not licensed in this country, but the advertisements were. It was held that despite the insubstantial nature of a teletext broadcast, the page constituted, sufficiently for the Act, 'an advertisement or other document … issued circulated or distributed' in the UK. The page held recorded information. The page was within the mischief contemplated. Chadwick LJ: The error in his reasoning, as it seems to me, was to regard the transmission of electronic impulses from one electronic database to another as the transmission of "information" as if that were something distinct from the transmission of a "document". The true analysis is that the transmission of electronic impulses is simply that: it is nothing more nor less than the transmission of electronic impulses. It is the combination of those impulses within co-ordinates and groups that may convey information. If the impulses are transmitted to a system which is capable of receiving and storing them in the same, or some derivative, combination - so that they can be analysed or "read" - then it may be said that a document is created in or on the recipient database. It is as apt to describe the process as the transmission of a document as it is to describe it as the transmission of information. Indeed, it is now a matter of common parlance to talk of "sending a document" from one computer to another. But what is really happening is that, by the transmission of electronic impulses in a combination, or "language", which the recipient system can read, the sender is creating a document on the recipient database. |
| Betting and Gaming Duties Act 1981 9(1)(b) |
| [ Bailii ] |
| | |
| Amerada Hess and Others -v- C W Rome and Others |
|
9 Mar 2000 QBD |
Litigation Practice, Limitation |
|
| The claimants had served proceedings on an agent who did not have authority to accept such service. They sought, out of time, leave to re-serve correctly, and also to add an additional cause of action which whilst now outside the limitation period arose out of the same facts. Held: The first application was refused. The court could only so act if preconditions were met, particularly here that the claimant had acted promptly. He had not so acted, and the court had no discretion to allow the re-service. The application to amend was granted. |
| | |
| Practice Direction (Family Proceedings: Court Bundles) Times, 22 March 2000; [2000] 1 WLR 737; [2000] 1 FLR 536 |
|
10 Mar 2000
|
Family, Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Citers
|
| There should at be lodged with the court a summary of the background to the hearing; a statement of the issue or issues to be determined; a summary of the order or directions sought by each party; a chronology; and skeleton arguments. |
| | |
| Odyssey Re (London) Limited and Alexander Howden Holdings Limited -v- OIC Run-Off Limited (Formerly Orion Insurance Company Plc) [2000] EWCA Civ 71 |
|
13 Mar 2000 CA |
Company, Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites

|
| There had been litigation between the two companies previously. The general manager and director had given evidence which was accepted by the judge and again on appeal. After his death and in other proceedings it became clear that he had perjured himself. The applicant sought to have the judgment set aside. Since the company could not itself give evidence, the question was whether the evidence of the director was that of the company allowing the judgment to be set aside. One question was the extent of his involvement in the preparation of the case. The test was described: "The rule on which this court acted in Boswell v Coaks, which I have held to continue to be the law, is that the fraud or perjury must be that of the party himself, or at least be suborned by or knowingly relied on by that party." |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Youell and others -v- Kara Mara Shipping Company Ltd and others [2000] EWHC 220 (Comm); [2000] CLC 1058; [2001] Lloyds Rep IR 553; [2001] IL Pr 34; [2001] Lloyd's Rep IR 553; [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep 102 |
|
13 Mar 2000 ComCAikens J |
Jurisdiction, Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites
|
|
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Leyvand -v- Barasch and Others |
|
16 Mar 2000 ChD |
Costs, Litigation Practice |
|
| In a partnership dispute the defendants sought an order for security for costs against the claimant, saying that he was ordinarily resident abroad. It was held that under the new regime such an order would not follow as a matter of course. The sole test was what was the just in the particular case. The existence of assets within the jurisdiction was relevant, and in this case the claimant had lived for a long time here, and had substantial assets here, and such an order was unnecessary. |
| | |
| Federal Bank of the Middle East -v- Hadkinson and Others [2000] 1 WLR 1695 |
|
16 Mar 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice, Trusts |
Casemap
1 Cites

|
| A Mareva injunction in its standard form operated only to attach and freeze assets in which the person injuncted had some interest. They did not affect funds of which he was a bare trustee without any beneficial interest in the assets. The legal title did not mean that the assets were 'owned' by him in the relevant sense. Such assets could not be used to satisfy any claim against the person injuncted and were therefore not covered by the standard wording. |
| | |
| Practice Direction: (Crown Office List: Preparation for Hearings) |
|
24 Mar 2000 QBD |
Litigation Practice |
|
| It was anticipated that the introduction into law of the Human Rights Act would lead to an increased burden on the courts, and it was appropriate to clear the judicial decks in anticipation. Procedural changes were required including the increase of the number of judges available, bundles are to be filed in the Crown Office three weeks before the hearing date, and skeleton arguments 14 days before that date. Parties must be ready to be called on for the case to be heard possibly at very short notice. On applications without notice the judgments will be recorded. |
| | |
| Sweetman -v- Shepherd and others [2000] EWCA Civ 91 |
|
24 Mar 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice |
|
| The rule that a claimant must bring his entire case in one action should not be extended to prevent a defendant from bringing a subsequent action against a former co-defendant for an indemnity or contribution, even though that claim might have been made in the first proceedings. The overriding objective of the court is to achieve justice for the parties. |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
|
28 Mar 2000 CA |
County Court Rules, Litigation Practice |
|
| A stay prevented a party from moving forward in proceedings, but did not stop time running for all purposes, including under CCR Ord 7 rule 20 which was a self contained code for extending the period of validity of a summons. |
| County Court Rules 1981 Order 7 Rule 20 |
| | |
| Molins Plc -v- G D Spa [2000] 1 WLR 1741 |
|
29 Mar 2000 CAAldous, Potter and Nourse LJJ |
Litigation Practice, International |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
In a case where the national court which would deal with a matter was the court first seised of the matter, a stay could only be awarded where the proceedings until the proceedings were definitively pending in that court. Documents could be served by fax only if the party being served had explicitly consented to service by fax. Publication of a fax number on stationery was not sufficient to amount to consent. This rule contrasts directly with that applied to service by post.
Aldous LJ: "I have no doubt that service is a requirement of Italian law before proceedings become definitively pending before an Italian court. I accept that irregular service can under Italian law be validated either by appearance or an order of the judge and that such validation would be retrospective; but until such validation has been achieved the Italian court cannot be seised, as during the interim period the proceedings could not be definitively pending before the Italian court." and "In my view, seisin cannot depend upon what will happen in the future. This court is concerned to decide whether proceedings in Italy were definitively pending prior to 30 July 1999, the date when the English court was seised of the cause of action. As of that date no validation had taken place. nce it is established, as it is, that service is required for proceedings to be definitively pending under Italian law, then the decision as to whether service took place depends upon whether service was effected as required by article IV of the Protocol to the Brussels Convention." |
| Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Comercial Matters 1965 Cmd 3986 |
| | |
| Rogers and Another -v- Rhys Evans (a Firm) and Others [2000] EWHC Admin 312 |
|
30 Mar 2000 Admn |
Insolvency, Litigation Practice |
|
| The claimant appealed a striking out of his action for professional negligence against the defendant firm of solicitors. He had obtained judgment by default, but had been shown not properly to have served proceedings. He was also a bankrupt at the relevant time and unable to commence the actions. It was then decided that the action was an abuse of process in that the claimant had not proceeded. Striking out an action where there has been a default judgment is a Draconian power and should only be granted in a strong case. In this case, because of the several complications, the delay was not inexcusable. Appeal allowed |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| All-In-One Design and Build Ltd -v- Motcomb Estates Ltd and Another |
|
4 Apr 2000 QBD |
Litigation Practice |
|
| The new civil procedure rules could impose sanctions or penalties on parties who failed to act in accordance with the spirit of the rules. The word 'interest' when allowing a judge to award interest by way of a penalty for the failure to accept a reasonable offer was not the same as the interest awarded on a judgement. |
