Scotland - 1960- 1969

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This page lists 68 cases, and was prepared on 28 October 2012.

D M'Ewing & Sons -v- Renfrewshire County Council [1960] SC 53
1960 Lord Clyde	Scotland, Land	Casemap 1 Citers

HM Advocate -v- Kidd 1960 SLT 82
1960	Scotland, Crime	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court set out the conditions for finding insanity in criminal law.

Watson -v- Fram Reinforced Concrete Co (Scotland) Ltd 1960 SC 92
1960 HL Lord Reid, Lord Keith of Avonholm, Lord Denning	Scotland, Negligence, Limitation	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	A workman had been injured through the breaking of a defective part in the machine with which he was working. He brought an action of damages against his employers, and later convened as second defenders the manufacturers of the machine, who had supplied it to his employers, on averments that the accident had been caused by the fault of the manufacturers in that they failed to supply his employers with a machine which was safe for use by their servants. The machine had been supplied on 7 July 1955 and the accident had happened on 9 August 1956, but the manufacturers were not convened in the action until 25 March 1959. Held: The three-year limitation period provided by section 6(1)(a) of the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions &c.) Act 1954 ran from the date when the workman suffered the injury and that, accordingly, the action against the manufacturers was not time-barred. "a cause of action accrues as soon as a wrongful act has caused personal injury beyond what can be regarded as negligible." Lord Reid: 'The ground of any action based on negligence is a concurrence of duty and damage and I cannot see how there can be that concurrence unless the duty still exists and is breached when the damage occurs.' and "It appears to me that default in the sense of breach of duty must persist after the act or neglect until the damage is suffered. The ground of any action based on negligence is the concurrence of breach of duty and damage, and I cannot see how there can be that concurrence unless the duty still exists and is breached when the damage occurs. Suppose that the damage occurred a year or two years after the manufacture and sale of the article: then undoubtedly the injured person can sue. But how could he sue if the manufacturer could say that his default had ceased a year before the injured person ever came near the dangerous article? Whatever be the true view with regard to the act or neglect, I think that the appellant is entitled to say that the respondents' 'default giving rise to the action' existed at the time when he suffered his injuries." Lord Keith of Avonholm: "Now this is a Donoghue v Stevenson type of case, and such a case undoubtedly introduces specialities into the law of negligence. But, on any view, I see difficulty in saying that there was negligence at the date of supply. At that date on the pursuer's pleadings there was no reason why the manufacturers should have known of the dangerous state of the strut. It can hardly be expected that they had a legal duty to take it to pieces and inspect it before sending it out. Undoubtedly there was an act of carelessness on the part of some workman when the pin was welded to the strut and the manufacturers would be vicariously responsible for that carelessness. But can it be said that at either date there was an act of negligence in the legal sense? The manufacturers owed a duty to anyone who should handle the machine to take reasonable steps to see that it was safe. They owed a duty not to injure, but until someone was injured there was no breach of duty. Only then could it be said that an act of negligence had been committed. That, I think, necessarily follows from the judgment of this House in Donoghue v Stevenson." and "Applying the ratio of these decisions there was, in my opinion, no act, neglect or default within the meaning of the statute affecting the pursuer until he was injured. A fortiori there was no act, neglect or default giving rise to his action before that date. It was then for the first time that there arose a breach of duty which made its impact on the pursuer. Time, in my opinion, commenced to run against the pursuer under the statute from that date." Lord Denning: "I think the true principle is contained simply in this: 'You must not injure your neighbour by your fault.' It is the doing of damage to him which, in my opinion, is the breach of duty giving rise to the action. It is no doubt correct to say, as Lord MacMillan did say (at p.71), that the manufacturer 'is under a duty to take care in the manufacture of these articles.' That is a duty which he owes to all those who may have occasion to use the article: and it is a duty which is broken at the time when he is negligent in making the article. But it is not a breach of duty to any particular individual. And it is not that breach of duty which gives rise to the action. There is another duty also to be considered: and that is the duty which Lord Atkin put in this wise (at p.44): 'You must not injure your neighbour': which I would expand so as to say that there is a duty on every man not to injure his neighbour by his want of reasonable care. This is a duty which he owes, not to the world at large, but to his neighbour. It is broken only when his neighbour is injured and not before. Then, and then only, is there a breach of duty giving rise to an action."

Smith -v- Grayton Estates Ltd 1960 SC 249
1960 SCS Lord President Clyde, Lord Sorn	Scotland, Landlord and Tenant	Casemap 1 Citers
	The Court was asked whether a tenancy continuing from year to year after the expiry of a fixed term by virtue of the 1949 Act was determined by notice given by one of two joint tenants. Held. The notice was effective. Lord President Clyde said: "In considering this matter, it is of importance to realise that in the present case the tenants were occupying under tacit relocation, in other words, that the tenancy was being prolonged from year to year beyond the stipulated term in the lease, but that otherwise the conditions in the lease continued to operate - see Rankine, Law of Leases, p. 601; Cowe v. Millar, reported only in Connell on The Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1923, p. 346, per Lord President Clyde at p. 355. The question comes to be whether, in that situation, a timeous notice by one of the two joint tenants is invalid to bring the tenancy to an end. The argument for the appellant was that a valid notice must be from both the joint tenants, and this notice, not being a joint one, consequently is bad. But, is I see it, this argument overlooks the meaning and effect of tacit relocation. Tacit relocation is not an indefinite prolongation of a lease. It is the prolongation each year of the tenancy for a further one year, if the actings of the parties to the lease show that they are consenting to this prolongation. For, as in all contracts, a tacit relocation or reletting must be based on consent. In the case of tacit relocation the law implies that consent if all the parties are silent in the matter. Hence, where there are joint tenants, tacit consent by both of them is necessary to secure the prolongation and to enable tacit relocation to operate. Silence by both is necessary to presume that both the tenants wish the tenancy to continue for another year. On the other hand, if both are not silent, and if one gives due notice of termination, the consent necessary for tacit relocation to operate is demonstrably not present, and tacit relocation will not operate beyond the date of termination in the notice. Clearly, in the present case, there is not such tacit consent, and, in my view, a notice by one of the two joint tenants is enough to exclude the further operation of tacit relocation.
	Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1949

