Torts - Other - 1930- 1959

These cases are extracted from a very large database. The entries on that database are now being published individually to the main swarb.co.uk website in a much improved form. As cases are published here, the entry here will be replaced by a link to the same case in that improved form on swarb.co.uk. In addition the swarb.co.uk site includes very substantial numbers of cases after 2000. Please take the time to look.  

This page lists 68 cases, and was prepared on 06 June 2013. These case are being transferred one by one to the main swarb.co.uk site which presents them better, with links to full text where we have it, and much improved cross referencing.

Lynn -v- Bamber; 1930

Excelsior Wire Rope Co Ltd -v- Callan [1930] AC 404 HL(E)
1930 HL	Land, Torts - Other	Casemap 1 Citers
	The House dismissed an appeal by an occupier of land against a finding that he was liable for an injury occasioned to a child trespassing on his land.

Stephens -v- Myers (1830) C & P 349; [1830] EWHC KB J37; [1830] 172 ER 735
17 Jul 1930 CCP Tindal CJ	Torts - Other	1 Citers
	In a turbulent parish council meeting, the meeting voted to have the defendant ejected. He refused, and advanced toward the chairman waving his clenched fist and saying he would rather throw him from the chair. He was stopped before getting within striking distance, but the chairman sued for assault. Held: The claim succeeded. Tindal CJ said: "It is not every threat, when there is no actual personal violence, that constitutes an assault, there must, in all cases, be the means of carrying the threat into effect."
	Link[s] omitted

Betts -v- Receiver of Metropolitan Police District and Carter Paterson & Co Ltd [1932] 2 KB 595
1932 du Parcq J	Police, Torts - Other	Casemap 1 Citers
	The police seized from the claimant certain cloth believing it to be stolen from Carter Paterson and delivered it to Carter Paterson, without any order under the 1897 Act. The claimant sued the receiver and Carter Paterson. Held: Since the theft could not be established and the delivery had been made without any order under the Act, the claimant in right of his possession at the time of seizure (subject only in case of the receiver to a limitation defence) was entitled to succeed in conversion against both defendants.
	Police (Property) Act 1897 1

Liddle -v- Yorkshire (North Riding) County Council; 1934

In re Simms [1934] 1 Ch 1
1934 CA Lord Hanworth MR, Lawrence and Romer LJJ	Torts - Other, Insolvency
	A bankrupt builder had been unable to fulfil and had abandoned his outstanding contracts. The receiver took them over and completed and earned monies under them which would not otherwise have been received. Held: The possibility of claiming for consequential damage to a company's business or to particular contractual commitments may, on ordinary principles of causation and mitigation, be attributable factually to acts of trespass and conversion committed by invalidly appointed receivers: but not in this case.

Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Limited v Brain [1935] (53 CLR 343)
1935 Dixon J	Commonwealth, Torts - Other	Casemap 1 Citers
	(High Court of Australia) Dixon J said: "that no responsibility was incurred by one who confines himself to bringing before some proper authority information which he does not believe, even although in the hope that a prosecution will be instituted, if it is actually instituted as the result of an independent discretion on the part of that authority . . but, if the discretion is misled by false information, or is otherwise practised upon in order to procure the laying of the charge, those who thus brought about the prosecution are responsible".

Thomas -v- Sawkins; KBD 1935

Duncan -v- Jones [1936] 1 KB 218
1936 KBD Lord Hewart CJ, Humphreys and Singleton JJ	Police, Torts - Other	1 Citers
	The appellant was about to make a public address in a situation in which the year before a disturbance had been incited by her speaking. A policeman believed reasonably that a breach of the peace would occur if the meeting was held, and ordered the appellant not to hold the meeting. The appellant however persisted in trying to hold the meeting and obstructed the police officer in his attempt to prevent her from doing so. Neither the appellant nor anyone present, committed, incited or provoked a breach of the peace, but the appellant was held to have wilfully obstructed the officer in the execution of his duty. Held: The fact that the officer reasonably apprehended a breach of the peace was a justification for the finding that he was acting in the execution of his duty. The police may prevent a demonstration on the public highway where there was any fear of a breach of the peace. Lord Hewart CJ: "English law does not recognize any special right of public meeting for political or other purposes".

