Magistrates - 1980- 1984

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This page lists 18 cases, and was prepared on 28 October 2012.

Regina -v- Nottingham Justices, ex parte Davis [1980] 71 Crim App R 178; [1981] 1 QB 38
1980 QBD Donaldson LJ and Bristow J	Magistrates, Criminal Practice	Casemap 1 Citers
	On a second or subsequent application for bail, magistrates need only ask first whether there had been a material change in circumstancs since the original order. If there had been no change, there was no need to look at the facts underlying the previous refusals of bail. Lord Justice Donaldson said: "The court considering afresh the question of bail is both entitled and bound to take account not only of the change in circumstances which has occurred since the last occasion but also all circumstances which, although they then existed, were not brought to the attention of the court. To do so is not to impugn the previous decision of the court and is necessary in justice to the accused. The question is a little wider than 'Has there been a change?', it is 'Are there new considerations which were not before the court when the accused was last remanded in custody?'"

Regina -v- Berwyn Justices, Ex parte Edwards [1980] 1 WLR 1045
1980	Crime, Magistrates	Casemap 1 Citers

Regina -v- Howell (Errol) [1982] QB 416; [1981] 73 Crim App R 31
1981 CACD Lord Justice Watkins	Crime, Magistrates, Police	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court considered the meaning of the legal concept of a breach of the peace. Held: The essence is to be found in violence or threatened violence. "We entertain no doubt that a constable has a power of arrest where there is reasonable apprehension of imminent danger of a breach of the peace; so for that matter has the ordinary citizen. We hold there is a power of arrest for breach of the peace where (1) a breach of the peace is committed in the presence of the person making the arrest, or (2) the arrestor reasonably believes that such a breach of the peace will be committed in the immediate future by the person arrested although he has not yet committed any breach, or (3) where a breach has been committed and it is reasonably believed that a renewal of it is threatened". And "We are emboldened to say that there is a breach of the peace whenever harm is actually done or likely to be done to a person or in his presence to his property or a person is in fear of being so harmed through an assault, an affray, a riot, unlawful assembly or other disturbance. It is for this breach of the peace when done in his presence that a constable, or anyone else, may arrest an offender without warrant". Justices, for three or more centuries have managed to cope with the offence of breach of the peace, not only as to when conduct has caused such a breach but also as to whether it was likely to do so: " . . . since keeping the peace in this country in the latter half of the 20th century presents formidable problems which bear upon the evolving process of the development of this breach of the common law. Nevertheless, even in these days when affrays, riotous behaviour and other disturbances happen all too frequently. We cannot accept that there can be a breach of the peace unless there has been an act done or threatened to be done which either actually harms a person, or in his presence his property, or is likely to cause such harm, or which puts someone in fear of such harm being done. There is nothing more likely to arouse resentment and anger in him, and a desire to take instant revenge, than attacks or threatened attacks on a person’s body or property." and "We hold that there is a power of arrest for breach of the peace where (1) a breach of the peace is committed in the presence of the person making the arrest ... (2) the arrestor reasonably believes that such a breach will be committed in the immediate future by the person arrested although he has not yet committed any breach . . ."

Regina -v- Hall [1981] 74 Cr App R 67
1981 CACD Lord Lane CJ	Criminal Practice, Magistrates	Casemap 1 Citers
	The certificate sent by the Magistrates on committal to the Crown Court indicated that the committal had been under legislation not yet applicable to the particular defendant. The procedure envisaged under each statute was the same, and, as this court pointed out, the committal was the judicial act of the magistrates, which must have taken place before the document came into existence. Held: Lord Lane CJ said: "The justices undoubtedly had power to act as they did under the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1952, sections 7(1) so far as their power to commit for trial is concerned, and under the Criminal Justice Act 1967, section 1, so far as their power to commit for trial without consideration of the evidence is concerned. Consequently the fact that in the certificate which comes into existence later the wrong Act was mentioned seems to us in no way to invalidate the committal."