Orlandi -v- Casteli [1960] ScotCS CSOH_1
5 Nov 1960 scs	Scotland
	[ Bailii ]

Rodden -v- Whatlings Ltd [1960] ScotCS CSOH_2
22 Nov 1960 scs	Scotland
	Link[s] omitted

Macrae -v- Reed and Mallik Ltd 1961 SC 68
1961 SCS Lord Patrick (Lord Justice Clerk Thomson dissenting)	Scotland, Damages	Casemap 1 Citers
	(Second Division) Held: Interest from a date earlier than the date of decree could be allowed on damages awarded for loss suffered before that date only where such loss could be definitely ascertained. Interest on solatium (being ascertainable not earlier than the award having been made in the court of first instance) was not payable from any date earlier than that court's decree. The exercise of the discretion in respect of interest required a selective and discriminating approach, with lower interest rates applied.
	Interest on Damages (Scotland) Act 1958 1

Templeton -v- HM Advocate 1961 JC 62
1961 Lord Guthrie	Scotland, Crime

Wissenbruch -v- Wissenbruch 1961 SC 340
1961	Scotland, Trusts	Casemap 1 Citers

Douglas-Hamilton -v- Hamilton's Trustees [1961] ScotCS CSIH_1
5 May 1961 scs	Scotland
	Link[s] omitted

Munro -v- Stein [1961] ScotCS CSOH_3
23 Jun 1961 scs	Scotland
	Link[s] omitted

White & Carter (Councils) Ltd -v- McGregor [1962] AC 413; [1961] UKHL 5; [1961] UKHL 7
6 Dec 1961 HL Lord Reid, Lord Keith	Contract, Scotland	1 Cites 1 Citers
	Mr McGregor contracted with the appellants for them to display advertisements for three years on litter bins. The contract was made on his behalf by an employee, without specific authority. On the day it was made, he sought to cancel the contract. Held: Where a party is in renunciatory breach of contract, the other party is not bound to accept the breach and sue for damages, but may perform its own obligations under the contract and claim what is due under the contract. A pary is not bound to enforce its contractual rights in a reasonable way. Lord Reid: "The general rule cannot be in doubt. It was settled in Scotland at least as early as 1848 and it has been authoritatively stated time and again in both Scotland and in England. If one party to a contract repudiates it in the sense of making it clear to the other party that he refuses or will refuse to carry out his part of the contract, the other party, the innocent party, has an option. He may accept that repudiation and sue for damages for breach of contract, whether or not the time for performance has come; or he may if he chooses disregard or refuse to accept it and then the contract remains in full effect." As an exception: "It may well be that, if it can be shown that a person has no legitimate interest financial or otherwise, in performing the contract rather than claiming damages, he ought not to be allowed to saddle the other party with an additional burden with no benefit to himself. If a party has no interest to enforce a stipulation, he cannot in general enforce it: so it it might be said that, if a party has no interest to insist on a particular remedy, he ought not to insist on it. And just as party is not allowed to enforce a penalty, so he ought not to be allowed to penalise the other party by taking one course when another is equally advantageous to him." Here the contract-breaker could not take advantage of the exception: "Here the respondent did not set out to prove that the appellants have no legitimate interest in completing the contract and claiming the contract price rather than claiming damages; there is nothing in the findings of fact to support such a case and it seems improbable that any such case could have been proved. It is, in my judgment, impossible to say that the appellants should be deprived of their right to claim the contract price merely because the benefit to them as against claiming damages and reletting their advertising space, might be small in comparison with the loss to the respondent…." Lord Keith said that absent express agreement, an action for the price arises only in two cases. First where the property in the goods has passed to the buyer, and: “The only other case is where parties have contracted for payment on a day certain, irrespective of delivery or the passing of property. This is a clear case of a contractual debt unconditioned by any question of performance by the other party.”
	Sale of Goods Act 1893
	Link[s] omitted

Colville, Petitioner [1961] SCotCS CSIH_2
15 Dec 1961 scs	Scotland
	Link[s] omitted