| Civil Procedure Rules 36.21 |
| | |
| Countryside Residential (North Thames) Ltd -v- Tugwell (2001) 81 P&C R 10 |
|
4 Apr 2000 CAAldous and Waller LJJ and Rougier J |
Land, Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| A company was granted a licence to enter on land, for surveys and technical investigations, with a view eventually to its purchase. The land was occupied by protesters, and the company sought an injunction to exclude them. It was held that the licence did not give a right to occupy the land to the exclusion of others, and therefore, they had insufficient degree of occupation of the land to found an application to exclude the protesters. Something beyond just the right to enter the land is required. "he places emphasis on the fact that the right is to enter and occupy. It seems to me that there is a clear difference between a licence granted for the purpose of access, which does not provide effective control over the land, and a license to occupy which does." |
| Rules of the Supreme Court Order 113 |
| | |
| Fryer -v- Pearson and Another |
|
4 Apr 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice |
|
| Courts and lawyers appearing before them should avoid the use of legal maxims in Latin, which could not be expected to be understood by the population at large. In this case a gas fitter had knelt on a carpet, and suffered when a needle in the carpet was driven into his knee. He failed in a claim for personal injuries. |
| | |
| Pirelli Cables Ltd and Others -v- United Thai Shipping Corporation Ltd and Others [2000] EWHC 195 (Comm) |
|
5 Apr 2000 QBD |
Litigation Practice |
|
| A writ was issued under the old rules. An application for relief to extend time for service was lodged within the four months but heard outside the limit under the old rules, but, again, inside the time limit under the new rules. It was held that for a writ issued under the old rules, should be judged under the old rules. An exclusive jurisdiction clause applied and the matter must be dealt with in accordance with it. |
| [ Bailii ] |
| | |
| Manchester City Council -v- Mclaughlin and Another |
|
5 Apr 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice, Contempt of Court |
|
| Proceedings were taken to commit a litigant for failure to obey a mandatory injunction for the demolition of property erected in breach of planning legislation. A mistake had been made as to the date of the order on which notice of motion was based. The notice had been corrected. It was held that the motion and committal remained valid. The meaning of the order had not been altered, and was quite clear. The original date was actually the date from which the order had in any event begun. |
| | |
| Habib Bank Limited -v- Gulzar Haider Jaffer; Habib Bank Limited -v- Haider Ladhu Jaffer [1999] EWCA Civ 1620 |
|
5 Apr 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice |
|
| A major litigation action was characterised by persistent delay on behalf of the plaintiffs. They had failed to follow advice given to them by their solicitors regarding the need to make progress. In the circumstances, the delay could only be interpreted as deliberate, and an abuse of process. The claim was to be struck out accordingly. |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Mock -v- Pension Ombudsman |
|
7 Apr 2000 ChD |
Litigation Practice |
|
| It was permissible, when seeking to understand ancient and obscure legislation to look to contemporary records of proper standing. Here the judge had been referred to 'An Autobiography by Anthony Trollope, when seeking to understand and construe regulations for the payment of pensions to civil servants from that period. |
| | |
| In Re Debtors (No 13-Misc-2000 and No 14-Misc-2000) |
|
10 Apr 2000 ChD |
Litigation Practice |
|
| The powers given to a court to manage cases could allow the court to override the judgment of the parties in agreeing directions by consent where this was plainly good management to do so. Here the judge decided to transfer a between the parties to the High Court to be heard by the same court as dealt with other issues between the same parties. |
| | |
| Anne-Margaret Duer -v- Peter Nigel Frazer [2001] 1 All ER 249 |
|
19 Apr 2000 QBDEvans-Lombe J |
Litigation Practice |
|
|
| | |
| Kuwait Airways Corporation and Another -v- Kuwait Insurance Company SAK and Others, [2000] EWHC 191 (Comm) |
|
19 Apr 2000 ComC |
Litigation Practice |
|
|
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| In Re Howglen Ltd [2001] 1 All ER 376 |
|
21 Apr 2000 ChDPumfrey J |
Litigation Practice |

1 Citers
|
Where a party applies for an order obliging a third party to discover all documents within a certain class of documents, the court must be satisfied that every document which might fall within the class also fell properly within the class of documents which had direct relevance to the court action as described in the new Rules. It was not for the non-Party to have to make up its mind about each of the documents separately, and the court must be sure that the documents do in fact exist.
Pumfrey J said: "It seems to me that, notwithstanding the provision as to costs, the jurisdiction to make an order against a non-party must be exercised with some caution. There is no doubt that an order in respect of specific documents presents no difficulties. However, in respect of a request for a class of documents it seems to me that notwithstanding the provision which I have read relating to the costs of the application and of compliance with any order made pursuant to it, it is none the less necessary to be satisfied that there are documents falling within the classes which are specified and those documents are – not may be – documents in relation to which disclosure will support the case of the applicant or adversely affect the case of one of the other parties to the proceedings." |
| | |
| John and Others -v- Express Newspapers and Others [2000] EWCA Civ 135; [2000] 1 WLR 1931 |
|
26 Apr 2000 CA |
Contempt of Court, Media, Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| Where a party sought from a newspaper disclosure of the source of a journalists story, and an order for contempt in default he was under a duty first to attempt to find that source through other means. A failure even to try can be persuasive to the court that no order should be made. The statute required a two stage process by the judge. He first decided whether the disclosure was necessary, and secondly he must weight the conflicting interests. An inquiry might be necessary even if no fruitful outcome was anticipated. The court may be astute to avoid a third party who has become involved innocently in wrongdoing by another from being subjected to a requirement to give disclosure unless this is established to be a necessary and proportionate response in all the circumstances. |
| Contempt of Court Act 1981 10 |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| HFC Bank Plc -v- HSBC Bank Plc (Formerly Midland Bank Plc) [2000] FSR 176 |
|
26 Apr 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites

|
| Following a trial, and before the judgment was delivered, the parties arranged to meet and settled their dispute. The judges and the court were not advised and continued to take the trouble of preparing the now nugatory judgment. The legal representatives had a clear duty to inform the court of such happenings in order to avoid wasting judicial time also fell upon the parties themselves, and is now an express duty laid down in the Civil Procedure Rules. |
| Civil Procedure Rules Rule 1 |
| | |
|
26 Apr 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice |
|
| Parties appearing in court should resist the temptation to quote too many cases. Where the reference was to a summary, and where it was not clear that the words in the summary were those of the judge or of a reporting practitioner, particular care must be taken, and such summaries should not be used in court. |
| | |
| Daniels -v- Walker [2000] EWCA Civ 508; [2000] PIQR 193; [2000] CPLR 462; [2000] 1 WLR 1382 |
|
3 May 2000 CAAldous, May LJJ |
Human Rights, Litigation Practice, Personal Injury |
|
| Counsel should not advance arguments under the Human Rights legislation which were without merit, and judges should be robust in rejecting references without merit. Where one party was unhappy with a joint expert's report, he should nevertheless be free to appoint his own further expert in order to have a fair trial. |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Barings Plc and Others -v- Coopers & Lybrand and Others |
|
5 May 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice, Banking |
|
| An investigation and transcripts of interviews in the course of it, by the Banking Supervisor having been conducted under the Act were subject to the restrictions on disclosure mentioned in the Act. Once however the transcripts had been exhibited to an affidavit used in the course of company director disqualification proceedings, they had become part of a public record and the protection was lost. |
| Banking Act 1987 |
| | |
| Tanfern Ltd -v- Cameron-MacDonald, Cameron-MacDonald [2000] 1 WLR 1311; [2000] EWCA Civ 152; [2000] 2 All ER 801; [2000] EWCA Civ 3023 |
|
12 May 2000 CABrooke LJ |
Litigation Practice, Civil Procedure Rules |

1 Cites
1 Citers
|
The court gave detailed guidance on the application of the new procedures on civil appeals in private law cases introduced on May 2. Appeals from a County Court District Judge's final decision in a multi-track case could now go straight to the Court of Appeal. Appeals will generally be subject to leave being obtained. An appeal should only be allowed where the decision of the lower court was "wrong" or where it was unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings. It is only in an "exceptional" case that a second appeal may be sanctioned. The general rule is that the decision of the appeal court on the first appeal will be the final decision. It is no longer possible to pursue a second appeal merely because the appeal is properly arguable or has a real prospect of success.