Regina -v- Klisiak; Regina -v- Ramsgate Justices, ex parte Warren [1981] CLY 549
1981	Magistrates	Casemap 1 Citers

Morris -v- Matthews [1981] JP 233
1981 CA Lloyd J, Lord Lane CJ	Criminal Practice, Magistrates	Casemap 1 Citers
	On a prosecution for theft, the prosecution failed to read a statement from the owner of the property, which statement had been served on the defence pursuant to Section 9 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967. It was submitted that there was no case to answer, but the court then allowed the statement to be read. Held: Lloyd J said: "The discretion is not limited to cases where what has been omitted is merely formal or technical. It includes matters of substance. The essence of a discretion is that it can be exercised in more than one way. It must always, of course, be exercised judicially. But there is no case for arguing that the discretion was not exercised judicially here. In addition, this particular discretion must be exercised carefully, having regard to the need to be fair to the defendant and to reach finality."

Regina -v- Brentford Justices Ex parte Wong [1981] 1 All ER 884; [1981] 2 WLR 203; (1981) 73 Cr App R 67; [1981] QB 445
1981 QBD Donaldson LJ	Magistrates, Criminal Practice	Casemap
	The defendant had been involved in a traffic accident. Very shortly before the expiry of the six month time limit, the prosecutor issued a careless driving summons apparently in order to preserve the possibility of a prosecution without yet having made his mind up to continue. He decided to continue only three months later. The defendant argued that this was an abuse of process, and that he had been prejudiced by the delay. The prosecutor denied that magistrates had jurisdiction to hear such an argument. The magistrates acceded to this but indicated that if they had had such a jurisdiction, they would have accepted that there had been abuse. The defendant appealed. Held: Magistrates do have a jurisdiction to hear and deteremine an application based on abuse of process. The case was remitted to the magistrates to consider the application. Donaldson LJ said: "For my part, I think that it is open to justices to conclude that it is an abuse of the process of the court for a prosecutor to lay an information when he has not reached a decision to prosecute. The process of laying an information is, I think, assumed by Parliament to be the first stage in a continuous process of bringing a prosecution. Section 104 of the 1952 Act is designed to ensure that prosecutions shall be brought within a reasonable time. That purpose is wholly frustrated if it is possible for a prosecutor to obtain summonses and then, in his own good time and at his convenience, serve them. Of course there may be delays in service of the summonses due perhaps to the evasiveness of the defendant. There may be delays due to administrative reasons which are excusable, but that is not so in this case."

Regina v Uxbridge Justices, ex parte Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1981] 1 QB 829
1981 CA Lord Denning MR, Sir George Baker and Sir Stanley Rees	Police, Magistrates, Costs	Casemap 1 Citers
	The applicant was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment for handling stolen currency notes from travellers at an airport. The police retained cash from his house, which he claimed. He applied for its return. The police not having opposed the application, now sought judicial review of the award of his costs. Held. Lord Denning would have held that the justices had no jurisdiction to award costs, but Sir George Baker and Sir Stanley Rees disagreed. Lord Denning MR said: "I must say that I am most surprised by the order of the justices. The police had done nothing wrong at all. They had taken possession of these currency notes - absolutely properly - because they were reasonably suspected by them to have been stolen. They retained them pending trial equally properly. They were absolutely right not to deliver them without a court order. If they had given them up to Mr. Prasad and the true owners had turned up afterwards, the police would have been liable in damages to the true owners. Only by a court order would they be protected. Viewed in the eyes of the civil law, the police were bailees of the goods. Their custody was like that of a sheriff - custodia legis. Faced with a claimant, the sheriff is entitled to inter-plead and to get his costs as a first charge so long as he acts properly, but he is never bound to pay any costs. So also when the police have goods in custodia legis, and act perfectly properly in regard to them, they should not be ordered to pay costs." Sir Stanley Rees said: "The proceedings before us do not include any issue or argument as to the propriety of the exercise of the discretion of the justices to make the order for costs which they did in favour of the complainant. Nevertheless, I share the considerable degree of unease in regard to the order for costs which is evident in the judgments delivered by Lord Denning M.R. in this court and in the judgments delivered in the Divisional Court by Donaldson L.J. and Kilner Brown J. [1981] 1 W.L.R. 112. If, as I am satisfied is the case, the justices are empowered to make an order for costs in proceedings by complaint and summons under the Police (Property) Act 1897 where there is a complainant and a defendant, their discretion must be exercised having regard to the exceptional and perhaps unique nature of the order sought and to the respective roles of the parties concerned. In a case in which the police have clearly indicated that they do not oppose the making of the order sought and are merely attending before the justices to confirm their attitude and to ensure that an appropriate order is made before the property is delivered to the complainant, it would indeed be difficult to justify any order for costs against the police. Even in a case in which the police do not consent to the order sought by the claimant or claimants but attend the hearing and the justices are satisfied that it was reasonable for them to do so in order to assist the court to assess the validity of the claim or claims made to the ownership of the property, it would be proper for no order for costs to be made against the police, even if the order for delivery of the property sought by a claimant were made. In short, in my judgment, the proper approach to an application for costs in such proceedings should most certainly not be on the basis that costs should simply follow the event, but rather that the discretion to award them should be sparingly exercised, having regard to the exceptional nature of the role of the police as custodians of the property in issue, who require an order of the court to protect them before the delivery up of the property to a claimant." Sir George Baker said: "I have had the advantage of reading the judgment about to be delivered by Sir Stanley Rees and wish to say that I entirely agree with him about the undesirability of justices making orders for costs in cases like the present."
	Police (Property) Act 1897 1(1)