Nicholas -v- Ely Beet Sugar Factory Ltd; CA 1936

Davis -v- Lisle; CA 1936

Skilton -v- Epsom and Ewell Urban District Council [1937] 1 KB 112
1937 CA Romer LJ, Slesser LJ	Road Traffic, Torts - Other
	A line of traffic studs had been placed in the centre of the highway. One of them had become loose. As a car passed over the loose stud it shot out and struck the plaintiff on her bicycle. She fell off and was injured. She sued the highway authority. The plaintiff succeeded at trial but the highway authority appealed on the ground that the plaintiff's complaint was of non-repair of the highway. Held: The appeal failed. Slesser LJ: "The question to be decided by the court is essentially this. Have the defendants caused a nuisance?" They had. Romer LJ: "I think that the defendants have rightly been made liable for the damage caused to the plaintiff, and for this reason: they have done something on the highway not for the purpose of maintaining it as a highway but for some totally different purpose, and the act which they did had become at the time the injury was caused to the plaintiff a nuisance to the highway for which they were, in my opinion, properly made liable, notwithstanding the fact that they are also the highway authority."

Thorne -v- Motor Trade Association; HL 1937

J & E Hall Ltd -v- Barclay [1937] 3 All ER 620
1937	Torts - Other, Damages	Casemap 1 Citers
	The company had erected and tested two experimental davits for the appellant. They were then taken down and left unused for many years. The parties disputed the account. The company claimed also for damages for detinue or conversion of the davits which had eventually sold as scrap. The judge had awarded the scrap value of the equipment as sold. Held: The company should have been awarded the values of the equipment sold, at the price of similar articles in the market. In this case there was no such second hand market, and the meausre was the cost of buying alternatives.

Herniman -v- Smith; HL 1938

Millington -v- Fox; 23-Jan-1938

Shaw Savill and Albion Company Ltd -v- The Commonwealth; 1940

Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co Ltd -v- Veitch
1940 SCS Lord Justice Clerk Aitchison, Lord Jamieson	Scotland, Torts - Other	1 Citers
	Lord Justice Clerk Aitchison said: "When the end of a combination is not a crime or a tort in the accepted sense, and the means are not in the accepted sense criminal or tortious - cases which give rise to no difficulty - the question always is - What is the real purpose of the combination? If it is to injure, without reference to anyone's lawful gain, or the enjoyment of one's rights, or the furtherance of one's legitimate interests, then what is done may become a wrongful act and be actionable. If, on the other hand, the real purpose of the combination is to further the lawful interests of the parties to it- these not necessarily being identical interests - no wrong is committed even when the means, employed not being in themselves illegal, are calculated, and even intended, to injure the persons against whom they are directed."

Potts -v- Miller (1940) 64 CLR 282
1940 Dixon J	Commonwealth, Torts - Other	Casemap
	High Court of Australia
	[ Austlli ]

United Australia Ltd -v- Barclays Bank Ltd; HL 1941

Saville Perfumery Ltd -v- June Perfect Ltd; CA 1941

Liversidge -v- Sir John Anderson; HL 03-Nov-1941

Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Company Limited -v- Veitch [1942] AC 435; [1941] UKHL 2; 1942 SC HL 1
15 Dec 1941 HL Viscount Simon LC, Lord Wright	Torts - Other, Scotland	1 Cites
	The plaintiffs sought an interdict against the respondents, a dockers' union, who sought to impose an embargo on their tweeds as they passed through the port of Stornoway. Held: A trade embargo was not tortious because the predominant purpose of the conspirators was to protect their own interests, not to damage those of the plaintiffs. The embargo had involved no illegality and Lord Wright drew a distinction between such a conspiracy and one to do 'acts in themselves wrongful'. Lord Wright defined conspiracy: 'A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means.' This must be supplemented by observing that though the crime is constituted by the agreement, the civil right of action is not complete unless the conspirators do acts in pursuance of their agreement to the damage of the plaintiffs.' In this area of law it cannot be assumed that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions or omissions. Viscount Simon: "Conspiracy, when regarded as a crime, is the agreement of two or more persons to effect any unlawful purpose, whether as their ultimate aim, or only as a means to it, and the crime is complete if there is such agreement, even though nothing is done in pursuance of it."
	Link[s] omitted

Walter -v- Alltools; 1944

Dumbell -v- Roberts; CA 1944

Roberts -v- J & F Stone Lighting and Radio Ltd (1945) 172 LT 240
1945 Asquith J	Torts - Other	Casemap 1 Citers
	Claim for damages against witness who fails to attend court though sumonsed when the case was lost. Held: the reason why no such claim had in fact succeeded was because of the difficulty in establishing the loss.

