Road Traffic - 1930- 1959

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This page lists 27 cases, and was prepared on 03 July 2010.

Harrison -v- Hill 1932 JC 13
1932 Lord Justice-General (Clyde), Lord Sands	Scotland, Road Traffic	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court considered the characteristics which would make "any other road to which the public has access?" a road for road traffic legislation. Lord Clyde: "There must be, as matter of fact, walking or driving by the public on the road, and such walking or driving must be lawfully performed--that is to say, must be permitted or allowed, either expressly or implicitly, by the person or persons to whom the road belongs." and "I think that, when the statute speaks of 'the public' in this connection, what is meant is the public generally, and not the special class of members of the public who have occasion for business or social purposes to go the farmhouse or to any part of the farm itself; were it otherwise, the definition might just as well have included all private roads as well as all public highways. I think also that, when the statute speaks of the public having 'access' to the road, what is meant is neither (at one extreme) that the public has a positive right of its own to access, nor (at the other extreme) that there exists no physical obstruction, of greater or less impenetrability, against physical access by the public; but that the public actually and legally and legally enjoys access to it. It is, I think, a certain state of use or possession that is pointed to. There must be, as matter of fact, walking or driving by the public on the road, and such walking or driving must be lawfully performed -- that is to say, must be permitted or allowed, either expressly or impliedly, by the person or persons to whom the road belongs." Lord Sands: "Any road may be regarded as a road to which the public have access upon which members of the public are to be found who have not obtained access either by overcoming a physical obstruction or in defiance of prohibition express or implied."

Rex -v- Bolkis (1932) 24 Cr App R 19
1932 CCA	Road Traffic	Casemap 1 Citers
	The defendant complained that a jury had not been asked a question of fact, namely whether his name and address could not be discovered withut due diligence. The section had a proviso that failure to comply with the section was not a bar to conviction if the court was satisfied inter alia that the accused's name and address could not be discovered with reasonable diligence. Held: The appeal failed. The words in the proviso "the court is satisfied" referred to the judge and not the jury.
	Road Traffic Act 1930 21

Monk -v- Warbey [1935] 1 KB 75
1935 CA Greer LJ	Road Traffic	Casemap
	The court took a strict view of a vehicle owner's potential liability to injured third parties. Held: A person who suffered injury by reason of a breach of s35 could maintain an action in damages for that breach: "The Road Traffic Act, 1930, under which the question arises, was passed in these circumstances: it had become apparent that people who were injured by the negligent driving of motor cars were in a parlous situation if the negligent person was unable to pay damages. Accordingly two statutes were passed, one for the purpose of enabling persons who were thus injured to recover, in the case of the bankruptcy of an insured defendant the money which would be payable to him by the insurance company. Parliament enacted that in such circumstances the insurance money should go not to the general creditors of the bankrupt defendant but to the injured person; in other words the injured person, although not a party to the insurance could make the insurance company liable. That Act–the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act, 1930, did not meet the whole difficulty that had arisen because motor car owners sometimes lent their cars to uninsured persons, and if a person who borrowed a car and in driving it caused injury to a third person the remedy provided by that Act did not avail the injured person. Consequently the Road Traffic Act, 1930, was passed for the very purpose of making provision for third parties who suffered injury by the negligent driving of motor vehicles by uninsured persons to whom the insured owner had lent such vehicles. How could Parliament make provision for their protection from such risks if it did not enable an injured third person to recover for a breach of s.35? That section which is in Part II of the Act headed "Provision against third-party risks arising out of the use of motor vehicles," would indeed be no protection to a person injured by the negligence of an uninsured person to whom a car had been lent by the insured owner, if no civil remedy were available for a breach of the section."
	Road Traffic Act 1930 35

