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Road Traffic - From: 1930 To: 1959

This page lists 36 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.


 
 Harrison v Hill; 1932 - 1932 JC 13

 
 Rex v Bolkis; CCA 1932 - (1932) 24 Cr App R 19
 
Monk v Warbey [1935] 1 KB 75
1935
CA
Greer LJ
Road Traffic
The court took a strict view of a vehicle owner's potential liability to injured third parties. Held: A person who suffered injury by reason of a breach of s35 could maintain an action in damages for that breach: "The Road Traffic Act, 1930, under which the question arises, was passed in these circumstances: it had become apparent that people who were injured by the negligent driving of motor cars were in a parlous situation if the negligent person was unable to pay damages. Accordingly two statutes were passed, one for the purpose of enabling persons who were thus injured to recover, in the case of the bankruptcy of an insured defendant the money which would be payable to him by the insurance company. Parliament enacted that in such circumstances the insurance money should go not to the general creditors of the bankrupt defendant but to the injured person; in other words the injured person, although not a party to the insurance could make the insurance company liable. That Act–the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act, 1930, did not meet the whole difficulty that had arisen because motor car owners sometimes lent their cars to uninsured persons, and if a person who borrowed a car and in driving it caused injury to a third person the remedy provided by that Act did not avail the injured person. Consequently the Road Traffic Act, 1930, was passed for the very purpose of making provision for third parties who suffered injury by the negligent driving of motor vehicles by uninsured persons to whom the insured owner had lent such vehicles. How could Parliament make provision for their protection from such risks if it did not enable an injured third person to recover for a breach of s.35? That section which is in Part II of the Act headed "Provision against third-party risks arising out of the use of motor vehicles," would indeed be no protection to a person injured by the negligence of an uninsured person to whom a car had been lent by the insured owner, if no civil remedy were available for a breach of the section."
Road Traffic Act 1930 35
1 Citers



 
 Skilton v Epsom and Ewell Urban District Council; CA 1937 - [1937] 1 KB 112

 
 Joseph Eva Ltd v Reeves; CA 1938 - [1938] 2 All ER 115
 
McCrone v Riding [1938] 1 All ER 157
1938


Crime, Road Traffic
The defendant had been acquitted of careless driving after the magistrates held that he was 'exercising oll the skill and attention to be expected from a peson with his short experience' Held: The justices were in error. The basic standard expected of a new driver was the same as that expected of any driver with the same duty as provided in the Act.
Road Traffic Act 1930 12


 
 Peters v General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd; 1938 - [1938] 2 All ER 267
 
Bugge v Taylor [1941] 1 KB 198
1941


Road Traffic
A branch of a road which leads into and continues out of the place in question, such as in this case, a forecourt may qualify as a road.
1 Citers


 
Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Co Ltd v Morrison [1942] 2 KB 53
1942

Goddard LJ
Road Traffic, Insurance
The statutory requirement for compulsory insurance in the Road Traffic Act 1930 was of little value if it was open to insurers to freely exclude liability for common risks.
Road Traffic Act 1934
1 Citers



 
 Kay v Butterworth; KBD 1945 - (1945) 61 TLR 452

 
 Peek v Towler; 1945 - [1945] KB 458
 
Whittall v Kirkby [1946] 2 All ER 552; [1947] KB 194
1946


Road Traffic
Special reasons for non-disqualification of a driver were defined as being reasons which, first, constitute mitigating or extenuating circumstances; secondly, do not amount in law to a defence to the charge; thirdly, are directly connected with the commission of the offence; and, fourthly, which the court ought properly to take into consideration when considering imposing sentence
1 Citers


 
Whittle v Kirby [1946] 2 All ER 252
1946


Road Traffic
A special reason for not disqualifying a driver is one which is special to the facts of the case and not personal to the offender.
1 Citers


 
Lyons v May [1948] 2 All ER 1062
1948


Road Traffic
A person who was ignorant of the fact that there was no policy of insurance covering a vehicle may be guilty of an offence if he permits the use of the vehicles while uninsured.
Road Traffic Act 1930 35(1)
1 Citers