Morris -v- Kanssen; HL 1946

Rosenthal -v- Alderton and Sons Limited [1946] KB 374
1946 CA Lord Evershed MR	Torts - Other, Damages	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court was asked as to how it should value goods which had disappeared, and where the plaintiff sought damages for their wrongful detention, either as at the date of the detention or as at the date of the judgment. Held: Damages for detinue were to be based on the value of the item at the time of the judgment. Lord Evershed MR said in the course of answering: 'it is further to be noted that the action of detinue was essentially a proprietary action implying property in the plaintiff in the goods claimed', and then a reference is made to Viner's Abridgement vol 8 p23 and Holdsworth, History of English Law vol 7, pp 438 and 439. ' It was, and still is, of the essence of an action of detinue that the plaintiff maintains and asserts his property in the goods claimed. I think that the rights of the plaintiff as regards these goods were not such as entitled him to bring an action in detinue against the defendant, in whose possession they were, as agent, as the time, of the person in whom the property in the goods was then vested'.

Mohammed Amin -v- Jogendra Kumar Bannerjee [1947] AC322
1947 PC Sir John Beaumont	Commonwealth, Torts - Other	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers
	The Board considered an action for malicious prosecution. Sir John Beaumont said: "The foundation of the action lies in abuse of the process of the court by wrongfully setting the law in motion, and it is designed to discourage the perversion of the machinery of justice for an improper purpose. The plaintiff must prove that the proceedings instituted against him were malicious, without reasonable and probable cause, that they terminated in his favour (if that be possible), and that he has suffered damage. As long ago as 1698 it was held by Holt CJ in Savile v Roberts that damages might be claimed in an action under three heads, (1) damage to the person, (2) damage to property, and (3) damage to reputation, and that rule has prevailed ever since. That the word "prosecution" in the title of the action is not used in the technical sense which it bears in criminal law is shown by the fact that the action lies for the malicious prosecution of certain classes of civil proceedings, for instance, falsely and maliciously presenting a petition in bankruptcy or a petition to wind up a company ( Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Eyre ). The reason why the action does not lie for falsely and maliciously prosecuting an ordinary civil action is, as explained by Bowen LJ in the last mentioned case, that such a case does not necessarily and naturally involve damage to the party sued. A civil action which is false will be dismissed at the hearing. The defendant's reputation will be cleared of any imputations made against him, and he will be indemnified against his expenses by the award of costs against his opponent. ... but a criminal charge involving scandal to reputation or the possible loss of life or liberty to the party charged does necessarily and naturally involve damage, and in such a case damage to reputation will be presumed."

Cakebread -v- Hopping Bros. Ltd [1947] KB 641
1947 CA Cohen LJ	Torts - Other	1 Citers
	Cohen LJ discussed the doctrine of ex turpi causa: "The maxim ex turpi causa is based on public policy, and it seems to me plain on the facts of this case that public policy, far from requiring that this action shall be dismissed, requires that it shall be entertained and decided on its merits."

Christie -v- Leachinsky; HL 25-Mar-1947

Cresswell -v- Sirl [1948] 1 KB 241
1948 CA Scott LJ	Torts - Other, Animals	Casemap 1 Citers
	The defendant shot and killed the plaintiff's dog. The plaintiff claimed damages for trespass to property, the property being the dog. The defence was that the defendant was justified in killing the dog because it was threatening his sheep. Held: The principle enunciated in Cope was of general application to all justifications for all acts of trespass.