"A final decision includes the assessment of damages or any other final decision where it is “made at the conclusion of part of a hearing or trial which has been split up into parts and would, if made at the conclusion of that hearing or trial, be a final decision:” article 1(3) of the Order of 2000; it does not include a decision only on costs. This means that if a judge makes a final decision on any aspect of a claim, such as limitation, or on part of a claim which has been directed to be heard separately, this is a final decision within the meaning of this provision." |
| Employment Tribunal (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2004 - Civil Procedure Rules |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Engel, BDO Stoy Hayward -v- Dr Stewart [2000] 1 WLR 2268; [2000] EWCA Civ 362; [2000] 3 All ER 518; [2001] ECDR 25; [2001] CP Rep 9 |
|
17 May 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| A judge may reopen a case even after he has delivered his final judgment. A judge invited counsel to amend his pleading to incorporate an improvement, but in the face of his repeated failure to take up the invitation, entered final judgment against him. After advice from leading counsel, counsel requested the judgment be reopened to allow the amendment. This was allowed, and again on appeal. The discretion is however strictly limited, and the arguments are quite different after final judgment. The Barrell jurisdiction survives the implementation of the Civil Procedure Rules but must be "very cautiously and sparingly exercised." |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| United Pan-Europe Communications N V -v- Deutsche Bank Ag [2000] EWCA Civ 166; [2000] 2 BCLC 461 |
|
19 May 2000 CAMorritt, Ward LJJ, Charles J |
Intellectual Property, Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| The claimant sought to prevent the misuse of what it said was its confidential information, identifying it by reference to specific documents in which it was said to be recorded. Held: That was a sufficient description because the defendant had "each of the documents in its possession and can see for itself what [the claimant] is referring to and could, if it had wished to do so, itself have put the documents in evidence on a confidential basis". |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Heaton & others -v- Axa Equity & Law Life Assurance Society Plc and Anr [2000] EWCA Civ 164 |
|
19 May 2000 CA |
Damages, Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| Where a claimant had settled one claim with one of two joint tortfeasors on an issue which also concerned the action against the second, it was a matter for interpretation of that settlement as to whether or not the claimant could continue the action against the remaining defendant. In such an action where the claimant had received full compensation the defendant in the second action could seek a contribution from the defendant in the first. |
| Civil Liability (Contributions) Act 1978 |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Clemens Toussaint and Patrick Thewalt -v- Noeme Perelman Mattis [2000] EWCA Civ 167 |
|
22 May 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice |
|
|
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Prudential Assurance Company Ltd -v- McBains Cooper (A Firm) and Others [2000] EWCA Civ 172; [2000] 1 WLR 2000; [2000] CPLR 475; [2001] 3 All ER 1014; [2001] CP Rep 19 |
|
23 May 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Citers
|
| A judge who had submitted a draft judgment to the parties for comment before publishing a final version, was entitled to go ahead and publish his judgment notwithstanding that the parties had reached a settlement after seeing the draft. The judge has an independent discretion to do so if he thought it in the public interest. |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Regina -v- Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Trades Union Congress [2000] EWHC Admin 345 |
|
23 May 2000 Admn |
European, Litigation Practice |
Casemap

|
|
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| In R H (A Minor) (Court Bundles: Disallowance of Fees) |
|
6 Jun 2000 CA |
Family, Litigation Practice, Legal Professions |
Casemap
1 Cites
|
| The court's practice direction on the provision of bundles and the specification of what the bundles should contain in Family Division cases, a warning to practitioners that they would have little by way of answer to a wasted costs order. The shorter the appointment the greater the need for appropriate bundles, and the judge should not be expected to have to rely upon the court papers. |
| | |
| Ropac Ltd -v- Inntrepreneur Pub Co and Another [2001] L&TR 10 |
|
7 Jun 2000 ChDNeuberger J |
Litigation Practice, Civil Procedure Rules |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
There had been a consent order in the terms of an unless order giving the landlord an order for possession unless the tenant paid sums by a certain date, time being of the essence. The order was not complied with and the tenant applied for a retrospective extension of time to comply with the order. Held: The court retained the power to grant an order for extension of time even though the parties had previously agreed the terms of an 'unless' consent order and it had expressed time to be of the essence. The court's case management powers had to be read in the light of the overriding objective as expressed in the Rules. Under the RSC the order in the case before him was in sufficiently clear terms to be a binding consent order with which the court would only have interfered in circumstances which would justify interference with a contract. Under the CPR however, the court had jurisdiction to extend time: "To my mind, the CPR therefore gives the Court rather more wide- ranging, more flexible powers than the RSC. In my judgment, those powers are to be exercised not merely to do justice between the parties, but in the wider public interest. Further, the objective to deal with a case justly must, as I see it, sometimes (albeit rarely) require the court to override an agreement made between the parties in the course of, and in connection with, the litigation. I consider that this means that the court has greater power to interfere than before. Having said that, I should add this. Where the parties have agreed in clear terms on a certain course, then, while that does not take away its power to extend time, the court should, when considering an application to extend time, place very great weight on what the parties have agreed and should be slow, save in unusual circumstances, to depart from what the parties have agreed."
Neuberger J set out the process he had to apply to to extend time in respect of a consent order. He said at: "First, at least in general, if the order was a genuine consent order, that is representing a contractual agreement between the parties, and stated that, if a party did not do something within a specified time, then his claim or defence would be struck out or that there would be some other sanction, that represented a contract with which the court had no power to interfere, save in circumstances in which the court has power to interfere with a contract. That seems to me to be the effect of the judgments in Purcell v FC Trigell Limited [1971] 1 QB 359 - see at 365G per Winn LJ and 366D per Buckley LJ ." |
| Civil Procedure Rules 81 |
| | |
| McPhilemy -v- Times Newspapers Ltd and Others [2001] 4 All ER 861 |
|
7 Jun 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| The new civil procedure rules did not change the basic rules of evidence. The old rule prevented a party putting in evidence a witness statement which he knew conflicted substantially with the case he wished to place before the jury, and then be allowed to assert to a jury that he disagreed with large parts of the evidence. There is now a discretion in the judge to do so, but the judge must reconcile rules which had been established in an adversarial system with newer rules. |
| | |
| Pitchmastic Plc -v- Birse Construction Ltd |
|
8 Jun 2000 QBD |
Litigation Practice, Costs, Litigation Practice |
|
| A party to litigation made an offer on the day before trial of settlement without prejudice save as to costs. At trial it made an open offer in similar terms which was rejected. After reading a draft unfavourable judgment, the party applied to be allowed to accept the offer, contending that such an offer was to remain open for 21 days in any event. The rules allowed a party to withdraw such an offer, and such situations must be decided by ordinary rules of offer and acceptance. The rules which apply to acceptance of a payment in do not necessarily apply to offers to settle. There is no rule requiring the permission of the court before allowing the withdrawal of an offer of settlement, and the test for whether such an offer remained capable of acceptance was the normal one of offer and acceptance. |
| Civil Procedure Rules Part 36 |
| | |
| Pitchmastic Plc -v- Birse Construction Ltd |
|
8 Jun 2000 QBD |
Litigation Practice, Costs, Litigation Practice |
|
| A party to litigation made an offer on the day before trial of settlement without prejudice save as to costs. At trial it made an open offer in similar terms which was rejected. After reading a draft unfavourable judgment, the party applied to be allowed to accept the offer, contending that such an offer was to remain open for 21 days in any event. The rules allowed a party to withdraw such an offer, and such situations must be decided by ordinary rules of offer and acceptance. The rules which apply to acceptance of a payment in do not necessarily apply to offers to settle. There is no rule requiring the permission of the court before allowing the withdrawal of an offer of settlement, and the test for whether such an offer remained capable of acceptance was the normal one of offer and acceptance. |
| Civil Procedure Rules Part 36 |
| | |
| Three Rivers District Council and Others -v- Governor and Company of The Bank of England [2000] UKHL 331; [2000] 2 WLR 1220; [2000] 3 All ER 1; [2003] 2 AC 1 |
|
8 Jun 2000 HLLord Steyn, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Hutton, Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough, Lord Millett |
Litigation Practice, Administrative, European, Torts - Other |

1 Cites

|
The applicants alleged misfeasance against the Bank of England in respect of the regulation of a bank. Held: The Bank could not be sued in negligence, but the tort of misfeasance required clear evidence of misdeeds. The action was now properly pleaded, and the bank knew the case it had to answer. The issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to support the allegation to the high standard required, was not a matter for summary assessment, but for the judge at trial. It was not appropriate to strike out the action. The defendant must be a public officer in a wide sense, and exercising power as such. A claim of misfeasance in public office gives rise to four principal questions: "i) Was the conduct complained of that of public officers, exercising power in that capacity? ii) Did the officers act knowingly or recklessly beyond their powers? iii) Did they thereby cause damage to the claimant? iv) Did they know that the act(s) in question probably would cause such damage or were they reckless in that regard?"
Lord Steyn said: "The case law reveals two different forms of liability for misfeasance in public office. First there is the case of targeted malice by a public officer, i.e. conduct specifically intended to injure a person or persons. This type of case involves bad faith in the sense of the exercise of public power for an improper or ulterior motive. The second form is where a public officer acts, knowing that he has no power to do the act complained of and that the act will probably injure the plaintiff. It involves bad faith inasmuch as the public officer does not have an honest belief that his act is lawful." |
| First Council Banking Co-ordination Directive (77/780/EEC) |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Locabail (UK Ltd and Another -v- Waldorf Investment Corporation and Others (No 4) |
|
13 Jun 2000 ChD |
Human Rights, Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites

|
| An application to the European Court of Human Rights was not an appeal. Where it was clear that any decision there would not affect the issues between the parties, there was no reason to suspend enforcement of the order which had given rise to the reference. A party complained at the lack of independence of the judge who had her trial, where he defended a possession summons. The possession order should go ahead. |
| European Convention on Human Rights |
| | |
| Brown and Another -v- Bennett and Others (2) |
|
13 Jun 2000 ChD |
Litigation Practice |
|
| The decision whether to order sequential or simultaneous disclosure of skeleton arguments was for each case. In construction cases simultaneous disclosure was usually appropriate, and this was also normal in Chancery. Nevertheless in complicated cases it might be sensible and was within the judge's discretion to order sequential disclosure, with the claimant going first. The rules are silent because of this discretion. |
| | |
| Martin -v- Steelforce Plc [2000] EWCA Civ 3014 |
|
13 Jun 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice |
|
| Appeal against order refusing defendant the right to refer to evidence in a statement, the court saying that the application was made late. |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Clarkson -v- Gilbert and others [2000] EWCA Civ 3018; [2000] CP Rep 58; [2000] 3 FCR 10; [2000] 2 FLR 839; [2000] Fam Law 808 |
|
14 Jun 2000 CALord Woolf CJ, Aldous and Waller LJJ |
Civil Procedure Rules, Legal Professions, Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Citers
|
The court considered the restrictions on lay representatives appearing in court as the related to relatives of the party. Held. The same objections to granting rights of audience did not apply to a husband who merely wished to assist his wife by representing her in court. Where a close relative was seeking to represent a party the question was whether there was good reason on the facts to grant it, such as ill health or lack of means.