Newman & others -v- London Borough of Hackney [1982] RTR 296
1982 Lord Justice Ormrod	Magistrates	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court considered the distinction between section 1(1)(a) and 1(1)(b) of the Trade Descriptions Act: "In my judgment, there is world of difference between the two offences. It is perfectly true that the application of a false trade description must, in some way, be related to a sale or prospective sale but, looking at the Act itself, I am disposed to take the view that the offence is committed when the false trade description is applied to the vehicle or goods and that is at the time when the odometer reading is altered to read a meaningful figure like 21,000 miles."
	Trades Description Act 1986 1(1)(a) 1(1)(b)

Regina -v- Watford Justices, Ex parte Outrim (1982) [1983] RTR 26
1982	Magistrates	Casemap 1 Citers
	Magistrates have a jurisdiction to hear abuse of process arguments.

Regina -v- Guildford Magistrates' Court, ex parte Healy [1983] 1 WLR 108
1983 CACD Buxton LJ	Criminal Practice, Magistrates	1 Citers
	Magistrates faced with a claim of abuse of process should recognise the wider responsibility for upholding the rule of law which must be that of the High Court. If a serious question arises as to the deliberate abuse of extradition procedures a magistrate should allow an adjournment so that an application can be made to the Divisional Court.

Marco (Croydon) Ltd -v- Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1983] Crim LR 395
1983 QBD Glidewell J, Nolan J	Magistrates	Casemap 1 Citers
	The defendant company traded as A & J Bull Containers. They hired out a builder's skip which was left out, unlit, on the highway at night. A cyclist rode into it and died. An information was laid against "A J Bull Ltd", charging an offence under the Highways Act 1980. The hearing took place after the expiry of the six-month limitation period permitted by Section 127 of the 1980 Act. Counsel appeared for A & J Bull Limited, a separate company entirely. The offending skip bore the name "A & J Bull". A delivery and collection note in respect of it bore the inscription "Marco (Croydon) Limited T/A A & J Bull Containers". The prosecution applied for the amendment of the name, which was allowed. The company appealed its conviction. Held: The justices had been wrong to permit the amendment, and the appeal was allowed. The justices had correctly formulated the law in the case stated as follows: "We were of the opinion that, where the wrong person has been summoned, amendment should not be allowed but where the prosecutor has correctly identified the defendant but merely misstated the name, amendment should be allowed . . ." They applied that test in this way: "Applying those principles to the present case we were of the opinion that the prosecutor clearly intended to summon the corporation which supplied the skip whose name was wrongly copied from the delivery note. We therefore allowed the amendment." Glidewell J: "What the justices do not say and do not specifically find is that the correct company, Marco (Croydon) Limited, received the summons and were apprised that they were being blamed for breach of Section 139 ..... and it was that company, through [counsel], which appeared before the justices on 11 June" - the date of the hearing - "[Counsel] says that he appeared instructed by another company called A & J Bull Limited which is a separate legal entity. "
	Magistrates' Court Act 1980

Regina -v- Macclesfield Justices, ex parte Jones (1983) RTR 143
1983	Magistrates	Casemap 1 Citers
	A defendant who is guilty of deliberately seeking to postpone a trial without good reason has no cause for complaint if his application for an adjournment is refused.

