Rating - 1960- 1969

The case shown here are derived from the lawindexpro case law database. lawindexpro is a low cost case law database, with over 260,000 case listings, and over 200,000 links to full text judgments. The free service below shows the core information on the case, but is restricted in several ways. A small proportion of cases do allow access to the full lawindexpro information. These cases are selected at random, and may be different on your next visit. The active links through to lawindexpro are extremely powerful allowing full access to all linked cases.  

This page lists 9 cases, and was prepared on 28 October 2012.

Society of Medical Officers of Health -v- Hope [1960] AC 553
1960 HL Radcliffe, Cohen, Jenkins LL, Viscount Simons, Keith L	Rating, Taxes Management, Estoppel	Casemap 1 Citers
	A local valuation court had decided in 1951 that the Society's land was exempt from rates under section 1 of the 1843 Act. The exemption was conditional on certain facts relating to the Society and its purpose in occupying the building. In 1956 the land was shown as a rateable in the new valuation list. The Lands Tribunal rejected a submission that a res judicata estoppel arose from the 1951 decision even though it was admitted that there had been no change of circumstances. Held. The limited jurisdiction of the local valuation court, which might have to form opinions on questions of general law, but only incidentally to its direct function of fixing the assessment and the special position of the valuation officer or equivalent official did not create an assessment binding for future years. Lord Radcliffe said there was: "high and frequent authority for the proposition that it is not in the nature of a decision on one rate or tax that it should settle anything more than the bare issue of that one liability, and that, consequently, it cannot constitute an estoppel when a new issue of liability to a succeeding year' s rate or tax comes up for adjudication. The question of this liability is a "new question." Lord Keith said: "The valuation officer has a public duty to perform by making periodically every five years a valuation list of all hereditaments, with certain exceptions, in his rating area. He must necessarily reconsider and revise the previous valuation list. He has no personal interest in any appeals taken against his valuations, and has a duty to hold the scales as fairly as he can among the ratepayers affected, the occupiers of the various hereditaments. The general body of ratepayers is constantly changing. With each quinquennium the revaluation will affect a new body of ratepayers. I doubt if the valuation officer owing such a duty to an ever-changing body of ratepayers can be regarded as always the same party in the sense in which that expression is used for the application of the rule of res judicata. What if the appellant society changes its habitat, and moves into another rating area with a different valuation officer? I emphasise these aspects of the functions of a valuation officer under the statute, for they lead to what I regard as the true answer to the submission for the appellants, which is that a public officer in the position of the respondent cannot be estopped from carrying out his duties under the statute."
	Scientific Societies Act 1843 1

Caffoor -v- Columbo Income Tax Commissioner [1961] AC 584
1961 PC Lord Radcliffe	Commonwealth, Taxes Management, Rating	Casemap 1 Citers
	Taxation and rating decisions are sui generis. Lord Radcliffe said: "The critical thing is that the dispute which alone can be determined by any decision given in the course of these proceedings is limited to one subject only, the amount of the assessable income for the year in which the assessment is challenged. It is only the amount of that assessable income that is concluded by an agreement or by a decision on an appeal against it (see section 75). Although, of course, the process of arriving at the necessary decision is likely to involve consideration of questions of law, turning upon the construction of the Ordinance or of other statutes or upon the general law, and the tribunal will have to form its view on those questions, all these questions have to be treated as collateral or incidental to what is the only issue that is truly submitted to determination (cf Reg v Hutchings)." and "It may be that the principles applied in these cases form a somewhat anomalous branch of the general law of estoppel per rem judicatam, and are not easily derived from or transferred to other branches of litigation in which such estoppels have to be considered; but in their Lordships opinion they are well established in their own field, and it is not by any means to be assumed that the result is one that should be regretted in the public interest."