Lord Woolf CJ said: "The overriding objective is that the courts should do justice. Now that legal aid is not available as readily as it was in the past means that there are going to be situations where litigants are forced to bring proceedings in person when they will need assistance. However, if they are litigants in person they must, in my judgment, establish why they need some other person who is not qualified to appear as an advocate on their behalf. In the ordinary way it will be for them to satisfy the court that that is appropriate. If somebody's health does not, or may not, enable them to conduct proceedings themselves, and if they lack means, those are the sort of circumstances that can justify a court saying that they should have somebody who can act as an advocate on their behalf." He qualified the decision in D v S saying: "what I indicated in that case was intended for a situation which was of the sort there described and did not deal with a situation where a husband wished to appear for his wife. It does not matter whether it is said that the position is different in that case or whether it is said that the fact that a husband wishes to appear for somebody who is part of the same family makes it an exceptional situation. It is clear that the objections to someone setting themselves up as an unqualified advocate do not exist in a matter where a husband is merely seeking to assist his wife." In this case: "I am satisfied that there would be a danger of Professor Clarkson being deprived of her right to have the case conducted before the courts in a way which would enable her claims to be investigated if she did not have the assistance of her husband as an advocate."
Waller LJ said: "I agree with my Lord on the proper principles to be applied to an application for a close relative to represent a litigant in person in order to have that right of audience. I also associate myself with my Lord's remarks in relation to his judgment in D v S (Rights of Audience) [1997] 1 FLR 724; I was a party to that judgment on that occasion. The position of a close relative seeking to exercise a right of audience is very different from the circumstances with which that case was concerned and it is unfortunate that the judge was possibly misled into applying a wrong test, as he did."
Clarke LJ said: "I agree with both judgments. The judge directed himself that the question which he should answer was whether there were exceptional circumstances which justified granting Mr Keter rights of audience under s 27(2)(c) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990. I agree with my Lords that that is not the relevant question in a case of this kind. As I see it, the question is simply whether, in all the circumstances of the case, the court should exercise its discretion under s 27(2)(c). The section does not in any way fetter the exercise of the court's discretion, although the discretion must be exercised in the light of the objective of Part II of the Act set out in s 17(1) and of the general principle set out in s 17(3). In exercising the discretion in any particular case, I agree that the court must have in mind the general principles referred to by Lord Woolf. There is a spectrum of different circumstances which may arise so that it is difficult to lay down precise guidelines. Cases will vary greatly. For example, in a case where the proposed advocate is holding himself out as providing advocacy services, whether for reward or not, the court will only make an order under s 27(2)(c) in exceptional circumstances: D v S (Rights of Audience) [1997] 1 FLR 724. On the other hand, where the proposed advocate is a member of the litigant's family, the position is likely to be very different, although, as this case shows, even in such cases the circumstances may vary widely. There is, in my judgment, no warrant for holding that in such cases an order should only be made in exceptional circumstances. To my mind there is nothing in any of the decisions to which we were referred, including D v S (Rights of Audience) [1997] 1 FLR 724, which requires us so to hold. All will depend upon the circumstances. It follows that the judge did not ask the correct question and that it is for this court to exercise its own discretion. That discretion should only be exercised for good reason. The question is whether, having regard to the general principles set out by Lord Woolf, there is good reason on the facts of this case to permit Mr Keter to speak on behalf of the claimant at the forthcoming interlocutory applications and at any trial. To put it another way: is it just to permit him to do so?" |
| Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 27(2)(c) |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Ryan and Another -v- Friction Dynamics Ltd and others |
|
14 Jun 2000 ChD |
Litigation Practice, Judicial Review |
|
| When granting asset freezing orders in support of proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction the court should exercise caution, particularly under the section since the court would not have full knowledge of the issues. Where good grounds existed, and comity required a court to grant an order, the requirements of risk of dissipation, and of a good case must be met; an order might be made even if refused by a foreign court, and the existence of a world-wide order already did not prevent an English court granting a local order. |
| Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 25 |
| | |
| Ashton and Another -v- Securum Finance Ltd [2000] EWCA Civ 197; [2001] Ch 291; [2000] 3 WLR 1400 |
|
21 Jun 2000 CAChadwick LJ, Rattee J |
Litigation Practice, Banking |

1 Cites

|
In the new litigation culture it was correct to strike out a second action which fundamentally re-litigated a case which had previously been struck out on the grounds of abuse of process or delay. The court's case management required it to consider whether it was appropriate to expend time on a case. When facing such an application, the court must have regard to the earlier action, and the decisions then taken. Older rules against striking out where and action could be recommenced without difficulty, should be set aside. Here a bank sought to pursue as a speciality debt a debt it had already claimed as a simple contract debt.
Chadwick LJ said: "For my part, I think that the time has come for this court to hold that the "change of culture" which has taken place in the last three years—and, in particular, the advent of the Civil Procedure Rules—has led to a position in which it is no longer open to a litigant whose action has been struck out on the grounds of inordinate and inexcusable delay to rely on the principle that a second action commenced within the limitation period will not be struck out save in exceptional cases. The position, now, is that the court must address the application to strike out the second action with the overriding objective of the Civil Procedure Rules in mind—and must consider whether the claimant's wish to have "a second bite at the cherry" outweighs the need to allot its own limited resources to other cases." |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Arrow Nominees Inc and Another -v- Blackledge and Others [2000] CP Rep 59; [2000] EWCA Civ 200; [2001] BCC 591; [2000] BCLC 167 |
|
22 Jun 2000 CARoch, Ward, Chadwick LJJ |
Litigation Practice, Company |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| The defendants alleged that when applying for relief under section 459, the claimants had attempted to pervert the course of justice by producing forged or falsified documentation in discovery. Held: If a party to litigation behaved in such a way as make it impossible safely to grant a judgment in his favour, or, where the behaviour amounted to an abuse of the processes of the court, the court must decline to allow that party to be heard, and to give judgment against him. The object of the rules of discovery was to secure a fair trial. A failure in disclosure might normally not defeat a claim, but a determined attempt to prevent a fair trial should do so: "A decision to stop the trial in those circumstances is not based on the court’s desire (or any perceived need) to punish the party concerned; rather it is a proper and necessary response where a party has shown that his object is not to have a fair trial which it is the court’s function to conduct, but to have a trial the fairness of which he has attempted (and continues to attempt) to compromise." As to pre-CPR cases: 'The old authorities are of interest only as the straws in the gale force winds of change which blew in Lord Woolf's reforms.' and 'The attempted perversion of justice is the very antithesis of parties coming before the court on an equal footing. ' |
| Companies Act 1985 459 |
| [ Bailii ] |
| | |
| Lubbe (Suing As Administrator Of The Estate Of Rachel Jacoba Lubbe) and 4 Others -v- Cape plc and Related Appeals [2000] UKHL 41; [2000] 4 All ER 268; [2000] 1 WLR 1545 |
|
22 Jun 2000 HLLord Hope of Craighead, Lord Bingham of Cornhill |
Litigation Practice, International, Human Rights |

1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| South African asbestosis victims suing in England submitted that to stay their proceedings in favour of the South African forum would violate their article 6 rights. A stay was refused on the non-Convention ground that, because of the lack of funding and legal representation in South Africa, they would be denied a fair trial on terms of equality with the defendant. Held. Public Interest issues arising from the prosecution of the case should not prevent the court deciding whether a stay against action should be granted. The claimants' right to an action in South Africa would be ineffective, and the case would be allowed to proceed in England. Public interest issues not relating to any private law interests of the parties should not affect that question. |
