Police - 1930- 1959

These cases are extracted from a very large database. The entries on that database are now being published individually to the main swarb.co.uk website in a much improved form. As cases are published here, the entry here will be replaced by a link to the same case in that improved form on swarb.co.uk. In addition the swarb.co.uk site includes very substantial numbers of cases after 2000. Please take the time to look.  

This page lists 16 cases, and was prepared on 06 June 2013. These case are being transferred one by one to the main swarb.co.uk site which presents them better, with links to full text where we have it, and much improved cross referencing.

Betts -v- Receiver of Metropolitan Police District and Carter Paterson & Co Ltd [1932] 2 KB 595
1932 du Parcq J	Police, Torts - Other	1 Citers
	The police seized from the claimant certain cloth believing it to be stolen from Carter Paterson and delivered it to Carter Paterson, without any order under the 1897 Act. The claimant sued the receiver and Carter Paterson. Held: Since the theft could not be established and the delivery had been made without any order under the Act, the claimant in right of his possession at the time of seizure (subject only in case of the receiver to a limitation defence) was entitled to succeed in conversion against both defendants.
	Police (Property) Act 1897 1

Thomas -v- Sawkins; KBD 1935

Davis -v- Lisle; CA 1936

Duncan -v- Jones [1936] 1 KB 218
1936 KBD Lord Hewart CJ, Humphreys and Singleton JJ	Police, Torts - Other	Casemap 1 Citers
	The appellant was about to make a public address in a situation in which the year before a disturbance had been incited by her speaking. A policeman believed reasonably that a breach of the peace would occur if the meeting was held, and ordered the appellant not to hold the meeting. The appellant however persisted in trying to hold the meeting and obstructed the police officer in his attempt to prevent her from doing so. Neither the appellant nor anyone present, committed, incited or provoked a breach of the peace, but the appellant was held to have wilfully obstructed the officer in the execution of his duty. Held: The fact that the officer reasonably apprehended a breach of the peace was a justification for the finding that he was acting in the execution of his duty. The police may prevent a demonstration on the public highway where there was any fear of a breach of the peace. Lord Hewart CJ: "English law does not recognize any special right of public meeting for political or other purposes".

Cooper -v- Wilson [1937] KB 309
1937	Natural Justice, Police	Casemap
	Police officers can be removed from office only by a valid exercise of the statutory power of dismissal.

Herniman -v- Smith; HL 1938

Dumbell -v- Roberts; CA 1944

Gavin -v- London (City) Police Authority [1944] KB 358
1944	Police	Casemap 1 Citers
	The words "in the execution of duty" are to be given a "benevolent" interpretation.

Christie -v- Leachinsky; HL 25-Mar-1947

Clarence Henry Willcock -v- Muckle [1951] 2 The Times LR 373
26 Jun 1951 KBD Lord Goddard CJ, Sir Raymond Evershed MR, Somervell and Jenkins LJJ, Kilberry, Lynskey and Devlin JJ	Administrative, Police
	Mr Willcock was stopped for speeding. PC Muckle asked him to show his national registration identity card. Mr Willcock refused. PC Muckle served a notice requiring its production which Mr Willcock ignored. He was prosecuted. He argued that the emergency which had led to the Act had passed. He was convicted by the magistrates, but the magistrates imposed only an absolute discharge. He appealed. Held: There had been a declaration that the war had come to an end but no Order in Council revoking the Act. Only one emergency was meant - the imminent outbreak of war. The policeman had really wanted the defendant's vehicle registration number, but was still acting under standing orders requiring them to ask every person stopped to produce the identity card. Lord Goddard "That sort of thing tends to make motorists not law-abiding; it tends to cause resentment." The Act was being used for a purpose for which it was not passed. A court of seven judges had been convened to decide whether the Act remained in force. It did. It required a specific Order in Council to revoke it. '. . . The court wishes to express its emphatic approval of the way in which they [the magistrates] dealt with this case by granting the defendant an absolute discharge. Because the police may have powers, it does not follow that they ought to exercise them on all occasions or as a matter of routine . . . To demand production of the national registration identity card from all and sundry . . . is wholly unreasonable. This Act was passed for security purposes; it was never passed for the purposes for which it is now apparently being used. To use Acts of Parliament passed for particular purposes in war-time when the war 'is a thing of the past . . . tends to turn law-abiding citizens into law-breakers, which is a most undesirable state of affairs. Further, in this country we have always prided ourselves on the good feeling that exists between the police and the public, and such action tends to make people resentful of the acts of the police, and inclines them to obstruct the police instead of assisting them.' Devlin J: 'I think that it would be very unfortunate if the public were to receive the impression that the continuance of the state of emergency had become a sort of statutory fiction which was used as a means of prolonging legislation initiated in different circumstances and for different purposes.'
	National Registration Act 1939 12(4)

Everett -v- Ribbands [1952] 2 QB 198
1952	Torts - Other, Police	Casemap
	The court considered the tort of the malicious obtaining of a search warrant.

Tempest -v- Snowden; 1952

Regina -v- Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Ex parte Parker [1953] 1 WLR 1150
1953	Police

Regina -v- Bass [1953] 1 QB 680; (1953) 17 Cr App R 51
1953 CCA Lord Goddard CJ, Byrne and Parker JJ	Criminal Practice, Police	1 Cites
	The court considered how to deal with the admission of a statement where the defendant contested its admissibility. Here the defendant said he had not been cautioned before the interview. Held: It was within the discretion of the judge to admit the interview "It is to be observed, as this court pointed out in Rex v Murray [1951] 1 KB 391, that while it is for the presiding judge to rule whether a statement is admissible, it is for the jury to determine the weight to be given to it if he admits it, and thus, when a statement has been admitted by the judge, he should direct the jury to apply to their consideration of it the principle as stated by Lord Sumner, and he should further tell them that if they are not satisfied that it was made voluntarily, they should give it no weight at all and disregard it." Byrne J said: "This court has observed that police officers nearly always deny that they have collaborated in the making of notes, and we cannot help wondering why they are the only class of society who do not collaborate in such a matter. It seems to us that nothing could be more natural or proper when two persons have been present at an interview with a third person than that they should afterwards make sure that they have a correct version of what was said. Collaboration would appear to be a better explanation of almost identical notes than the possession of a superhuman memory."

Regina -v- Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Ex parte Fry [1954] 1 WLR 730
1954 Goddard LCJ	Police	Casemap

Gaynor -v- Allen [1959] 2 QB 403
1959 McNair J	Road Traffic, Police, Negligence
	McNair J considered that when looking at the driving of a police officer, the standard remained that of the experienced skilled and careful driver. McNair considered a submission: "that if the motor-cyclist had been a civilian he would undoubtedly have been guilty of some negligence in driving at 60mph, though not necessarily entirely to blame for the accident. To show that a police officer was driving at that speed on a restricted road does not prima facie show negligence" Held: McNair J said: "The driver of this police motor-cycle on this occasion must be judged, as regards civil liability, in exactly the same way as any other driver of a motor-cycle in similar circumstances. He, like any other driver, owed a duty to the public to drive with due care and attention and without exposing the members of the public to unnecessary danger."