Scotland - 1960- 1969

Scotland. Many cases are heard in Scotland, but if they appear also to deal with the law in England, they are listed (perhaps unwisely) under that heading. To see full lists of cases heard in Scotland, see IHCS and OHCS (Inner and Outer Court of Session.

These cases are extracted from a very large database. The entries on that database are now being published individually to the main swarb.co.uk website in a much improved form. As cases are published here, the entry here will be replaced by a link to the same case in that improved form on swarb.co.uk. In addition the swarb.co.uk site includes very substantial numbers of cases after 2000. Please take the time to look.  

This page lists 71 cases, and was prepared on 19 May 2014. These case are being transferred one by one to the main swarb.co.uk site which presents them better, with links to full text where we have it, and much improved cross referencing.
HM Advocate -v- Kidd 1960 SLT 82
1960

Scotland, Crime
1 Citers
The court set out the conditions for finding insanity in criminal law.
D M'Ewing & Sons -v- Renfrewshire County Council [1960] SC 53
1960

Lord Clyde
Scotland, Land
1 Citers
Watson -v- Fram Reinforced Concrete Co (Scotland) Ltd; HL 1960
Smith -v- Grayton Estates Ltd 1960 SC 249
1960
SCS
Lord President Clyde, Lord Sorn
Scotland, Landlord and Tenant

The Court was asked whether a tenancy continuing from year to year after the expiry of a fixed term by virtue of the 1949 Act was determined by notice given by one of two joint tenants. Held. The notice was effective.
Lord President Clyde said: "In considering this matter, it is of importance to realise that in the present case the tenants were occupying under tacit relocation, in other words, that the tenancy was being prolonged from year to year beyond the stipulated term in the lease, but that otherwise the conditions in the lease continued to operate - see Rankine, Law of Leases, p. 601; Cowe v. Millar, reported only in Connell on The Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1923, p. 346, per Lord President Clyde at p. 355. The question comes to be whether, in that situation, a timeous notice by one of the two joint tenants is invalid to bring the tenancy to an end. The argument for the appellant was that a valid notice must be from both the joint tenants, and this notice, not being a joint one, consequently is bad.
But, is I see it, this argument overlooks the meaning and effect of tacit relocation. Tacit relocation is not an indefinite prolongation of a lease. It is the prolongation each year of the tenancy for a further one year, if the actings of the parties to the lease show that they are consenting to this prolongation. For, as in all contracts, a tacit relocation or reletting must be based on consent. In the case of tacit relocation the law implies that consent if all the parties are silent in the matter. Hence, where there are joint tenants, tacit consent by both of them is necessary to secure the prolongation and to enable tacit relocation to operate. Silence by both is necessary to presume that both the tenants wish the tenancy to continue for another year. On the other hand, if both are not silent, and if one gives due notice of termination, the consent necessary for tacit relocation to operate is demonstrably not present, and tacit relocation will not operate beyond the date of termination in the notice. Clearly, in the present case, there is not such tacit consent, and, in my view, a notice by one of the two joint tenants is enough to exclude the further operation of tacit relocation.
Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1949
Orlandi -v- Casteli [1960] ScotCS CSOH_1
5 Nov 1960
scs
Scotland
Link[s] omitted
Rodden -v- Whatlings Ltd [1960] ScotCS CSOH_2
22 Nov 1960
scs
Scotland
Link[s] omitted
Macrae -v- Reed and Mallik Ltd; SCS 1961
Wissenbruch -v- Wissenbruch 1961 SC 340
1961

Scotland, Trusts

Templeton -v- HM Advocate 1961 JC 62
1961

Lord Guthrie
Scotland, Crime
Douglas-Hamilton -v- Hamilton's Trustees [1961] ScotCS CSIH_1
5 May 1961
scs
Scotland
Link[s] omitted
Munro -v- Stein [1961] ScotCS CSOH_3
23 Jun 1961
scs
Scotland
Link[s] omitted
White and Carter (Councils) Ltd -v- McGregor; HL 06-Dec-1961
Colville, Petitioner [1961] SCotCS CSIH_2
15 Dec 1961
scs
Scotland
[ Bailii ]
McWilliams -v- Sir William Arrol & Co Ltd [1962] 1 WLR 295; 1962 SC (HL) 70
1962
HL
Lord Reid
Health and Safety, Personal Injury, Scotland Casemap