| European onvention on Human Rights 6 |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Gadget Shop Ltd -v- Bug Com Ltd and Others |
|
28 Jun 2000 ChD |
Litigation Practice |
|
| Material failures by the claimants to comply with the protocols on search and seizure orders led to the order being set aside. The claimant had not disclosed the possible execution on a female defendant's home, and the solicitor accompanying the exercise was an assistant solicitor not a partner, the supervising solicitors did not have recent experience of such procedures, and not all material had been disclosed. |
| | |
| David Yablon Minton -v- Kenburgh Investments (Northern) Ltd [2000] EWCA Civ 202 |
|
28 Jun 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice, Torts - Other, Negligence |
Casemap
1 Cites
|
| An agreement 'in full and final settlement' of insolvency proceedings between a liquidator and directors, did not prevent an action in negligence against solicitors as regards the same contractual situation who had themselves issued third party proceedings against the directors under the Act. There is a difference between settlement and satisfaction. The second claim was sufficiently different, and might even give rise to a larger claim for damages. The settlement of one claim need not satisfy |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Harmon CFEM Facades (UK) Ltd -v- The Corporate Officer of the House of Commons [2000] EWHC Technology 84 |
|
29 Jun 2000 TCC |
Insolvency, Company, Litigation Practice, Landlord and Tenant |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| The company began a claim for damages for the failure to complete an award of a contract, but then went into voluntary liquidation. The defendant refused payment claiming that it would be used only for payment of the insolvency practitioner's costs. The new CPR rules disapplied old assumptions, and the overriding objective should apply. An interim payment was ordered limited to reflect the risk of a failure to secure recovery in the case of a failure of the action. |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Gnitrow Ltd -v- Cape Plc [2000] EWCA Civ 5561; [2001] CP Rep 21; [2000] 3 All ER 763; [2000] 1 WLR 2327 |
|
30 Jun 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice |
|
|
| Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Kapadia -v- Lambeth London Borough Council |
|
4 Jul 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice, Employment |
|
| The claimant asserted disability discrimination, and consented to a medical report for the purpose of the claim. He was then to be obliged to consent to its release to the other party. To order otherwise would be contrary to the need for expeditious and efficient litigation. |
| | |
| Clarkson -v- Gilbert and Others |
|
4 Jul 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice |
|
| A litigant in person seeking permission for the use of an advocate must give reasons for the request, and satisfy the court that it was appropriate. Where the court granted such a right, the litigant in person should normally herself be present throughout. The objections which naturally arose against an unqualified person providing an advocacy service being granted such rights need not apply to a family member offering support. |
| Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 27(2)(c) |
| | |
| Maria Dolores Townsend and Beverley Ann King -v- George Nicolas Achilleas [2000] EWCA Civ 210 |
|
6 Jul 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Citers
|
|
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| W -v- H (Family Division: without notice orders) [2001] 1 All ER 300 |
|
10 Jul 2000 FDMunby J |
Family, Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
Munby J considered the practice to be followed in the Family Division when injunctions are granted ex parte and without notice against third parties in ancillary relief cases. Held: The court traced the history of undertakings in damages give by litigants in the family division seeking interim injunctions. As to the Interoute case, "I am not pursuaded that Lightman J.'s approach can simply be imposed without more ado in the Family Division. The circumstances in which ex parte relief is obtained in the Family Division vary very widely. Moreover, as cases such as Khreino v Khreino (No.2) (court's power to grant injunctions) [2000] 1 FCR 80 so vividly illustrate, such relief is often granted in the Family Division in circumstances very far removed indeed from any circumstances in which ex parte relief is ever normally granted in the Chancery Division." |
| | |
| Gregson -v- Channel Four Television Corporation [2000] EWCA Civ 214 |
|
11 Jul 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice, Limitation |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| It was possible to amend pleadings outside of the limitation period, where the alteration to identify the correct party was genuine and the mistake had not mislead any party. In this case there was no reasonable doubt about who had been intended to be sued. The overriding objective and rule 17.4(3) could either be applied to allow the amendment. |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
|
18 Jul 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice, Damages |
|
| Where a main contractor had agreed through its insurers levels of compensation to be paid to workers affected by asbestosis, and sought to recover those damages from a sub-contractor, justice could only be served if the compensation agreement was disclosed to the defendant. If not then the defendant would be needlessly in the dark when considering a payment in. The judge need not however know of the terms of the agreement until an appropriate point in the trial. |
| | |
| Spice Girls Ltd -v- Aprilla World Service BV (No 3) |
|
20 Jul 2000 ChDArden J |
Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
After trials and hearings as to the facts, as to damages, and as to costs, and where the parties had previously been shown draft judgments, and been invited to comment, the applicants sought to appeal, on the grounds that losses which had been claimed, had not been suffered. Held: The information had been known or available to the appellants and had not been raised when opportunities presented themselves. The suggested evidence did not suggest a real difference. The appeal was the wrong way to go about things and was denied.
Arden J said: "In my judgment, an appeal is not the appropriate course where there are errors in judgments which can be corrected by the court which conducted the trial. To leave such matters to an appeal means further delay, uncertainty and costs, which is not in the interests of litigants. The trial judge is in a strong position to consider the effect of the error in the context of the entire case." and "I do not wish to say anything against the usefulness of the reconsideration jurisdiction, within its proper limits. I have made use of it myself. … There are of course cases where an error of fact or law may be too clear for argument. The best test of that is perhaps – but not necessarily – where the judge himself identifies the error which concerns him. In such a case, it is better that the error is corrected without imposing on the parties the need for an appeal." |
| | |
| Hertfordshire Investments Ltd -v- Bubb and Another [2000] 1 WLR 2318; [2000] CPLR 588; [2001] CP Rep 38; [2000] EWCA Civ 3013 |
|
25 Jul 2000 CASwinton Thomas LJ, Sedley LJ, Hale LJ |
Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
When considering an application for a re-hearing of a County Court action in order to consider and admit new evidence, the county court and High Court practice is now the same and the judge should consider the list of questions in Ladd v Marshall, although the new procedural environment required that they be implemented less rigorously. The new evidence should not have been available at the time of the original trial, should be significant in its effect, and credible.
Hale LJ said: "The power to reopen a case after final judgment because of fresh evidence should be the same whatever the procedural route adopted. It would be most unjust if a party to county court proceedings could reopen matters when a party to High Court proceedings could not." |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Somatra Limited -v- Sinclair Roche & Temperley (a Firm) etc [2000] EWCA Civ 229; [2000] 1 WLR 2453 |
|
26 Jul 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice, Legal Professions, Professional Negligence |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
In an action between clients and their solicitors, the solicitors produced at an interlocutory hearing evidence derived from without prejudice discussions. The claimants applied for disclosure of all such documents, but this was rejected on the basis that the evidence would not be admissible at trial. On appeal it was held that the evidence having been introduced already by the defendants, it would not be just if they were not admitted in evidence in full at trial.
Alleged negligence in defending a claim. |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Standard Chartered Bank -v- Pakistan National Shipping Corporation, Seaways Maritime Ltd, SGS United Kingdom Ltd, Oakprime International Ltd, Arvind Mehra (No 2) [2000] EWCA Civ 230; [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 218 |
|
27 Jul 2000 CAAldous LJ,Ward LJ |
Damages, Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
Where a deceit was established leading to an award of damages, that award of damages was not capable of being reduced under the Act through a contribution to the loss occasioned by the claimant's own behaviour, where that behaviour did not fall under the heads of contribution recognised by the Act.