McWilliams -v- Sir William Arrol & Co Ltd [1962] 1 WLR 295; 1962 SC (HL) 70
1962 HL Lord Reid	Health and Safety, Personal Injury, Scotland	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	A steel erector had fallen seventy feet to his death from a steel lattice tower. The employers had not provided a safety harness, but the judge found that he would not have used a security belt even if provided, and that the onus was on the pursuer to prove that the deceased would have worn a safety belt. Held: The claim failed. The onus was on the pursuer to establish, not only the breach of duty, but also the causal connection between the breach of duty and the accident; that what the deceased would have done, if a safety belt had been provided, was a matter of inference from the appropriate facts, and that, in the present case, the inference was that he would not have worn a belt; further that there was no obligation on the employers to instruct or exhort him to wear a safety belt. Liability was not established. Lord Reid: "It has been suggested that the decision of this House in Wardlaw v Bonnington Castings Ltd 1956 S.C. (H.L.) 26 lays down new law and increased the burden on pursuers. I do not think so. It states what has always been the law - a pursuer must prove his case. He must prove that the fault of the defender caused or contributed to the damage which he has suffered. But proof need not be by direct evidence. If general practice or a regulation requires that some safety appliance shall be provided, one would assume that it is of some use, and that a reasonable man would use it. And one would assume that the injured man was a reasonable man. So the initial onus on the pursuer to connect the failure to provide the appliance with the accident would normally be discharged merely by proving the circumstances which led to the accident, and it is only where the evidence throws doubt on either of these assumptions that any difficulty would arise. Normally, it would be left to the defender to adduce evidence, if he could, to displace these assumptions. So, in practice, it would be realistic, even if not theoretically accurate, to say that the onus is generally on the defender to show that the man would not have used the appliance, even if it had been available. But in the end, when all the evidence has been brought out, it rarely matters where the onus originally lay: the question is which way the balance of probability has come to rest."
	Factories Act 1937

Duke of Argyll -v- Duchess of Argyll 1962 SC (HL) 88
1962 HL Lord Reid, Lord Guest	Scotland, Intellectual Property	Casemap 1 Citers
	The pursuer sought to protect the contents of her diary from publication using the law of confidence. Held: Lord Reid said: "the effect, and indeed the purpose, of the law of confidentiality is to prevent the court from ascertaining the truth so far as regards those matters which the law holds to be confidential."

Close -v- Steel Company of Wales Ltd [1962] AC 367
1962 Lord Denning	Health and Safety, Scotland, Constitutional	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The pursuer sought damages after injury arising from the misuse of a tool for a purpose other than that for which it was intended to be used. Lord denning quoted Sir Frederick Pollock to say: "Judicial authority belongs not to the exact words used in this or that judgment, nor even to all the reasons given, but only to the principles accepted and applied as necessary grounds of the decision." referring to Selborne LC's judgment in Caledonian Railway, he said: "A judgment which is right, and consistent with sound principles, upon the facts and circumstances of the case which the House had to decide, need not be construed as laying down a rule for a substantially different state of facts and circumstances, though some propositions, wider than the case itself required, may appear to have received countenance from those who then advised the House."

McWilliams -v- Sir William Arrol & Company Ltd [1962] UKHL 3; [1962] 1 WLR 295; [1962] 1 All ER 623; [1961] UKHL 8; 1962 SLT 121; 1962 SC (HL) 70
21 Feb 1962 HL	Scotland, Negligence, Health and Safety, Personal Injury	Casemap 1 Citers
	Damages were sought after the death of the pursuer's husband working for the respondent. The trial judge had been satisfied that even if the defendants had performed their duty at common law and pursuant to statute, and had provided the deceased steel erector with a safety harness, he would not have worn it, and he therefore suffered no loss as a consequence of the breach of duty complained of. Held. The claim failed.
	Link[s] omitted

Gray -v- University of Edinburgh [1962] ScotCS CSIH_1
1 Mar 1962 scs	Scotland
	Link[s] omitted

Argyllshire Weavers -v- Macauley [1962] ScotCS CSIH_2
25 May 1962 scs	Scotland
	Link[s] omitted

Burmah Oil Company Limited (Burma Trading) -v- Lord Advocate 1963 SC 410
1963 IHCS Lord President Clyde	Scotland, Constitutional	Casemap 1 Citers
	The Act was to be construed restrictively, lest “what was intended as a reasonable protection for a public authority would become an engine of oppression.”
	War Damage Act 1965

Inland Revenue Commissioners -v- Luke 1963 SC (HL) 65; [1963] AC 557
1963 HL Lord Reid	Scotland, Taxes Management	Casemap 1 Citers
	The House applied the literal approach to statutory interpretation. However there may be cases where 'to achieve the obvious intention and produce a reasonable result [the court] must do some violence to the words.' Lord Reid said: "How, then, are we to resolve the difficulty? To apply the words literally is to defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and to produce a wholly unreasonable result. To achieve the obvious intention and produce a reasonable result we must do some violence to the words. This is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges. The general principle is well settled. It is only where the words are absolutely incapable of a construction which will accord with the apparent intention of the provision and will avoid a wholly unreasonable result, that the words of the enactment must prevail."

HM Advocate -v- Cunningham 1963 SLT 345
1963	Scotland, Crime	Casemap 1 Citers

Palmer -v- Inverness Hospitals Board of Management [1963] ScotCS CSOH_3
18 Jan 1963 scs	Scotland
	Link[s] omitted

Bankhead -v- Mccarthy [1963] ScotCS CSOH_2
8 Feb 1963 scs	Scotland
	Link[s] omitted