Skilton -v- Epsom and Ewell Urban District Council [1937] 1 KB 112
1937 CA Romer LJ, Slesser LJ	Road Traffic, Torts - Other	Casemap 1 Citers
	A line of traffic studs had been placed in the centre of the highway. One of them had become loose. As a car passed over the loose stud it shot out and struck the plaintiff on her bicycle. She fell off and was injured. She sued the highway authority. The plaintiff succeeded at trial but the highway authority appealed on the ground that the plaintiff's complaint was of non-repair of the highway. Held: The appeal failed. Slesser LJ: "The question to be decided by the court is essentially this. Have the defendants caused a nuisance?" They had. Romer LJ: "I think that the defendants have rightly been made liable for the damage caused to the plaintiff, and for this reason: they have done something on the highway not for the purpose of maintaining it as a highway but for some totally different purpose, and the act which they did had become at the time the injury was caused to the plaintiff a nuisance to the highway for which they were, in my opinion, properly made liable, notwithstanding the fact that they are also the highway authority."

Joseph Eva Ltd -v- Reeves [1938] 2 All ER 115
1938 CA Scott LJ	Road Traffic, Negligence	1 Citers
	An accident occurred when a police vehicle went through traffic lights at green, but on the wrong side of the road. Held: A driver crossing through traffic lights at green owes no duty to traffic entering the crossing in disobedience to the lights beyond a duty that if he in fact sees such traffic he must take all reasonable steps to avoid a collision. Scott LJ: "Nothing but implicit obedience to the absolute prohibition of the red -- and indeed of the amber, subject only to the momentary discretion which it grants -- can ensure safety to those who are crossing on the invitation of the green. Nothing but absolute confidence, in the mind of the driver invited by the green to proceed, that he can safely go right ahead, accelerating up the full speed proper to a clear road in the particular locality, without having to think of the risk of traffic from the right crossing his path, will promote the free circulation of traffic, which, next to safety is the main purpose of all traffic-regulations. Nothing again will help more to encourage obedience to the prohibition of the lights than the knowledge that, if there is a collision on the crossroads, the trespasser will have no chance of escaping liability on a plea alleging contributory negligence against the car which has the right of way. Finally, nothing will help more to encourage compliance with the summons of the green to go straight on than the knowledge of the driver that the law will not blame him if unfortunately he does have a collision with an unexpected trespasser from the left or right."

McCrone -v- Riding [1938] 1 All ER 157
1938	Crime, Road Traffic
	The defendant had been acquitted of careless driving after the magistrates held that he was 'exercising oll the skill and attention to be expected from a peson with his short experience' Held: The justices were in error. The basic standard expected of a new driver was the same as that expected of any driver with the same duty as provided in the Act.
	Road Traffic Act 1930 12

Bugge -v- Taylor [1941] 1 KB 198
1941	Road Traffic	Casemap 1 Citers
	A branch of a road which leads into and continues out of the place in question, such as as here, the forecourt may qualify as a road.

Peek -v- Towler [1945] KB 458
1945 Tucker J	Road Traffic	Casemap 1 Citers
	A driver of a vehicle who had been involved in an accident, remained under a duty to report the accident and to provide his particulars whether or not he had been requested to do so: "It would be a remarkable state of affairs if . . . The obligations should only arise in cases where there has been some bystander who has asked for these particulars and where there has been a failue to comply with his request."
	Road Traffic Act 1930 822(2)

Whittall -v- Kirkby [1946] 2 All ER 552; [1947] KB 194
1946	Road Traffic
	Special reasons for non-disqualification of a driver were defined as being reasons which, first, constitute mitigating or extenuating circumstances; secondly, do not amount in law to a defence to the charge; thirdly, are directly connected with the commission of the offence; and, fourthly, which the court ought properly to take into consideration when considering imposing sentence

Whittle -v- Kirby [1946] 2 All ER 252
1946	Road Traffic	Casemap 1 Citers
	A special reason for not disqualifying a driver is one which is special to the facts of the case and not personal to the offender.