The fourth defendants, Oakprime Limited (O), chartered to transport their cargo of bitumen. O had persuaded the shipowners, Pakistan National Shipping Corporation, to authorise signature of bills of lading which O knew to be false. O presented the bills of lading to Standard Chartered Bank in order to obtain payment under letters of credit. A question on the appeal was whether the third defendant, Mehra, a director of O, was personally liable for the false representations made to the Bank. The judge had held that he was, on the ground that he had authorised, directed and procured the acts complained of with full knowledge that those acts were tortious. Held: The appeal succeeded, because although M was the person who was responsible for making the misrepresentations, he did not commit the deceit himself; the representations were made by O and the Bank relied upon them as representations by Oakprime and not as representations made by M. The Court went on to consider whether it had been open to the judge to hold that M was liable as a joint tortfeasor for authorising and procuring the misrepresentations. Lord Justice Aldous saw three circumstances in which a director or employee, acting as such, would be liable for tortious acts committed during the course of his employment. First, where the director or employee commits the tort himself. Lord Justice Aldous gave as an example the lorry driver who is involved in an accident in the course of his employment. Second, where the director or employee, when carrying out his duties for the company, assumes a personal responsibility. Lord Justice Aldous gives Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd as an example of a case where alleged liability on that ground failed on the facts. Third, where the director does not carry out the tortious act himself, nor does he assume liability for it, but he procures and induces another, the company to, commit the tort. Lord Justice Aldous: "A person who procures and induces another to commit a tort becomes a joint tortfeasor (see Unilever Plc v Gillette (UK) Limited [1989] RPC 583 and Molnlycke AB v Procter & Gamble Ltd [1992] RPC 583). There is no reason why a director of a company should be in any different position to a third party and therefore it is possible that a director can be capable of becoming a joint tortfeasor by procuring and inducing the company, for which he works, to carry out a tortious act. However there are good reasons to conclude that the carrying out of duties of a director would never be sufficient to make a director liable. That was the view of the Court of Appeal in C Evans v Spritebrand Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 317." and "… public policy requires that the Courts will not lend their aid to a man who founds his action upon an immoral or illegal act. The action will not be founded upon an immoral or illegal act, if it can be pleaded and proved without reliance upon such an act. … The fact that damage may not have resulted but for a decision to deceive is irrelevant to the cause of action when pleaded and proved." |
| Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 1(1) |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Fashion Gossip Limited -v- Esprit Telecoms UK Limited Esprit Telecom Group Plc Esprit Telecom Benelux Bv [2000] EWCA Civ 233 |
|
27 Jul 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice |
|
|
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Practice Direction (Administrative Court Establishment) |
|
27 Jul 2000 QBD |
Administrative, Litigation Practice |
|
| The direction establishes the Administrative Court as a successor to the Crown Office List. Existing orders and directions applying to the List should be renamed. A lead nominated judge would take responsibility for the speed efficiency and economy of the conduct of the court's business. New rules for judicial review will also be implemented to accompany the introduction of the Human Rights Act. |
| | |
| Cas (Nominees) Ltd and Another -v- Nottingham Forest Plc and Others [2002] BCC 145; [2001] 1 All ER 954; [2000] EWHC 45 (Comm) |
|
31 Jul 2000 ComCEvans-Lombe J |
Company, Litigation Practice |
|
| Application for disclosure of documents. |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
|
2 Aug 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice |
|
| In appropriate cases it was proper for a court summarily to dispose of cases. If a party has no reasonable prospect of success, it is in accordance with the philosophy of the new rules to manage cases actively and to allot court time to cases with the need to deal justly with claims. In this case active management might have avoided a three day listing for a case which was eventually dismissed on the first day. |
| Civil Procedure Rules 24.2(a)(ii) |
| | |
|
3 Aug 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice, Personal Injury |
|
| In personal injury cases involving substantial damages claims, it was inappropriate for a district judge to seek assess the level of damages to be awarded. Cases involving a degree of complexity should be referred to a circuit judge. Even though in this case the award had been made by the district judge by consent of both parties, legal advisers should take care to protect their client's interests. |
| | |
| Society of Lloyd's -v- Jaffray and others |
|
3 Aug 2000 QBD |
Litigation Practice, Evidence |
Casemap
1 Citers
|
| Any party was free to put in evidence statements where the party who had prepared them had himself decided not to call the evidence. There was no power to call the person to give that evidence, but it could be admitted on the basis that it was hearsay evidence. This reversed the old rule. The court still does not have the power to order a party to tender his witness. |
| Civil Procedure Rules 35.5(5) |
| | |
| Keith -v- Cpm Marketing Ltd |
|
30 Aug 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice |
|
| Where a party applied for an extension of time in order to comply with a directions order, and it was clear that he would want some alternative order if the extension of time was not granted, the court could, in pursuance of the courts over-riding objective, make such an alternative order as if an explicit request had been made. This could include a relief from sanctions for non-compliance. |
| | |
| On Demand Information Plc and Another -v- Michael Gerson (Finance) Plc and Another |
|
19 Sep 2000 CA |
Financial Services, Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| The power to grant relief from forfeiture in finance leases was real, but ceased to be available after property repossessed by the finance company had been contracted for sale by the applicants. The application for relief was in its nature, an application to permit the continuation of the lease, which could not be the basis where the property was to be sold. |
| | |
| Pitts -v- Hartman and Others [2000] EWCA Civ 376 |
|
27 Sep 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice |
|
| Application for permission to appeal against the strike out of a claim against a consultant psychiatrist who had provided a report in a child custody application. |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Pitts -v- Hartman and others [2000] EWCA Civ 376 |
|
27 Sep 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice |
|
|
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Hickling -v- Doshi Financial Services Ltd [2000] EWCA Civ 381 |
|
5 Oct 2000 CAArden LJ |
Litigation Practice |
|
| Application for leave to appeal. |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Barbara Alison Al-Sabah and Another -v- Grupo Torras S A and Others [2000] UKPC 38 |
|
10 Oct 2000 PCLord Hobhouse of Woodborough Lord Scott of Foscote Sir Ivor Richardson |
Commonwealth, Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| PC (Jersey) The board refused special leave to appeal: "Normally all such questions of case management are matters for the courts concerned and are not suitable for any further review before their Lordships’ Board. The directions and orders which may be made cover a spectrum of possibilities and have to take into account all the prevailing local circumstances. In the absence of some error of principle or other special factor, leave should not ordinarily be granted for any further appeal. Such interlocutory appeals inevitably delay the action. This is the position in the present case. Their Lordships have advised that special leave be refused " |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Canada Trust Co and Others -v- Stolzenberg and Others (No 2) [2000] UKHL 51; [2000] 4 All ER 481; [2000] 3 WLR 1376; [2002] 1 AC 1; [2001] CLC 118; [2001] IL Pr 40 |
|
12 Oct 2000 HLLord Steyn Lord Hoffmann Lord Cooke of Thorndon Lord Hope of Craighead Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough |
Litigation Practice, Jurisdiction |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| The plaintiffs alleged the involvement of the defendant in a conspiracy to defraud. He had been domiciled in England, but had moved to Germany. He denied that the UK court had jurisdiction. The court of appeal said that jurisdiction was determined at the issue of the writ. The defendant appealed. Held: Where one defendant was domiciled in the UK at the time of the issue of a writ it was permissible at the same time to issue proceedings against other defendants who were not domiciled here, even if that the defendant upon whose domicile the action was founded subsequently abandoned or lost that domicile. The date in question was not the date on which the writ was served, particularly upon other defendants. The words 'sued', and 'issued proceedings', and began proceedings were used interchangeably in the Convention. |
| Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1988 Art 6 - Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 |
| [ House of Lords ] - [ House of Lords ] - [ House of Lords ] - [ Bailii ] |
| | |
| Glencore International Ag -v- Metro Trading International Inc [2000] EWHC 199 (Comm) |
|
12 Oct 2000 ComC |
Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites
|
| Main fact finding judgment in Metro Litigation. |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Hamilton -v- Al-Fayed (2) [2001] EMLR 15; [2002] 3 All ER 641 |
|
13 Oct 2000 CALord Phillips MR, Simon Brown LJ |
Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
A third party who financially supported a court action had no right to be joined as a party even at hearings at which decisions would be made which might affect his potential liabilities. Those who financially support proceedings must acknowledge the risks they run in doing so, and to decide otherwise would provide an unacceptable way for partied to buy themselves into a litigation process. Simon Brown LJ: "There is ample authority" and "no dispute" but that "proof of causation is a necessary pre-condition to the making of a section 51 order against a non-party" before concluding, as a further ground for rejecting the application made in that case for costs against non-party funders, that some at least of the contributions "plainly did not cause Mr Al Fayed to incur any costs which he would not otherwise have incurred".
The court considered an application to admit new evidence to support an allegation that the original judgment had been obtained by fraud: "Often the fresh evidence relied upon demonstrates that perjured evidence was given at the trial. In such circumstances, provided that the requirements of Ladd v Marshall are satisfied, the practice of the Court of Appeal has been to order a new trial without resolving the issue of whether the alleged fraud in fact occurred. That issue is best resolved on the retrial." and Lord Phillips MR: "We consider that under the new, as under the old, procedure special grounds must be shown to justify the introduction of fresh evidence on appeal … That question must be considered in light of the overriding objective of the new CPR. The old cases will nonetheless remain powerful persuasive authority, for they illustrate the attempts of the courts to strike a fair balance between the need for concluded litigation to be determinative of disputes and the desirability that the judicial process should achieve the right result. The task is one which accords with the overriding objective."