Askey -v- Golden Wine Co Ltd; 1948

Beaman -v- ARTS Ltd [1949] 1 KB 550
1949 Lord Greene	Torts - Other	Casemap 1 Cites 1 Citers

Industries and General Mortgage Co Ltd [1949] 2 All ER 573
1949 Slade J	Agency, Torts - Other	Casemap 1 Cites
	The court discussed difficulties in defining what is a bribe: "Yes, but earlier the learned judge has said that if a gift be made to a confidential agent with a view to inducing him, it is a bribe, and, therefore, in using the later language and referring to the bribes the learned judge is in effect saying: "I am using these later presumptions in cases where a bribe has been established and I have already defined a bribe as being only something which has been established as being paid with a certain motive." That, of course, would tear up the whole of the learned judge's observation because he says lower down that the courts will not receive evidence as to what is the motive of the person making the payment. The motive will be conclusively inferred against him."

Curtis -v- Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co; CA 1951

Armstrong -v- Strain (1951) 1 TLR 856
1951 QBD Devlin J	Torts - Other	1 Cites
	The necessary knowledge for the tort of deceit could not be found by adding the innocent mind of a principal, who knew facts which showed what his agent said to be untrue but did not know what the agent was saying, to the innocent mind of the agent who did not know that what he was saying was untrue. Devlin J said: 'A man may be said to know a fact when once he has been told it and pigeon-holed it somewhere in his brain where it is more or less accessible in case of need. In another sense of the word a man knows a fact only when he is fully conscious of it. For an action of deceit there must be knowledge in the narrower sense, and conscious knowledge of falsity must always amount to wickedness and dishonesty. When Judges say, therefore, that wickedness and dishonesty must be present, they are not requiring a new ingredient for the tort of deceit so much as describing the sort of knowledge which is necessary.'

British Motor Trade Association -v- Gray 1951 SLT 247; 1951 SC 586
1951 Lord Russell, Lord President Cooper	Scotland, Torts - Other, Contract	Casemap 1 Citers
	The test for an allegation of wrongful interference in a contract required something more than a failure to act.

Conway -v- George Wimpey & Co Ltd (1951) 2 KB 266
1951	Torts - Other	Casemap 1 Citers

John Lewis -v- Tims; HL 1952

D C Thomson & Co Ltd -v- Deakin [1952] Ch 646
1952 CA Jenkins LJ, Lord Evershed MR	Torts - Other, Contract	Casemap 1 Citers
	The defendant Trades Union was alleged to have indirectly prevented a supplier from performing its contract to supply paper to the plaintiffs by inducing its members to withdraw their services from the supplier. Held: It is a tort at common law knowingly to have contractual dealings which are inconsistent with a prior contract. It is also a tort for a third party directly to do an act, with knowledge of the contract, which, if done by one of the parties to the contract, would have been a breach of contract. Lord Evershed MR considered the tort of directly inducing a breach of contract, saying that it was conceded that the defendant must have acted with the intention of doing damage to the person damaged and that he must have succeeded in his efforts. So far as indirectly procuring a breach of contract was concerned, the same intention had to be proved, but the tort would only be committed if the acts indirectly inducing the breach of contract involved wrongful conduct. Jenkins LJ said: "First . . . there may…be an actionable interference with contractual rights where other means of interference than persuasion or procurement or inducement, in the sense of influence of one kind or another brought to bear on the mind of the contract breaker to cause him to break his contract, are used by the interferer; but, secondly, that (apart from conspiracy to injure, which, as I have said, is not in question so far as this motion is concerned) acts of a third party lawful in themselves do not constitute an actionable interference with contractual rights merely because they bring about a breach of contract, even if they were done with the object and intention of bringing about such breach." Lord Evershed MR: "It was suggested in the course of argument by Sir Frank Soskice and by Mr. Lindner, that the tort must still be properly confined to such direct intervention, that is, to cases where the intervener or persuader uses by personal intervention persuasion on the mind of one of the parties to the contract so as to procure that party to break it. I am unable to agree that any such limitation is logical, rational or part of our law. In such cases where the intervener (if I may call him such) does so directly act upon the mind of a party to the contract as to cause him to break it, the result is, for practical purposes, as though in substance he, the intervener, is breaking the contract, although he in not a party to it…At any rate, it is clear that, when there is such a direct intervention by the intervener, the intervention itself is thereby considered wrongful. I cannot think that the result is any different if the intervener, instead of so acting upon the mind of the contracting party himself, by some other act, tortious in itself, prevents the contracting party from performing the bargain. A simple case is where the intervener, for example, physically detains the contracting party so that the contracting party is rendered unable by the detention to perform the contract."