A steel erector had fallen seventy feet to his death from a steel lattice tower. The employers had not provided a safety harness, but the judge found that he would not have used a security belt even if provided, and that the onus was on the pursuer to prove that the deceased would have worn a safety belt. Held: The claim failed. The onus was on the pursuer to establish, not only the breach of duty, but also the causal connection between the breach of duty and the accident; that what the deceased would have done, if a safety belt had been provided, was a matter of inference from the appropriate facts, and that, in the present case, the inference was that he would not have worn a belt; further that there was no obligation on the employers to instruct or exhort him to wear a safety belt. Liability was not established. Lord Reid: "It has been suggested that the decision of this House in Wardlaw v Bonnington Castings Ltd 1956 S.C. (H.L.) 26 lays down new law and increased the burden on pursuers. I do not think so. It states what has always been the law - a pursuer must prove his case. He must prove that the fault of the defender caused or contributed to the damage which he has suffered. But proof need not be by direct evidence. If general practice or a regulation requires that some safety appliance shall be provided, one would assume that it is of some use, and that a reasonable man would use it. And one would assume that the injured man was a reasonable man. So the initial onus on the pursuer to connect the failure to provide the appliance with the accident would normally be discharged merely by proving the circumstances which led to the accident, and it is only where the evidence throws doubt on either of these assumptions that any difficulty would arise. Normally, it would be left to the defender to adduce evidence, if he could, to displace these assumptions. So, in practice, it would be realistic, even if not theoretically accurate, to say that the onus is generally on the defender to show that the man would not have used the appliance, even if it had been available. But in the end, when all the evidence has been brought out, it rarely matters where the onus originally lay: the question is which way the balance of probability has come to rest."
Factories Act 1937
Duke of Argyll -v- Duchess of Argyll; HL 1962
Commissioners of Inland Revenue -v- John M Whiteford & Son; 1962
Close -v- Steel Company of Wales Ltd; 1962
McWilliams -v- Sir William Arrol & Company Ltd; HL 21-Feb-1962
Gray -v- University of Edinburgh [1962] ScotCS CSIH_1
1 Mar 1962
scs
Scotland
Link[s] omitted
Argyllshire Weavers -v- Macauley [1962] ScotCS CSIH_2
25 May 1962
scs
Scotland
[ Bailii ]
HM Advocate -v- Cunningham 1963 SLT 345
1963

Scotland, Crime Casemap
1 Citers
Inland Revenue Commissioners -v- Luke 1963 SC (HL) 65; [1963] AC 557
1963
HL
Lord Reid
Scotland, Taxes Management Casemap
1 Citers
The House applied the literal approach to statutory interpretation. However there may be cases where 'to achieve the obvious intention and produce a reasonable result [the court] must do some violence to the words.'
Lord Reid said: "How, then, are we to resolve the difficulty? To apply the words literally is to defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and to produce a wholly unreasonable result. To achieve the obvious intention and produce a reasonable result we must do some violence to the words. This is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges. The general principle is well settled. It is only where the words are absolutely incapable of a construction which will accord with the apparent intention of the provision and will avoid a wholly unreasonable result, that the words of the enactment must prevail."
Burmah Oil Company Limited (Burma Trading) -v- Lord Advocate 1963 SC 410
1963
IHCS
Lord President Clyde
Scotland, Constitutional

The Act was to be construed restrictively, lest “what was intended as a reasonable protection for a public authority would become an engine of oppression.”
War Damage Act 1965
In re Sutherland, dec'd; Winter -v- Inland Revenue Commissioners; HL 1963
Palmer -v- Inverness Hospitals Board of Management [1963] ScotCS CSOH_3
18 Jan 1963
scs
Scotland
[ Bailii ]
Bankhead -v- Mccarthy [1963] ScotCS CSOH_2
8 Feb 1963
scs
Scotland
[ Bailii ]
Hughes -v- Lord Advocate; HL 21-Feb-1963
Lord Advocate -v- University of Aberdeen & Budge [1963] ScotCS CSIH_1
2 Aug 1963
scs
Scotland
Link[s] omitted
McCaig -v- Langan; 1964
McCutcheon -v- David MacBrayne Ltd; HL 21-Jan-1964
Hunter -v- Fox [1964] UKHL 8; 1964 SLT 20; 1964 190 EG 205; 1964 SC (HL) 95
8 Apr 1964
HL
Lord Reid
Scotland, Land
[ Bailii ]
Burmah Oil Company (Burma Trading) Limited -v- Lord Advocate; HL 21-Apr-1964
R & J Dempster Ltd -v- Motherwell Bridge and Engineering Co Ltd; SCS 03-Jul-1964
B and B [1964] ScotCS CSIH_2
12 Nov 1964
scs
Scotland
[ Bailii ]
Grieve -v- Douglas-Home (Election Court) [1964] ScotCS 3
23 Dec 1964
scs
Scotland
Link[s] omitted
Macleod -v- Hamilton; 1965
Law -v- McNicol 1965 JC 32
1965