As to the significance of former cases under the new CPR: "That question must be considered in the light of the overriding objective of the new CPR. The old cases will, nonetheless, remain powerful persuasive authority, for they illustrate the attempts of the courts to strike a fair balance between the need for concluded litigation to be determinative of the disputes and the desirability that the judicial process should achieve the right result. That task is one which accords with the overriding objective." and "A party who seeks to set aside a judgment or verdict by adducing fresh evidence to show that the court was fraudulently deceived can adopt one of two alternative procedures. He can appeal to the Court of Appeal and seek, on appeal, to adduce the fresh evidence, or he can bring a fresh action in which the relief sought is the setting aside of the judgment fraudulently obtained. Where the fresh evidence, or its effect is hotly contested, the latter procedure may prove to be the more satisfactory . . ." and "Because the Court of Appeal alone has power to order a new trial on the ground of fresh evidence, it has been the rule rather than the exception that parties seeking to overturn a judgment on the grounds that it was obtained by fraud have appealed to the Court of Appeal. Lord Buckmaster's strictures have been generally disregarded. We are inclined to think that because the Court of Appeal has much wider powers to do justice in such a situation, including the power to order issues of fact to be tried, the prevalent practice is one attuned to the overriding objective." This was not a case where the judgment had been obtained by fraud. |
| | |
| Regency Rolls Ltd and Another -v- Carnall [2000] EWCA Civ 379 |
|
16 Oct 2000 CASimon Brown LJ |
Litigation Practice |
Casemap

|
| The court considered what was meant by 'act promptly' in the Rule. Held. Dictionary definitions were considered by both Arden LJ and Simon Brown LJ – "with alacrity" or "all reasonable celerity in the circumstances". In all the circumstances, 4 weeks was held to be too long by Simon Brown LJ and Rix LJ. Arden LJ expressed grave doubt but found it unnecessary to decide the point. |
| Civil Procedure Rules 39.3 |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Regina -v- Secretary of State for Trade and Industry Ex Parte Trades Union Congress (2000) IRLR 565 |
|
17 Oct 2000 CALord Justice Buxton |
Litigation Practice, European |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| Where a court referred an issue to the European Court, it was for that court in its discretion to decide whether interim relief might be granted, and an appellate court should not normally interfere in that exercise. The considerations for such a grant of interim relief pending a reference had been fully set out by the House of Lords in Factortame, being the threshold condition, the existence of a serious case to be tried, the balance of convenience, the strength of the case on the reference, and the potential losses incurred according to the grant or refusal of interim relief. Referring to a speech from Lord Goff in Factortame (2): "I venture to draw from that latter passage that Lord Goff was recognising that there may be an unusual – I infer in Lord Goff's view it would be a very unusual case - where there was no strong prima facie case that the law was invalid, but where, nevertheless, it would be appropriate because of the weight of other factors to grant interim relief. But that case apart, Lord Goff in my judgment appears to regard the importance of not restraining a public authority by interim injunction except in a case such as that he refers to at the end of the passages I have cited as being, not a paramount factor, but an important threshold principle to which the court that is being asked to consider interim relief must direct its attention in the first instance." |
| | |
|
20 Oct 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice, Insolvency |
|
| Where permission to appeal had been granted, an application to set aside that permission had to be considered only where there existed compelling reason for that reconsideration. The issues for the grant were the overriding objective of litigation and whether an appeal offered a real prospect of success. If that existed, permission was to be granted. If not then it should be refused. The cases of Iran Nabuvat [1990] 1 WLR and Smith v Cosworth Casting Processes Ltd ([1997] 4 All ER 840) remained applicable. |
| | |
| Barclays Bank Plc -v- Ellis and Another |
|
24 Oct 2000 CA |
Human Rights, Litigation Practice |
|
| If counsel wished to raise at trial an argument about an infringement of the Convention, it behove him to be prepared with a full argument and to have available any material in terms of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights upon which they or the court could rely. |
| | |
| Miller -v- Allied Sainif (Uk) Ltd |
|
31 Oct 2000 ChD |
Litigation Practice, Legal Professions |
|
| In a simple case it was appropriate for a solicitor to apply by post for an order to declare that he had ceased to represent a party. This was a reasonable way of minimising costs for all parties, but the solicitor must be ready to consider whether attendance might be required. |
| | |
| Jephson Homes Housing Association -v- Moisejevs and Another [2000] EWCA Civ 271; [2001] 23 EGLR 14; [2001] 41 EG 186; [2001] 2 All ER 901 |
|
1 Nov 2000 CALord Justice Simon Brown And Lord Justice Rix |
Landlord and Tenant, Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| A possession warrant, properly issued and executed in ignorance of a payment into court by the tenant was not an abuse of process. The tenant had paid funds into court in the mistaken belief that this would be effective to set aside the warrant. She was assisted in this misapprehension neither by the Court nor by the landlord. Their behaviour could not properly be described as oppressive. It was not clear, in this context, what was meant by 'oppressive'. The applicant had not in this case been misled. Once it is concluded that there is no oppression, there is no inherent power in the court to set aside the eviction. The Rules did not require notice to be given of an intention to aply for a warrant for possession. Though a failure to give notice might be oppressive conduct, it was not in this case. |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Brown and Another -v- Bennett and Others (No 2) |
|
2 Nov 2000 ChD |
Litigation Practice |
|
| An expert witness should not be compelled to attend court where the party who instructed him had been unable to satisfy him that he was able to pay the expert's fees. To hold otherwise would be to endanger the system of expert witnesses by allowing potential manipulation, by issuing a sub poena instead of paying the fee. In such circumstances the practice should remain that a witness summons should be issued only in exceptional cases. |
| | |
|
2 Nov 2000 QBD |
International, Litigation Practice |
|
| The fact that public policy would sometimes allow the refusal of registration of a foreign judgment did not provide an opportunity to a party here to re-litigate the issue when he had had an opportunity to do so before the foreign court and had failed to take it. Foreign judgments may not be registered if they could be shown to have been obtained by fraud. Here documents were prepared in accordance with Islamic practice, and there was no evidence that any such fraud existed. |
| Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 |
| | |
| Regina -v- Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Ex Parte Eastaway [2000] UKHL 56; [2000] 1 WLR 2222; [2000] 1 All ER 27 |
|
8 Nov 2000 HLLord Bingham of Cornhill Lord Steyn Lord Hoffmann Lord Clyde Lord Millett |
Litigation Practice, Judicial Review |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| Where the Court of Appeal refused permission to apply for judicial review after a similar refusal by a judge, that decision was also, by implication, a refusal to grant permission to appeal against the judge's decision, and there was no scope for a further appeal to the House of Lords. It is not the role of the highest court to correct errors in the application of settled law. |
| Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 6 - Supreme Court Act 1981 18(1A) 31(3) - Access to Justice Act 1999 54 - Civil Procedure (Amendment Rules) 2000 (SI 221/2000) - Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 3 |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| UYB Ltd -v- British Railways Board [2000] EWCA Civ 265 |
|
15 Nov 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice, Damages |
|
| When disallowing interest on a claim, the judge refused to allow the admission of the plaintiff's expert report on quantum, dated two years before the writ, in rebuttal of the respondent's assertion, that they had not known of the amount claimed until immediately before the action. Held: The draft had been marked without prejudice, and it was against public policy to discourage attempts to settle actions without litigation by allowing reference to such documents. The draft remained a draft, and the figures were in fact different from those ultimately disclosed. The judge was correct not to allow the report to be admitted. |
| [ Bailii ] |
| | |
| Trustor AB -v- Barclays Bank plc |
|
16 Nov 2000 ChD |
International, Litigation Practice |
|
| The court had failed to stamp an order as to the entitlement to serve it outside the jurisdiction, and the defendant applied for summary dismissal. The court held that although the directions were mandatory, and the court should endorse reasons why leave had been given to serve the document outside the jurisdiction, such a failure was at most an irregularity, and could not justify the court saying the defendant had not been served. |
| Civil Procedure Rules 6.19 (3) |
| | |
| Designers Guild Ltd -v- Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd (Trading As Washington DC) [2000] UKHL 58; [2001] 1 All ER 700; [2000] 1 WLR 2416; [2001] FSR 113 |
|
28 Nov 2000 HLLord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Hoffmann Lord Hope of Craighead Lord Millett Lord Scott of Foscote |
Litigation Practice, Intellectual Property |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
The claimant sought to enforce its copyright in artwork for a fabric design Ixia, saying the defendant's design Marguerite infringed that copyright. Two issues faced the House. Just what had been copied and if any, then did this amount amount to the whole or a substantial part the design. Held: Where a court of first instance considered a claim of breach of copyright, it must consider both the question of whether copying had taken place, and if so whether what had been copied was substantial. An appellate court should recognise that both are questions of fact and degree, and should be very careful not to usurp the function of the court of first instance by reversing such a decision on appeal. Claims for infringement of artistic copyright differ from other infringement cases in that the result of infringement might or might not look like the original, and the fact of copying was more important. The line was very difficult to draw. Although in this case not the smallest part of a fabric design had been reproduced with anything approaching photographic fidelity, the copying of certain of the ideas expressed in that design which, in their conjoined expression, had involved original artistic skill and labour, constituted the copying of a substantial part of the artistic work.