Toteff -v- Antonas (1952) 87 CLR 647
1952 Dixon J	Commonwealth, Damages, Torts - Other	Casemap 1 Citers
	(High Court of Australia) Dixon J said: "In an action of deceit a plaintiff is entitled to recover as damages a sum representing the prejudice or disadvantage he has suffered in consequence of his altering his position under the inducement of the fraudulent misrepresentations made by the defendant. When what he has been induced to do is to make a purchase from the defendant and part with his money to him in payment of the price, then, if the transaction stands and is not disaffirmed or rescinded what is recoverable is 'the difference between the real value of the property, and the sum which the plaintiff was induced to give for it' per Abbott L.C.J. Pearson v. Wheeler. As Sir James Hannen P. in Peek v. Perry pointed out, the question is how much worse off is the plaintiff than if he had not entered into the transaction. If he had not done so he would have had the purchase money in his pocket. To ascertain his loss you must deduct from the amount he paid the real value of the thing he got. It may be objected that the point of the application of this doctrine lies in identifying 'the transaction' and that what Mayo J. has done is to identify it as the purchase of the goodwill and that only. But what is meant is the transaction into which the representation induced the plaintiff to enter. The measure of damages in an action of deceit consists in the loss or expenditure incurred by the plaintiff in consequence of the inducement on which he relied diminished by the corresponding advantage in money or moneys worth obtained by him on the other side: Potts v. Miller. You look to what he has been induced to part with as the initial step. He is entitled to say that but for the fraud he would never have parted with his money; per Coleridge L.C.J. Twycross v. Grant. But he cannot recover the entire price he has paid unless the thing prove wholly worthless. If the thing has any appreciable value the damages must be reduced pro tanto: per Cockburn L.C.J., Twycross v. Grant. It must not be forgotten that after all deceit is an action on the case for special damages incurred in consequence of the defendant's fraudulent inducement."
	[ Austlii ]

Everett -v- Ribbands [1952] 2 QB 198
1952	Torts - Other, Police	Casemap
	The court considered the tort of the malicious obtaining of a search warrant.

Armstrong -v- Strain [1952] 1 KB 236
1952 CA Devlin J	Torts - Other, Contract	Casemap 1 Citers
	(Upheld)

Horobin [1952] 2 Lloyd's Rep 460
1952 Barry J	Torts - Other	1 Citers
	Barry J sought to define wilful misconduct through negligence as: "he took a risk which he knew he ought not to take."

Tempest -v- Snowden; 1952

Strand Electric and Engineering Co Ltd -v- Berisford Entertainments Ltd [1952] 2 QB 246
1952	Damages, Torts - Other	Casemap 1 Citers
	The court assessed the amount of damages for the wrongful refusal to deliver up portable switchboards which the owner would not have used anyway. The measure was a sum equivalent to the price or hire that a reasonable person would pay for such use.

Wimpey (George) Co Ltd -v- British Overseas Airways Corporation; HL 1954

Briess -v- Woolley; HL 1954

Jarvis -v- Williams [1955] 1 WLR 71
1955 CA Lord Evershed MR	Torts - Other
	J, the owner of the goods, sued in detinue the defendant W to whom they had been delivered at the request of a third party, P, who had failed to pay for them. W refused to deliver up the goods. Held: The claim was not maintainable. Lord Evershed MR said: "I take [the judgment below] to mean that the contractual right which the plaintiff had vis-á-vis Patterson to go and collect these goods from Patterson's agent was a right of a sufficient character to enable the plaintiff to bring an action in detinue against the agent of the owner of the property in these goods. But, with all respect to the County Court Judge, I am unable to accept that as a good proposition of law. Certain classes of persons, as for example bailees have, no doubt, a special right to sustain actions in trover and detinue but the general rule is, I think, correctly stated in the text of Halsbury's Laws of England 2nd Ed Vol 33 at p62, para 98: 'in order to maintain an action of trover or detinue, a person must have the right of possession and a right of property in the goods at the time of the conversion or detention; and he cannot sue if he has parted with the property in the goods at the time of the alleged conversion, or if at the time of the alleged conversion his title to the goods has been divested by a disposition which is valid under the Factors Act 1989'.
	Factors Act 1989