Lyons -v- May [1948] 2 All ER 1062
1948	Road Traffic	Casemap 1 Citers
	A person who was ignorant of the fact that there was no policy of insurance covering a vehicle may be guilty of an offence if he permits the use of the vehicles while uninsured.
	Road Traffic Act 1930 35(1)

Corkery -v- Carpenter [1950] 2 All ER 745
1950 KBD	Road Traffic, Crime
	The defendant was accused of being drunk in charge of a carriage. He was in fact riding a cycle. Held: The Act was to be read purposively. The mischief rule allowed the court to hold that a carriage included a bicycle.

Weldrick -v- Essex & Suffolk Equitable Insurance Society Ltd [1950] 83 Ll R 91
1950 QBD Birkett J	Insurance, Road Traffic	Casemap 1 Citers
	Nine months before the writ was issued to make a claim against the insured under a motor policy, the plaintiff's solicitors had written to the insurers: "We understand your Society has repudiated liability, and we shall be grateful to have your confirmation thereof in writing, because you will appreciate, we shall have to take proceedings against Mohamed, and as against the owner of the other vehicle, and at the same time give notice to the Motor Insurers Bureau of your repudiation of liability." The insureres confirmed that they would repudiate liability. Held: "It is very difficult to resist the view that the defendants in those circumstances knew that proceedings would almost inevitably be brought, but I am afraid I cannot quite decide it like that." The solicitor's letter was insufficient notice for the purposes of section 10(2): "What they (the insurers) did have was an intimation that in certain circumstances proceedings might be brought, but not necessarily that they would be brought."
	Road Traffic Act 1934 10(2)

Leicester -v- Pearson [1952] 2 All ER 71; [1952] 2 QB 668; [1952] 1 TLR 1537
1952	Road Traffic, Negligence
	Road signs and layouts creating a pedestrian crossing did not create an absolute precedence for a pedestrian. The driver must use reasonable endeavours in the circumstances to give a a pedestrian preference. Where an accident occurs, the fact if it be so that the driver was free of negligence, will afford a full defence.

Simpson v Peat [1952] 2 QB 24
1952 Lord Goddard	Road Traffic	Casemap 1 Citers
	As to the offence of driving without due care and attention, Lord Goddard said: "The expression "error of judgment" is not a term of art; it is in fact one of the vaguest possible description: it can be used colloquially to describe either a negligent act or one which, though mistaken, is not negligent."

Sykes -v- Millington [1953] 1 All ER 1098
1953	Vicarious Liability, Road Traffic	Casemap 1 Citers
	Road and Rail Traffic Act 1933 2(3)

Regina -v- Kitson [1955] 39 Cr App R 66
1955	Road Traffic	Casemap 1 Citers
	K had a lot to drink and went to sleep in the passenger seat of a car driven by his brother-in-law. When later charged with driving car under the influence of drink, he said in his defence that when he woke up, he found that the driving seat was empty, and the car was moving down a hill with the hand brake off. He managed to steer the car into a grass verge at the bottom of the hill. Held: The conviction for driving a car under the influence of drink stood. The ingredients of the offence were made out, and he had undoubtedly been driving the car within the meaning of the Act.

John -v- Humphreys [1955] 1 WLR 325
1955	Road Traffic	Casemap
	It was for a defendant driver positively to establish that he had driven in accordance with a driving licence and with an appropriate policy of insurance.

Morton -v- Wheeler 1956 CA 33
1956 CA Lord Denning MR	Nuisance, Road Traffic	1 Citers
	Sharp spikes by the side of a highway were said to be a nuisance. Lord Denning MR said: "As all lawyers know, the tort of public nuisance is a curious mixture. It covers a multitude of sins. We are concerned to-day with only one of them, namely, a danger in or adjoining a highway. This is different, I think, from an obstruction in the highway. If a man wrongfully obstructs a highway, or makes it less commodious for others (without making it dangerous) he is guilty of a public nuisance because he interferes with the right of the public to pass along it freely." and "Danger stands, however, on a different footing from obstruction."