Hughes -v- Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837; [1963] 1 All ER 705; 1963 SC (HL) 31; [1963] UKHL 1; [1963] UKHL 8
21 Feb 1963 HL Lord Jenkins, Lord Reid, Lord Guest, Lord Pearce	Negligence, Scotland	Casemap 1 Citers
	The defendants had left a manhole uncovered and protected only by a tent and paraffin lamp. A child climbed down the hole. When he came out he kicked over one of the lamps. It fell into the hole and caused an explosion. The child was burned. The Court of Session held that there was no liability. Held: A defendant will not be liable if the injury actually sustained is not foreseeable, if it is of a different kind from that which the defendant ought to have foreseen as the likely outcome of his want of care. Liability was sought to be established in respect of 'meddlesome children'. The House considered the people to whom a duty was owed: (Lord Reid) "So we have (first) a duty owned by the workmen, (secondly) the fact that if they had done as they ought to have done there would have been no accident, and (thirdly) the fact that the injuries suffered by the appellant, though perhaps different in degree, did not differ in kind from injuries which might have resulted from an accident of a foreseeable nature. The ground on which this case has been decided against the appellant is that the accident was of an unforeseeable type. Of course, the pursuer has to prove that the defender's fault caused the accident and there could be a case where the intrusion of a new and unexpected factor could be regarded as the cause of the accident rather than the fault of the defender. But that is not this case. The cause of this accident was a known source of danger, the lamp, but it behaved in an unpredictable way." and "This accident was caused by a known source of danger, but caused in a way which could not have been foreseen and in my judgment, that affords no defence." "It is true that the duty of care expected in cases of this sort is confined to reasonably foreseeable dangers, but it does not necessarily follow that liability is escaped because the danger actually materialising is not identical with the danger reasonably foreseen and guarded against." A defender is liable although the damage may be a good deal greater in extent than was foreseeable, as he can escape liability only if the damage can be regarded as differing in kind from what was foreseeable. Lord Morris: "My Lords, in my view, there was a duty owed by the defenders to safeguard the pursuer against the type or kind of occurrence which in fact happened and which resulted in his injuries, and the defenders are not absolved from liability because they did not envisage "the precise concatenation of circumstances which led up to the accident."
	Link[s] omitted

Lord Advocate -v- University of Aberdeen & Budge [1963] ScotCS CSIH_1
2 Aug 1963 scs	Scotland
	Link[s] omitted

McCaig -v- Langan 1964 SLT 121
1964	Scotland, Torts - Other	Casemap 1 Citers
	A car passenger suffered serious injuries in an accident while the car was being driven by a friend. He brought an action of damages against the driver of the car who admitted that the accident was caused by his fault. The defender averred that when the pursuer entered the car he knew that the defender's ability to drive had been so affected by drink as to endanger his passengers' safety and he also knew that the car was so overcrowded as to render the safe steering and control of the car difficult. The defender further averred that the pursuer knew that because of both the drunkenness of the driver and the overcrowding of the car he ran a risk of grave injury by allowing himself to be driven in the said car, and by entering the car he voluntarily accepted the said risk. In these circumstances, the defender pleaded inter alia that the pursuer had voluntarily accepted the risk of sustaining such injuries as he did sustain. It was held by Lord Kilbrandon that these averments were relevant.

Burmah Oil Company Litide (Burma Trading) -v- Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75; [1965] 2 All ER 248; 1964 SC (HL) 117
1964 HL Lord Upjohn, Lord Read	Constitutional, Scotland	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	There is no common law power to take or confiscate property without compensation. The House considered the right to self help in an emergency: Lord Upjohn said "No doubt in earlier times the individual had some . . rights of self-help or destruction in immediate emergency, whether caused by enemy action or by fire, and the legal answer was that he could not in such circumstances be sued for trespass on or destruction of his neighbour's property. Those rights of the individual are now at least obsolescent. No man now, without risking some action against him in the courts, could pull down his neighbour's house to prevent the fire spreading to his own; he would be told that he ought to have dialled 999 and summoned the local fire brigade." Burma Trading discussed the use of the Royal prerogative: "The prerogative is really a relic of a past age, not lost by disuse, but only available for a case not covered by statute. So I would think the proper approach is a historical one: how was it used in former times and how has it been used in modern times?"
	War Damage Act 1965

McCutcheon -v- David MacBrayne Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 125; [1964] 1 All ER 430 HL (Sc); [1964] UKHL 4; [1964] UKHL 7
21 Jan 1964 HL Lord Reid	Scotland, Contract	Casemap 1 Citers
	Lord Reid quoted Gloag on Contract: "The judicial task is not to discover the actual intentions of each party; it is to decide what each was reasonably entitled to conclude from the attitude of the other."
	Link[s] omitted

Hunter -v- Fox [1964] UKHL 8; 1964 SLT 20; 1964 190 EG 205; 1964 SC (HL) 95
8 Apr 1964 HL Lord Reid	Scotland, Land
	Link[s] omitted

R & J Dempster Ltd -v- Motherwell Bridge and Engineering Co Ltd [1964] ScotCS CSIH_1
3 Jul 1964 scs	Scotland
	Link[s] omitted

B and B [1964] ScotCS CSIH_2
12 Nov 1964 scs	Scotland
	Link[s] omitted

Grieve -v- Douglas-Home (Election Court) [1964] ScotCS 3
23 Dec 1964 scs	Scotland
	Link[s] omitted

St Johnstone Football Club -v- Scottish Football Association Ltd 1965 SLT 171
1965	Natural Justice, Scotland	Casemap 1 Citers
	The Supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of Session was available to check whether the proceedings leading to a disciplinary decision of the Scottish Football Association, a private association, had been conducted in accordance with natural justice.

Macleod –v- Hamilton [1965] SLT 305
1965	Road Traffic, Scotland	Casemap 1 Citers
	Unless an authority which makes a traffic control order complies with the requirements imposed on the making of such an order and the publication of the order is adequate, any offence which it purports to create cannot be effectively prosecuted.

Macleod -v- Hamilton 1965 SLT 305
1965 Lord Clyde, Lord Migdale	Scotland, Road Traffic	Casemap 1 Citers
	Lord Clyde said: "It was an integral part of the statutory scheme for a traffic regulation order that notice by means of traffic signs should be given to the public using the roads which were restricted so as to warn users of their obligations. Unless these traffic signs were there accordingly and the opportunity was thus afforded to the public to know what they could not legally do, no offence would be committed. It would, indeed, be anomalous and absurd were the position otherwise." Lord Migdale said: "the order is not effective unless and until the council complies with Regulation 15(c) and erects road signs at the locus. Signs were erected but they were not the proper ones nor were they clear."