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints -v- Henning (Valuation Officer) [1962] 1 WLR 1091
1962 CA Lord Denning MR, Donovan and Pearson LJJ	Rating	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court was asked whether a Mormon Temple was a public place of worship. Lord Denning MR rejected an argument that the Temple was merely a church hall: "The short answer is that this temple is not a church hall, chapel hall nor a similar building. It is not in the least on the same footing as a church hall or chapel hall. It is a very sacred sanctuary, quite different from a building of that category." Donovan LJ said that the Temple was: "far too important in the life of the Mormon Church" to be described as a building similar to a church hall or chapel hall.

Anderson Grice & Co Ltd -v- Assessor for Angus [1962] RA 90
1962	Rating	Casemap 1 Citers
	If a thing is by its nature movable, the mere passage of time will not make it heritable even though it is never in fact moved.

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints -v- Henning (Valuation Officer) [1964] AC 420
1964 HL Lord Pearce	Rating, Charity	Casemap 1 Cites
	The House was asked whether the Mormon Temple at Godstone was exempt from rates as a "place of public religious worship". Held: The words could not apply to places used for religious worship from which the public was excluded. Lord Pearce said that Parliament was entitled to take the view that religious services which were open to the public provided a public benefit which justified the exemption.
	Rating and Valuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1955 7(2)(a)

Field Place Caravan Park Ltd -v- Harding [1966] 2 QB 484
1966 CA Denning MR, Dankworths, Salmon LJJ	Rating	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The Court considered the rateability of a residential caravan site. The caravans were on wheels and retained their mobility although they were jacked up to keep them stable. Held: Although a chattel is not a rateable hereditament by itself, it may become rateable together with land, if it is placed on a piece of land and enjoyed with it in such circumstances and with such a degree of permanence that the chattel with the land can together be regarded as one unit of occupation. Lord Denning MR said: "the correct position today is that, although a chattel is not a rateable hereditament by itself, nevertheless it may become rateable together with land, if it is placed on a piece of land and enjoyed with it in such circumstances and with such a degree of permanence that the chattel with the land can together be regarded as one unit of occupation."

Scottish Burial Reform & Cremation Society -v- Glasgow Corporation [1967] UKHL 3; [1968] AC 138
26 Jul 1967 HL Lord Reid, Lord Guest, Lord Upjohn, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Pearson	Charity, Rating, Scotland	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The appellants sought partial exemption from rates on its premises. The Corporation challenged their charitable status. The society's object was to encourage and provide facilities for cremation. Held: The object was charitable. Lord Reid said that it was not now necessary to produce evidence so as to show that the object was for the public benefit, and also that, this being so, the public benefit was not subverted because there was or might also be a profit or benefit to individuals involved in the prosecution of the objects: "But the appellants must also show that the public benefit is of a kind within the spirit and intendment of the Statute of Elizabeth I. The preamble specifies a number of objects which were then recognised as charitable. But in more recent times a wide variety of other objects have come to be recognised as also being charitable. The courts appear to have proceeded first by seeking some analogy between an object mentioned in the preamble and the object with regard to which they had to reach a decision. And then they appear to have gone further and to have been satisfied if they could find an analogy between an object already held to be charitable and the new object claimed to be charitable. And this gradual extension has proceeded so far that there are few modern reported cases where a bequest or donation was made or an institution was being carried on for a clearly specified object which was for the benefit of the public at large and not of individuals, and yet the object was held not to be within the spirit and intendment of the Statute of Elizabeth I. Counsel in the present case were invited to search for any case having even the remotest resemblance to this case in which an object was held to be for the public benefit but yet not to be within that spirit and intendment. But no such case could be found." Lord Upjohn said: "Upon the first point it must be remembered that Lord Macnaghten's classification was taken from Sir Samuel Romilly's argument in Morice v. Bishop of Durham 162 years ago when the great majority of the inhabitants of the country were living in conditions which to-day would be regarded as of the utmost squalor. The concept of purposes beneficial to the community might then appear to have the qualities of a class and so perhaps, to a lesser extent, in 1891. This so-called fourth class is incapable of further definition and can today hardly be regarded as more than a portmanteau to receive those objects which enlightened opinion would regard as qualifying for consideration under the second heading." As to the preamble to the 1601 Act: "While it may seem almost incredible to anyone not familiar with this branch of the English law that this should still be taken as the test, it is undoubtedly the accepted test, though only in a very wide and broad sense, well illustrated by the observations of Lord Greene M.R. in In re Strakosch [1949] Ch 529 . ." He concluded, with some skepticism: "My Lords, I conclude by saying that the authorities show that the "spirit and intendment" of the preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth have been stretched almost to breaking point. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries this was often due to a desire on the part of the courts to save the intentions of the settlor or testator from failure from some technical rule of law. Now that it is used so frequently to avoid the common man's liability to rates or taxes, this generous trend of the law may one day require reconsideration."
	Local Government (Financial Provisions etc.) (Scotland) Act 1962 - Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act 1888 13
	Link[s] omitted

