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Wills and Probate - From: 1980 To: 1984

This page lists 19 cases, and was prepared on 07 December 2014.


 
 In re Bourke's Will Trusts; ChD 1980 - [1980] 1 WLR 539

 
 In re Beaumont, Deceased; Martin -v- Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd; 1980 - [1980] 1 Ch 444; [1980] 1 All ER 266

 
 Ross -v- Caunters (a firm); ChD 1980 - [1980] Ch 297

 
 Re Grant's Will Trusts; ChD 1980 - [1980] 1 WLR 360
 
Jelley -v- Illife [1981] Fam 128; [1981] 2 All ER 29
1981
CA
Stephenson LJ, Griffiths LJ
Family, Wills and Probate
The court referred to the case of In re Beaumont and continued: "In considering whether a person is being maintained immediately before the death of the deceased, it is the settled basis or general arrangement between the parties as regards maintenance during the lifetime of the deceased which has to be looked at, not the actual, perhaps fluctuating, variation of it which exists immediately before his or her death. It is, I think, not disputed that a relationship of dependence which has persisted for years will not be defeated by its termination during a few weeks of mortal illness." and "Accordingly, I am of opinion that the court has to consider whether the deceased, otherwise than for valuable consideration (and irrespective of the existence of any contract), was in fact making a substantial contribution in money or money's worth towards the reasonable needs of the plaintiff on a settled basis or arrangement which either was still in force immediately before the deceased's death or would have lasted until her death but for the approach of death and the consequent inability of either party to continue to carry out the arrangement." Griffiths LJ: "The words 'immediately before the death of the deceased' in section (1)(1)(e) cannot be construed literally as applying to the de facto situation at death, but refer to the general arrangements for maintenance subsisting at the time of death. So that if for example the deceased had been making regular payments to the support of an old friend, the claim would not be defeated if those payments ceased during a terminal illness because the deceased was too ill to make them."
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 1
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 In re Cleaver dec'd, Cleaver -v- Insley; ChD 1981 - [1981] 1 WLR 939; [1981] 2 All ER 1018
 
In re Salmon (Deceased) [1981] Ch 167
1981


Wills and Probate

Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975
1 Citers


 
Escritt -v- Escritt [1982] 3 FLR 280
1981


Wills and Probate

Administration of Justice Act 1975 4
1 Citers



 
 In re Dennis (Deceased); 1981 - [1981] 2 All ER 140
 
Re Flynn Deceased [1982] 1 WLR 310
1982
ChD
Slade J
Wills and Probate
An application was made to dismiss a challenge to a codicil on the basis that the claim disclosed no cause of action. The deceased, who had given instructions for the preparation of the codicil some time earlier, was gravely ill after a heart attack at the time when he executed it and died the next day. The codicil was challenged on the grounds of want of knowledge and approval. Held: There was no prior authority supporting the case that delay in institution might warrant the striking out of a probate claim. The issues fell to be decided by reference to the facts alleged in the pleadings. Slade J said: "The authorities appear to show that in a case where a testator, even in a state approaching insensibility, has executed a testamentary instrument drawn up in accordance with previous instructions, he will be held to have known and approved of its contents if, at the time of execution, he was capable of understanding and did understand that he was engaged in executing the will for which he had given instructions, even though at the moment of execution he might not have remembered those previous instructions and would not, at that moment, have understood the provisions of the will, if read to him clause by clause: see Williams and Mortimer, Executors, Administrators and Probate, 15th ed. (1970), p. 148 and the cases there cited. However, if a litigant is successfully to avail himself of this principle he must, I think, satisfy the court at least that the testator at the time of execution was capable of understanding and did understand that he was executing the will for which he had given instructions." and "After an action of this nature has been started, he submitted, the court is under a duty to investigate the propriety or otherwise of the order under which the relevant grant was obtained, no matter how extreme the delay. The court, in his submission, is sitting as a court of conscience concerned with the sanctity of probate, so that it must allow the validity of the grant of probate to be investigated at whatever date the challenge may be made, unless there are other grounds, apart from questions of delay, upon which it is obvious that the action must, in due course, fail."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Re Flynn [1982] 1 WLR 310
1982
ChD
Slade J
Wills and Probate
The deceased, who had given instructions for the preparation of the codicil some time earlier, was gravely ill after a heart attack at the time when he executed it and died the next day. The codicil was challenged on the grounds of want of knowledge and approval. An application to strike out a challenge to a codicil on the grounds that the claim disclosed no cause of action. The court considered the effect of delay on a challenge to the validity of a will, and the effect of the alleged inability of the testator to read the will. Held: Any invalidity arose from the lack of testamentary capacity, and not from any want of knowledge and approval. The challenge failed.
Slade J described the position in law: "The authorities appear to show that in a case where a testator, even in a state approaching insensibility, has executed a testamentary instrument drawn up in accordance with previous instructions, he will be held to have known and approved of its contents if, at the time of execution, he was capable of understanding and did understand that he was engaged in executing the will for which he had given instructions, even though at the moment of execution he might not have remembered those previous instructions and would not, at that moment, have understood the provisions of the will, if read to him clause by clause: see Williams and Mortimer, Executors, Administrators and Probate, 15th ed. (1970), p. 148 and the cases there cited. However, if a litigant is successfully to avail himself of this principle he must, I think, satisfy the court at least that the testator at the time of execution was capable of understanding and did understand that he was executing the will for which he had given instructions."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
In re D (J) [1982] 2 WLR 373; [1982] 2 All ER 37; [1982] Ch 237
1982
ChD
Sir Robert Megarry VC
Wills and Probate, Health
The patient, a widow had five children. After she became a mental inpatient the court was asked to draft a statutory will. Held: The court emphasised the need to provide full details of the estate assets and family background. An order that a will should not be executed pending an appeal was wrong in principle. The court laid down the principles upon which it should act. A letter of offer was taken into account on the question of costs.
Mental Health Act 1959 100(4) 102(1) 103(1)(dd)
1 Citers


 
Re Orwell's Trust [1982] 1 WLR 1337
1982
ChD
Vinelott J
Wills and Probate, Legal Professions, Company
The term "firm" may include a company: "Whilst the term 'firm' in its narrowest sense is apt to describe an unincorporated partnership it is in ordinary usage frequently applied as a description of a private company."
1 Citers



 
 Kourkgy -v- Lusher; 1983 - (1983) 4 FLR 65; 12 Fam Law 86
 
Re Rapley, deceased [1983] 1 WLR 1069
1983
ChD
Judge Finlay QC
Wills and Probate
The deceased was an apprentice with Ellerman City Lines. He was discharged from one ship on 7 October 1960 and joined another of his employer's ships on 29 November. He attempted to make a privileged will on 22 October when, as was common ground at the trial, he had not yet been notified by the shipping company when and where he was to join his next ship. Held. Judge Finlay QC distinguished earlier cases saying that the deceased was not "at sea" on 22 October.
1 Cites



 
 Gartside -v- Sheffield Young & Ellis; 1983 - [1983] NZLR 37

 
 Re Bunning, deceased; Bunning -v- Salmon; ChD 1984 - [1984] 1 Ch 480; [1984] 3 WLR 265; [1984] 3 All ER 1

 
 Re Callaghan, deceased; 1984 - [1985] Fam 1; [1984] 3 All ER 790

 
 Re Besterman, decd; CA 1984 - [1984] Ch 458
 
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