Randall -v- Tarrant; CA 1955

Phipps -v- Rochester Corporation; 1955

In re Ellenborough Park; CA 15-Nov-1955

Alati -v- Kruger; 29-Nov-1955

Hornal -v- Neuberger Products Ltd; CA 1956

Lazarus Estates Ltd -v- Beasley; CA 1956

Smith (Kathleen Rose) -v- East Elloe Rural District Council; HL 26-Mar-1956

Kelson -v- Imperial Tobacco Co (of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) Ltd [1957] 2 QB 344
1957	Torts - Other

Kelson -v- Imperial Tobacco Company; 1957

Huntley -v- Thornton; 1957

Kuchenmeister -v- Home Office; QBD 1958

Armstrong -v- Sheppard & Short Ltd; CA 1959

Williams -v- Hursey (1959) 103 CLR 30
1959	Torts - Other	Casemap

Farrington -v- Thomson and Bridgland [1959] VR 286
1959 Smith J	Commonwealth, Torts - Other	Casemap
	(Supreme Court of Victoria) Smith J: ". . . Proof of damage is, of course, necessary in addition. In my view, therefore, the rule should be taken to go this far at least, that if a public officer does an act which, to his knowledge, amounts to an abuse of his office, and he thereby causes damage to another person, then an action in tort for misfeasance in a public office will lie against him at the suit of that person".

Akerhielm -v- De Mare [1959] AC 789; [1959] 3 All ER 485
1959 PC Lord Jenkins	Litigation Practice, Torts - Other, Company	Casemap 1 Citers
	A company prospectus contained the following: "About a third of the capital has already been subscribed in Denmark." Though the directors believed this to be true, it was not true at the time the prospectus was issued. Held: The statement was not fraudulent having been made with an honest belief in its truth. When a party has been acquitted of fraud the decision in his favour should not be displaced except on the clearest grounds. Lord Jenkins said: "their Lordships are satisfied that this is not one of those exceptional cases in which an appellate court is justified in reversing the decision of a judge at first instance when the decision under review is founded upon the judge's opinion of the credibility of a witness formed after seeing and hearing him give his evidence. Their Lordships can hardly imagine a case in which the credibility of a witness could be more vital than a case like the present where the claim is based on deceit, and the witness in question is one of the defendants charged with deceit. Their Lordships would add that they accept, and would apply in the present case, the principle that where a defendant has been acquitted of fraud in a court of first instance the decision in his favour should not be displaced on appeal except on the clearest grounds." and "The question is not whether the defendant in any given case honestly believed the representation to be true in the sense assigned to it by the court on an objective consideration of its truth or falsity, but whether he honestly believed the representation to be true in the sense in which he understood it albeit erroneously when it was made."

Roncarelli -v- Duplessis [1959] SCR 121
1959	Commonwealth, Torts - Other	1 Citers
	(Canada) The court discussed what was 'targeted malice' in the context of misfeasance.

Hargreaves -v- Bretherton [1959] 1 QB 45
1959 Lord Goddard CJ	Torts - Other	Casemap 1 Cites
	The Plaintiff pleaded that the First Defendant had falsely and maliciously and without justification or excuse committed perjury at the Plaintiffs trial on charges of criminal offences and that as a result the Plaintiff had been convicted and sentenced to eight years preventive detention. Held: The claim was struck out as disclosing no cause of action. Telling lies about a defendant is not by itself tortious. Even if there was provable perjury in the proceedings, no second cause of action arises in civil proceedings from that. Lord Goddard CJ said: "The simple point that I have to decide is whether or not an action lies at the suit of the person who says that he has been demnified by false evidence given against him. In my opinion it is perfectly clear and beyond peradventure nowadays that such an action will not lie".

Smith -v- Pywell Times, 29 April 1959
29 Apr 1959 Diplock J	Torts - Other	Casemap
	There is no separate tort of procuring a third person to commit a tort, but the procurer was a joint tortfeasor with the person who actually committed it.