Lord Hoffmann: "Generally speaking, in cases of artistic copyright, the more abstract and simple the copied idea, the less likely it is to constitute a substantial part. Originality, in the sense of the contribution of the author's skill and labour, tends to lie in the detail with which the basic idea is presented. Copyright law protects foxes better than hedgehogs. " |
| Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 16(3) |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Ot Africa Line Ltd -v- Fayad Hijazy and Another; Same -v- Fayad Hijazy and Others |
|
28 Nov 2000 QBD |
Litigation Practice, Human Rights, Jurisdiction |
|
| The human right to a fair trial did not amount to a right to an unfettered choice of tribunal. Contracts said that they were exclusively governed by English law and to be decided in England. Proceedings between the parties having already commenced in England some of the defendants were enjoined from continuing another action they had begun in Belgium arising from the same contract. |
| Brussels Convention on Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1968 art 17 |
| | |
| HM Attorney-General -v- Ian Richard Flack [2000] EWHC Admin 422 |
|
29 Nov 2000 AdmnPill LJ, Butterfield J |
Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites
|
| A civil proceedings order was sought against the respondent. The respondent had commenced many actions against a particular company, which it was claimed were vindictive in nature. Held: Though the earliest proceedings had been vexatious it was not possible to characterise more recent attempts to litigate as such. "An improper motive may convert an otherwise legitimate action into one which for present purposes is vexatious. The conversion should not lightly be undertaken however in the circumstances described." An order was denied. |
| Supreme Court Act 1981 41(1) |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Mensah -v- Islington Council and Another [2000] EWCA Civ 405; [2002] CP Rep 2 |
|
1 Dec 2000 CAPeter Gibson LJ, Arden LJ |
Local Government, Negligence, Legal Professions, Litigation Practice |

1 Cites
1 Citers
|
Permission was sought for a McKenzie friend to address the court. Peter Gibson LJ said: "In accordance with the overriding objective of the CPR and to avoid the waste of today's hearing, attended as this court had earlier directed, by counsel for the defendants, we took the exceptional course in this highly unsatisfactory situation of allowing Mr Alexander to speak for Mr Mensah. But I must make it clear that this should not be taken as creating any precedent as to how those who have no right of audience can act as advocates for litigants in person. Anyone who aspires to be an advocate should obtain the requisite qualifications, and the court should be very slow to permit those who are allowed to be present in court as Mackenzie friends to act as advocates. That is not the proper function of a Mackenzie friend. The position in law was recently restated by this court in R v Bow County Court ex parte Pelling [1999] 1 WLR 1807. I repeat and endorse the warning given by Lord Woolf MR at page 1825 that if a person chooses to appear regularly as a Mackenzie friend and uses the litigant as a mere puppet, such behaviour could provide a firm foundation for a judge not wishing him to be present as a Mackenzie friend." |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Gooden -v- Prior [2000] EWCA Civ 391 |
|
1 Dec 2000 CA |
Litigation Practice |
|
| Application by Mr Gooden for leave to appeal. |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Dubai Aluminium Company Ltd -v- Deloitte Haskins and Sells and others [2000] EWHC 209 (Comm) |
|
4 Dec 2000 ComC |
Professional Negligence, Litigation Practice |
|
| The claimant sued its professional advisers, alleging that they had failed to advise the claimant of the fraudulent activities of its own executive. A substantial action was under way, and the parties sought directions from the court in the transition to the new Civil Procedure Rules. |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Oxford Gene Technology Ltd -v- Affymetrix Inc and Another |
|
5 Dec 2000 CA |
Intellectual Property, Litigation Practice |
|
| In the course of a challenge to a patent, the patentee sought to amend the patent. Held: He was not obliged when doing so to disclose documents in a manner which would allow their use on a wider basis than for the consideration of the amendment application. Revealing such documents beyond what was required to show the good faith of the assertion of privilege would lead to the loss of that privilege abroad. There was no obligation in modern litigation on a patentee to waive privilege in respect of all such documents. The decision whether to waive privilege was the patentee's, and the court's job was then to decide whether in fact privilege is waived. |
| | |
| Thurrock Borough Council -v- Secretary of State for the Enviroment, Transport & The Regions ex parte Terry Holding [2000] EWCA Civ 323 |
|
13 Dec 2000 CA |
Planning, Litigation Practice |
|
| Where the claimant was not out of time to bring an appeal, or he retained the right of appeal, or the works proposed involved were not new, and no amendment or substitute of a new claim was proposed, the court should exercise its discretion to amend the claim form so that an application for permission to appeal under section 289, should proceed as an application under section 288. |
| Town and Country Planning Act 1990 288 289 - Civil Procedure Rules Part 1.1(1) 1.2 17.4 |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Alexander -v- Prime Minister and others [2000] EWCA Civ 375 |
|
14 Dec 2000 CA |
Company, Litigation Practice |
|
|
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Geoffrey Cobham -v- Joseph Frett [2000] UKPC 49; [2001] 1 WLR 1775 |
|
18 Dec 2000 PCLord Slynn of Hadley Lord Hope of Craighead Lord Scott of Foscote Sir Ivor Richardson The Rt. Hon. Edward Zacca |
Commonwealth, Land, Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
(British Virgin Islands) Two issues arose. First, what was the consequence of inordinate delay between a judge hearing a case and giving his decision, and secondly, how was the law of adverse possession to be applied in cases of interrupted or intermittent occupation. The parties had had resolved a dispute as to the ownership of land, but the winner moved to England, and the neighbour began acts to retake the land. The action to retake the land was heard, but judgement was not given until over a year after the hearing. Held: There was a suggestion that the judge had misremembered some of the evidence, but his notes were detailed, and there was no evidence that the delay had actually effected the judgement. Such would have to be shown to justify setting aside a judgement on this ground. Similarly the judge's analysis of the law was correct.
"As to demeanour, two things can be said. First, in their Lordships' collective experience, a judge re-reading his notes of evidence after the elapse of a considerable period of time can expect, if the notes are of the requisite quality, his impressions of the witnesses to be revived by the re-reading. Second, every experienced judge, and Georges J was certainly that, is likely to make notes as a trial progresses recording the impressions being made on him by the witnesses. Notes of this character would not, without the judge's permission or special request being made to him, form part of the record on an appeal. They might be couched in language quite unsuitable for public record." |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Hubert Scammell, Dora Scammell, Donald Green -v-Margaret Kathleen Dicker [2000] EWCA Civ 352 |
|
21 Dec 2000 CALord Justice Aldous And Lord Justice Mance |
Litigation Practice, Civil Procedure Rules |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| A part 36 offer can be withdrawn at any time before it is accepted or expires. The rules can not force an offer to be left open. Clear words would have been required within the rules to impose such an obligation. The actual words referred to offers 'expressed' to be open for 21 days, but the intention was to create an 'unless' condition not a positive obligation. Such offers are subject to the general rules of contract, including offer and acceptance and the rules merely provide an advantage to the parties in dealing with each other. A court will strive to give effect to agreements, unless not intended to create legal relations, particularly when the agreement is a compromise of an existing dispute and when it has been acted on. |
| Civil Procedure Rules Part 36 |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Hamilton -v- Al Fayed [2000] EWCA Civ 3012; [2001] EMLR 15 |
|
21 Dec 2000 CALord Phillips MR, Sedley and Hale LJJ |
Litigation Practice |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
The claimant sought an order saying that his counsel had discarded confidential documents which were retrieved from his dustbin by a Mr Pell who then sold them to his opponent who had used them to obtain an unfair advantage.
Lord Phillips MR said of Ladd v Marshall: "These principles have been followed by the Court of Appeal for nearly half a century and are in no way in conflict with the overriding objective. In particular it will not normally be in the interests of justice to reopen a concluded trial in order to introduce fresh evidence unless that evidence will probably influence the result. Often the fresh evidence relied upon demonstrates that perjured evidence was given at the trial. In such circumstances, provided that the requirements of Ladd v Marshall are satisfied, the practice of the Court of Appeal has been to order a new trial without resolving the issue of whether the alleged fraud in fact occurred." |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| In Re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No 2); Director General of Fair Trading -v- Proprietary Association of Great Britain and Proprietary Articles Trade Association [2001] ICR 564; [2001] 1 WLR 700; [2000] EWCA Civ 350; [2000] All ER (D) 2425 |
|
21 Dec 2000 CALJ Brooke, Lord Phillips MR, Robert Walker LJ |
Litigation Practice, Natural Justice, Human Rights |
Casemap
1 Cites
1 Citers
|
| The claimants alleged that a connection between a member of the Restrictive Practices Court, who was to hear a complaint and another company, disclosed bias against them. She had not recused herself. Held: When asking whether material circumstances in a case might give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, the test was whether objectively that appearance might be reasonable. It was not a subjective test of whether the lesser tribunal was actually biased. There is little substance to the distinction between a 'real danger', and a 'real possibility' of bias. Circumstances beyond those apparent to the parties might be taken into account. The judge's own account of those circumstances can be taken into account. In this case a possible connection with a party meant that the judge should have recused herself. The court summarised the principles to be derived from this line of cases as follows: "(1) If a Judge is shown to have been influenced by actual bias, his decision must be set aside. (2) Where actual bias has not been established the personal impartiality of the Judge is to be presumed. (3) The Court then has to decide whether, on an objective appraisal, the material facts give rise to a legitimate fear that the Judge might not have been impartial. If they do the decision of the Judge must be set aside. (4) The material facts are not limited to those which were apparent to the applicant. They are those which are ascertained upon investigation by the Court. (5) An important consideration in making an objective appraisal of the facts is the desirability that the public should remain confident in the administration of justice." |
| European Convention on Human Rights 6 |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| Martin Mcleod -v- British Railways Board [2000] ScotCS 333 |
|
22 Dec 2000 SCSLord President |
Scotland, Scotland, Litigation Practice |
|
| It was not a reason for withholding trial by jury that the pursuer's claim was in respect of the physical injury only. |
| Link[s] omitted |
| | |
| MacDonald -v- Taree Holdings Ltd |
|
28 Dec 2000 ChD |
Commercial, Litigation Practice |
|
| It was wrong to deprive a party of his costs because only of his failure to serve an appropriate schedule of costs at least 24 hours before the summary assessment hearing. The court should consider first, a brief adjournment, and second whether the case should be stood over for a detailed assessment, and third whether it should be stood over for a summary assessment. In the absence of other aggravating features, it was wrong to refuse entirely a party his costs. The remedy was disproportionate. The court should make use of other ways of penalising a party in default. |
| Civil Procedure Rules Part 44 |
|