Noble -v- Noble [1965] SLT 415
1965 OHCS Lord Migdale, Lord Strachan, Lord Clyde	Scotland, Company	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	A father took his son into a farming partnership. The agreement recited that they agreed that "the heritable property should be taken as of the value of eight thousand pounds, but which is burdened with a heritable security for three thousand five hundred pounds". Proper books of account were to be kept. Until 1963 the books of account were prepared on the basis of those values. In 1963 the father sought a declaration that he was entitled to have the capital value of the assets of the partnership entered in the balance sheet at a real and not an arbitrary or notional value. Held: The issue is one of construction: what did the partners intend by the agreement which they made. Lord Strachan, sitting in the Outer House of the Court of Session, granted the declaration. As to Cruikshank v Sutherland: "The fact that Cruikshank was dealing with the share of a deceased partner is not, in my opinion, a material ground for distinguishing it from the present case. Similar issues are involved in this case, because under clause seventh of the contract a retiring partner or the representatives of a deceased partner are to be paid the sum at his credit as shown in the last preceding balance sheet. The same issues are therefore raised, but ab ante. It was argued for the defender, however, that there is vital distinction between Cruikshank and the present case in respect that the agreement that the heritable property is to be taken as of the value of £8,000 laid down a definite figure which was to be adopted in preparing the accounts and that it therefore cannot be said that the contract is silent as to the principle to be adopted in entering the heritable property. That point is the crux of the case, and with some hesitation, I have come to the opinion that the narrative references in the contract and the disposition cannot reasonably be read as meaning that the figure of £8,000 was to be entered in every balance sheet. It was a figure which was agreed for the purpose of fixing the capital of the company but on a construction of the whole deeds I find insufficient warrant for holding that it was intended to be a permanent valuation to be entered in every balance sheet. If that were so, a retiring or deceased partner would have no share whatever in any increase in the market value of the property, and if such an apparently unfair result had been intended, I think it would have been provided for in the eight clauses in which the terms and conditions of the partnership are reduced to writing, and would not have been left to be inferred from the narrative clauses. In my opinion, therefore, the contract is silent as to the principle to be adopted in framing the balance sheet, and Cruikshank is not distinguishable on that ground." Lord Clyde: "In my opinion the provision requiring the keeping of proper books annually balanced and regularly audited requires the inclusion in the balance sheet of the assets of the partnership at their true value at the end of the year in question. The language of cl.6 of the contract of co-partnery will not therefore be complied with if any of the assets, one of which is the farm itself, is entered at a mere nominal value which was fixed by agreement between the parties when the contract was made. I can find nothing in art. 6 of the contract to support the view that the value of the farm itself - the main asset - was to be frozen year by year at a constant figure throughout the partnership . . . It was contended by the defender that in solicitors' partnership agreements it is quite common to provide that the heritable property in which the business is carried on should be entered at a constant figure in the balance sheets of the partnership throughout its term. It is of course quite legitimate for parties to make such a provision, but clear language to that effect is essential. There is no such provision in the present case." Lord Migdale: "As I understood their arguments counsel on both sides are agreed that it is always open to partners to provide that an asset acquired by the partnership should continue to appear in the partnership books at its original value. The question raised here is not whether it can be so agreed but whether in this case it was so agreed."

Law -v- McNicol 1965 JC 32
1965	Scotland, Criminal Practice	1 Citers

Forbes -v- Aberdeen Motors Ltd. [1965] ScotCS CSIH_1
12 Mar 1965 scs	Scotland
	Link[s] omitted

Macleod -v- Kerr [1965] ScotCS CSIH_2
14 May 1965 scs	Scotland
	Link[s] omitted

Kelly -v- Edmund Nuttall Sons & Co. (London) Ltd [1965] ScotCS CSIH_3; 1965 SC 427; 1965 SLT 418
15 Jul 1965 SCS	Scotland, Personal Injury	Casemap 1 Cites
	Link[s] omitted

Assessor for Fife -v- Hodgson (Lands Valuation Appeal Court) [1965] ScotCS 4
11 Nov 1965 scs	Scotland
	Link[s] omitted

Reid -v- Mini-Cabs 1966 SC 137
1966 SCS Lord Avonside	Scotland, Licensing	Casemap 1 Citers
	The general aim of regulations imposed by local authorities on traders was to ensure the good conduct and efficiency of the various trades and activities for the benefit and protection of the citizens in the burgh.

Beedie v Norrie 1966 SC 207
1966	Negligence, Scotland	Casemap 1 Citers
	Chapter 26 of the Rules of the Court of Session 1994, which is headed Third Party Procedure, enables questions arising out of claims by a defender against a third party for contribution, relief or indemnity and liability to be disposed of in the same action as that in which the defender is himself being sued.
	Rules of the Court of Session 1994 824 - Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 3(2)