Scotland, Criminal Practice Casemap

St Johnstone Football Club -v- Scottish Football Association Ltd; 1965
Noble -v- Noble; OHCS 1965
Macleod -v- Hamilton 1965 SLT 305
1965

Lord Clyde, Lord Migdale
Scotland, Road Traffic

Lord Clyde said: "It was an integral part of the statutory scheme for a traffic regulation order that notice by means of traffic signs should be given to the public using the roads which were restricted so as to warn users of their obligations. Unless these traffic signs were there accordingly and the opportunity was thus afforded to the public to know what they could not legally do, no offence would be committed. It would, indeed, be anomalous and absurd were the position otherwise."
Lord Migdale said: "the order is not effective unless and until the council complies with Regulation 15(c) and erects road signs at the locus. Signs were erected but they were not the proper ones nor were they clear."
Forbes -v- Aberdeen Motors Ltd. [1965] ScotCS CSIH_1
12 Mar 1965
scs
Scotland
[ Bailii ]
Macleod -v- Kerr [1965] ScotCS CSIH_2
14 May 1965
SCS
Scotland
[ Bailii ]
Kelly -v- Edmund Nuttall Sons & Co. (London) Ltd [1965] ScotCS CSIH_3; 1965 SC 427; 1965 SLT 418
15 Jul 1965
SCS
Scotland, Personal Injury
1 Cites
[ Bailii ]
M'Glone -v- British Railways Board; HL 27-Oct-1965
Assessor for Fife -v- Hodgson (Lands Valuation Appeal Court) [1965] ScotCS 4
11 Nov 1965
scs
Scotland
Link[s] omitted
Williams -v- A & W Hemphill Ltd; HL 1966
M'Glone -v- British Railways Board [1966] SC (HL) 1 HL(Sc)
1966
HL
Scotland Casemap
1 Citers
Reid -v- Mini-Cabs; SCS 1966
Beedie v Norrie 1966 SC 207
1966

Negligence, Scotland Casemap
1 Citers
Chapter 26 of the Rules of the Court of Session 1994, which is headed Third Party Procedure, enables questions arising out of claims by a defender against a third party for contribution, relief or indemnity and liability to be disposed of in the same action as that in which the defender is himself being sued.
Rules of the Court of Session 1994 824 - Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 3(2)
Noble -v- Noble Unreported, 26 January 1996
26 Jan 1966
IHCS
Company, Scotland Casemap


Errol -v- Walker [1966] ScotCS CSIH_2
11 Mar 1966
scs
Scotland
Link[s] omitted
White -v- White [1966] ScotCS CSIH_1
2 Jun 1966
scs
Scotland
[ Bailii ]
Makouipour -v- Makouipour [1966] ScotCS CSOH_3
15 Dec 1966
scs
Scotland
Link[s] omitted
Nimmo -v- Alexander Cowan & Sons Ltd; HL 1967
Saxone Lilley & Skinner (Holdings) Ltd -v- Commissioner of Inland Revenue 44 TC 122; [1967] 1 WLR 501; (1966) 42 TC 675
1967
HL
Lord Reid
Income Tax, Scotland
1 Citers
The taxpayer company was the parent company of a group of subsidiaries, one of which traded as the manufacturer and retailer of shoes. The others either manufactured or sold shoes. The company built a warehouse which was let to a warehousing subsidiary (Jacksons Limited). Parts of the warehouse were used to store shoes from the manufacturing and retailing company, but most of the shoes stored there were shoes which had been delivered to the retailing companies and were held by them as stock. The holding company claimed allowances on the basis that the warehouse was used for part of the trade of Jacksons Limited consisting in the storage of shoes manufactured by the manufacturing and retailing subsidiary, but not yet delivered to a purchaser, so as to come within s.271(1)(d)(iii) of the Income Tax Act 1952. The Special Commissioners had accepted that on the evidence part of the trade of Jacksons Ltd did consist in the storage of shoes which qualified under s.271(d)(iii) but they rejected the contention that the whole building was used for that purpose. The Court of Session had held that it was not necessary to show that the building was wholly or mainly in use for the relevant part of the company's trade. It could be a shared use, and the storage of the qualifying shoes did constitute part of Jacksons Ltd's trade. Held: The Court of Session's decision was upheld. In order to qualify for relief for an industrial building is is not necessary that the qualifying use should be the sole or exclusive use made of the premises.
Lord Reid: "The shoes manufactured at Kilmarnock come within the scope of s. 271 (1)(d)(iii) because, when in this warehouse, they have not yet been delivered to any purchaser. But the other shoes in the warehouse have already been delivered to the Respondents or one of their subsidiary companies, having been purchased from other manufacturers. During the relevant period there were generally some 500,000 pairs of shoes in the warehouse at any one time, of which a third or so had come from Kilmarnock and the remaining two-thirds or so from outside manufacturers. While in the warehouse these shoes were not kept separate. They were classified so that in each part of the warehouse one would generally find some of the Kilmarnock shoes and some of the others.
The trade of this warehouse keeper is storing shoes from both these sources, and the contention of the Respondents is that, within the meaning of s. 271(2), storing the Kilmarnock shoes is a part of his trade. The Commissioners so found, and I think that this is clearly right. I reject the argument that there is no sufficient distinction between the ways in which the two kinds of shoes are treated to enable one to say that storing the one kind is one part of the trade and storing the other kind is another part. If a trader stores or sells or otherwise deals with two kinds of goods, A and B, I think that it is the ordinary use of language to say that dealing with A is one part of his trade and dealing with B is another part, and I see nothing in the context here to justify giving any other interpretation to "a part of a trade" in s. 271(2). The question therefore comes to be whether this warehouse is in use for the purposes of that part of the warehouseman's trade which consisted in the storing of Kilmarnock shoes.
Again taking the ordinary use of language, it appears to me that it clearly was. Premises can be and often are in use for more than one purpose, and I think that the whole of this warehouse was in use for both parts of the warehouseman's trade, because both kinds of shoes could generally be found stored in every part of it."
Income Tax Act 1952 271(1)(d)(iii)
McKillen -v- Barclay Curle & Co Ltd 1967 SLT 41
1967