 
 Harding v Price; KBD 1948 - [1948] 1 KB 695

 
 Weldrick v Essex and Suffolk Equitable Insurance Society Ltd; QBD 1950 - [1950] 83 Ll R 91
 
Corkery v Carpenter [1950] 2 All ER 745; [1951] 1 KB 102
1950
KBD
Lord Goddard CJ, Hilbery, Byrne JJ
Road Traffic, Crime
The defendant was accused of being drunk in charge of a carriage. He was in fact riding a cycle. Section 12 made it an offence to be "drunk while in charge on any highway . . of any carriage, horse, cattle, or steam engine". Held: The Act was to be read purposively. The mischief rule allowed the court to hold that a carriage included a bicycle.
Lord Goddard CJ said: "for this purpose there cannot be any distinction between a section in a highway statute passed for the protection of the public and a section in a licensing statute passed for the same purpose, both of them concerning the conduct of a person on the highway and the preservation of public order." and "a bicycle is a carriage . . It is a carriage in my opinion because it carries."
Licensing Act 1872 12
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Nicholas v Penny [1950] 2 KB 466; [1950] 2 All ER 89
1950
QBD
Lord Goddard
Road Traffic, Evidence
A police officer's assessment of a defendant's speed could be corroborated by evidence as to the reading of a speedometer, even if the latter device had not been checked for the accuracy of its reading, unless there were particular reasons for deciding otherwise. "The question in the present case is whether, if evidence is given that a mechanical device, such as a watch or speedometer, recorded a particular speed or a particular time, that recording is prima facie evidence on which the court can act. In a particular case the court might refuse to act on it, but here counsel for the respondent called our attention to the fact that the difference is very great. The offence is driving at a speed exceeding thirty miles an hour, and the evidence is that the speedometer showed that the appellant was exceeding that speed by ten miles an hour. It would be a very considerable error if the speedometer was as much out as that."
There is a very well-established presumption in the law of evidence that a measurement made by a technical or scientific instrument is accurate, if the instrument is of a type which as a matter of common knowledge or experience may be expected to be accurate. In my opinion, a tape measure is undoubtedly such an instrument.
Lord Goddard CJ set out the doctrine of 'per incuriam', saying: " ''Per incuriam' are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the Court concerned, so that in such cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong."
1 Citers


 
Leicester v Pearson [1952] 2 All ER 71; [1952] 2 QB 668; [1952] 1 TLR 1537
1952


Road Traffic, Negligence
Road signs and layouts creating a pedestrian crossing did not create an absolute precedence for a pedestrian. The driver must use reasonable endeavours in the circumstances to give a a pedestrian preference. Where an accident occurs, the fact if it be so that the driver was free of negligence, will afford a full defence.

 
Simpson v Peat [1952] 2 QB 24
1952

Lord Goddard
Road Traffic
As to the offence of driving without due care and attention, Lord Goddard said: "The expression "error of judgment" is not a term of art; it is in fact one of the vaguest possible description: it can be used colloquially to describe either a negligent act or one which, though mistaken, is not negligent."
1 Citers


 
Sykes v Millington [1953] 1 All ER 1098
1953


Vicarious Liability, Road Traffic

Road and Rail Traffic Act 1933 2(3)
1 Citers



 
 Bray v Palmer; CA 1953 - [1953] 1 WLR 1455
 
Dennis v Tame [1954] 1 WLR 1338
1954
QBD
Lord Goddard CJ
Road Traffic
The defendant had been given a conditional discharge, which had the effect under section 12(2) of avoiding disqualification. The prosecutor appealed by case stated. Held: The conditional discharge was set aside. The Divisional Court had said more than once that conditional discharge provisions should not be used in order to avoid disqualification in cases where, under the 1930 Act, the defendant must be disqualified in the absence of special circumstances. It further held that there were no special circumstances on the facts.
Road Traffic Act 1930
1 Citers