Williams -v- A & W Hemphill Ltd 1966 SC(HL) 31
1966 HL Lord Pearson	Scotland, Vicarious Liability	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	Against his employers's instructions a driver of a lorry deviated substantially from his route. On the detour an accident occurred owing to the fault of the driver. The question arose whether the employers of the lorry driver were vicariously liable. Held: "Had the driver in the present case been driving a lorry which was empty or contained nothing of real importance, I think that so substantial a deviation might well have constituted a frolic of his own. The presence of passengers, however, whom the servant is charged qua servant to drive to their ultimate destination makes it impossible (at all events, provided that they are not all parties to the plans for deviation) to say that the deviation is entirely for the servant's purposes. Their presence and transport is a dominant purpose of the authorised journey, and, although they are transported deviously, continues to play an essential part. It was said in argument that there must be some limits to that contention and that one could not hold that, if the driver had gone to Inverness, he would still be acting on his master's business. No doubt there are such limits to the argument as common sense may set on the facts of each case. But when there are passengers whom the servants on his master's behalf has taken aboard for transport to Glasgow, their transport and safety does not cease at a certain stage of the journey to be the master's business, or part of his enterprise, merely because the servant has for his own purposes chosen some route which is contrary to his instructions. . . . The more dominant are the current obligations of the master's business in connection with the lorry, the less weight is to be attached to disobedient navigational extravagances of the servant. . . . In weighing up, therefore, the question of degree, whether the admittedly substantial deviation of the vehicle with its passengers and baggage was such as to make the lorry's progress a frolic of the servant unconnected with or in substitution for the master's business, the presence of the passengers is a decisive factor against regarding it as a mere frolic of the servant. In the present case the defenders remained liable, in spite of the deviation, for their driver's negligence."

M'Glone -v- British Railways Board [1966] SC (HL) 1 HL(Sc)
1966 HL	Scotland	Casemap 1 Citers

Noble -v- Noble Unreported, 26 January 1996
26 Jan 1966 IHCS	Company, Scotland	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers

Errol -v- Walker [1966] ScotCS CSIH_2
11 Mar 1966 scs	Scotland
	Link[s] omitted

White -v- White [1966] ScotCS CSIH_1
2 Jun 1966 scs	Scotland
	Link[s] omitted

Makouipour -v- Makouipour [1966] ScotCS CSOH_3
15 Dec 1966 scs	Scotland
	Link[s] omitted

Nimmo -v- Alexander Cowan & Sons Ltd 1967 SC (HL) 79; [1968] AC 107
1967 HL Lord Wilberforce, Lord Guest, Lord Upjohn	Scotland, Health and Safety	Casemap 1 Citers
	The employer was prosecuted under the 1961 Act. Held: the burden of proving that it was not reasonably practicable to make and keep a place of work safe rested upon the defendant employer. If an exception was to be established, it was for the party claiming the exception to establish it. (Majority) Where a linguistic construction of the statute could not clearly indicate upon whom the burden should lie the court should look to other considerations to determine the intention of Parliament such as the mischief at which the Act was aimed and practical considerations affecting the burden of proof and, in particular, the ease or difficulty that the respective parties would encounter in discharging the burden. Lord Wilberforce: "the orthodox principle (common to both the criminal and the civil law) that exceptions, etc., are to be set up by those who rely on them."
	Factories Act 1961 29(1) - Mines and Quarries Act 1954 48(1)

Saxone Lilley & Skinner (Holdings) Ltd -v- Commissioner of Inland Revenue 44 TC 122; [1967] 1 WLR 501; (1966) 42 TC 675
1967 HL Lord Reid	Income Tax, Scotland	Casemap 1 Citers
	The taxpayer company was the parent company of a group of subsidiaries, one of which traded as the manufacturer and retailer of shoes. The others either manufactured or sold shoes. The company built a warehouse which was let to a warehousing subsidiary (Jacksons Limited). Parts of the warehouse were used to store shoes from the manufacturing and retailing company, but most of the shoes stored there were shoes which had been delivered to the retailing companies and were held by them as stock. The holding company claimed allowances on the basis that the warehouse was used for part of the trade of Jacksons Limited consisting in the storage of shoes manufactured by the manufacturing and retailing subsidiary, but not yet delivered to a purchaser, so as to come within s.271(1)(d)(iii) of the Income Tax Act 1952. The Special Commissioners had accepted that on the evidence part of the trade of Jacksons Ltd did consist in the storage of shoes which qualified under s.271(d)(iii) but they rejected the contention that the whole building was used for that purpose. The Court of Session had held that it was not necessary to show that the building was wholly or mainly in use for the relevant part of the company's trade. It could be a shared use, and the storage of the qualifying shoes did constitute part of Jacksons Ltd's trade. Held: The Court of Session's decision was upheld. In order to qualify for relief for an industrial building is is not necessary that the qualifying use should be the sole or exclusive use made of the premises. Lord Reid: "The shoes manufactured at Kilmarnock come within the scope of s. 271 (1)(d)(iii) because, when in this warehouse, they have not yet been delivered to any purchaser. But the other shoes in the warehouse have already been delivered to the Respondents or one of their subsidiary companies, having been purchased from other manufacturers. During the relevant period there were generally some 500,000 pairs of shoes in the warehouse at any one time, of which a third or so had come from Kilmarnock and the remaining two-thirds or so from outside manufacturers. While in the warehouse these shoes were not kept separate. They were classified so that in each part of the warehouse one would generally find some of the Kilmarnock shoes and some of the others. The trade of this warehouse keeper is storing shoes from both these sources, and the contention of the Respondents is that, within the meaning of s. 271(2), storing the Kilmarnock shoes is a part of his trade. The Commissioners so found, and I think that this is clearly right. I reject the argument that there is no sufficient distinction between the ways in which the two kinds of shoes are treated to enable one to say that storing the one kind is one part of the trade and storing the other kind is another part. If a trader stores or sells or otherwise deals with two kinds of goods, A and B, I think that it is the ordinary use of language to say that dealing with A is one part of his trade and dealing with B is another part, and I see nothing in the context here to justify giving any other interpretation to "a part of a trade" in s. 271(2). The question therefore comes to be whether this warehouse is in use for the purposes of that part of the warehouseman's trade which consisted in the storing of Kilmarnock shoes. Again taking the ordinary use of language, it appears to me that it clearly was. Premises can be and often are in use for more than one purpose, and I think that the whole of this warehouse was in use for both parts of the warehouseman's trade, because both kinds of shoes could generally be found stored in every part of it."
	Income Tax Act 1952 271(1)(d)(iii)