Commissioner of Valuation for Northern Ireland -v- Lurgan Borough Council [1968] NI 104
1968 CANI Lord MacDermott LCJ	Northern Ireland, Rating, Charity	Casemap 1 Citers
	The respondent local authority owned an indoor swimming pool. It claimed exemption from rates under section 2 of the 1854 Act saying that it was used exclusively for the purposes of a recreational charity under the Act of 1958. Held. (By a majority) The ground of exemption was established. Lord MacDermott said: "Here, I think, there can be no doubt that in the construction, equipment and running of this hereditament the Council has provided facilities for recreation. The big question is - have these facilities been provided 'in the interests of social welfare'? 'Social welfare' is a somewhat vague and uncertain expression. Taken by itself I still incline to the view I expressed in National Deposit Friendly Society Trustees v. Skegness Urban District Council, that it signifies something more than 'social well-being'. In the present context, however, I do not think it necessary to speculate as to the precise distinction to be drawn between these two expressions as subsection (2) of section 1, though not exactly a definition, provides in effect, in my opinion, the essential elements which must be present if a state of social well-being is to amount to 'social welfare' as that expression is used in the section. These elements are to be drawn from paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (2). By (a) the facilities must be provided with the object of improving the conditions of life for the persons for whom the facilities are primarily intended. To my mind the provision of the hereditament satisfies that requirement. The primary object, even if confined to the phraseology of the preamble to the Act of 1846, was clearly to improve the conditions of life of the inhabitants of the Borough of Lurgan and if, as I have held, this was done in a manner which enured for the benefit of the public at large, paragraph (a) would still be complied with. It is clear from the terms of the case stated that the hereditament was not only provided to improve the conditions of life for those for whom it was primarily intended, but that in fact it has done so. The full use which has been made of the hereditament since its inauguration is, I think, cogent evidence that it has filled a need in the life of the community and has added to the enjoyment of its members. The second requirement to be satisfied is one or other of the subparagraphs of paragraph (b). Of these alternatives I am of opinion that subparagraph (i) does not apply so as to support the Council's case. There is nothing in the case stated that I can see which shows that those benefited have need of the facilities provided by reason of any of the specific factors mentioned, ie. youth, age, infirmity or disablement, poverty or social and economic circumstances. But subparagraph (ii), on the views I have already expressed, is applicable for the facilities of the hereditament are available to the public at large."
	Valuation (Ireland) Amendment Act 1854 82

Dawkins (Valuation Officer) -v- Ash Brothers & Heaton [1969] 2 AC 366
1969 HL Lord Pearson	Rating	Casemap 1 Citers
	The House considered the statutory principle of valuation for rating purposes: "But one excludes human realities to a limited and necessary extent, since it is only the human realities that give any value at all to hereditaments. They are excluded in so far as they are accidental to the letting of a hereditament. They are acknowledged so far as they are essential to the hereditament itself. It is, for instance, essential to the hereditament itself that it is close to the sea and that humans will pay more highly for a house close to the sea. One can therefore take that into account in the hypothetical letting. It is, however, accidental to the house that its owner was shrewd or that the rich man happened to want it and that therefore the rent being paid is extremely high…"