 
John v Humphreys [1955] 1 WLR 325
1955


Road Traffic
It was for a defendant driver positively to establish that he had driven in accordance with a driving licence and with an appropriate policy of insurance.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Kitson [1955] 39 Cr App R 66
1955


Road Traffic
K had a lot to drink and went to sleep in the passenger seat of a car driven by his brother-in-law. When later charged with driving car under the influence of drink, he said in his defence that when he woke up, he found that the driving seat was empty, and the car was moving down a hill with the hand brake off. He managed to steer the car into a grass verge at the bottom of the hill. Held: The conviction for driving a car under the influence of drink stood. The ingredients of the offence were made out, and he had undoubtedly been driving the car within the meaning of the Act.
1 Citers


 
Morton v Wheeler 1956 CA 33
1956
CA
Lord Denning MR
Nuisance, Road Traffic
Sharp spikes by the side of a highway were said to be a nuisance. Lord Denning MR said: "As all lawyers know, the tort of public nuisance is a curious mixture. It covers a multitude of sins. We are concerned to-day with only one of them, namely, a danger in or adjoining a highway. This is different, I think, from an obstruction in the highway. If a man wrongfully obstructs a highway, or makes it less commodious for others (without making it dangerous) he is guilty of a public nuisance because he interferes with the right of the public to pass along it freely." and "Danger stands, however, on a different footing from obstruction."
1 Citers


 
Morton v Weaver Unreported, 31/01/1956
31 Jan 1956
CA
Lord Denning MR
Nuisance, Road Traffic
The court distinguished between obstructions of a highway and dangers created on it. Lord Denning MR asked: "How are we to determine whether a state of affairs in or near a highway is a danger?" and answered "This depends, I think, on whether injury may reasonably be foreseen. If you take all the cases in the book, you will - find that if the state of affairs is such that injury may reasonably be anticipated by persons using the highway it is a public nuisance .... But if the possibility of injury is so remote that the reasonable man would dismiss it out of hand, saying 'Of course, it is possible, but not in the least probable', then it is not a danger."
He went on to say: "Inasmuch as the test of danger is what may reasonably be foreseen, it is apparent that cases of public nuisance . . have an affinity with negligence." Nevertheless: "There is a real distinction between negligence and nuisance. In an action for private damage arising out of a public nuisance, the court does not look at the conduct of the defendant and ask whether he was negligent. It looks at the actual state of affairs as it exists in or adjoining the highway, without regard to the merits or demerits of the defendant. If the state of affairs is such as to be a danger to persons using the highway . . it is a public nuisance. Once it is held to be a danger, the person who created it is liable unless he can show sufficient justification or excuse."
1 Citers


 
Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 All ER 193; (1958) 42 Cr App R 51; [1958] 2 WLR 76; [1958] 1 QB 277; 122 JP 134
1958
QBD
Goddard CJ, Devlin, Pearson JJ
Crime, Road Traffic
The Court was asked whether the accused had put forward sufficient evidence on a charge of dangerous driving to justify the justices adjudging that he should be acquitted, there having been no dispute that at the time when his car collided with another one he was at the driving wheel. At the trial the accused had contended that he became unconscious as a result of being overcome by an unidentified illness. Held: The prosecutor's appeal succeeded. The court discussed the defence of insanity.
Devlin J said: "For the purposes of the criminal law there are two categories of mental irresponsibility, one where the disorder is due to disease and the other where it is not. The distinction is not an arbitrary one. If disease is not the cause, if there is some temporary loss of consciousness arising accidentally, it is reasonable to hope that it will not be repeated and that it is safe to let an acquitted man go entirely free. But if disease is present, the same thing may happen again and therefore, since 1800, the law has provided that persons acquitted on this ground should be subject to restraint."
However: "It would be quite unreasonable to allow the defence to submit at the end of the prosecution's case that the Crown had not proved affirmatively and beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was at the time of the crime sober, or not sleep walking or not in a trance or black out."
Goddard CJ did not equate unconsciousness due to a sudden illness, which must entail the malfunctioning of the mental processes of the sufferer, with disease of the mind. Where the driving or apparent driving is deprived of its voluntary character by, for example, automatism or unconsciousness, the offence is not committed: "I agree that there may be cases where the circumstances are such that the accused could not really be said to be driving at all. Suppose he had a stroke or an epileptic fit, both instances of what may properly be called acts of God; he might well be in the driver's seat even with his hands on the wheel, but in such a state of unconsciousness that he could not be said to be driving".
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Griffin v Squires [1958] 1 WLR 1106
1958