McKillen -v- Barclay Curle & Co Ltd 1967 SLT 41
1967 Lord President Clyde	Negligence, Damages, Scotland	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The Lord Ordinary had awarded the pursuer damages for tuberculosis, on the basis that in the accident he had fractured a rib and this had reactivated his pre-existing tuberculosis. Held: The pursuer had failed to prove the causal connexion between the fractured rib and the tuberculosis, since there was no corroboration of the evidence of the pursuer's expert witness. They accordingly allowed the reclaiming motion. In Scots law a wrongdoer takes his victim as he finds him. Foreseeability had no relevance to the determination of the measure of damage, once liability had been established.

James Kemp (Leslie) Ltd -v- Robertson [1967] ScotCS CSOH_1
10 Apr 1967 scs	Scotland
	Link[s] omitted

Chalmers Property Investment Co Ltd -v- Robson Unreported, 20 June 1967
20 Jun 1967 HL Lord Reid, Lord Guest	Land, Scotland	Casemap 1 Citers
	A cottage on Mull had no public water supply. The owner had a right to draw water for domestic purposes from a "spring or well" on neighbouring land, but without any guarantee as to its sufficiency, purity or suitability; "and for the above purpose to lay and maintain at the expense of my said disponee and her foresaids adequate water pipes for the purpose of withdrawing water for the purposes aforesaid." The owner of the cottage employed a firm, carried on by the man behind the company that owned the land on which the source of water lay, to construct a piped water supply from the source to her cottage. The work was not done satisfactorily and the owner terminated her contract with the firm and employed other contractors to complete the necessary works, which included a dam and settling tank. The company threatened to remove the entire installation, on the ground that, due to a misdescription of the source of the water in the title, the owner of the cottage had no servitude whatever over its land. She brought proceedings to interdict the company from interfering with her water supply. The company contended that, even if the misdescription point were rejected - as it was - the settling tank should none the less be removed, on the ground that, in terms of the disposition, the dominant proprietor had no right to do anything more than lay water pipes on its land. Held: The company's appeal failed. It was not entitled to remove the settling tank. Although the right to construct and maintain a settling tank on the servient land was different from the right to lay pipes on the land, a servitude right to lay pipes could carry with it an implied right to construct a settling tank on the servient land, where the works "were essential to make the servitude effective" (Lord Reid) or were "essential to the carrying out of the purpose for which the original servitude was granted" or were a "means of obtaining an effective supply of water" (Lord Guest). After noting that the company admitted that some kind of dam was necessary to provide a source from which water would flow into the pipe, Lord Reid said: "And if it is equally necessary for the enjoyment of the right to draw a domestic water supply from this point that there should be a settling tank, in my opinion the making of such a tank is equally authorised by the grant. The owner of the dominant tenement must not erect works of a size or character beyond what is necessary for the enjoyment of the right granted. But it must have been the intention of the granter of the servitude should have a right to construct on his land such works as were essential to make the servitude effective, and I find nothing in the wording of the grant to prevent that from being done." Lord Guest pointed out that without the settling tank, the pipes became blocked, and said "If the respondent was entitled to draw water from the stream and she was entitled to collect the water by means of a dam and to take it by means of pipes for domestic purposes, my view is that the servitude comprehended that she would be given an effective water supply system. Ferguson on The Law of Water, page 264, states the matter thus: 'The principle appears to be that that may be done which is essential to the carrying out of the purpose for which the original servitude was granted….' Without a settling tank the water supply granted by the servitude would be rendered useless as the pipes would be at times blocked. Whether the settling tank be regarded as part of the system of water pipes or as a means of obtaining an effective supply of water, I am clearly of opinion that the appellants cannot object to the presence of the settling tank."

Mackay -v- Campbell [1967] UKHL 8; 1967 SC (HL) 5; 1967 SLT 337
29 Jun 1967 HL	Scotland, Land
	Link[s] omitted