Regina -v- Carey [1983] 76 Cr App R 152
1983	Magistrates	Casemap 1 Citers
	Magistrates had failed to sign the committal papers when sending the case to the crown court. Held: Applying Hall, the committal remained effective.

Regina -v- Liverpool City Justices ex parte Topping [1983] 1 WLR 119
1983 Ackner LJ	Natural Justice, Magistrates	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	When the Applicant appeared before the Justices, his solicitor submitted that the Justices should acknowledge that they were aware that in addition to the matter which they were about to try (that is to say an offence of criminal damage against a door) the Applicant was also facing six complaints of failing to answer to bail and one of being drunk in a public place, and with that knowledge, they should not continue to hear the allegation, as they would or might not be prejudiced by their knowledge from the court sheets of those outstanding charges. Held: The test of whether there had been a fair hearing in a case of doubt "We conclude that the test to be applied can conveniently be expressed by slightly adapting the "words of Lord Widgery CJ in a test which he laid down in Reg v Uxbridge Justices, ex parte Burbridge apparently only reported in The Times June 20th, 1972, but referred to by him [in a later case]: Would 'a reasonable and fair-minded person sitting in the court and' knowing all the relevant facts have a 'reasonable suspicion that a fair trial for' the applicant 'was not possible'."

Mercer v Oldham [1984] Crim LR 232
1984 QBD	Magistrates, Police, Costs
	The respondent had recovered his car from the police via a complaint to the magistrates, having lent it to his brother-in-law, who had used it in a burglary. The magistrates found that he had not known of the intended use. The police had taken no steps to ascertain his state of knowledge, and the magistrates ordered the police to pay his costs. The police appealed by case stated against the order for costs. Held. The appeal was dismissed. The conduct of the police justified the order. In the course of judgment the Court said: "In matters of this kind, it was of the utmost assistance to the justices that the police should be present at court, both to indicate whether or not they objected to the order being made, and to test the evidence of a claimant. In such circumstances, the justices would normally make no order for costs. But they did have a discretion, and if they considered that the police had gone beyond the usual rule merely assisting the justices, and actively opposed the order, then there was no reason why the justices should not, in the exercise of their discretion, order the police to pay costs. That was clearly what happened in the present case."

Regina -v- Clerkenwell Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions [1984] 2 All ER 193
1984	Magistrates	Casemap 1 Citers
	A magistrate acting not as an Examining Magistrate, but deciding a preliminary issue as to jurisdiction, gives a ruling which is final and can properly be challenged by way of case stated or judicial review.

In re McC (A Minor); McC -v- Mullan [1985] AC 528; [1984] 3 WLR 1227; [1984] 3 All ER 908
1984 HL Lord Bridge of Harwich, Lord Lowry, Lor Templeman	Litigation Practice, Magistrates	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The House considered the immunity from suit of judges. The Magistrate here had passed a custodial sentence on a minor without complying with a statutory provision which required him to inform the offender of the right to Legal Aid. Held: The House reaffirmed the common law rule that judges of the higher courts were immune from suit even if it could be shown that they had been actuated by malice. Lord Bridge said: "The principle underlying this rule is clear. If one judge in a thousand acts dishonestly within his jurisdiction to the detriment of a party before him, it is less harmful to the health of society to leave that party without a remedy than that nine hundred and ninety nine honest judges should be harassed by vexatious litigation alleging malice in the exercise of their proper jurisdiction." and "It is, of course, clear that the holder of any judicial office who acts in bad faith, doing what he knows he has no power to do, is liable in damages. If the Lord Chief Justice himself, on the acquittal of a defendant charged before him with a criminal offence, were to say: ‘That is a perverse verdict’, and thereupon proceed to pass a sentence of imprisonment, he could be sued for trespass." The word 'jurisdiction' is not always used in its strict sense Lord Templeman discussed the judicial immunity of Magistrates: "If in the course of a trial which a magistrate is empowered to undertake, the magistrate misbehaves or does not accord the accused a fair trial, or is guilty or some other breach of the principles of natural justice or reaches a result which is vitiated by any error of fact or law, the decision may be quashed by the Magistrate Acts within jurisdiction." Lord Lowry said that the Courts should be slow to change or develop the law in disputed areas of social policy, particularly when Parliament has considered the position and made some changes, or has rejected the opportunity to make changes.