Road Traffic
To count as a road in road traffic law, a stretch of land must at least be a road. A car park was held not to be a road.
1 Citers


 
Beer v Davies (1958) 2 All ER 255; [1958] 2 QB 187
1958
QBD
Goddard CJ and Hilbery and Donovan JJ
Road Traffic
A bus driver was allegedly involved in an act of careless driving and was sent notice of an intention to prosecute by registered post ten days after the accident. In fact he was on holiday and the letter was returned without ever being delivered. Held: This did not constitute appropriate service within 14 days within the meaning of the relevant legislation, then section 21 of the Road Traffic Act 1930. The mere sending of a letter did not constitute service and section 26 of the Interpretation Act did not help because the presumption of service in the ordinary course of post had again been rebutted on the facts.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Wickens (1958) 42 Cr App R 236
1958

Devlin J
Road Traffic
The court set out the requirements to be met by a defendant on an argument that there existed special reasons for him not to be disqualified: (1) a special reason must be a mitigating or extenuating circumstance; (2) it must not amount in law to a defence; (3) it must be directly connected with the commission of the offence; and (4) it must be a matter which the court ought properly to take into account when considering sentence.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Wickins [1958] 42 Cr App R 236
1958

Devlin J
Road Traffic
The court prescribed four requirements for a special reason: namely, it must be a mitigating or extenuating circumstance; it must not in law amount to a defence; it must be directly connected with the commission of the offence; and the matter must be one which the court ought properly to take into consideration when imposing punishment. The divisional court this court should be slow to interfere with a Justices' decision in this area, where they have properly directed themselves as to the law and taken proper considerations into account.
1 Citers


 
Cogley v Sherwood [1959] WLR 781
1959


Road Traffic
It is the exhibition of the vehicle for hire through the agency of the driver which is the essence of the offence of plying for hire, unlicensed.
Metropolitan Police Public Carriage Act 1869 7
1 Citers


 
Elliott v Grey [1959] 3 All ER 733
1959
QBD

Road Traffic
The defendant had left his car on the roadway. It was raised on bricks, and the battery was removed. He appealed his conviction for it not being insured. Held: The conviction was correct. The acts of the defendant fell within the mischief of the Act. The car was being 'used on a road'.

 
Montgomery v Loney [1959] NI 171
1959

Lord MacDermott CJ
Road Traffic, Northern Ireland
When asking whether a roadway is a public road, one asks whether there is about those who obtain permission to enter 'some reason personal to them for their admittance'.
1 Citers


 
Gaynor v Allen [1959] 2 QB 403
1959

McNair J
Road Traffic, Police, Negligence
McNair J considered that when looking at the driving of a police officer, the standard remained that of the experienced skilled and careful driver. McNair considered a submission: "that if the motor-cyclist had been a civilian he would undoubtedly have been guilty of some negligence in driving at 60mph, though not necessarily entirely to blame for the accident. To show that a police officer was driving at that speed on a restricted road does not prima facie show negligence" Held: McNair J said: "The driver of this police motor-cycle on this occasion must be judged, as regards civil liability, in exactly the same way as any other driver of a motor-cycle in similar circumstances. He, like any other driver, owed a duty to the public to drive with due care and attention and without exposing the members of the public to unnecessary danger."
1 Citers


 
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