Scottish Burial Reform & Cremation Society -v- Glasgow Corporation [1967] UKHL 3; [1968] AC 138
26 Jul 1967 HL Lord Reid, Lord Guest, Lord Upjohn, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Pearson	Charity, Rating, Scotland	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The appellants sought partial exemption from rates on its premises. The Corporation challenged their charitable status. The society's object was to encourage and provide facilities for cremation. Held: The object was charitable. Lord Reid said that it was not now necessary to produce evidence so as to show that the object was for the public benefit, and also that, this being so, the public benefit was not subverted because there was or might also be a profit or benefit to individuals involved in the prosecution of the objects: "But the appellants must also show that the public benefit is of a kind within the spirit and intendment of the Statute of Elizabeth I. The preamble specifies a number of objects which were then recognised as charitable. But in more recent times a wide variety of other objects have come to be recognised as also being charitable. The courts appear to have proceeded first by seeking some analogy between an object mentioned in the preamble and the object with regard to which they had to reach a decision. And then they appear to have gone further and to have been satisfied if they could find an analogy between an object already held to be charitable and the new object claimed to be charitable. And this gradual extension has proceeded so far that there are few modern reported cases where a bequest or donation was made or an institution was being carried on for a clearly specified object which was for the benefit of the public at large and not of individuals, and yet the object was held not to be within the spirit and intendment of the Statute of Elizabeth I. Counsel in the present case were invited to search for any case having even the remotest resemblance to this case in which an object was held to be for the public benefit but yet not to be within that spirit and intendment. But no such case could be found." Lord Upjohn said: "Upon the first point it must be remembered that Lord Macnaghten's classification was taken from Sir Samuel Romilly's argument in Morice v. Bishop of Durham 162 years ago when the great majority of the inhabitants of the country were living in conditions which to-day would be regarded as of the utmost squalor. The concept of purposes beneficial to the community might then appear to have the qualities of a class and so perhaps, to a lesser extent, in 1891. This so-called fourth class is incapable of further definition and can today hardly be regarded as more than a portmanteau to receive those objects which enlightened opinion would regard as qualifying for consideration under the second heading." As to the preamble to the 1601 Act: "While it may seem almost incredible to anyone not familiar with this branch of the English law that this should still be taken as the test, it is undoubtedly the accepted test, though only in a very wide and broad sense, well illustrated by the observations of Lord Greene M.R. in In re Strakosch [1949] Ch 529 . ." He concluded, with some skepticism: "My Lords, I conclude by saying that the authorities show that the "spirit and intendment" of the preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth have been stretched almost to breaking point. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries this was often due to a desire on the part of the courts to save the intentions of the settlor or testator from failure from some technical rule of law. Now that it is used so frequently to avoid the common man's liability to rates or taxes, this generous trend of the law may one day require reconsideration."
	Local Government (Financial Provisions etc.) (Scotland) Act 1962 - Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act 1888 13
	Link[s] omitted

Brown -v- North British Steel Foundry Ltd 1968 SC 51
1968 OHCS Lord President Clyde	Scotland, Personal Injury, Limitation	1 Citers
	The 1954 Act passed on 4 June 1954 but was not to affect any action or proceeding if the cause of action arose before that date. The Lord Ordinary found that the pursuer who sought damages for pneumoconiosis did not begin to suffer from until 1955. But the pursuer contended that the injury had been done to his lungs by 1949 because he had been inhaling dangerous dust for some years before that and, as subsequent events showed, he was susceptible to pneumoconiosis in 1949. So the cause of action had arisen at that date. The First Division of the Court of Session rejected that argument. Held: Lord President Clyde said that there was no cause of action in 1949 and added: "To create a cause of action, injuria and damnum are essential ingredients. In the present case there is no evidence of any injuries to the workman's lungs in 1949. He had then merely a deposit of dust in his lungs, which might or might not subsequently create an injury. But, in addition, he had then sustained no damnum. He could not then have been awarded damages for any loss, because at that stage he had sustained no loss of wages and had suffered none of the discomforts and disabilities which, he avers, followed upon the onset of pneumoconiosis and which in fact flowed from the outbreak of that disease in 1955."
	Law Reform (Limitation of Actions etc) Act 1954

Barton -v- William Low & Co Ltd 1968 SLT (Notes) 27
1968 Lord Stott	Scotland	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court was asked the question as to whether it was competent for a party who had been brought into the action under the third party procedure to challenge the relevancy of averments which the pursuer, who made no case against the third party, was seeking to incorporate in her pleadings as part of her case against the defenders. Held: Lord Stott: "The third parties have been convened into the process by the defenders, and the pursuer makes no case against them. The defenders, however, have set out in their pleadings what is, in effect, a right of relief against the third parties. The third parties have therefore a clear interest in the success or failure of the pursuer's case against the defenders, and one of the objects of third party procedure, as I see it, is to enable the third parties to be heard on any matter in which they have a relevant interest in relation to the case between pursuer and defender. The question of whether the pursuer has made a competent or relevant case against the defenders is such a matter, and in my opinion the third parties are entitled to take a plea to the relevancy of the pursuer's pleadings and to be heard upon that plea."

Lucas's Executors -v- Demarco 1968 SLT 89
1968	Scotland, Landlord and Tenant
	The tenant argued as to the unreasonableness of the exercise of an irritancy.

The Carnegie Trustees for the Universities of Scotland -v- The University of St Andrews 1968 SC (HL) 27
1968 HL	Scotland	Casemap 1 Citers

Shaw -v- Shaw 1968 SLT 94
1968 OHCS Lord Hunter	Scotland	Casemap
	"The authorities to which I was referred, including, in particular, Noble v Noble; Inner House, 28th January 1966 (unreported), and Cruickshank's Trustees v Sutherland, satisfy me that, as a general principle, where in a partnership it is necessary to make up a balance sheet affecting the money interests of the partners, the partnership assets should be entered in the balance sheet at their fair value to the partners, unless there is provision to the contrary in the contract of co-partnery . . . "

Cawthorne (Richard Graves) -v- Hm Advocate [1968] ScotHC HCJ_1
15 May 1968 HCJ	Scotland, Crime
	Link[s] omitted

Denvir -v- Denvir 1969 SLT 301
1969	Scotland, Trusts	Casemap

M'Kew -v- Holland & Hannen & Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd [1969] 3 All ER 1621; 1969 SC 14
1969 Lord Justice Clerk (Grant)	Scotland, Negligence, Damages	1 Cites 1 Citers

Lothian -v- Jenolite Limited 1969 SC 111
1969	Scotland, Contract

Lothian -v- Jenolite [1969] ScotCS CSIH_1
6 Feb 1969 scs	Scotland
	Link[s] omitted

Bruce's Judicial Factor -v- Lord Advocate [1969] ScotCS CSIH_2
19 Jun 1969 scs	Scotland
	Link[s] omitted