Lord President Clyde
Negligence, Damages, Scotland
1 Cites
1 Citers
The Lord Ordinary had awarded the pursuer damages for tuberculosis, on the basis that in the accident he had fractured a rib and this had reactivated his pre-existing tuberculosis. Held: The pursuer had failed to prove the causal connexion between the fractured rib and the tuberculosis, since there was no corroboration of the evidence of the pursuer's expert witness. They accordingly allowed the reclaiming motion. In Scots law a wrongdoer takes his victim as he finds him. Foreseeability had no relevance to the determination of the measure of damage, once liability had been established.
James Kemp (Leslie) Ltd -v- Robertson [1967] ScotCS CSOH_1
10 Apr 1967
scs
Scotland
Link[s] omitted
Chalmers Property Investment Co Ltd -v- Robson; HL 20-Jun-1967
Mackay -v- Campbell [1967] UKHL 8; 1967 SC (HL) 5; 1967 SLT 337
29 Jun 1967
HL
Scotland, Land
[ Bailii ]
Scottish Burial Reform & Cremation Society -v- Glasgow Corporation; HL 26-Jul-1967
Lucas's Executors -v- Demarco 1968 SLT 89
1968

Scotland, Landlord and Tenant
The tenant argued as to the unreasonableness of the exercise of an irritancy.
Barton -v- William Low & Co Ltd; 1968
Shaw -v- Shaw 1968 SLT 94
1968
OHCS
Lord Hunter
Scotland
1 Cites
1 Citers
"The authorities to which I was referred, including, in particular, Noble v Noble; Inner House, 28th January 1966 (unreported), and Cruickshank's Trustees v Sutherland, satisfy me that, as a general principle, where in a partnership it is necessary to make up a balance sheet affecting the money interests of the partners, the partnership assets should be entered in the balance sheet at their fair value to the partners, unless there is provision to the contrary in the contract of co-partnery . . . "
The Carnegie Trustees for the Universities of Scotland -v- The University of St Andrews; HL 1968
Brown -v- North British Steel Foundry Ltd; OHCS 1968
Cawthorne (Richard Graves) -v- Hm Advocate [1968] ScotHC HCJ_1
15 May 1968
HCJ
Scotland, Crime
Link[s] omitted
Denvir -v- Denvir 1969 SLT 301
1969

Scotland, Trusts Casemap
1 Citers
M'Kew -v- Holland & Hannen & Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd [1969] 3 All ER 1621; 1969 SC 14
1969

Lord Justice Clerk (Grant)
Scotland, Negligence, Damages
1 Cites
1 Citers
Lothian -v- Jenolite Limited 1969 SC 111
1969

Scotland, Contract
Lothian -v- Jenolite [1969] ScotCS CSIH_1
6 Feb 1969
scs
Scotland
[ Bailii ]
Bruce's Judicial Factor -v- Lord Advocate [1969] ScotCS CSIH_2
19 Jun 1969
scs
Scotland
[ Bailii ]