Morton -v- Weaver Unreported, 31/01/1956
31 Jan 1956 CA Lord Denning MR	Nuisance, Road Traffic	1 Citers
	The court distinguished between obstructions of a highway and dangers created on it. Lord Denning MR asked: "How are we to determine whether a state of affairs in or near a highway is a danger?" and answered "This depends, I think, on whether injury may reasonably be foreseen. If you take all the cases in the book, you will - find that if the state of affairs is such that injury may reasonably be anticipated by persons using the highway it is a public nuisance .... But if the possibility of injury is so remote that the reasonable man would dismiss it out of hand, saying 'Of course, it is possible, but not in the least probable', then it is not a danger." He went on to say: "Inasmuch as the test of danger is what may reasonably be foreseen, it is apparent that cases of public nuisance . . have an affinity with negligence." Nevertheless: "There is a real distinction between negligence and nuisance. In an action for private damage arising out of a public nuisance, the court does not look at the conduct of the defendant and ask whether he was negligent. It looks at the actual state of affairs as it exists in or adjoining the highway, without regard to the merits or demerits of the defendant. If the state of affairs is such as to be a danger to persons using the highway . . it is a public nuisance. Once it is held to be a danger, the person who created it is liable unless he can show sufficient justification or excuse."

Regina -v- Wickens (1958) 42 Cr App R 236
1958 Devlin J	Road Traffic	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court set out the requirements to be met by a defendant on an argument that there existed special reasons for him not to be disqualified: (1) a special reason must be a mitigating or extenuating circumstance; (2) it must not amount in law to a defence; (3) it must be directly connected with the commission of the offence; and (4) it must be a matter which the court ought properly to take into account when considering sentence.

Griffin -v- Squires [1958] 1 WLR 1106
1958	Road Traffic	Casemap 1 Citers
	To count as a road in road traffic law, a stretch of land must at least be a road. A car park was held not to be a road.

Regina -v- Wickins [1958] 42 Cr App R 236
1958 Devlin J	Road Traffic	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court prescribed four requirements for a special reason: namely, it must be a mitigating or extenuating circumstance; it must not in law amount to a defence; it must be directly connected with the commission of the offence; and the matter must be one which the court ought properly to take into consideration when imposing punishment. The divisional court this court should be slow to interfere with a Justices' decision in this area, where they have properly directed themselves as to the law and taken proper considerations into account.

Montgomery -v- Loney [1959] NI 171
1959 Lord MacDermott CJ	Road Traffic, Northern Ireland	1 Citers
	When asking whether a roadway is a public road, one asks whether there is about those who obtain permission to enter 'some reason personal to them for their admittance'.

Cogley -v- Sherwood [1959] WLR 781
1959	Road Traffic	Casemap 1 Citers
	It is the exhibition of the vehicle for hire through the agency of the driver which is the essence of the offence of plying for hire, unlicensed.
	Metropolitan Police Public Carriage Act 1869 7

Gaynor -v- Allen [1959] 2 QB 403
1959 McNair J	Road Traffic, Police, Negligence	Casemap 1 Citers
	McNair J considered that when looking at the driving of a police officer, the standard remained that of the experienced skilled and careful driver. McNair considered a submission: "that if the motor-cyclist had been a civilian he would undoubtedly have been guilty of some negligence in driving at 60mph, though not necessarily entirely to blame for the accident. To show that a police officer was driving at that speed on a restricted road does not prima facie show negligence" Held: McNair J said: "The driver of this police motor-cycle on this occasion must be judged, as regards civil liability, in exactly the same way as any other driver of a motor-cycle in similar circumstances. He, like any other driver, owed a duty to the public to drive with due care and attention and without exposing the members of the public to unnecessary danger."

Elliott -v- Grey [1959] 3 All ER 733
1959 QBD	Road Traffic
	The defendant had left his car on the roadway. It was raised on bricks, and the battery was removed. He appealed his conviction for it not being insured. Held: The conviction was correct. The acts of the defendant fell within the mischief of the Act. The car was being 'used on a road'.